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ABSTRACT 
A comparative analysis of the two Tibetan Prasangika 
Madhyamika Accounts of the Two Truths 
The primary objective of this dissertation is to demonstrate that the Tibetan 
Prasangika Madhyamika offers at least two radically distinct philosophical 
and hermeneutic approaches concerning the doctrine of the two truths and to 
explain the nature of the distinction between those accounts. Given the 
widespread tendency to construe the Tibetan Prasangika as constituting a 
single homogeneous system (especially among Theravadin scholars), the 
dissertation not only has implications for the understanding of the two 
approaches that are the focus of discussion, but also for the broader 
understanding of the Tibetan Prasangika in general. 
The two approaches at issue here are associated with the Tibetan 
Prasangika thinkers Tsong khapa (A.D. 1357-1423) and Go rampa (A.D. 1429- 
1489). The dissertation focuses on a comparative analysis of their conception 
of the two truths—providing an account of their respective definitions of the 
two truths, their accounts of the relationship between the two truths, the 
ontological status of the two truths, the epistemic resources for accessing the 
two truths, the problems concerning the limits of language and thought as 
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these relate to the notion of ultimate truth, the different modes of realising 
ultimate truth, and, finally, the nature and possibility of knowledge of the 
two truths and the implications of such knowledge for the attainment of 
enlightenment. Through the comparative analysis of Tsong khapa and Go 
ramp a on these issues, the dissertation demonstrates where, why and how 
the two Tibetan readings of the original Indian sources exhibit distinct and 
independent characters. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The buddhas' teachings of the Dharma is based on two truths: a truth of 
worldly conventions and an ultimate truth. 
—Nagarjuna, Mi4lamadhyamakakarika XXIV: 8. 
The objective and scope of the research 
The doctrine of the two truths lies at the very heart of the Madhyamaka l 
tradition. In this dissertation, I will argue that the Tibetan Prasafigika 
Madhyamika offers at least two distinct philosophical and hermeneutic 
approaches concerning this doctrine. I will therefore demonstrate two 
radically distinct Tibetan ways of reading and interpreting this doctrine. I 
compare Tsong khapa and Go rampa's interpretations of the Indian 
Prasatigika Madhyamika doctrine of the two truths. Since it falls beyond the 
scope of this thesis, I will not attempt to adjudicate which of the two readings 
is right about what the Indian sources mean. I do, however, quite often 
juxtapose the two readings against some of the more obvious assertions made 
by the founding fathers of the tradition—the Buddha, Nagarjuna, Aryadeva 
and Candrakirti. As far as possible, I have avoided extensive discussions on 
the secondary scholastic works and views propounded by the other Buddhist 
philosophers and their modern counterparts. I do not entirely ignore their 
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scholarship however. Acknowledgments of their scholarship are made when 
or wherever they are found appropriate, though always in the service of a 
direct comparision of Tsong khapa and Go rampa. 
The thesis consists of five chapters. The first chapter compares Tsong 
khapa and Go rampa's responses on three principle questions: What is 
divided into the two truths? How are they related? Are there two actual 
truths or just one truth? By examining these questions, I will show that Tsong 
khapa is a pluralist. For him the two truths are actual truths. Conventional 
truth and ultimate truth are mutually interlocking and there is no hierarchical 
relation between them. Both truths stand on an equal footing in terms of their 
ontological, epistemological and even soteriological importance. I will argue 
that Go rampa, on the other hand, is an absolute monist. Conventional truth, 
according to Go rampa, is not actual truth. Ultimate truth alone is the truth. 
Thus the two truths are distinct, hierarchically ordered and mutually 
exclusive. Ultimate truth has primacy over conventional truth in terms of 
ontological, epistemological and soteriological importance. 
The second chapter compares the two Tibetan Prasangika Madhyamikas 
in regard to their interpretations of the meanings and the definitions of the 
two truths. I will argue that, for Tsong khapa, definitions of the two truths are 
based on the two natures that are verified by, respectively, empirically valid 
and ultimately valid cognition. However, the two truths cannot, on this 
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account, be simply reduced to these two modes of cognition and ultimate 
truth, in particular, cannot be taken as metaphysically unconditioned (in 
other words, it is not reducible to an independent and 'ultimate' mode of 
cognition), even though it may be epistemologically unconditioned. For Go 
rampa, the position is rather different, in that ignorance and wisdom. 
respectively determine the character, and therefore the definition of each of 
the two truths. The two truths are thus underlain by, and reducible to, two 
conflicting modes of cognition or perspectives. Ultimate truth is therefore 
unconditioned in the metaphysical sense—it represents an independent and 
'ultimate' mode of cognition. 
In the third chapter, I compare Tsong khapa and Go rampa's positions 
on the limits of language and conceptual mind (thought). I will argue that, for 
Tsong khapa, ultimate truth is, to a certain extent, both 'effable' and 
conceptually knowable, while, for Go rampa, it is ineffable and conceptually 
unknowable. 
The fourth chapter compares Tsong lchapa and Go rampa on the three 
principal modes of knowing ultimate truth: by way of not seeing it; by way of 
transcending conceptual elaborations; and by way of ascending to non-
duality. In this chapter, I will demonstrate that Tsong lchapa mobilises all 
three modes of knowing ultimate truth as the means to establish empirically 
given phenomena (accessible to the senses) as essenceless, and thus as 
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dependently arisen. Therefore, even transcendental and non-dual knowledge, 
he argues, are strictly equivalent to the knowledge of empirical phenomena 
as dependently arisen. Go rampa, on the other hand, mobilises the three 
modes of knowing ultimate truth as epistemological scaffolding to ascend to 
. a metaphysical non-duality. He therefore argues that transcendental and non-
dual knowledge are utterly distinct and independent of conventional 
knowledge. Thus, the knowledge of empirically given phenomena as 
dependently arisen and transcendental and non-dual knowledge must be 
distinct and contradictory. 
Finally, in the fifth chapter I compare the two Tibetan Prasafigika 
Madhyamikas in their treatment of the unparalleled status of enlightened 
knowledge. This is where the disagreement between Tsong khapa and Go 
rampa reaches its climax. Tsong khapa argues that enlightenment is the 
perfection of knowledge of empirically given phenomena from both 
empirical and ultimate standpoints. Thus the unity between the two truths 
and their two modes of knowing attains perfect equilibrium. For Go rampa, 
however, enlightenment represents a total breakdown of the relation between 
the two truths—ontologically, epistemologically and soteriologically. On the 
latter account, the attainment of enlightenment culminates with the utter 
disappearance of the conventional world, conventional knowledge and the 
appearance of an absolute transcendental consciousness. 
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Why Tsong khapa and Go ramp a? 
Tsong khapa and Go rampa clearly stand out as two of the most widely read 
and respected figures within the contemporary Tibetan philosophical 
environment. Their scholarship is not only highly respected within the 
schools to which they each belonged, but also within the general Tibetan 
philosophical community. In addition, their philosophical works are also 
gaining wider currency among contemporary modern interpreters. Both 
Tsong khapa and Go rampa have systematically formulated a complete 
Buddhist epistemological, ontological and soteriological agenda based on 
their understandings of the Indian Prasafigika Madhyamika. Both rank 
Prasafigika Nirvana as the most profound of all Buddhist philosophical 
schools. Most importantly of all, these two great figures, while interpreting 
the same Indian Prasangika Madhyamika, represent two distinct 
philosophical and hermeneutic traditions. 
Tsong khapa Blo bzang Grags pa (A.D. 1357-1423) is the founder of the 
dGe lugs pa order of Tibetan buddhism. He wrote extensively on 
Madhyamaka philosophy. Included among his works are Lam rim chen mo 
and Legs bshad snying pa—widely recognised as the two most illustrious of his 
principal works. dGongs pa rab gsal (his commentary on the Madhyamakavatara 
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of Candrakirti) and rTsa she tik chen (his commentary on the 
Mitlamadhyamakakarika of Nagarjuna) are the most celebrated of his 
commentarial works. 
Go bo rab 'byams pa bSod nams Senge (A.D. 1429-1489) is considered 
one of the pillars of the Sa skya pa . school of thought. Although he is not the 
founder of the Sa skya pa order, the works of Go rampa are highly regarded 
in the contemporary Sa skya pa learning centres and his writings receive 
more attention than almost all other scholars of this tradition. In all academic 
institutions affiliated to the Sa skya pa school, Go rampa's writings are 
prescribed as compulsory textbooks on the academic curriculum. Included 
amongst his most highly regarded writings are the two independent works, 
1Ta ba'i shen 'byed theg mchog gnad gyi za zer and bDu ma spyi don nges don rab 
gsal. Also included among them are his two commentaries, Yang dag lta ba'i 
'od zer (his commentary on Nagarjuna's - Midamadhyamakakarika) and 1Ta ba 
ngen sel (his commentary on Candrakirti's Madhyamakavatara). 
In the dGe lugs pa and Sa skya pa schools of thought, respectively, 
Tsong khapa and Go rampa are recognised as authentic and impeccable 
interpreters of Nagarjuna's philosophy as transmitted through Candrakirti, 
the pioneer of the Prasafigika Nirvana tradition. However, each is viewed, 
from the perspective of the other's School, as occupying a thoroughly 
problematic position. My aim here is not to reconcile these two thinkers, but 
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rather to develop an appreciation of their distinctive philosophical positions 
and the differences between them. 
Methodological considerations 
Since the majority of the relevant materials on Tsong khapa and Go rampa 
presented in my dissertation are available only in Tibetan, I have used a great 
many of my own translations. I have done my best to render the Tibetan 
versions into meaningful English. I have also made every effort to be as 
accurate and precise as possible in my translations. I have supported my 
readings—including my translations and interpretations—with relevant 
Tibetan textual and other evidence. Except in a few places where the Tibetan 
texts are too long to be cited, I have substantiated my readings by 
documenting the Tibetan text in the notes. 
The Tibetan texts presented in the notes appear in three different 
formats. First, if the source of the reference is in book-form, the Tibetan text is 
documented in the note with its title and page (p /pp) number(s)—other 
bibliographic details are contained in the bibliography. Second, if the Tibetan 
textual source is in the traditional scriptural format, the Tibetan text appears 
with its folio(f/ff) number(s), for example, f.10. Third, if the textual resource 
is a combination of both, namely, folios compiled into a book-form, then the 
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note-numbering appears as page(p /pp) number(s) with 'a,"b,"c,"d,' etc 
wherein the letters refer to folios, for example, p.110a. 
I have also cited many Pali sources. Over the years, Pali scholars have 
developed a variety of numbering schemes when referring to suttas and other 
texts in the Tipitaka. There is, thus no one, agreed numbering convention.' I 
have mostly taken the suttas appearing in this thesis from Thanissaro 
Bhikkhu's Access to Insight's translations. Thanissaro Bhikkhu uses a 
referencing convention to identify text or sutta numbers within the Sutta 
Pitaka. 3 In the case of Digha Nikaya (DN) for example, the first sutta is 
referenced as DN 1, the twenty-first sutta as DN 21. A similar convention is 
applied in the case of Majjhima Nikaya (MN), Sathyutta Nilcaya (SN), Ariguttara 
Nikaya (AN), Khuddaka Nikaya (Khp), LIdana (Ud), Itivuttaka (Iti), and Sutta 
Nipata (Sn). 
The nature of my project is such that its full attention is given to Tsong 
khapa and Go rampa's treatment of the two truths. Hence as far as possible, I 
have used Tsong khapa and Go rampa's writings as primary sources and 
deliberately avoided discursive secondary materials. However, I have made 
reference to Tibetan and English secondary sources where appropriate. If the 
ideas presented by other scholars appropriately fit in with the main stream of 
discussion, I have incorporated them within the main text. If the ideas detract 
the flow of ongoing discussion and debate between Tsong khapa and Go 
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rampa, then I have included reference to those ideas in the notes. For the 
most part those references consist in direct citations from the authors' works, 
often with very short comments. 
CHAPTER I 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO TRUTHS 
Introduction 
This chapter examines the relationship between the two truths. It focuses on 
three principal issues. The first issue concerns the analysis of 'what is divided 
into the two truths' or on what grounds the division or distinction of the two 
truths is made. Technically speaking, this section explores 'what is the basis 
of the division (dbye gzhi, jrieya) into the two truths?' The precise identification 
of the basis of the division is critical for both Tsong khapa and Go rampa. For 
the former, it relates to his effort to maintain a non-paradoxical compatibility 
between the two truths, while for the latter, it relates to his effort to maintain 
a paradoxical relationship between the two truths. As we shall see, Tsong 
khapa argues that the 'objects of knowledge' (shes bya) constitute the basis of 
the divisions, and therefore grounds his exposition on the dual nature of 
empirically given phenomena. Go rampa argues that 'mere mind' (citta or 
manas, blo tsam) constitutes the basis of the divisions, and grounds his 
exposition on two conflicting perspectives. 
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The second issue concerns the way in which the two truths are related. 
Here it will be argued that, for Tsong khapa, the two truths constitute a 
'single ontological identity' (ngo bo gcig) with 'different conceptual identities' 
(ldog pa tha dad). Whereas Go rampa argues that the truths are separate in a 
way that is 'incompatible with their unity' (gcig pa bkag pa'i tha dad) or 
identity. 
Here two rather technical phrases provide the context for our 
examination of the relationship between the two truths. The Tibetan phrase 
ngo bo gcig used in Tsong khapa's philosophy, particularly in the context of 
the relationship between the two truths is usually translated in English as 
'one entity'. 1 Although 'entity' has some connotations of 'being', as pointed 
out in The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, it usually refers to a 'thing'? In 
Tsong khapa's sense, in spite of the fact that there is an underlying 
assumption that the two truths constitute 'one entity' or 'one thing' or 'one 
phenomena', the ngo bo, it does not as such directly refer to a 'thing'. Even in 
the ordinary Tibetan discourses, ngo bo does not have any explicit reference to 
things. There is however an implicit reference to things since ngo bo always 
refers to the identity, nature or the property of that thing. 
The Great Tibetan-Chinese Dictionary (Bod rgya tshig mdzod chen mo) 
defines ngo bo as rang bzhin, meaning 'nature,' or gnas lugs, meaning 'mode of 
being'? It also explains ngo bo gcig pa as rang bzhin tha mi thad pa, meaning, 
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"that which has no distinct nature like for instance being a jar and being 
impermanent".4 Making it even clearer, the dictionary enumerates the rang 
bzhin gcig pa meaning, 'single nature' and bdag nyid gcig pa, meaning, 'identical 
character' as the synonyms of ngo bo gcig pa, meaning, 'single ontological 
identity'.5 Considering these issues, instead of 'entity', we shall choose to 
translate ngo bo as 'ontological identity', thus ngo ho gcig as 'single ontological 
identity', or as 'nature' interchangeably, depending on context. As we shall 
see, the analysis of the relationship between the two truths for Tsong khapa 
amounts to analysing the relationship between the two natures. 
The second Tibetan phrase is ldog pa tha dad. This phrase is usually 
translated in English as 'isolates' or less frequently as 'opposites', 8 
'distinguisher',9 or even 'under description'. 10 However, ldog pa is explained 
in The Great Tibetan-Chinese Dictionary (Bod rgya tshig mdzod chen mo) as "a 
phenomenon that appears to conceptual mind as being different categories ... 
or it is that which appears not being different. For instance, the ldog pa of a jar 
is the aspect which is merely not being of the non-jar like the form that 
appears to conceptual mind".11 While translating ldog pa as 'distinguisher', 
Dreyfus also points out that the ldog pa of a phenomenon "is its conceptual 
identity. It is the property of a phenomenon being not what it is not. For 
example, a jar is distinct from everything (that is not jar). This is explained by 
the Collected Topics to be as its distinguisher. Since such a distinguisher is a 
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distinction made by thought, it is conceptual". 12 Similarly, Dreyfus explains 
"when we think that the Vedic language is impermanent, we apply the 
distinguisher, that is, the concept of impermanence, to the Vedic language".' 
As the above explanations of the phrase reveal, ldog pa is a term more to 
do with conceptual identification than the thing itself. In order to be closer to 
the meaning at issue here, and although the translation is less literal, we shall 
tentatively use the English term 'conceptual identity' in place of the Tibetan 
phrase ldog pa. Ngo bo gcig la ldog pa tha dad is therefore tentatively rendered 
as 'single ontological identity with different conceptual identities'. These two 
Tibetan phrases are conjunctively explained in The Great Tibetan-Chinese 
Dictionary as follows: "in spite of not having distinct natures, exists as 
separate conceptual identities. For example, [it is like the conceptual 
relationship between] a jar and object of knowledge, being impermanent and 
things, mankind and their causal condition, the five aggregates and the 
like" 14 
The final issue to be taken up in this chapter is the question of whether 
there really are two truths. By applying the principle of 'single ontological 
identity' (ngo bo gcig) with 'different conceptual identities' (ldog pa tha dad), 
Tsong khapa argues that there are two truths and that this is coherent. While 
applying the principle of 'distinct and incompatible' relationships between 
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the two truths (gcig pa bkag pa'i tha dad), Go rampa proposes that there is in 
fact only one truth. 
1. What is divided into the two truths? 
'Jam dbyangs bZhad pa (1648-1722)' and Hopkins' note six different bases 
of the division asserted by non-dGe lugs pa scholars. They include (1) mere 
appearance (snang tsam), (2) entities ranging from material form to 
omniscience (gzugs nas rnam mkh yen bar gyi ngo bo), (3) non-reified objects 
(sgro ma btags pa'i yul), (4) unanalysed objects (ma rtags ma dpyad pa'i yul), (5) 
truth (bden pa) and (6) unspecified basis. Newland' notes as many as seven 
different ways of positing the basis of the two truths among the non-dGe lugs 
pa Madhyamikas. They are (1) truths, (2) all entities from phenomena such as 
forms through to omniscient consciousness, (3) mere appearances, (4) 
unanalysed knowables, (5) phenomena, (6) perspectives, and (7) mere minds. 
1.1.The objects of knowledge as the basis of the division 
The lists of the above different positions adequately indicate that there is no 
unanimity among Tibetan Madhyamikas in terms of their views regarding 
the basis of the divisions of the two truths (bden gnyis dbye gzhi). Let us first 
turn to Tsong khapa's account. Although Tsong khapa is aware of the 
different views expressed by his predecessors on the division of the two 
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truths, he maintains that 'objects of knowledge' (shes bya, frieya) are the basis 
of the division of the two truths.' For him, this means that the two truths 
relate to two different objects of knowledge. Tsong khapa relies on the 
Buddha's discourse to support this view. In the Pitaputrasamagama sutra, the 
Buddha states: 
...The Tathagata understands both the conventional (kun rdzob) and the 
ultimate (don dam), for the objects of knowledge (shes bya) exhaustively 
comprise conventional and ultimate truths. Besides, the Bhagavan 
perfectly sees, perfectly understands and thoroughly actualises 
emptiness. Because of this, he is described as omniscient (thams cad 
mkh yen pa, sarvapia). 19 
It also says: 
The 'Knower of the Universe' taught these two truths without hearing 
from others. There is the empirical, and likewise the ultimate. There can 
never be a third truth.2° 
The object of knowledge (shes bya, jrieya) is defined as "an object that is 
cognisable (blo'i yul du bya rung ba). Whether it is a pillar, a jar or any other 
phenomenon, it must be an object of cognition in general, [cognitions] 
ranging from that of the [ordinary] sentient beings through to enlightened 
beings".' This definition, Tsong khapa agrees, attempts to capture any thing 
knowable in the broadest possible sense. This is necessary since the Buddha 
maintains knowledge of the two truths to be necessary for enlightenment, 
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and so the understanding of the two truths must constitute an exhaustive 
understanding of all objects of knowledge. 
Tsong khapa agrees with Go rampa that the doctrine of the two truths is 
pedagogically important in conveying the Buddha's message. Yet Tsong 
khapa firmly believes that pedagogical considerations are not the primary 
reason for the Buddha's distinction between the two truths. For Tsong khapa, 
the most important reason for the Buddha's division of the objects of 
knowledge into two truths is to reveal that every empirically (tha snyad) or 
conventionally (kun rdzob) given phenomenon possesses dual natures (ngo 
bo): namely, the empirical nature (or coventional nature) and the ultimate 
nature. Yet, one is putatively described as false and deceptive while the other 
is described as true and non-deceptive. "The division of two truths", as 
Hopkins puts it, "emphasise two types of objects of consciousness, truths and 
falsities. Both, however, are falsely existent or falsely established because 
neither is independent; each depends on imputing consciousness and on the 
other".n 
Since both of them are realities pertaining to each phenomenon, the 
division of the two truths means the division of each phenomenon into two 
natures. Thus, the division of two truths "reveals that it makes sense to divide 
even the nature of a single entity like the sprout into dual natures—its 
conventional and its ultimate natures". The fact that the Buddha divides the 
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nature of each phenomenon into the two truths, according to Tsong khapa, 
"demonstrates that the nature of even one phenomenon, the sprout for 
instance, can be divided into two natures—one of the empirical (kun rdzob) 
and the other of the ultimate (don dam)" and he goes on, "It does not however 
show that the one nature of the sprout is itself divided into two truths in 
relation to ordinary beings (so slcye, prthagjana) and to aryas (iphags pa)" .24 
The division of the nature of each phenomenon into two does not 
contradict Tsong khapa's own claim that the two truths constitute a 'single 
ontological identity' (ngo ho gcig) with 'different conceptual identities' (idog pa 
tha dad). As we shall see, these two ideas are, in fact, interdependent and 
mutually supporting. The idea behind the twofold nature is central to the 
possibility of there being a single 'ontological' identity with different 
'conceptual' identities. Likewise, the notion of a single ontological identity 
with distinct conceptual identities is central to the idea of of a single 
phenomenon with two natures. 
How can the single ontological identity of each phenomenon be 
bifurcated into two distinct conceptual identities? Essentially this is a matter 
of the way in which the single ontological identity appears to a cognising 
consciousness, both deceptively and non-deceptively. The two natures 
correspond to these deceptive or non-deceptive modes of appearance and as 
such, while they both belong to the same ontological identity, they are 
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epistemologically or conceptually mutually exclusive. Take the sprout for 
instance. For it to exist is necessarily for it to exhibit a dual nature and yet 
those two natures cannot be ontologically distinct. The ultimate nature of the 
sprout cannot be separated from its conventional nature—its colour, texture, 
shape, extension and so on. As an object of knowledge, the sprout retains its 
single ontological identity, but it is known through its two natures and these 
two natures exclude one another so far as knowledge is concerned even 
though neither can be separated from the other in terms of existence. The 
mind that verifies the false and the deceptive empirical nature of the sprout 
thus does not have direct access to its non-deceptive ultimate nature. 
Similarly, the mind that verifies the non-deceptive ultimate nature of the 
sprout does not have direct access to the false and deceptive empirical nature 
of the sprout. Newland explains: 
A table and its emptiness are a single entity. When an ordinary 
conventional mind takes a table as its object of observation, it sees a 
table. When a mind of ultimate analysis searches for the table, it finds 
the emptiness of the table. Hence, the two truths are posited in relation 
to a single entity by way of the perspectives of the observing 
consciousness. This is as close as Geluk-bas will come to defining the 
two truths as perspectives. 26 
It is important to recognise that, for Tsong khapa, the two types of verifying 
consciousness do not imply two different individuals. Each cognitive agent is 
potentially capable of verifying both the truths. Thus each possesses all the 
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cognitive resources enabling the verification of the two natures. The model 
that Tsong khapa articulates in this way is the key to a non-paradoxical 
compatibility between the two truths and their verifying consciousnesses. If 
the two verifying consciousnesses belonged to the two different individuals 
or types of individuals—empirically valid consciousness for an ordinary 
being and ultimately valid consciousness for an arya (as Go rampa would 
argue)—then the two verifying consciousnesses would conflict with each 
other. The former would constitute ignorance, while the latter would 
constitute wisdom. Realising this, Newland also writes: 
These distinctions are critical to the Ge-luk-ba philosophical project, the 
preservation of non-paradoxical compatibility between the two truths. 
The conventional mind that finds a table is not discredited by the 
ultimate mind that finds the emptiness of the table. The first is valid 
because the table (a conventional truth) does exist; the second is also 
valid because the table's real nature is an emptiness of inherent 
existence (an ultimate truth).27 
For Tsong khapa, however, the two verifying consciousnesses stand on an 
equal footing such that neither is superior to the other. Moreover, they may 
both belong to the same cognitive agent. Since the mutual network between 
the two verifying consciousnesses is a necessary condition for realising both 
the truths, in spite of each having different primary roles, they are mutually 
entailing. 
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1.2. 'Mere mind' (blo tsam) as the basis of the division 
Let us now turn to Go rampa's account of the basis of the division of the two 
truths. Go rampa outlines what he describes as the four bases of the division. 
They are: 
• 'mere mind' (blo tsam); 
• 'mere interdependence' (rten 'brel tsam); 
• 'mere objects of knowledge' (shes bya tsam); and 
• 'mere subjects of the Buddha's discourses' (gsung rab gyi brjod bya 
tsam).' 
Go rampa himself does not explicitly spell out what the qualification 'mere' 
(tsam) is doing here. However, considering the overall direction of his 
philosophical and soteriological agenda, suffice it to say that he intends to 
emphasise the qualified basis of the division of the two truths. 
In emphasising the first basis of the division, 'mere mind', Go rampa 
rules out the possibility of any objective reference as the basis of that division. 
This means that the distinctions between the two truths become purely 
subjective—a matter of mere mind. Closely connected to 'mere mind' is the 
second possible basis, 'mere interdependence' (rten 'brel tsam). The term 'mere 
interdependence' in Go rampa's usage implies that the divisions of the two 
truths are simply dependent on ignorance and wisdom. In other words, if 
there were no ignorance and wisdom, not only the distinctions between the 
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two truths, but also the two truths themselves would not exist. Go rampa's 
third basis is 'mere objects of knowledge' (shes bya tsam). For him, all objects 
of knowledge excluding ultimate truth are thought constructs, reifications of 
ignorance. Ultimate truth is none other than the transcendental wisdom itself. 
Thus, by suggesting that the basis of the division of the two truths is 'mere 
objects of knowledge' Go rampa does not contradict his earlier claim that 
basis of the division of the two truths is 'mere mind'. Go rampa claims that 
the Buddha arbitrarily fabricated conventional truth purely for a pedagogical 
purpose. Hence, 'mere subjects of the Buddha's discourses' (gsung rab gyi 
brjod bya tsam) is also taken as the fourth plausible basis of the divisions of the 
two truths. 
Since all four options equally emphasise the subjective distinction of the 
two truths, so, in Go rampa's view, all four bases for the division of the two 
truths are mutually compatible. "There is no conflict at all in positing either 
'mere mind'.. .'mere interdependence' ...'mere objects of knowledge'...'mere 
subjects of the Buddha's discourses' to be the basis of the division", says Go 
rampa.' Nevertheless, Go rampa gives special emphasis to 'mere mind' and 
'mere subjects of the Buddha's discourses'. Of the former, he states: "Despite 
the fact that there are no two truths in terms of the object's mode of existence 
(gnas tshul), it means that the truth is divided into two in terms of [the 
contrasting perspectives] of mind that sees the mode of existence and the 
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mind that does not see the mode of existence. This makes perfect sense"?' 
The point here is to stress the subjective basis of the division at issue. The 
division of the two truths cannot be grounded ontologically, for there is only 
one reality. The two truths are divided according to the contrasting cognitive 
experiences of those individuals who see only the phenomenal world and 
those who see the reality. He who sees only phenomena, according to Go 
rampa, is ignorant, and he who sees reality, rather than the phenomena, is 
wise. This is because he who sees phenomena is caught within the web of 
conceptual elaborations, and he who sees reality has transcended these 
conceptual elaborations. 
Go rampa also emphasises the pedagogical necessity of the two truths. 
This is why he takes the 'subjects of the Buddha's discourses' (gsung rab gyi 
brjod bya tsam) as one of the bases for the division of the two truths: 
[Besides, reality] cannot be revealed through linguistic expressions 
(sgra) in the context of the Madhyamaka literature. Yet, it is nominally 
expressed through terms. The two truths, although indivisible, are 
presented to disciples as distinct. In this way, if we see the consistency 
of the [whole philosophical system], from the beginning until the end, I 
think [the subjects of the Buddha's discourses provide] a perfectly 
plausible [basis of the division] •31 
Although all phenomena are entirely false and deceptive with no grounding 
in reality whatsoever, Go rampa explicitly claims that the Buddha posited 
(sgros brtags pa, samaropa) empirically given phenomena as empirical truths 
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(tha snyad bden pa, vyavaharika-satya) for pedagogical reasons. Since ordinary 
beings are obsessed with empirical phenomena, the Buddha saw the practical 
application of positing empirical truth. The Buddha, according to Go rampa, 
fabricates the idea of empirical truth knowing its absolute futility, and yet is 
at the same time aware of its provisional utility. He then mobilises it as an 
instructional device to gradually coax his disciples beyond the realm of the 
phenomenal world. 
In terms of the way things exist (gnas tsul), it is not possible to draw 
distinctions between characteristic and characterised, the basis of 
division and the divided and the like. However, when empirical truth 
(tha snyad bden pa) is fabricated (sgro brtags pa) as a means of 
instructional device for disciples, it is important to consider the basis of 
division like the divided components.' 
As far as Go rampa is concerned, the Buddha teaches about empirical truth, 
not because he sees some reality in empirical truth, but because he sees it as 
simply a means to lead ordinary beings into the ultimate realm from the 
delusional worldly realm. The empirical world, according to this view, 
provides purely instrumental rather than actual truth. "A relative or 
conventional truth (satitvrtisatya)," as Lindtner puts it "serves as the means for 
obtaining the absolute or ultimate truth (paramarthasatya)". 33 Furthermore, he 
explicitly defends Go rampa's view that "the theory of satyadvaya is above all 
a pedagogical device"?' 
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In discussing this issue of the pedagogical necessity of the two truths Go 
rampa paraphrases his earlier statement regarding 'mere mind' (blo tsam) as 
the basis of the division of the two truths.' He writes that "based on the 
subjective consciousness (yul can gyi blo) truth is [divided into] twofold: 
empirical truth and ultimate truth"?' This latter claim, although it reinforces 
Go rampa's preference for the subjective (yul can) division of the two truths 
over the objective (yu/), does not expressly demonstrate Go rampa's rejection 
of the idea that there is any objective reference for the division. But then he 
writes: "here in the Madhyamaka literature, it is not coherent to divide the 
object per se (yul rang ngos nas) into the two truths"?' 
In his commentary on the Madhyamakavatara Go rampa states: "a basis 
per se is separated in terms of its mode of appearances. Otherwise in terms of 
the object there is no separate division"?' Since empirical phenomena are 
entirely false and deceptive, one cannot take the division between the two 
truths to be a divison that applies to empirical phenomena themselves—what 
is false and deceptive cannot be divided into the deceptive and the non-
deceptive, the false and the not-false. As Go rampa sees it, this would amount 
to creating an entirely non-deceptive truth from totally false and deceptive 
phenomena. Go rampa forcefully summarises his view as follows: 
Here in the Madhyamaka system, the object itself cannot be divided 
into two truths. Empirical truth and ultimate truth are divided in terms 
of the mode of apprehensions (mthong tshul). In terms of the subject 
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apprehending falsehood and the subject apprehending truth; or 
mistaken and unmistaken apprehensions ('khrul ma 'khrul), or deluded 
or undeluded apprehensions (rmongs ma rmongs), or erroneous or 
nonerroneous apprehensions (ph yin ci log ma log), or valid or invalid 
cognitions (tshad ma yin min).' 
And he adds: 
Because two truths are posited in terms of the subjective consciousness 
(yul can gyi blo) depending on whether it is a deluded (rmongs) or non-
deluded (ma rmongs); a perception of falsity (brdzun pa thong ba), or 
perception of reality (yang dag mthong ba) and a mistaken (khrul) or an 
unmistaken (ma khrul), the position of [the truths] in terms of the 
subjective consciousness (yul can gyi blo) is unanimously accepted by all 
Prasaligikas and Svatantrikas of India.° 
It is worth underlining the two points at issue here. Since the minds of 
ordinary beings are always deluded, mistaken and erroneous they falsely 
experience conventional truth. Conventional truth is thus strictly posited only 
in relation to the perspective of ordinary beings. Ordinary beings always 
assume the sensory experiences of empirical entities as veridical, despite the 
fact that they are utterly false. However, since the wisdom of arya's 
meditative equipoise and enlightened minds are never mistaken, always non-
deluded and non-erroneous, they flawlessly experience ultimate truth. 
Ultimate truth is thus posited strictly in relation to an arya's and a buddha's 
perspective. 
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Among other Tibetans who maintain Go rampa's line of argument in 
respect of the basis of the division of the two truths are kLong chen,' Sa 
pap,' Mi pham,' Rong ston," sTag tsang," akya mChog ldan" and Mi 
skyod rDo rje.' They all agree with Go rampa that the distinctions between 
the two truths are purely subjective. Except for some minor linguistic 
differences, they all argue that the two truths are reducible to the two 
conflicting perspectives, namely, ignorance and wisdom. Modern scholars 
including T. R. V. Murti," La Vallee Poussin,' Jaideva Singh, 5° Chr. Lindtner 51 
and C. W. Huntington' also endorse Go rampa's approach. Guy Newland 
also notes "many Western scholars hold that the two truths are not two types 
of object, but rather two viewpoints, perspectives, or types of 
consciousnesses". 53 Streng, for example maintains this position: 
Since there are no intrinsically different objects of knowledge, the 
distinction between 'mundane truth' and 'ultimate truth' does not 
pertain to different objects of knowledge, e.g., the world and ultimate 
reality. It refers, rather to the manner by which 'things' are perceived.' 
In addition, he states that: 
[T]there are two forms of understanding: world-ensconced truth and 
the highest truth... The distinction.. .is a difference of attitude or 
awareness about oneself in relation to existence. It is foremost an 
epistemological difference, which becomes an ontological difference 
insofar as knowledge determines what one becomes.' 
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Elsewhere Streng writes, "Thus, the basic difference between conventional 
and ultimate truth is.. .a difference of the perspective...". % 
As we have already seen, according to Tsong khapa, the object of 
knowledge as that which can be known by means of two different modes of 
cognition, each of which may be available to the same cognising agent, 
though verified through different forms of consciousness, that is the basis of 
the division of the two truths. At the heart of Tsong khapa's argument lies the 
point that every empirically given object of knowledge consists of dual 
natures—conventional and ultimate—and these two natures form the 
objective basis of the two truths. Despite the fact that the different cognitions 
that correspond to the two natures engage with the same phenomenon, 
Tsong khapa argues that his view is not committed to the subjective division 
of the two truths that is advanced by Go rampa, since the two modes of 
cognition have an objective reference, namely the two natures that belong to 
that single phenomenon. Therefore, as Hopkins puts it, "there are standards 
and criteria for valid establishment, and in this sense both suchness and the 
phenomena qualified by it are objective".' 
While Tsong khapa distances himself from the subjective division of the 
two truths, Go rampa on the other hand, makes every attempt to demonstrate 
that the distinctions between the two truths are indeed purely subjective. He 
therefore argues that 'mere mind' (blo tsam) provides the primary basis for the 
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division of the two truths. Unlike Tsong khapa, Go rampa holds that the two 
truths do not have any objective basis. Instead they are entirely reducible to. 
the experiences of the deluded minds of ordinary beings and the experiences 
of the wisdom of aryas. 
There is one last crucial point to be noted before we move to the next 
section. According to Tsong Ichapa, the cognitive agent who understands the 
two truths may be one and the same individual. Each agent has all the 
cognitive resources that are potentially capable of accessing both the two 
truths. In the case of ordinary beings, they have only conceptual access to 
ultimate truth. The aryas who are in the process of learning have direct access 
to ultimate truth even if only intermittently. Enlightened beings, however, 
always have simultaneous access to both the truths. The view held by Go 
rampa argues for separate cognitive agents corresponding to each of the two 
truths. Ordinary beings have direct access to conventional truth, but are 
utterly incapable of accessing ultimate truth. The aryas in training have direct 
access to both ultimate and conventional truths. Buddhas, on the other hand, 
only have access to ultimate truth. They have strictly no access to 
conventional truth whatsoever. 
In the following section, we shall take up the relationship between the 
two truths as the focus for our comparative analysis. As we shall see, the 
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relationship between the two truths is deeply entangled with the issue 
concerning the basis of the division of the truths. 
2. How are the two truths related? 
Before we move on, there are two important background issues that we must 
remember. In formulating an account of the relationship between the two 
truths, Tsong khapa places great emphasis on the relationship between 'the 
two natures of a single entity'. By emphasising this, Tsoing khapa is implicitly 
suggesting that the two truths constitute one and the same phenomenon (or 
entity or thing)—they do not, in any way, represent two ontologically distinct 
identities. As a consequence, in the account of the relationship between the 
two truths, Tsong khapa's primary aim is to establish the mutually 
compatible relationship between two modes of cognition that relate to the two 
natures of a single phenomenon or entity. In other words, for Tsong khapa, 
the two modes of cognition and the two natures corresponding to the two 
truths are underlain by one phenomenon. In contrast, however, Go rampa 
views the relationship between the two truths as one between two distinct 
and incompatible modes of cognition that do not refer to a single entity with 
two natures, but rather constitute two modes of cognition only one of which 
refers us to a real phenomenon. 
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2.1. The two truths are ontologically identical but conceptually 
distinct 
The principle of 'single ontological identity' (ng-0 bo gcig) with 'distinct 
conceptual identities' (ldog pa tha dad), pointed out earlier, is founded on the 
concept of the two natures. The two natures not only serve as the basic 
reference point for Tsong khapa in his exposition of the basis of the division 
of the two truths, of their their meanings and definitions, but they also serve 
as the basic ontological reference for his account of the relationship between 
the two truths. 
Tsong khapa traces the notion of the two natures back to Candrakirti. 
"[The Buddha] said that all things have two natures—those found by 
perceivers of reality and of falsities", says Candrakirti in the 
Madhyamaka vatara [VI:23]. While glossing statement in the 
Madhyamakavatarabhasya, Candrakirti also writes: "All phenomena—interior 
and exterior—, such as conditioned phenomena and the sprout, have two 
natures".' In mKhas grub de's (1385-1438) words, the point can be rephrased 
in this way: "as both the root texts of the Madhyamalca]vataral and its 
commentary maintain.. .all conventional and ultiirnate phenomena possess 
natures, and if their natures exist they must be either one or different. For if 
[two natures] exist they must be either the same or different".' Since the dual 
natures are ontologically locked together within the framework of each 
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phenomenon, it is obvious that the two truths constitute the same 
phenomenon. So, the question concerning the relationship between the two 
truths is the same question as that which concerns the relationship between 
the two natures. To find out the relationship between the two truths is thus 
equivalent to examining the precise relationship between the two natures. 
So, how are the two natures related? Are they identical or distinct? 61 
According to the view held by Tsong khapa, the short answer is that the two 
natures are neither identical nor distinct in any unqualified sense. The two 
natures are related in terms of a single ontological identity with distinct 
conceptual identities—thus they are both the same and different. Since the 
two natures are the basis of the relationship between the two truths, so the 
relationship between the two truths will reflect the relationship between the 
two natures. Ultimate truth and conventional truth thus possess the same 
ontological status. As the two natures are two natures of the same ontological 
structure, so the two truths are truths that relate to the same ontological 
structure also. 
Tsong khapa likens the relationship between the two truths, and the two 
natures, to the relationship between "being conditioned (byas pa) and being 
impermanent (ml rtag pa)" .6' He borrows this point from Nagarjuna's 
Bodhicittavivarana (byang chub sems igrel), wherein the latter states: "Reality (de 
nyid, tathata) is not perceived as separate from conventionality (kun rdzob, 
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sariivrti) [67]. The conventionality is explained to be empty. Empty alone is the 
conventionality", and therefore for Nagarjuna, "if one of them does not exist 
neither will the other, like being conditioned and being impermanent" [681. 63 
Commenting on this passage from Bodhicittavivararza, Tsong khapa writes: 
The first four lines show that things as they really are are not 
ontologically distinct from that of the conventionality. The latter two 
lines establish their relationship such that if one did not exist neither 
could the other (med na ml 'bung ba'i 'brel ba). This, in fact, is equivalent 
to their being constituted by a single-property relationship (bdag cig pa'i 
'brel ba). Therefore, like the case of being conditioned and being 
impermanent, [the relation between the two truths] is demonstrated as 
one of a single ontological identity (ngo bo gcig pa).' 
The way in which the two truths are related is thus analogous to the way in 
which being conditioned and being impermanent are related. So far as the 
character of being conditioned and being impermanent is concerned, they are 
ontologically identical and mutually entailing. Whatever is impermanent is 
also conditioned; likewise whatever is conditioned is also impermanent. If 
impermanence did not exist, conditioned phenomena would not exist; 
similarly, if conditioned phenomenon did not exist, impermanence would not 
exist. 
The ontological identity between being conditioned and being 
impermanent does not imply identity in all and every respect. So far as their 
mode of appearance is concerned, conditioned and impermanent phenomena 
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are distinct and contrasting. Impermanence always presents itself to the 
cognising mind as impermanent, but not as conditioned. Similarly, being 
conditioned always presents itself to its cognising mind as conditioned, but 
not as impermanent. Similarly, it does not necessarily follow that the two 
truths are identical in every respect just because they share a common 
ontological identity. So far as the modes of appearance are concerned, 
ultimate nature and conventional nature are distinct. The mode of 
appearance of ultimate nature is non-deceptive and consistent with its mode 
of existence, while the mode of appearance of conventional nature is 
deceptive and inconsistent with its mode of existence. 
Conventional nature is uncritically verified by empirical valid cognition 
whereas ultimate nature is critically verified by ultimately valid cognition. 
Hence, just as ultimate nature is inaccessible to the empirically valid 
cognition for its uncritical mode of engagement, so too, is conventional nature 
inaccessible to ultimately valid cognition for its critical mode of engagement. 
This is how, in Tsong khapa's view, the truths differ conceptually in spite of 
sharing a common ontological identity. 
In summarising Tsong khapa's points, mithas grub de writes: "the two 
truths are therefore of the same nature, but different conceptual identities 
(ngo bo gcig la ldog pa tha dad). They have a single-nature relationship such that 
if one did not exist neither could the other (med na mi 'byung bdag gcig 
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'brel) just like being conditioned and impermanent". In commenting on dGe 
lugs pa thought, Newland also echoes the same point: 
That the two truths are 'different isolates' [Idog pa that dad] means, for 
example, that a table and its emptiness can be distinguished in terms of 
how they are understood by a conceptual consciousness. To say that 
two things are different isolates is to make only the most minimal 
distinction between them. Since conceptual consciousnesses often 
operate under the sway of language, things are different isolates as 
soon as they are given different names—even if those names refer to the 
same object.' 
Since the meaning of 'distinct conceptual identities' (Wog pa tha dad), in Tsong 
khapa's view, is rooted in the two natures, the conceptual distinction between 
the two truths must not be understood as a pure epistemological distinction. 
The distinction between the two truths, according to Tsong khapa, is not 
reducible to two different perspectives, or even to two different linguistic 
practices. Since both the truths have their own objective references, namely 
the two natures, they are not reducible to subjective viewpoints nor are they 
reducible to merely a difference of language. Jose Ignacio Cabezon is one 
commentator who does emphasise the distinction between the two truths as 
entirely linguistic and writes that the two truths "although having the same 
referent... have different names, different designations, being the opposites of 
different entities qua names".' Both Newland and Cabezon are correct in 
pointing out that 'distinct conceptual identities' (idog pa tha dad) in Tsong 
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khapa's sense are distinctions drawn by the conceptual consciousness, and so 
clearly have a linguistic component. They are also correct in pointing out, as I 
have above, that the two truths have only 'one entity' or 'one phenomenon' as 
their referent. Yet to say, as a consequence, that the differences between the 
two truths are purely linguistic in nature, is to ignore Tsong lchapa's own 
emphasis on the role of the two natures to which the two truths correspond. 
The distinction between those two natures is not merely linguistic. 
Although the two truths presuppose, according to Tsong khapa, a 
single phenomenon or entity as their common referent, this does not mean 
that they share exactly the same objective referent. Ultimate truth has the 
ultimate nature of the phenomenon as its referent, while conventional truth 
has the conventional nature of the same phenomenon as its referent. Thus, 
while engaging with the same phenomenon, both verifying consciousnesses 
have their own distinctive referents according to the manner in which they 
operate—one critically, the other uncritically. This latter point is one of Tsong 
khapa's central theses. It allows him to ground both the identity and 
difference that stems from the relationship between the two truths on the 
single ontological identity and different conceptual nature of the one 
phenomenon. In doing this, he effectively dismisses the idea of treating the 
difference between the truths as merely one of contradictory perspectives or 
different linguistic practices. Thus he allows equal significance to both the 
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epistemological and ontological issues involved in the relationship between 
the two truths. To say that they share a single ontological identity with 
different conceptual identities does not mean, therefore, that the distinctions 
at issue are purely epistemological. This is consistent with his position that 
the two truths stand on an equal footing and do not constitute an ontological 
or epistemological hierarchy. 
2.2. The two truths are distinct and incompatible 
Let us now examine how Go rampa formulates the relationship between the 
two truths. From Go rampa's point of view, the position advanced by Tsong 
Ichapa is utterly unacceptable. To say that the two truths are ontologically 
identical is similar to equating ignorance with wisdom. Jay Garfield precisely 
summarises Go rampa's general approach to the doctrine of the two truths 
when he writes: 
By distinguishing the conventional from the ultimate, it is tempting to 
disparage the former in contrast to the latter, developing a sort of 
theory of one truth and one falsehood. This is done if one reifies the 
entities associated with the ultimate, such as emptiness or 
impermanence or the Four Noble Truths, or the Buddha. Then one 
treats these as real, intrinsically existent phenomena. The conventional 
then become the world of illusion.68 
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As we saw above, the main point of reference in Go rampa's exposition of the 
basis of the two truths is what he calls 'mere mind' (blo tsam) since this is 
what underpins the claim that the distinction between the two truths is 
purely subjective. Moreover, because Go rampa denies that there is any 
ontological unity that underlies the distinction between the two truths—that 
distinction is one of 'mere mind' such that the two truths cannot both have an 
objective referent—the two truths must constitute conflicting and 
incompatible perspectives. As a consequence, the relationship between the 
two truths is, according to this view, equivalent to the relationship between 
the two conflicting perspectives—namely, ignorance and wisdom. The 
question now becomes: How is ignorance related to wisdom? Or how does . 
wisdom relate to ignorance? In answer, Go rampa suggests four possible sets 
of relationships between the two truths. He borrows them from Sa par: 
Generally the twofold division is analysed in order to determine (1) 
whether its members are substantially distinct (rdzas tha dad) like a 
mattress and a jar. (2) Or [to determine whether they are] single identity 
with distinct conceptual identities (ngo bo gcig la ldog pa tha dad) like 
being conditioned (byas pa) and impermanent (mi rtag pa), (3) or 
coreferential but different in meaning (rnams grangs pa'i tha dad) like 
'moon' and 'that which has a cooling effect (bsil zer byed pa)', (4) or 
'distinct' in the sense that is incompatible with oneness (gcig pa gdag pa'i 
tha dad) like entity (dngos po) and entitilessness (dngos med). This 
[relationship] between the two truths also has to be analysed in this 
way.' 
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Among these four sets of relations, Go rampa ignores the first—substantially 
distinct (rdzas tha dad)—and the third—co-referential, but different in 
meaning (rnams grangs pa'i tha dad). Because his adversary, Tsong khapa, 
advocates the second type of relationship—'single ontological identity with 
distinct conceptual identities' (ngo bo gcig la ldog pa tha dad), Go rampa rejects 
it. He formulates his own account based on the fourth type of relation—that 
the two truths are 'distinct in the sense they are incompatible with unity' (gcig 
pa dgag pa'i tha dad) like entity (dngos po) and entitilessness (dngos med). 
For Go rampa, the relationship between the two truths is a 
straightforward one. In the ultimate sense, he argues that the two truths 
. transcend identity and difference.' "The transcendence of identity and 
difference from the ultimate standpoint is synonymous with the 
transcendence of identity and difference from the purview of the arya's 
meditative equipoise"?' However, from the empirical standpoint (tha snyad 
du), he claims that the two truths are 'distinct in the sense that they are 
incompatible with their unity' (gcig pa bkag pa'i tha dad). He likens this relation 
with that between 'entity' (dngos po) and 'entitilessness' (dngo med).' 
In claiming that the two truths are distinct and incompatible, Go rampa 
asserts that the two truths are both ontologically and epistemologically 
distinct. Since what is divided into the two truths is 'mere mind' (blo tsam), it 
is obvious that there is no single phenomenon that could serve as the 
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objective referent for both. This also means that the two truths must be 
construed as corresponding to distinct spheres belonging to distinct modes of 
consciousness: conventional truth corresponds to ignorance and ultimate 
truth to wisdom. It is thus inappropriate to describe the relationship between 
the two truths, and their corresponding modes of consciousness, in terms of 
two ways of looking at the same entity. Although the two truths can be 
thought of as two ways of looking, one of ignorance and the other of wisdom, 
there is no same entity at which both look. There is nothing common between 
the two truths and if they are both ways of looking then they do not look at 
the same thing. 
Go rampa's formulation of the distinct and incompatible relationship 
between the two truths is also reinforced by his objections launched against 
the notion that the two truths share a common ontological identity. One of 
these objections states that: 73 
If two truths were identical in their natures, then metaphorically 
speaking, the hairs seen through blurred vision and the nonexistence of 
hairs seen through a correct vision would absurdly become identical. 
This would follow from the two truths being identical in their natures.' 
According to this view, the relationship between conventional truth and 
ultimate truth is comparable to the relationship between the 'hairs seen 
through cataracts' and the 'absence of falling hair seen through correct 
vision'. Although this is a metaphor, it has a direct application to the matter 
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of how the two truths are related. Conventional truth is analogous to the 
seeing of falling hairs as a result of cataracts: both conventional truth and 
such false seeing are illusory, in the ontological sense that there is nothing to 
which each corresponds, and in the epistemological sense that there is no true 
knowledge in either case. On this basis, ultimate truth is therefore analogous, 
ontologically and epistemologically, to the true seeing unaffected by cataracts 
in which there are no falling hairs. Just as cataracts give rise to illusory 
appearances, so ignorance, according to Go rampa, gives rise to all 
conventional truths—wisdom, on the other hand, gives rise to ultimate truth. 
As each is the result of a different state, so there is no link, either in terms of 
some common ontological identity or some common epistemological or 
conceptual identity, to which both the conventional and the ultimate are 
related. 
For Go rampa, the idea that the two truths refer to one ontological 
identity with different conceptual identities is highly problematic. He takes it 
as equivalent to claiming that there is an ontological identity between the 
falling hairs seen as a result of cataracts and the absence of falling hairs seen 
in the absence of such cataracts. Likewise, to say that the two truths share an 
epistemological link is equivalent to claiming that there is an epistemological 
connection between the seeing of falling hairs by someone with cataracts and 
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the seeing from which falling hairs are absent experienced by someone with 
healthy vision. 
Go rampa rejects the identity of the two truths by relying on the 
Sarridhinirmocana sutra. This sutra, according to him, exposes four absurdities 
in claiming that the two truths are ontologically identical.' If the two truths 
were identical, then: 
[1] Just as the childish ( byis pa) directly perceive conventional things 
such as form and sound, they would absurdly directly perceive 
ultimate truth. [2] Just as conventional [truth] comprises many 
divisions of categories (spros pa'i dbye ba) such as form and sound, even 
so, ultimate [truth] would absurdly comprise many divisions (bye ba du 
ma). [3] Just as the conventional [truth] by definition (mtshan nyid) has 
nature of (rang bzhin) deluded ignorance (kun nas nyon mongs pa), 
ultimate truth would [absurdly] be the same. [4] Just as conventional 
meaning is not sought apart from what is seen by the childish, ultimate 
truth would absurdly be the same.' 
By reading the Sarridhinirmocana sutra as presenting the relationship between 
the two truths as distinct and incompatible, Go rampa does not mean to 
suggest that the two truths constitute two distinct entities (dngos po). Nor 
does he mean to suggest that the two truths are one entity seen under two 
conflicting aspects. First, the basis of the divisions of the two truths is 'mere 
mind' (blo tsam), and it is not coherent to reduce mind into two distinct 
entities. Second, all entities (dngos po) are classified as belonging to 
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conventional truth, while ultimate truth consists purely of 'entitilessness' 
(dngos med). 
If the two truths are really two distinct entities, then, Go rampa argues, 
they give rise to a second set of absurdities, also four in number, as set out in 
the Sathdhinirmocana sutra as follow: 
... if two truths were distinct [entities], then [1] aryas, while directly 
realising ultimate [truth] absurdly would remain unreleased (ml grol ba) 
from the conventional bondage (kun rdzob kyi 'ching ba). [2] Reality (chos 
nyid), nyid) simultaneously, despite their distinctness, that is, the 
ultimate [truth] absurdly would not be universal (spyi tshan nyid, 
samanya-laksana) of conventionalities. [3] Either conditioned phenomena 
('du byed), i.e., conventionalities would remain unestablished or 
selflessness would absurdly not be ultimate truth. [4] A continuum of 
each person would absurdly accommodate both, afflictive 
characteristics (nyon mongs gyi mtshan nyid) and liberating qualities 
(rnam byang gyi mtshan 
This second quartet of absurd consequences show, according Go rampa, that 
the two truths are not utterly distinct entities even though they they are 
distinct and incompatible perspectives—perspectives that are in no way 
convergent. Tsong khapa, however totally disagrees with Go rampa's 
interpretation of the passage in the Sathdhinirmocana sutra. As far as Tsong 
khapa is concerned, the first four absurdities to which the Sathdhinirmocana 
sutra direct attention are intended to operate against the position that treats 
the two truths as equivalent—as identical in every respect. These absurdities, 
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as Tsong khapa understands them, expose the problems inherent in any such 
identification of the two truths. Tsong khapa himself does not explicitly cite 
the Sathdhinirmocana sutra, nor does he exactly spell out these faults, however, 
many later dGe lugs pa scholars do use the same citation and, just as Go 
rampa did, they point to the four absurdities as settling the issue concerning 
the claim that the two truths are equivalent. Consider one example. In inKhen 
zur Pad ma rGyal tshan's words, we read: 
If the two truths [not only have single ontological identity but] a single 
• 
conceptual identity (ldog pa gcig yin na), then [I] common beings (so 
skye, prthajana) would directly realise the ultimate reality (chos nyid, 
dharmata); [2] the awareness of that reality would generate delusions 
such as attachment; [3] that [reality] would be comprised of colours, 
shapes and so forth and [4] yogi's effort to meditate on reality would 
absurdly be pointless. This would follow because a jar and its ultimate 
reality (chos nyid, dharmata) would fall under a single conceptual 
identity.' 
For Tsong khapa, if the two truths were distinct, then, by definition, they 
would have distinct ontological identities, since the definitions are founded 
on those identities.' As mKhas grub rje points out, "if the two truths are 
ontologically distinct they must be distinct unrelated things because 
ontologically distinct things cannot have a 'single-character relationship' 
(bdag gcig ibrel)".' But such a 'single-character' relationship is essential for the 
unity of the two truths. To reinforce this position, the later dGe lugs pa 
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scholars also use the Satildhinirmocana sutra.' For example, mKhan zur Pad 
ma rGyal tshan borrows from the Saritdhinirmocana sutra the idea that four 
absurdities would follow were the two truths entirely distinct: 
[1] A jar's emptiness of true existence would not be the jar's mode of 
existence; [2] the realisation of a jar's emptiness of true existence would 
not eradicate the reification through the conception of true existence; [3] 
it would make no sense to say that a jar is the basis of the repudiation of 
the true existence of the jar and so forth; and [4] the fact that a rya 
buddhas' continuum does not simultaneously accommodate both—the 
wisdom realising the emptiness and the grasping to true existence of a 
jar—would become absurd. This would follow if the jar and the jar's 
emptiness of true existence are distinct. 82 
Although these four absurdities are here employed to argue against the view 
that takes the two truths to be utterly distinct, the argument in which they 
play a part is quite different from that found in Go rampa. Go rampa is not 
interested in demonstrating the unity between the two truths. His goal is to 
prove that they constitute two distinct perspectives. On the other hand, Tsong 
khapa and the other dGe lugs pa scholars, by drawing attention to these 
absurdities in the way that they do, aim implicitly at establishing the mutual 
interdependence of the two truths. 
Other Tibetan scholars, kLong chen (1308-1363), Rong ston (1367-
1449), Mi pham (1846-1912) and dGe 'dun Chos 'phel (1903-1951) agree 
with Go rampa, however, in asserting that the two truths are distinct. They all 
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argue that the two truths are essentially incompatible with their unity (gcig pa 
bkag pa'i tha dad). In criticising Tsong khape for holding that there is a non-
contradictory relationship between the two truths, dGe 'dun Chos 'phel, for 
example, writes: 
The so-called mutually compatible relationship between the two truths 
might be possible if there was ever a time whereby the arya's wisdom 
and the conception of ordinary beings become mutually compatible 
without contradiction. Otherwise, such a [relationship] is utterly 
impossible... There is indeed no opportunity to attain the liberation for 
those who hold that conventional and ultimate [truths] as non-
contradictory. [This also holds true] in terms of the modes of analysis of 
both the truths.' 
Also he states: 
...This implies the acceptance of the mutually compatible and the non-
contradictory relationship between the mental states of the naïve 
ordinary beings—the lowest extent of foolishness—and the enlightened 
knowledge—the highest extent of erudition. If by accepting this, it did 
[justice to the enlightened wisdom], then there should be no problem 
even in accepting the mutually compatible relationship between the 
objects of ignorance and reasoning consciousness (i.e., arya's wisdom), 
[would there?]... In short, the view that holds the two truths as non-
contradictory is a philosophical system that accepts all categories of 
mental states from buddhas down to sentient beings as non-
contradictory.88 
Still others such as Sa part (1182-1251),89 Red mda' ba (1349-1412),' akya 
mChog ldan (1428-1507),91 and Mi skyod rDo rje (1507-1554)92 argue that the 
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relationship between the two truths is essentially 'inexpressible'. They claim 
that 'ultimately the two truths transcend the notion of identity and difference' 
(gcig dang tha dad spros pa dang bral ba) and 'conventionally, their relationship 
is neither expressed as identical nor as distinct' (de nyid dang gzhan du brjod du 
med)." 
In short, the two accounts we have been considering here differ 
markedly in their views regarding the relationship between the two truths. 
Tsong khapa insists that the two truths constitute a single ontological 
structure and that they share a common ontological identity. Yet he 
emphatically denies that the two truths are identical in every respect. They 
are different so far as their mode of appearance and their mode of existence is 
concerned. The appearance of conventional truth does not cohere with the 
mode of existence of conventional truth (so conventional truth is contingent 
and yet gives the appearance of non-contingency), whereas the appearance of 
ultimate truth is coherent with the mode of existence of ultimate truth (it 
appears to be non-contingent and is so). Conventional and ultimate truth 
differ, then, in terms of the two natures upon which they are founded and 
therefore to the respective cognising consciousnesses to which they relate. 
The identity and difference of the two truths must, according to Tsong 
khapa, be both ontologically and epistemologically grounded in the two 
natures. This renders the reduction of the two truths to a mere subjective 
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distinction impossible, since the two natures do not constiutute a merely 
subjective distinction. In contrast, Go rampa's account of the relationship 
between the two truths takes them to be reducible to two conflicting 
perspectives. The cognitive experiences of ordinary beings (so skye, prthajana) 
and the cognitive experiences of buddhas are distinct in every sense of the 
word. There is nothing in common between these two conflicting 
perspectives and neither is there any common ontological identity nor 
epistemological link between these two perspectives. 
The difference between Tsong khapa and Go rampa's views regarding 
the relationship between the two truths will become even clearer as we 
proceed further into the discussion. In the following section, we will compare 
their views in relation to the authority of the two truths: are there really two 
truths or is there just one? 
3. Two truths or one? 
In this section, I will argue that for Tsong khapa the truth is always twofold 
while for Go rampa the truth is always single. Fundamental to this debate, 
not surprisingly, is the disagreement between Tsong khapa and Go rampa 
regarding the basis of the divisions between the two truths. For Tsong khapa, 
since the two natures of every empirically given phenomenon provide the 
ontological and epistemological foundation for each of the truths, the division 
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of truth into two is just right. Both the conventional and the ultimate are 
actual truths, and since the two natures are mutually interlocking, neither of 
the two truths has primacy over the other—both stand on an equal footing, 
ontologically, epistemologically and even soteriologically. For Go rampa, 
however, 'truth' per se is not divisible into two. Since 'mere mind' provides 
the basis of the division of the two truths wherein ultimate truth—namely, 
wisdom—alone is seen as properly satisfying the criterion of truth, so 
conventional truth—namely, ignorance—cannot properly be taken as truth. 
Wisdom and ignorance are always contradictory, and thus the two truths 
cannot coexist. Go rampa argues, in fact, that conventional truth must be 
eliminated in the ascent to ultimate truth. Given the fact that the wisdom has 
primacy over ignorance, 'ultimately' it is ultimate truth alone that must 
prevail without its merely conventional counterpart. Ultimate truth is 
therefore far more significant than conventional truth in all 
respects—ontologically, epistemologically and soteriologically. 
3.1. How is conventional truth 'truth' at all? 
	Let us now return to Tsong 	khapw.-Given the fact-thaTTsong khapa accepts 
conventional truths as actual truth and that he argues for an equal status for 
the two truths, the question that he now must address is: how is conventional 
truth, which is described as 'false' and 'deceptive', truth at all? In other 
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words, how are the two truths of equal status given the fact that conventional 
truth is 'false' and 'deceptive'? Since Tsong khapa grounds both truths in the 
dual nature of a single phenomenon, then "just as the ultimate reality (chos 
nyid) of the sprout [for instance] is taken as characteristic (rang bzhin) of the 
sprout, hence it is described as the sprout's nature (ngo bo). So too", argues 
Tsong khapa, "are the sprout's colour, shape etc., the sprout's characteristics 
(bdag nyid). Therefore, they too are its nature (ngo bo)". Since the two natures 
are ontologically mutually entailing, the sprout's ultimate truth cannot exist 
without its conventional truth. Likewise, without the conventional truth of 
the sprout, its ultimate truth cannot exist. In other words, neither truth could 
exist without the other. 
In order to preserve a compatible relationship between the two truths, 
one of the crucial tasks for Tsong khapa to accomplish is the demonstration of 
their equal footing. In order to do this, Tsong khapa borrows Nagarjuna's 
arguments establishing the unity between the two truths. In the 
Midamadhyamakaka rika, particularly in chapter XXIV, Nagarjuna offers his 
most explicit statements on the unity between the two truths by advancing 
two separate arguments, one emphasising the epistemological link, and the 
other emphasising the ontological unity between the two truths. Both these 
lines of argument draw upon an understanding of conventional truth as tied 
to dependent arising and ultimate truth as tied to emptiness. 
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First, in order to articulate the epistemological link between the two 
truths, Nagarjuna states: "without relying upon empirical [truth], the 
meaning of the ultimate cannot be explained. Without understanding the 
meaning of the ultimate, nirvana is not attained" [XXIV:101. 95 Similarly, "to 
whomsoever emptiness makes sense, everything [the four noble truths] 
makes sense. To whomsoever emptiness makes no sense, everything make no 
sense" [XXIV:14].96 In the Vigrahavyavartant, Nagarjuna puts this point in a 
slightly different style: "wherever emptiness is possible, there every function 
is possible. Wherever emptiness is not possible, there every function is not 
possible" [70]. 97 Second, in order to demonstrate the ontological unity 
between the two truths, in the Malamadhyamakakarika Nagarjuna writes: 
"whatever is dependently arisen, is itself explained to be empty. That being 
dependently designated, is itself the middle path" [XXIV:18]." In the 
Vigrahavyavartani, by emphasising the same point, Nagarjuna pays his 
homage to the Buddha: "I pay homage to this peerless Buddha, who perfectly 
explained that the identity of meaning of 'emptiness' and 'dependent arising' 
constitutes the middle path" [71]." More explicitly, he argues that "there is no 
thing that is not dependently arisen; therefore, there is no such a thing that is 
not empty" [XXIV:19].' 
Candrakirti also reinforces the unity between the two truths by 
emphasising the causal efficacy of empty phenomena. "It is not a secret that 
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empty entities like reflections and so forth depend on aggregation (of causes 
and conditions), and a consciousness may arise in the form. of an image of 
such an empty reflection for example" EVI:371. 1°1 Moreover he argues that "all 
entities are, in the similar characteristics, not only are empty [as effects], but 
they are produced out of empty [causal conditions]" • 1' This must follow 
"because there is no essence whatsoever from the standpoints of both truths": 
hence all entities, according to Candrakirti "are neither permanent nor subject 
to annihilation" [VI:38].' 
For Tsong khapa, empty phenomenon and dependently arisen 
phenomenon, as both Nagarjuna and Candrakirti point out, are synonymous. 
The concept of emptiness is incoherent unless it is applied to dependently 
arisen phenomena, and so too, is the concept of dependent arising incoherent 
unless it is applied to empty phenomena. In the rTen 'brel stoci pa (the Praise of 
Dependently Arisen), Tsong khapa mobilises his arguments to reinforce the 
unity between the two truths as follows: 
According to you (i.e., the Buddha), since emptiness means 'dependent 
arising,' the 'emptiness of essence' and the 'efficacy of action and its 
agent' are not contradictory [11]. If however emptiness is seen as 
contradictory with [dependent arising], there would be neither action 
in empty nor empty in action. This way you accept that one falls in a 
precipice of despair.' 
... Since there is no such phenomenon other than what is 
dependently arisen, there is no such a phenomenon other than what is 
empty of essence [14].' ... The 'utter nonexistence of essence' and 
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making sense of everything in the light of the principle 'this arises 
depending on this,'—there is indeed no need to say that they are non-
contradictory [181' ... Therefore, in spite of the fact that whatever is 
dependently arisen is albeit primordially devoid of essence, it 
nonetheless appears. [Phenomena] all are thus proclaimed as illusion-
like [271.1' 
In the Lam gtso rnam gsum (The Three Principal Pathways), Tsong khapa uses 
another slightly different argument to establish this unity. "Appearance 
avoids the extreme of existence, and empty [phenomena] avoids the extreme 
of nonexistence. Hence by understanding that the empty [phenomenon] itself 
is the bearer of cause and effect, one is not robbed by the extreme view" 
[131.' As indicated in Nagarjuna and Candrakirti's arguments the efficacy of 
empty phenomena, namely, the bearer of cause and effect, is particularly 
significant to this view. The idea of empty phenomena acting as the basis of 
cause and effect is crucial in understanding the inextricable relationship 
between ultimate truth and conventional truth. 
Given the fact that empty and dependently arisen phenomena are 
ontologically united, the knowledge of erripty and dependently arisen 
phenomena are also epistemologically interlinked—the latter is, in fact, 
founded on the former. To the extent that empty phenomena are understood 
in terms of relational and dependently arisen phenomena, to that extent 
empty phenomena are always functional and causally effective. The phrase 
Chapter I 	 The relationship between the two truths 	 Page 53 
'empty phenomena', although expressed negatively, is not negative in a 
metaphysical sense—i.e. it is not equivalent to 'no-thingness'. Although the 
empty phenomenon appears to its cognising consciousness negatively, and 
without any positive affirmation, it is nonetheless equivalent to a relational 
and dependently arisen phenomenon seen in a different light. Since seeing 
phenomena as empty does not violate the inevitable epistemological link 
with the understanding of dependently arisen, and since the understanding 
of phenomena as dependently arisen does not violate its inevitable 
epistemological link with seeing phenomena as empty, so the unity between 
the two truths—between understanding things both as empty and as 
dependently arisen—is made clear. 
Tsong khapa also argues, moreover, that the realisation of phenomena 
as dependently arisen is the necessary and sufficient condition for the 
realisation of both the truths. For one cannot realise phenomena as 
dependently arisen unless one sees phenomena as empty. "So long as the 
understanding pertaining to empirically consistent 
appearances—dependently arisen—and the understanding pertaining to the 
empty [phenomena]—free from all claims—are seen as mutually exclusive," 
according to Tsong khapa, "the purport of the Buddha is not yet understood" 
[11]." Thus the philosophical inquiry, argues to Tsong khapa, is not complete 
until one achieves the simultaneous realisations of the two truths. 
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However the process of philosophical analysis is complete whenever 
[these two realisations] operate simultaneously without taking alternate 
turns, and consequently eschew all conceived objects [blindfolding] the 
discerning wisdom by merely seeing empirically consistent 
dependently arisen phenomena [121. 110 
The unity between the two truths, according to Tsong khapa, is not merely 
applicable to ontological and epistemological issues, it equally applies to 
soteriological issues. 'Jam dbyangs bZhad pa, one of the more recent (1648- 
1722) commentators on Tsong khapa's works for example writes: 
Undermining either of the two truths would result in a similar 
downfall, i.e., a similar eventual ruin. If however, they are not 
undermined, they are alike insofar as the accomplishment of the 
twofold accumulations (tshogs gnyis) and the attainment of the twofold 
kayos (skus gnyis) 1" etc., are concerned. If one undermines conventional 
[truth] by denying it, one would succumb to the extreme of nihilism, 
which would rob the root of virtue, and would consequently migrate in 
the realm of unfortunates (ngan 'gro, durgati). It would also undermine 
the fruit and the means by which rapakaya is accomplished. It is 
therefore not sensible to approach the two truths with bias [attitude] h12 
...Since this relation continues [as a means to prevent] falling into 
extremes, thereby being ruined, and also to accomplish the twofold 
accumulations (tshogs gnyis, dvi-sathbhara) 1" and the attainment of the 
twofold kayos (sku gnyis), it is imperative that the two truths be 
understood as mutually inter-related.' 
The ultimate soteriological goal for Tsong khapa is to attain the perfect 
enlightenment, and this attainment, as the above passages explain, depends 
on the accomplishment of the 'twofold kayas' (sku gnyis) of a 
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buddha—namely, rapakaya (gzugs sku), literally 'form body' and dharmakaya 
(chos sku), literally 'nature body,' or 'truth body'. The accomplishment of the 
twofold kayo in turn depends on the comprehension of the unity between the 
two truths and therefore unity between empty and dependently arisen 
phenomena. The rupakaya is accomplished as a result of the 'exhaustive 
accumulation of virtues' (bsod nams kyi tshogs, panya sathbhara) while the 
dharmakaya is as a result of the 'exhaustive accumulation of penetrative 
wisdom' (yeshe kyi tshogs, jiiana saMbhara). The former emphasises an 
engagement with the wisdom of dependent arising, while the latter 
emphasises an engagement with the wisdom of emptiness. 
The 'accomplishment of the virtues' emphasises the practical 
orientations and the need for conventional engagements such as practicing 
the six-perfections—generosity, morality, forbearance, effort, serenity and 
wisdom. All these engagements are undertaken in conformity with worldly 
conventions underpinned by the wisdom of dependent arising. The 
'accumulation of penetrative wisdom', on the other hand, emphasises the 
direct experience of ultimate truth including the direct experience of 
impermanent, selfless and empty phenomena. This requires the 
transcendence of worldly conventions by means of achieving the meditative 
equipoise. The accomplishment of both accumulations, however, culminates 
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with the purification of defilements and the simultaneous realisation of the 
two truths, and therefore of emptiness and dependent arising. 
Bearing in mind the soteriological unity of the two truths, and therefore 
of empty and dependently arisen phenomena, Nagarjuna also remarks: "By 
virtue of this meritorious deed, may all people accumulate merit and wisdom 
and attain the two noble fruits (i.e., rupakaya and dharmakaya) that arise from 
merit and wisdom" [60].'5 Similarly, the Buddha himself articulates how the 
two truths are soteriologically intertwined: "Bhikkhus, he who sees suffering 
sees also the origin of suffering, sees also the cessation of suffering, sees also 
the way leading to the cessation of suffering" [SN V.4371. 1 ' And further it is 
said: "the knowledge of one who possesses the path is knowledge of 
suffering and it is knowledge of the origin of suffering and it is knowledge of 
the cessation of suffering and it is knowledge of the way leading to the 
cessation of suffering" [Ps 1.119[ 117 Given the fact that the four noble truths are 
divisions within the two truths,' and since the four noble truths are 
soteriologically intertwined, the Buddha clearly points out that the two truths 
are united even in the soteriological terms. To conclude this section, in rGyal 
tshab rje's words we can state: 
Since the two kayas, viz., Pitt- na dharma kaya (yeshes chos sku) and the 
sambhoga kaya (lungs spyod rtogs pa'i sku) depend on the appropriation of 
the same actual conditions, they are related. They are also 
consummated simultaneously at the same time... Therefore, logically it 
follows that phenomenal basis consists of a unity between the two 
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truths, the path consists of a unity between the two accumulations, and 
the result consists of a unity between dharmakaya and ritpakaya.' 
Similarly, Kalupahana puts the unity between the two truths as follows: 
"Artha as well as paramartha are truths (satya). The former [conventional truth] 
is not presented as an un-truth (a-satya) in relation to the latter [ultimate 
truth], as it would be in an absolutistic tradition. Neither is the former 
sublated by the latter, and further "there is no indication whatsoever that 
these are two truths with different standing as higher and lower". 120 Neither 
truth is higher or lower than the other, neither is more true or less true than 
the other, and neither is more significant or less significant than the other. 121 
Therefore, Candrakirti states "the doctrines taught by the Buddha are based 
on the two truths".' 22 He stresses this point and says, "even if there were 
another truth whatsoever [apart from the four noble truths], that too would 
be certainly contained within the categories of the two truths". 123 Tsong khapa 
agrees. 
3.2. Why is conventional truth false and deceptive? 
If the two natures are ontologically identical, why is conventional truth 
described as 'deceptive' and 'false,' while ultimate truth is described as 'non-
deceptive' and 'true'? "Non-deceptive" as Tsong khapa argues, "is the mode 
of truth (bden tshul) of the ultimate. That is, ultimate truth does not deceive 
the world ('jig rten, loka) by posing one mode of appearance while existing in 
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another mode".' Ultimate truth is described as 'ultimate,' not because it is 
absolute or higher than conventional truth, but simply because of its 
consistent character—its mode of appearance and its mode of being are the 
same—in contrast with the inconsistent character of conventional truth. 
Ultimate truth is non-deceptive for the same reason. Thus Candrakirti writes, 
in his commentary on the Yuktisastika,: "[Interlocutor]: why is nirvana said to 
be the ultimate truth? [Reply]: nirvana is said to be ultimate truth purely 
based on worldly conventions ('jig rten gyi tha snyad kho nas), because its 
nature (bdag nyid) does not deceive the world ('jig rten, loka)".' 
To the cognising consciousness, conventional truth presents itself as 
inherently existent. It appears as if it has substance, or essence, and therefore 
it deceives ordinary beings (byis pa). "Insofar as conventional phenomena 
present themselves as more than conventional—as inherently existent—they 
deceive us. We take them to be what they are not—to be intrinsically 
identified, inherently existent entities. In that sense, they are false", writes 
Garfield. 126 And he continues, "but to the extent that we understand them as 
dependently arisen, empty, interdependent phenomena, they constitute a 
conventional truth". Nagarjuna also recognises the deceptive nature of 
conventional truth in this sense: He writes "The Victorious Conqueror has 
said that whatever is deceptive is false. Compounded phenomena are 
deceptive. Therefore they are all false" EXIII:11.' 
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So, the rationale behind describing one of the two truths as 'ultimate,' 
'non-deceptive' or 'true,' amd the other as 'conventional,' false' or 'deceptive,' 
so far as Tsong khapa is concerned, is to contrast the two truths on the basis 
of the consistency between their mode of appearance and their mode of 
existence. Since ultimate truth is, by definition, consistent with its mode of 
appearance, so it does not deceive anyone, not even ordinary beings (so skye, 
prthajana). However, since conventional truth is, by definition, inconsistent 
with its mode of appearance, so it deceives ordinary beings. It is thus crucial 
to understand exactly what sense of falsehood is in play when the 
conventional is characterised as 'deceptive,' as Garfield rightly points out. 129 
Nevertheless, this does not mean that ultimate truth can be considered 
to be epistemologically more significant than conventional truth. It is true 
that ordinary beings are deceived by the false and deceptive appearances of 
conventional truth, but the question is, are they deceived because of their 
knowledge of conventional truth or are they deceived because they have no 
proper knowledge of conventional truth? The fact that conventional truth 
deceives ordinary beings, according to Tsong khapa, demonstrates that they 
have not yet understood what conventional truth is. 
Although ordinary beings experience false and deceptive conventional 
truth all the time, the inconsistent, and in this sense the false and deceptive 
nature of conventional truth remains unknown to them. Thus, instead of 
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knowing such truths for what they are, ordinary beings always grasp them to 
be essentially real—as if the conventional truth were the ultimate truth. 
Garfield explains: 
Yet one must bear in mind that, according to Nagarjuna [and also for 
Tsong khapa], perception untutored by Madhyamika philosophy and 
rigorous practice delivers objects to consciousness as inherently 
existent. In this sense, the things that we see are wholly false. For most 
of us, the best that we can do is reason our way into knowing, but not 
seeing, their true nature. The goal of meditation on emptiness is to 
bring this knowledge into perceptual experience and, hence, to see 
things as they are. 13° 
Tsong khapa maintains an importance distinction between the knowledge of 
conventional truth and the ordinary experience of conventional truth. The 
knowledge of empirically given phenomena as dependently arisen is not 
treated as equivalent to merely experiencing dependently arisen phenomena. 
The ordinary being directly experiences conventional truth. Yet Tsong khapa 
holds that the ordinary being does not have direct understanding of 
conventional truth. For ordinary beings, seeing physical forms, tasting 
flavours, smelling aromas, hearing sounds, touching tangible objects and 
conceiving ideas etc. are in themselves sufficient to form the foundation of 
conventional knowledge required to lead a pragmatic life. In such 
circumstances, knowledge of conventional truth is not required, but mere 
perceptual or conceptual experiences of conventional truth, or even 
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reification of conventional truths, is enough to provide knowledge acceptable 
to the mundane norms. 
The experiencing of conventional truths by ordinary beings can be 
likened to an audience held spellbound by a magic show. While the audience 
consistently experiences illusory animals conjured up by the magician, they 
may remain ignorant of the illusory nature of those animals, taking them 
instead, to be real. The illusory nature of the animals thus need not alter the 
captivating effect of what is presented and experienced, and no knowledge of 
the reality is necessary for the experience. Similarly, so long as beings are 
ignorant of conventional truth, and thereby deceived by conventional truth, 
they are also ignorant of ultimate truth. In such a situation, we lack proper 
knowledge and understanding of both conventional and ultimate 
truth—according to Tsong lchapa, we have knowledge of neither. 
3.3. Applying the worldly convention 
Now, if it is true that there are two actual truths, as Tsong khapa proposes, 
why did the Buddha declare that nirvana is the only truth? The Buddha 
states: "The truth is one, there is no second about which a person who knows 
it would argue with one who knows. Contemplatives promote their various 
personal truths, that is why they do not say one thing and the same" [Cala-
Viyaha Sutta, Sn IV.12]. 131 Also in the Yuktisastika [35], Candrakirti raises the 
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same question: "when the Jinas have stated that nirvana alone is true, what 
learned person will then imagine that the rest is not false. How would you 
interpret that nirvana alone is true and others are untrue (mi bden)',?132 The 
answer to this is question, as far as Tsong khapa is concerned, is well 
explained in the Yuktisastikavrtti by Candrakirti himself: 
[Interlocutor]: Well, Bhagvan states: "Oh monks! There is one noble 
truth. That is, nirvana, which is characteristically non-deceptive". What 
do you make of this statement? [Reply]: Insofar as conditioned 
phenomena ('dus byas, satizskrta) deceive the childish (byis pa) by 
presenting false appearances (log par snang ba) nirvana is not. For the 
existence of nirvana is always consistent with its characteristic of the 
non-arising nature. Unlike conditioned phenomena ('dus byas, sathskrta), 
it never appears, even to the childish (byis ba), as having a nature of 
arising (skye ba'i ngo bo). Since, nirvana is always consistent with the 
mode of existence of nirvana, it is explained as the noble truth (bden pa 
dam pa), yet, strictly in terms of worldly conventions ('jig rten gyi tha 
snyad, lokavyavandra).' 
Candrakirti emphasises that nirvana is said to be the truth strictly in terms of 
worldly conventions ('jig rten gyi tha snyad, lokavyavahara). Let us briefly 
understand what Candrakirti meant by explaining nirvana as the noble truth 
'strictly in terms of worldly conventions' ('jig rten gyi tha snyad, lokavyavahara). 
Consider this example. In ordinary worldly discourse, it can be asked, 
are a visual illusion, a mirage, a reflection of a face in a mirror, an echo of 
sound, an image of the moon in a pool, etc. true? To say that they are not true 
Chapter I 	 The relationship between the two truths 	 Page 63 
would not help here, since it would merely lead on to the further question, 
why do they exist at all?—the unicorn and the rabbit's horn are also false, yet 
nowhere do we find them in the way that we find mirages, mirror images 
and so forth. The real answer must be something like this: Entities such as 
illusions, mirages, reflections and so forth are real, but they do not exist the way they 
appear to us. They all appear to be something other than they really are. It is the 
inconsistency between the appearance and the mode of existence that marks 
these entities as false, and since even the ordinary worldly consciousness 
understands this inconsistency, so visual illusions, mirages, mirror images 
and so forth are described as 'false' and 'deceptive' phenomena. Thus, these 
are descriptions in conventional terms. 
On the other hand, what if the question is asked: what is the truth of an 
actual face, an actual moon, an actual sound, actual water, in contrast with an 
illusion or reflection? From a commonsensical standpoint, the answer would 
be that their truths are such that the appearances and the modes of existence are 
consistent and, therefore, they are true and non-deceptive. The non-deceptive 
nature of a face, a moon, a sound etc. is the ultimate truth pertaining to them 
from the vantage point of the worldly conventions. Hence, they are described 
as 'true' or 'real' instead of 'false'. 
Candrakirti and Tsong khapa recognise this linguistic convention and 
mobilise exactly the same dialectical styles in the Prasafigika Madhyamika 
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system. Thus the Prasangika Madhyamika's insistence on conformity with 
the worldly conventions ('jig rten gyi tha snyad, lokavyavahara) has very 
significant philosophical implications. Just as an illusion, a mirror image, etc. 
are real in the ordinary sense, in spite of the fact that they are deceptive and 
false, so too, conventional phenomena in the Prasafigika Madhyamika sense, 
are real, and can even be said to constitute truths, in spite of the fact that they 
are recognised by the Madhyamika themselves as false and deceptive. 
Similarly, the concept of ultimate truth is also taken from its ordinary 
application. Nirvana is non-deceptive in the sense that its mode of existence 
is consistent with its mode of appearance. The non-deceptive nature of the 
empty phenomenon itself constitutes its truth, and so it is described as 
'ultimate' in the Prasafigika system. 
These examples, based on worldly conventions, further illustrate that 
ultimate truth is not superior to conventional truth. As far as Tsong khapa 
and Candrakirti are concerned, there is no room for such an interpretation. 
Let us again return to the examples. Take the example of a reflection of a face 
in the mirror, for instance, as against the actual face. We might naively 
assume that because the reflection of a face is not an actual face and does not 
function as the actual face, it is less important or less significant. But why 
should we make such assumption? Why not say that the actual face must also 
be less important or less significant, because it is not the reflection of the face 
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and therefore it does not function as the reflection of face. The same logic 
applies both ways. The mere fact that the image is not something other than it 
is (it is not what it reflects) should not 'diminish its significance. Understood 
as a reflection, the mirror image of the face has its own significance and even 
its own causal effectiveness, just as does the actual face. Moreover, for Tsong 
khapa, the causal effectiveness of a thing is precisely what determines its 
being true. As long as a reflection of face is causally effective, thus empirically 
functional, even if not necessarily consistent with its appearance, then it is 
true, in the ordinary sense, in its own right. 
Now, let us apply the same concept in the Prasafigika context. If we 
claim that the conventional characteristics of a sprout such as its colour, 
shape, extension, size, weight etc. are less important, or less significant, 
because these charcateristics are not identical with the sprout's emptiness, the 
reverse logic also applies. The ultimate nature of a sprout, i.e., the sprout's 
empty mode of being, would also be less important or less significant than 
the sprout's conventional truth. For the sprout's empty mode of being would 
not be able to function as the sprout's conventional truth. The sprout's empty 
mode of being would not manifest itself as the sprout's colour, shape, 
extension, weight and so forth. 
It is clear then, neither of the two truths is more or less significant than 
the other. Indeed, while the illusion only makes sense as illusion in relation to 
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that which is not illusion, the reflection only makes sense as reflection in 
relation to that which is reflected. So too does the real only make sense as real 
in relation to the illusion, the thing reflected in relation to its reflection. This 
also holds in the case of discussions about the ultimate natures of things—the 
being of the sprout—only makes sense inasmuch as it holds in discussions of 
ordinary phenomena. The only criterion that determines a thing's truth in the 
Prasangika Madhyamaka system, represented by Tsong khapa, is the causal 
effectiveness of the thing as opposed to mere 'heuristic' significance. The 
sprout's empty mode of being and the sprout's being as appearance are both 
truths, insofar as they both are causally effective, and thus both functional. 
Although the two truths, understood as the empty and the dependently 
arisen character of phenomena, are of equal footing from the vantage point of 
Prasafigika Madhyamika, these truths are nevertheless differently described. 
The sprout's empty mode is always described as 'ultimate truth', while the 
conventional properties of a sprout such as colour, shape etc are described as 
'conventional truths'. The former is accepted as 'non-deceptive truth,' while 
the sprout's conventional properties are accepted as 'deceptive truth' or 'false 
truth' in spite of the fact that the conventional properties, here described as 
deceptive or false truth, are presupposed in commonsensical view as true and 
real. From the standpoint of arya's meditative equipoise, even what is 
accepted as empirically real in the ordinary sense is understood as 
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thoroughly false and deceptive truth. The sprout's conventional properties 
for example, while having one mode of existence, present themselves to their 
cognising consciousnesses with the conflicting modes of appearance. The 
sprout's empty mode, on the other hand, is accepted as a non-deceptive truth 
from the standpoint of arya's meditative equipoise, for the way it exists and 
the way it appears to this consciousness are consistent. Nevertheless, for 
Tsong khapa, following the worldly convention of giving different 
nomenclatures such as 'true' or 'false' or 'deceptive' or 'non-deceptive,' does 
not make one true and the other less true. In Garfield's words: "it is 
important to note that they are introduced as two truths, and that they are 
introduced as distinct. This will be important to bear in mind... For it is 
tempting, since one of the truths is characterised as an ultimate truth, to think 
of the conventional as 'less true'".' Just as ultimate truth is a form of truth, so 
too is conventional truth—both are truths and hence, for Tsong khapa, there 
are indeed two truths. Nevertheless given the fact that the two truths are not 
conceptually or epistemologically identical in all respects, they are rightly 
described as 'conventional truth' and 'ultimate truth', rather than just 'truth'. 
3.4. The one and only truth 
Let us now turn to Go rampa. In his view, the two truths are binary 
opposites. Moreover, for Go rampa, whatever is false and deceptive cannot be 
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truth—non-deception is thus the mark of truth. With this in mind, Go rampa 
argues that: "truth, in the end, cannot be divided into two. It therefore makes 
no sense to enumerate it. Therefore in the sutra, it is said that 'there is only 
one noble truth, i.e., a nirvana, which is by nature non-deceptive".' Go 
rampa also cites Nagarjuna's statement: "when the Jinas have stated that 
nirvana alone is true, what learned person will then imagine that the rest is 
not false"?' 
Go rampa rejects the authority of conventional truth by treating it as a 
projection of conventional mind—it is the ignorance of ordinary beings. As he 
writes: 
[Question] :If this was true, even the mere term ( tha snyad) conventional 
truth (kun rdzob bden pa, sathvrtisatya) would be unacceptable, for 
whatever is a conventional (kun rdzob) is incompatible with truth (bden 
pa, satya). [Reply]: Since [conventional] truth is posited only in relation 
to a conventional mind (blo kun rdzob), there is no such a problem. Even 
so-called true conventionalities (yang dag kun rdzob ces p'yang) are 
posited as truth with respect to conventional mind (blo kun rdzob). 1' 
This statement is based on the presupposition that conventional truth is not 
actual truth. So, in the attempt to justify the rationale behind the description 
of conventional phenomenon as 'truth', Go rampa argues that 'conventional 
truth' is simply described to suit the 'conventional mind' (blo kun rdzob), that 
is, the ignorant mind of ordinary beings who experience the phenomenal 
world. In other words, conventional truth is described as 'truth' only 
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inasmuch as it is a truth from the perspective of ignorance. It is a truth 
projected (sgro brtag pa) and taken for granted. 
Go rampa equates the ontological significance of conventional truth 
with 'the appearances of non-existent entities just like i1lusions'. 138 As Sa pan 
puts it "conventional truths are like reflections of the moon in the water, 
despite their nonexistence, they appear due to thoughts". 139 And Sa pan 
further argues: "the defining characteristic of conventional truth constitutes 
the appearances of the non-existent objects".' In this sense, the conventional 
truths "are things apprehended by the cognition perceiving empirical entities 
(i.e., ignorance of ordinary beings). Those very things are found as non-
existent by the cognition analysing their mode of existence that is itself 
posited as the ultimate". 141 
Most importantly, Go rampa argues that to describe conventional truth 
as 'truth' has great pedagogical significance in itself. Inasmuch as 
conventional truth is seen merely as a means to achieve ultimate truth, so Go 
rampa claims that the Buddha arbitrarily fabricated or described 
conventional truth as 'truth' simply to suit the rnentality of ordinary beings.'
The two truths are thus categorised as a 'means' (thabs) and a 'result' (thabs 
byung). Go rampa argues for the importance of conventional truth, then, as 
the means to attain the one and only truth that is nirvarta. 1 When 
conventional truth is provisionally designated as truth, it is contrasted with 
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ultimate truth by treating the former as ignorant (rmongs), or ignorance and 
the latter as non-ignorant (ma rmongs), or wisdom.' 
Given the arguments presented above, it is not surprising to draw the 
conclusion that, according. to the view held by Go rarrapa, any duality 
ascribed to truth is entirely untenable. Since there is only orie truth, it cannot 
be distinguished any further. Sa pan,' kLong chen,' Rong ston,' Red mda' 
ba,' sTag tsang,' Sakya mChog ldan" and dGe 'dun Chos 'phel' all agree 
with Go rampa that truth itself is not divisible. These schol a rs also agree that 
the distinction between the two truths is essentially a distinction between two 
conflicting perspectives, rather than a distinction within truth. As such alcya 
mChog ldan, for example, writes: 
Precise enumeration (grangs nges) of the twofold truth explained by all 
earlier Tibetans rests on the precise enumeration of tl -te mistaken 
cognition (blo 'khrul) and unmistaken cognition (blo ma 'khrzzl). With this 
underpinning reason, they explained the precise enumeration through 
the elimination of the third alternative. There is not even a single figure 
to be found who claims the view comparable with the latter [Tibetan 
scholars, i.e., dGe lugs pas], who assert a precise enumeration of the 
twofold truth based on the certification of valid cognitions. 1' 
Among those who avowedly join Go rampa in claiming that the ultimate 
truth (i.e., nirvana) is the sole truth and that the phenomenal world is utter 
illusion are kLong chen,' Sakya mChog ldan,' sTag tsang,' Mi pham,' Mi 
skyod rDo rje,' and dGe 'dun Chos 'phel.' Modern scholars such as 
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Lindtner,' Singh,16° Stcherbatsky 161 and Mufti' also follow the same line of 
argument. Although all of them are monists about truth, there is a 
differentiation to be made. akya mChog ldan,163 and sTag tsang 164 are non-
absolute monists. Despite the fact that they maintain that ultimate truth is the 
sole truth, they do not claim it as a truly established phenomenon (bden par grub 
pa), one that withstands logical analysis. For example, sTag tsang argues, 
"nirvana, alone, is accepted as the truth and non-deceptive from the 
perspective of reasoning consciousness. Even then when it is subjected to 
analysis not only is nirvana, but if there were anything at all that supersedes 
nirvana, that should also remain unestablished". 165 Thus no phenomena, 
according to sTag tsang, withstands logical analysis. The rest are avowed 
absolute monists. For example, Mi pham goes to argue with clarity and 
vigour that the ultimate truth is 'ultimately established' (don dam par grub pa) 
and that it withstands logical analysis without being undermined: 
Reality (de bzhin nyid, tathata) is truly established (bden par grub, satya-
siddhi). Conventional phenomena are established as false and deceptive. 
Ultimate, which is free from [falsity and deception] is established as 
truth of non-deception and non-falsehood. If this remains 
urtestablished, it would then be impossible to see the arya's truth ('phags 
pa'i bden pa, arya satya). Merely seeing false and deceptive objects like 
ordinary beings (tha mal pa) would never ever free anybody... 
Whatever is dharmata, i.e., ultimate truth is truly established (bden grub), 
because it is established as cognitive sphere of the nondual wisdom 
(gnyis snang med pa'i blo'i yul). Besides it withstands logical analysis (rig 
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pa'i dpyad bzod pa), for no logical reasoning, whatsoever can undermine 
(gzhig cing) it or causes its destruction (gcom pa). Therefore, so long as it 
does not withstand logical analysis, it is not ultimate, because it would 
absurdly be conventional. 166 
In short, since in his view both truths are actual truths, Tsong khapa is fully 
committed to a non-paradoxical, mutually entailing, and non-hierarchical 
relationship between the two truths. In contrast, since ultimate truth is the 
only truth, Go rampa is committed to a paradoxical, mutually contradictory 
and hierarchical relationship between the two truths. 
Conclusion 
The gulf between Tsong khapa and Go rampa's positions regarding the 
nature of the relationship between the two truths is evident from the outset. 
Their disagreement on the nature of the distinction between the two truths 
forms the ground of the debate between them. The key to Tsong khapa's view 
is his insistence on the 'two natures' (rang bzhin gnyis), while for Go rampa, it 
is the idea of 'mere mind' (blo tsam). Tsong khapa attempts to show that the 
two natures must stand as the foundation of the doctrine of the two truths. 
On this basis, he is able to argue that the distinction between the two truths is 
not purely subjective or linguistic in character. Since both the truths have the 
two natures as their ontological reference, so the distinction between the 
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truths cannot be reduced to one of mere perspective or even purely 
epistemological or linguistic practice. In contrast, Go rampa's approach is one 
that does indeed uphold and reinforce the conception of the two truths as 
founded in two contradictory perspectives. Consequently, he is able to treat 
the distinction between the two truths as purely subjective. Since the two 
truths are not grounded in distinct natures, so the two truths are ultimately 
reducible to their cognising consciousnesses—ignorance and wisdom. 
The gap continues to widen as the analysis focuses on the relationship 
between the two truths. By arguing that the two truths have a single 
ontological identity, even though they have different conceptual identities, 
Tsong Ichapa shows that they stand on the same ontological footing in spite of 
the fact that they are verified along separate epistemic pathways. He also 
insists that they are equally significant in terms of their epistemological and 
soteriological values. Go rampa, on the other hand, insists that the two truths 
are distinct and incompatible. In so doing, he not only argues that they are 
ontologically distinct, but disparages conventional truth as less significant in 
terms of its epistemological and soteriological value. By treating the two 
truths as hierarchical, Go rampa holds to a monistic and absolutist view. By 
treating the two truths as standing on an equal basis, Tsong khapa maintains 
a pluralistic and a non-absolutistic account and claims that it is indeed 
consistent with Prasaftgika Madhyamika thought. 
CHAPTER II 
MEANINGS AND DEFINITIONS OF THE TWO TRUTHS 
Introduction 
This chapter compares Tsong khapa and Go rampa's definitions of the two 
truths in two parts. The first part offers a detailed analysis of the meaning of 
the two truths.' This includes analyses of several important concepts related 
to the meaning of sanivrti (kun rdzob), namely, the relationship between 
sarinyti and ignorance, saritvrti and mutual interdependence and sorivrti and 
the worldly conventions. These concepts and relations, as we shall see, are 
critical not only in understanding the defining characteristics of the two 
truths, but also in clarifying the background to the discussion as well as in 
addressing the significance of and relationship between the two truths. 
Since the meanings and definitions of sathvrti proposed by Tsong khapa 
and Go rampa are closely intertwined with the way they understand the 
scope and the limits of the objects of negation, we shall explore the nature of 
ignorance in relation to the concealers (sgrib pa, avaranas). This will be 
followed by a brief, but nonetheless important, comparison of the meanings 
of the paramarthasatya (don dam bden pa). The focus of this analysis will be on 
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the question of whether the unconditioned and the transcendental nature of 
the paramarthasatya is epistemological or metaphysical. 
The second part of this chapter is devoted to a comparative study of the 
definitions of the two truths offered by Tsong khapa and Go rampa. First, I 
will compare the criteria they each mobilise to determine the defining 
characteristics of the two truths. I will argue that for Go rampa, the two 
contradictory perspectives, viz., ignorance and wisdom, determine his 
definitions of the two truths, whereas for Tsong khapa, this is determined by 
the empirically valid consciousness and ultimately valid consciousness. 
Second, through a comparison of the status of the two truths, Tsong khapa's 
view that the two truths stand on an equal footing is reinforced. As Tsong 
khapa understands matters, all empirically given phenomena satisfy the 
defining characteristics of both truths since they are equivalent to the dual 
natures verified by their corresponding consciousnesses. I will argue that for 
Go rampa, in contrast, the defining characteristics of the two truths are 
mutually excluding and hierarchical. 
1. The meanings of saritvrti (kun rdzob) 
Let us begin with Candrakirti's explanation of the meaning of satiwrti. In the 
Prasannapada, he attributes three meanings to the term satiivrti: 
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Sarrivrti (kun rdzob) means entirely obstructing. Ignorance is posited as 
sarinyti [concealer] for it veils the true nature of things. Or, santvrti 
means mutual interdependence; it has the sense of being mutually 
interdependent. Or, satrivrti means 'terms;' it is equivalent with 'worldly 
convention'. [In this sense], it has the character of expression and 
expressed, consciousness and objects of consciousness, etc. 2 
In commenting on Candrakirit's passage both Tsong khapa and Go rampa 
offer three explanations (sgra bshad) of the term samvrti (kun rdzob): 3 
• 'ignorant consciousness' (ma rig pa, avidya) that conceals the true nature 
of things either through the conception of essence or through the 
reification of essence; 
• 'mutually interdependent' (phan tshun brtan pa, paraparasaiithhavana); 
and 
• 'worldly conventions' ('jig rten tha snyad,lokavyavahara). 
Tsong khapa and Go rampa comment on these three meanings as 
follows—Tsong khapa first: 
[1] Kun rdzob (sarnvrti) is nescience or ignorance (mi shes pa, avidya or 
djiidna) because it conceals ('gebs), and thereby obstructs (sgrib par byed 
pa) reality. Since the [Sanskrit] equivalent of the [term] kun rdzob 
(sarrivrti) also applies to the obstruction (sgrib pa), it is explained in these 
terms; this however is far from stating that all kun rdzob (sarhvrti) are 
obstructors. [2] Or, kun rdzob (sarrivrti) means mutually interdependent 
(phan tshun brten pa, parasparasambhavana). This means that, since [all 
phenomena] must be mutually interdependent, it is untrue that they 
possess self-instituting natures (tshugs thub kyi rang bzhin pa). The 
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reason for this explanation of the term [kun rdzob] is also applicable to 
ultimate truth, yet the term kun rdzob (sainvrrti) does not apply [to 
ultimate truth, for it is not kun rdzob]. For example, the reason for the 
explanation of the term 'lake-born' [lotus flowers], although, is 
applicable to frogs [since frogs are born in lakes], but the term 'lake-
born' does not apply to them [because they are not lotuses]. [3] Or, kun 
rdzob (sainvrti) means—terms (brda, saritket)—i.e., worldly conventions 
('jig rten gyi tha snyad, lokavyavahara). That too is explained as having 
characteristics of expresser and expressed, consciousness and object of 
consciousness, and so forth. Therefore [kun rdzob] must not held to be 
merely the object possessing conventions (yul can gyi tha snya. d), 
consciousness, and expressions.' 
and then Go rampa: 
[1] Kun rdzob (sathvrti) is that which obstructs all. The primal ignorance 
(ml shes pa, ajnana or avidya) is described as kun rdzob (sarrivrti) because 
, ignorance thoroughly conceals the reality of things. [2] Or kun rdzob 
(sarirvrti) means mutually interdependent (phan tshun brten pa, 
parasparsambhavana). It means [that things] are mutually 
interdependent. [3] Or, kun rdzob (sarrivrti) refers to terms (rda, saritket), 
i.e., worldly conventions ('ig rten gyi tha snyad, lokavyavahara). That too 
is explained as having the characteristics of expresser and expressed, 
consciousness and objects of consciousness, and so forth.' 
In reference to the three meanings, Tsong khapa and Go rampa point out that 
these are sets of connotations or implications that the word sanivrti (kun rdzob) 
may bear in various contexts. In the following three sections, we shall briefly 
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consider the epistemological, ontological and soteriological significance of 
each of these three meanings in turn. 
1.1.Saritvrti as 'ignorant consciousness' 
In the first meaning of sariivrti, the debate between Tsong khapa and Go 
rampa centres primarily on the scope of ignorance and its implications for the 
system of conventional truths (sarrivrtisatya, kun rdzob bden pa). Tsong khapa 
argues that essences reified by ignorant consciousness are strictly 
epistemological since they are purely conceptual reifications. Empirically, 
essences are nonexistent and, strictly speaking, do not have any ontological 
foundation. In spite of the fact that the reifying agents themselves (ordinary 
beings) cling to essences as realities or truths, those essences do not constitute 
empirical truths. The eradication of ignorance thus leads to the eradication of 
conceptually reified essences, but not to the eradication of empirical truths 
themselves. Go rampa, on the other hand, argues that empirical truths are 
themselves essences reified by ignorance and as a consequence he also denies 
that there are any so-called 'conceptually reified' essences apart from what 
are empirically given. The eradication of ignorance, according to this view, 
leads to the eradication of empirical truth. 
In the context in which sariivrti refers to ignorant consciousness (ma rig 
pa, avidya), both Tsong khapa and Go rampa maintain that saiiivrti (kun rdzob) 
Chapter II 
	
Meanings and definitions of the two truths 	Page 79 
has the connotation of what Newland6 calls a 'concealer,' for it specifically 
refers to a consciousness that conceals the true identities of phenomena. 
Phenomena, for both Tsong khapa and Go rampa, are devoid of essences and 
are essentially empty of any substantial mode of being. Due to ignorance, 
however, as Tsong khapa and Go rampa explain it, ordinary beings 
conceptually reify or superimpose (sgro 'dogs pa) onto phenomena the idea of 
their having an essential mode of existence. Tsong khapa and Go rampa also 
agree that ignorance compels ordinary beings to unconsciously apply 
conceptually distorted identities to phenomena and to confuse them with 
true identities. Since ignorance conceals the truth from being directly 
perceived, it is described as a 'concealer' (samvrti, kun rdzob). 7 Ignorance is 
also described as an 'obscuring consciousness' (rmongs par byed), inasmuch as 
it literally obstructs sentient beings from seeing things as they really are. Go 
rampa, for example, argues as follows: 
In the first [etymological explanation of] sarhvrtisatya, sam is [an 
abbreviated form] of samyag, meaning 'reality', and vrti means 'to 
conceal'. Since it conceals true meaning of reality (yang dag pa'i don), 
ignorance—the conception of true existence—is a model of kun rdzob 
(sarhvrti) regardless of the difference between reified objects (kun brtag 
pa) and intuitive assumptions (than skes). For it 'conceals true meaning 
of reality'. Satya (bden pa) means 'truth'. It is truth in the sense that it 
appears true from the perspective of the ignorant consciousness.8 
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The agreement between Tsong khapa and Go rampa regarding their 
treatments of ignorance does not, however, go far. Unlike Tsong khapa, Go 
rampa goes on to argue that satiorti, namely ignorance (ma rig pa, ajriana), is 
responsible for reifying sainvrtisatya (kun rdzob bden pa), that is, for reifying the 
whole system of empirical truths (tha snyad bden pa, vyavaharikasatya). Indeed, 
according to Go rampa's view, there is no cognitive process that does not 
reify sathvrtisatya (kun rdzob bden pa) at the same time as it verifies sarhvrtisatya 
(kun rdzob bden pa). Every cognitive event, either perceptual or conceptual 
reifies or conceives essence and therefore reifies or conceives all cognitions 
and the cognised objects classified as the 'objects of negation' (dgag bya). 
Every cognition thus operates under the influence of ignorance. 
'The objects of negation', according to Go rampa, are of two types—the 
'soteriological objects of negation' (/am gyi dgag bya) and the 'epistemological 
objects of negation' (rig pa'i dgag bya). We shall leave the details of the 
'soteriological objects of negation' for consideration later. In the current 
context, what is most relevant to address is the exact scope of the 
'epistemological objects of negation' in Go rampa's account. In the following 
passage Go rampa clearly asserts that all subjects and objects, and thus all 
conventional truths, belong to the 'epistemological objects of negation'. 
The soteriological object of negation (lam gyi dgag bya) is constitutive of 
all deceptive appearances. The epistemological (rigs pa) and the 
scriptural (lung) objects of negation (dgag bya)... are comprised of 
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apprehended objects and apprehending subjects. The former 
[apprehended objects], includes two types [of objects of negation]: that 
which is grossly reified through philosophical misconception and that 
which is reified by virtue of innate misconception... .The latter, the 
subjective object of negation comprised of all cognitions and distorted 
views—including concepts such as 'this object' and that object'. 9 
Tsong khapa also distinguishes between the 'soteriological objects of 
negation' and the 'epistemological objects of negation'. However, for Tsong 
khapa, the epistemological objects of negation consist of 'the conception of 
essence' and of 'essence per se'. 1° Of the two, Tsong khapa sees the latter as 
fundamental, since the eradication of reified essence leads to the eradication 
of the consciousness that conceives or reifies essence. The erroneous 
conception of essence does not arise if its conceptual object, i.e. essence, is 
negated. The cognising subject depends on its object to exist, since the 
existence of both subject and object is one of mutual interdependence.' In 
direct contrast with Go rampa's view (wherein empirical truths themselves 
are considered as the epistemological objects of negation), Tsong khapa 
argues that "whatever is [the epistemological] object of negation must have 
no empirical existence. For something that exists empirically cannot be 
repudiated by way of conceptual analysis".' This does not mean that the 
repudiation of the epistemological objects of negation is a futile exercise. 
Despite the nonexistence of essence per se, argues Tsong khapa, "the 
Chapter II 
	
Meanings and definitions of the two truths 	Page 82 
misconceptions pertaining to the existence of essence still arise. This has to be 
repudiated".13 
Given the more restricted scope of the first sense of sarrivrti, Tsong 
Ichapa, equates it with ignorance and maintains that whatever is reified by 
ignorance must be included among the epistemological objects of negation. It 
is thus crucial to note that, in this context, the term satrivrti should not be 
understood in its usual sense. The scope of saihvrti (kun rdzob) does not, 
therefore, include subjects and objects in any broad sense. Go rampa, on the 
other hand, argues that the first sense of satiorti must include all conventional 
phenomena. He borrows this argument from his Indian predecessor 
jayananda [12th Century]. jayananda treats the entire system of sarhvrtisatya as 
a reification of ignorance. In his commentary on the Madhayamakavatara, 
Jayananda distinguishes between the two types of concealers (sgrib pa, 
avarartas)—namely, deluded ignorance (nyon mongs can gyi ma rig pa, 
klegajliana) and non-deluded ignorance (nyon mongs can ma yin pa'i ma rig pa, 
aklegajfiana)—the former is seen as responsible for causing the recurrence of 
sariisaric life while the latter is seen as responsible for causing the appearance 
of the conventional world.' The appearance of the conventional world, 
according to Jayananda, is therefore due to non-deluded ignorance. Go 
rampa could not agree more. 
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Tsong khapa however considers the view held by Jayananda, and 
therefore of Go rampa, to be extremely problematic, at least so far as the 
Prasangika Madhyamika is concerned. From Tsong khapa's perspective, to 
identify ignorance as sarrivrti "amounts to identifying sariivrti in terms of a 
perspective to which sarrivrti is being referred, but this does not amount to 
identifying sari/7)ra in a general sense". 15 To describe sathvrti or ignorance as a 
concealer because it obstructs seeing reality as it is, is for Tsong khapa "far 
from claiming that all sari-tura are concealers".' It is acceptable for the 
Prasangika Madhyamika to maintain that all phenomena are sariorti, that is, 
conventionalities, and yet it is not acceptable to maintain that all phenomena 
are sathvrti, that is, concealers of reality. Hence 'concealer of reality', in the 
case of Tsong khapa, specifically refers to ignorant consciousness, but not to 
phenomenal objects and sense perceptions. 
Tsong khapa does acknowledge, however, that sarirvrti has another 
dimension. When the sarrivrti—ignorance as a concealer of reality—is 
understood in conjunction with the term satya (bden pa), then the two terms 
can be combined to form sathvrtisatya (kun rdzob bden pa)—literally 'truth for a 
concealer'. In this context, satya should be taken as the object of 
consciousness, while sarrivrti refers to the deluded consciousness itself. This 
very specific "sathvrtisatya", according to Tsong khapa, "is posited entirely by 
the power of a deluded ignorance". 17 In fact, this particular satya, as we shall 
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see shortly, is said to be entirely fabricated by the deluded consciousness. It 
has no empirical objectivity whatsoever. 
The question then is: what is the ontological status of the satya, i.e., the 
truth reified by this saritvrti (deluded ignorance)? How is this particular truth 
as reified by ignorance different from other empirically given truths? Since 
Go rampa treats conceptually reified truth and empirically given truth as one 
and the same, these questions do not arise. But for Tsong khapa the issue is 
totally different. Since he insists on the radical distinction of conceptually 
reified truth from empirically given truth, Tsong khapa's responses to the 
above questions are crucial: 
Under the influence of this kun rdzob, the conception of true existence 
(bden 'dzin)—things such as blue colours appear to have essential 
existence, while in fact they have no essence whatsoever. False 
constructions (bcos ma) fabricated (bcos pa) [by the ignorance] appear so 
real (bden par snang) to sentient beings that they are described by the 
Victor (thub pa, muni) as 'jig rten gyi kun rdzob kyi bden pa [truths for 
worldly beings], i.e., they are real [only] from the perspective of 
erroneous consciousness of ordinary beings, ('jig rten gyi phin ci log kyi 
kun rdzob). 18 
Satya, truth reified by ignorance, entails, in Tsong khapa's view, reified 
essence and the conception of essence. Essence fabricated by ignorance, 
which is truth or reality for deluded consciousness, is nevertheless utterly 
rejected by Madhyamika thought. In fact, Tsong khapa argues that it is one of 
Chapter II 
	
Meanings and definitions of the two truths 	Page 85 
the distinctive features of Prasafigika (as opposed to Svatantrika) to proclaim 
that things do not have essences even conventionally. Although essence is 
recognised as the truth by ordinary people, and thus it is described as 'jig rten 
gyi kun rdzob kyi bden pa, a truth for ordinary beings or truth for-a-concealer, it 
is nonetheless, utterly nonexistent for the Prasafigikas. 
From the Prasarigika standpoint "essence.. .is not a conventional truth 
(kun rdzob kyi bden pa, samvrtisatya)". 19 Far from it being empirical truth, Tsong 
khapa insists that "anything that is posited by the reifying cognition (bden 
'dzin) is not even conventionally possible". 2° For while essence is reified by 
ignorance, it is empirically nonexistent. Essence (svabhava) superimposed or 
conceived through ignorance (samvrti, kun rdzob) must not therefore have any 
empirical grounding (tha snyad du 'ang mi srid). For something to be qualified 
as a sarhvrtisatya (kun rdzob kyi bden pa yin na), Tsong khapa claims that "it 
must inevitably satisfy an empirical position". 21 All Prasafigika Madhyamikas 
are unanimous in asserting that "it is impossible for things to be essentially 
existent in and of themselves. This is precisely because, apart from the 
reifying cognition, no other non-reifying consciousness such as perception 
verifies the existence of essence. This shows", Tsong khapa concludes, "that 
essence is purely subjective (blo ngor)". Kalupahana also points out that "the 
notion of a substance was rejected because it could not be identified with 
anything in experience".' Therefore, reified essence and the conception of 
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essence, according Tsong khapa, constitute the central epistemological objects 
of negation. It is thus clear that the distinction between the description of 
phenomena as sathvrti (kun rdzob), and the description of ignorance 
(understood as a reifying perspective) as sanzvrti plays such a crucial role in 
Tsong khapa's account. 
The next question at issue here is this: what is the impact of eradicating 
ignorance and its reified essence and so of eradicating the epistemological 
objects of negation? This question concerns both Tsong khapa and Go rampa 
and their responses are radically different, reflecting their contrasting 
positions regarding the scope of ignorance and its reified essence, and so the 
scope of the epistemological objects of negation. There is, however, one thing 
upon which they agree, although the agreement is somewhat superficial. 
Both Tsong khapa and Go rampa maintain that all phenomena conceived as 
essentially real by ordinary sentient beings under the spell of ignorance are 
understood by those who have eradicated deluded ignorance (nyon mongs pa 
can gyi ma rig pa) as conditioned, false and deceptive. The essences fabricated 
by ignorance can only deceive immature beings (byis pa), but such reified 
truths cannot deceive enlightened beings such as arya-gravakas, arya-
pratyekabuddhas and arya-bodhisattvas. Hence, Tsong khapa, for example, 
argues that "since those beings no longer presuppose the existence of such 
essences, they see all phenomena as essentially unreal". 24 All conventional 
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phenomena are "mere sanivrti (kun rdzob tsam), just like illusions, and they are 
perceived as dependently arisen"." Go rampa agrees. 
In spite of the fact that arya-gravakas, arya-pratyekabuddhas and arya-
bodhisattvas are free from sarrivrti—ignorance and its reified essence—their 
empirically valid cognitions consistently verify sathvrtisatya, conventional 
truths.' This means that although arya understand all conditioned 
phenomena (saritskara, 'du 'byed rnams) as untrue (me bden pa), they do not 
reduce "conventional phenomena to non-conventional truths of some kind 
(kun rdzob bden par ma yin par ma bsgrubs)".' And those conventional truths 
are not concealers whether they relate to subjective consciousness or to the • 
object of that consciousness. In contrast, for Go rampa, whether we look to 
subjective consciousness (yul can) or objective phenomena, then so long as 
these are sarhvrti, so long are they responsible for concealing the truth. Both 
subjective consciousnesses and the objects of consciousnesses are, according 
to this view, concealers of reality.' "Objective appearances of the conditioned 
phenomena perceived by three types of aryas in their post meditative 
equipoise", as Go rampa argues, "are also concealers of reality (yang dag sgrib 
byed). For [those appearances] arise due to the power of the impressions or 
the apprehensions of duality"." Moreover, Go rampa also claims that 
objective appearances obstruct the development of the meditative equipoise 
that transcends the apprehension of appearances.' 
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While Tsong Ichapa argues that empirical truths are not posited by 
ignorance, but instead are certified by empirically valid consciousnesses, Go 
rampa takes empirical truths to be wholly posited by ignorance. Go rampa 
borrows this position from Jayananda. When Jayananda was asked by his 
interlocutors, "but why are illusory objects like dependently arisen 
phenomena apparent, even after the eradication of deluded ignorance (nyon 
mongs pa can gyi ma rig pa)? It is due to the operation of mere ignorance that 
conceals true knowledge (shes bya'i sgrib pa, jrieyavarana)," replies Jayananda.' 
Go rampa fully agrees. 
1.2. Sanivrti as 'mutually interdependent' 
The second sense of satiivrti is 'mutually interdependent' (phan tshun brten pa, 
parsparasambhavana). For Tsong khapa, this represents a radical contrast with 
the first meaning of satrivrti wherein satrivrti is equated with ignorance. 
Satrivrti, in this context is taken to refer to the mutually interdependent nature 
of the two truths both epistemologically and ontologically. I will argue that, 
for Tsong khapa, even paramarthasatya, ultimate truth, let alone all empirically 
given truths, should be classified as categories of satrivrti whenever sarrivrti 
takes 'mutually interdependent' as its sense. I will argue that, for Go rampa, 
in contrast, the second meaning of sorivrti, namely, 'mutually 
interdependent', while it does apply to empirical truth in both an ontological 
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and epistemological sense, cannot apply to ultimate truth. For Go rampa 
ultimate truth is ontologically transcendent and absolute and cannot be 
sarinyti at any level. 
Let us turn to Tsong khapa first. If the term sariorti is taken to mean 
'mutually interdependent', as opposed to meaning 'ignorance', then, Tsong 
khapa argues, sativvrti must apply exhaustively to all phenomena including 
ultimate truth. What is at issue here does not merely concern the relation 
between phenomena and the apprehending consciousness, but rather the core 
ontological status of all phenomena. With respect to empirical or conventional 
truth, mutual interdependence implies ontological insubstantiality, 
essenceless and evanescence. In other words, being 'mutually 
interdependent' means that the very existence of all phenomena depends on 
their being relational and interdependent—"As all phenomena must arise 
through a network of their causes and conditions, they simply are empty of 
the self-defining characteristics"?' 
'Mutual interdependence,' according to the view held by Tsong khapa, 
is not restricted to empirical truths alone. Indeed, Tsong khapa argues that 
the term sathvrti, in the sense of 'mutually interdependent', refers also to the 
ontological and epistemological interdependence of ultimate truth 
(paramarthasatya don dam bden pa) in relation to conventional truth. The mode 
of the existence of ultimate truth is entirely dependent on its conventional 
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counterpart. The two are like subject and predicate in that the latter cannot 
exist without the former and the vice versa. In this sense, ultimate truth can 
be said to belong to the categories of sainvrti (kun rdzob). Consequently, 
paramarthasatya, ultimate truth, is considered as a category of sarirvrti not 
because it fulfils the defining criterion of sarirvrti, but because it is 
ontologically and epistemologically interdependent with conventional truth. 
The idea of classifying ultimate truth as sainvrti is not sustainable, 
argues Tsong khapa, if ultimate truth is given primacy or priority over 
conventional truth—whether ontological or epistemological. Since he himself 
views paramarthasatya and sarrivrtisatya as standing on an equal footing, so 
neither of the two can have priority over the other. Paramarthasatya is the 
ultimate nature, or ultimate mode, of the empirically given truths. Since the 
ultimate truth is not possible without a characterised empirical object, 
paramarthasatya is not possible unless it is a dependently arisen phenomenon. 
Indeed, ultimate truth is none other than the ultimate mode of being of 
empirical truth. If paramarthasatya were not a dependently arisen 
phenomenon, then it would then be ontologically absolute, and therefore 
essentially real, but in that case, paramarthasatya would neither be equivalent 
to empty phenomenon nor would it be feasible to categorise it as satrivrti—as 
a mutually interdependent phenomenon. 
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Go rampa agrees with Tsong khapa in recognising empirical 
phenomena as mutually interdependent phenomena, and as being 
dependently arisen and contigent. Go rampa explains s a rii as meaning 
interdependent' (brten pa) or 'relative' (ltos pa) and vrti as 'engaging' ('jug pa).' 
The first two of these, 'interdependent' and 'relative', reflect the idea of 
ontological interdependence, while the third, 'engaging', reflects the idea of 
epistemological interdependence. The point of contrast for Go rampa, 
however, is that all interdependent phenomena, namely, all conventional and 
thus empirically given truths, are themselves the effects of ignorance—all 
empirically given truths arise as the result of ignorance. Although he takes 
sariivrti to mean 'mutually interdependent', Go ramp a emphasises 
dependence of object on subject and hence relativity to the subject. According 
to this view, the phenomenal world is ontologically dependent on the subject 
that cognises. Moreover, like Jayananda, Go rampa claims that the whole 
system of empirical truths (tha snyad bden pa, vyavaharikasatya) is causally 
dependent on ignorance. It is ignorance, he argues, that causally projects all 
empirical truths (tha snyad bden pa, vyavaharikasatya) either "through the 
impressions of primordial ignorance which conceives true existence" or "due 
to familiarity with flawed philosophical systems".' 
So far as interdependence is concerned, Go rampa sees conventional and 
ultimate truth as radically distinct—indeed, Go rampa does not view ultimate 
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truth as ontologically dependent or interdependent at all. Firstly, ultimate 
truth is not projected by primal ignorance, for it is the only non-deceptive 
truth. Secondly, ultimate truth has ontological primacy over empirical truth. 
It is, in other words, ontologically distinct and stands higher than empirical 
truth. Ultimate truth is ontologically free from the imperfections of empirical 
truths such as being conditioned, false, and deceptive and thus, ultimate truth 
is not interdependent. It is ontologically transcendent and absolute. Hence, 
according to Go rampa, ultimate truth canriot in any circumstance be a 
category of satinyti. In endorsing Go rampa's view, Murti states Isatinytil 
may also mean the mutual dependence of things—their relativity. In this 
sense it is equated with phenomena, and is in direct contrast with the 
absolute which is by itself, unrelated"?' Similarly, Jaideva Singh states: "the 
Absolute comprehended through the categories of thought is phenomena and 
phenomena stripped of these categories are the Absolute"?' 
There is yet another important distinction to be made between Tsong 
khapa, on one hand, and Go rampa on the other. As far as the former is 
concerned, ontological interdependence per se is precisely the paramarthasatya, 
ultimate nature of all phenomena. There is no paramarthasatya of phenomena 
apart from them being dependently arisen. To know phenomena as 
dependently arisen is tantamount to knowing ultimate truth. In contrast, Go 
rampa argues that dependent arising is incompatible with ultimate truth. The 
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perception of phenomena as dependently arisen operates only under the spell 
of ignorance, whether deluded and non-deluded. Dependently arisen 
phenomena are ultimately reducible to the effects of ignorant consciousness, 
and hence cannot be the ultimate truth of any other phenomena. 
1.3. Satrivrti as 'worldly conventions' 
The third meaning of sathvrti (kun rdzob) is 'worldly convention' (jig rten gyi 
tha snyad, lokavyavahara). This sense of satitvrti, according to Tsong khapa, 
takes into account the terms and the consciousnesses and their objective 
referents. As Candrakirti puts it, sarinTH as worldly convention "has the 
characteristics of expression and expressed object, consciousness and object of 
consciousness, and so forth". 38 As opposed to the first meaning of sathvrti, 
where sathvrti is specifically equated with the reifying ignorant 
consciousness, in the third sense of sarinTH, Tsong khapa argues that sari/7)0/ 
"must not be held to be merely subjective conventionalities (yul can gyi tha 
snyad)—consciousness and expressions".' The third sense of sari/v0i, namely, 
'worldly convention' ('jig rten pa'i tha snyad, lokavyavahara) or 'terms' (brda, 
sanket, samay) applies and takes into account all cognitive resources, namely 
the six senses—eye, ear, nose, tongue, body and intellect—their six 
corresponding objects—form, sound, aroma, taste, tactile objects and 
ideas—and also the six consciousnesses—visual consciousness, auditory 
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consciousness etc.—that arise from the contact between the six senses and the 
six objects. 
Go rampa agrees with Tsong khapa regarding the third meaning of 
sarrivrti. Go rampa explains that soh refers to sanket (brda), meaning, 'terms', 
or 'expressions', while vrti refers 'to posit'. Sarrivrti therefore refers to 
conventionalities posited by terms or expressions.' The second and the third 
meanings of sathvrti—mutually interdependent and worldly conventions 
respectively, are closely tied to the first meaning of sathvrti. The whole system 
of 'worldly conventions'—including cognising consciousness, cognised 
objects, terms and their referents, processes, events etc.—are said to be the 
effects of ignorance, the first sense of sarrivrti. Without ignorance, that is, 
without the first meaning of sathvrti, neither the second meaning of sathvrti as 
'mutully interdependent' nor the third meaning as 'worldly conventions' 
would make any sense. Only in the presence of ignorance, which literally 
gives rise to worldly conventions and to the interdependent empirical 
phenomena would either of these able to arise or to be understood. Go rampa 
also argues that sarrivrtisatya is so described because it is true only from the 
vantage point of the ignorant consciousness. This is why in Go rampa's view, 
the first sense of sathvrti is fundamental, and overides the significances of the 
two other senses of sarrivrti. According to Go rampa, then, conventional 
phenomena are true only with respect to the deluded cognitive perspective 
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associated with ignorance It is in this sense that objects are "conventional 
truths (sarhortisatya, kun rdzob bden pa), and are considered referents of 
linguistic conventions (brda 'jug pa'i gzhi)".' 
This discussion of Tsong khapa and Go rampa's analyses of the 
meanings of sathvrti can now be brought to a conclusion with some brief 
reflections on their respective readings of one of the most crucial verses 
relating to the issue at stake here to be found in the Madhyamakavatara of 
Candrakirti: 
Because ignorance conceals the true nature, it is (1) sathvrti. 
It conceives all conditioned phenomena (bcos ma) as real. 
Thus, they are declared by [akya]miCuli as (2) sathvrtisatya. 
All conditioned things (bcos mar gyur ba) are (3) sathvrti [VI: 28].42 
In this verse Candrakirti repeats the term sathvrti three times and in each 
ocassion we can see Tsong khapa and Go rampa as interpreting Candrakirti's 
words in contrasting ways. Tsong khapa maintains that there is a significant 
difference between the meaning of the first use of the term sathvrti and the 
latter two uses, arguing that these uses "should not be taken as identical".' 
The first use of sathvrti, he claims, refers to subjective consciousness, qua 
ignorance, as a concealer. Ignorance, Tsong khapa holds, "is a sathvrti, 
because, it is a reifying cognition, which superimposes essential existence 
onto [contingent phenomena] by concealing the true mode of existence from 
being seen [by sentient beingsr.' As was pointed out earlier, when sarizvrti is 
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understood with reference to sarhvrtisatya, meaning literally 'a truth-for-a-
concealer', the idea is, as Tsong khapa puts it, "to identify [a specific] satiivrti, 
i.e., a perspective to which the saiinyti is being referred. However, strictly 
speaking, this [identification] does not amount to identifying sarrivrti in a 
general sense". 45 According to Tsong khapa, sa thvrti, in this context, 
specifically refers an erroneous or a reifying cognition. Hence, the first sense 
of "satinyti employed by Candrakirti refers to a concealer (sgrib byed), 
whereby the concealer is taken as meaning the same (skad dod) as satiivrti".' 
The second meaning of sathvrti has two senses: it refers to 'essence' as it 
is conceptually reified by the ignorant consciousness, which, as Tsong khapa 
argues, is empirically nonexistent. It can also refer to the empirical 
phenomena that act as the basis for the reification process, for example, to the 
table that is itself reified as an essential phenomenon. The third sathvrti, so far 
as Tsong khapa is concerned, refers to all conventionalities in a much broader 
sense. All conditioned phenomena or dependently arisen phenomena, 
including ignorance itself as well as the conception of essence, come under 
the third category of satiwrti. However, not all conventionalities (kun rdzobs, 
sathvrti) satisfy the criterion of being conventional truth (kun rdzob bden pa, 
sathvrtisatya). As Tsong khapa argues, "if something is a conventional truth, it 
must necessarily meet the criterion of empirical existence (tha snyad du yod 
pa)".' Ignorance and all other dependently arising phenomena are 
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conventional truths and are grounded in empirical evidence. While the 
essence projected by ignorance constitutes a conventional truth for ordinary 
beings, essence is not a conventional truth from the Madhyamika standpoint. 
It does not meet the criterion of empirical truth. "It is thus unfounded even 
empirically". Therefore, as Candrakirti puts it "[essence] and other things 
that are understood to be false even conventionally [e.g. the reflection of face 
being an actual face, mirage being water etc.,] are not considered as categories 
of conventional truths".' Nonetheless, they are considered as categories of 
conventionalities (sarrivrti, kun rdzob). 
Unlike Tsong khapa, who has a more nuanced account of the term 
sathvrti as it appears in verse VI:28 of the Madhyamakdvatara, Go rampa's 
reading of this verse is a quite straightforward one. He takes the first sense of 
satrivrti to be synonymous with ignorance itself and the latter two senses 
sathvrti(s) to be synonymous with the objects found or reified by such 
ignorance. In this respect, objects themselves are the essences and there is no 
essence apart from what is empirically given. Dependently arisen 
phenomena, therefore, are the categories of objects that are projected by 
ignorance. The explanations of sathvrti by kLong chen,' So pan,51 akya 
mChog ldan, 52 Rong ston,' and Mure largely accord with Go rampa's 
interpretation. All of them treat primal ignorance as the villain responsible for 
projecting the entire system of conventional truths. As a consequence, they 
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also agree that the senses of sarhvrti as conventional and as interdependent 
are entirely dependent upon the first meaning of sathvrti as ignorance. 
2. Concealers: the 'soteriological objects of negation' 
The scope and role of ignorance is a central issue in any exploration of the 
three meanings of sarrivrti and since, in order fully to comprehend the 
meanings of sarrivrti, it is crucial to grasp the scope of the negative impact of 
ignorance, we shall also briefly consider Tsong khapa and Go rampa's views 
on the `soteriological objects of negation' (lam gyi dgag bya)—the avaranas 
(sgrib pa) rendered as 'concealers', or 'obstructions'. 
Both Tsong khapa and Go rampa maintain that it is the presence of the 
soteriological objects of negation—namely, the two types of concealers (sgrib 
pa, avaranas)—that is responsible for preventing sentient beings from 
attaining correct knowledge and so from attaining enlightenment. The 
concealers comprise so-called 'deluded concealers' (mnyon sgrib, klegavaranas) 
and 'non-deluded concealers' (akleitavarana, nyon rmongs can ma yin pa'i sgrib 
pa). The non-deluded concealers are also called the 'concealers of true 
knowledge' (shes bya'i sgrib pa, jiteyavarana). These two concealers are said to 
be obstructions responsible for obscuring the true nature of reality. They thus 
prevent cognising beings from knowing phenomena as they actually are. The 
deluded concealers (nyon sgrib, klegavaranas) comprise three main elements: 
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craving, aversion, and ignorance. Among them, the last, deluded ignorance 
(akleitavarana, nyon mongs can gyi ma rig pa) plays the chief role in concealing 
reality through actively reifying essences (rang bzhin, svabhava) or passively 
conceiving them (and sometime both in combination). Either way, the 
deluded concealers are those reifying cognitive processes responsible for 
distorting the ultimate truth pertaining to processes, events and 
phenomena.' The non-deluded concealers—concealers of true knowledge 
(shes bya'i sgrib pa, jfieyavarana)—are comprised of predispositions or 
impressions left in our mind by the deluded concealers (nyon sgrib, 
kleaavaranas). 
For both Tsong khapa and Go rampa, the concealers of true knowledge 
(shes bya'i sgrib pa, jiieyavaratm) are subtle mental conditionings that 
predispose cognising beings to the influence of deluded ignorance or reifying 
mental processes. These subtle mental conditionings, unlike the reifying 
ignorance itself, do not themselves bring about the active reification of 
essences, but are instead passive dispositions that may persist even after the 
total eradication of the deluded concealers. Just as the smell of the onion 
remains even after the onion itself has been removed, so the concealers of true 
knowledge remain after the removal of the deluded concealers—and just as it 
is much easier to remove the onion than its smell, so it is easier to remove the 
deluded concealer than the non-deluded. 
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Why are non-deluded concealers taken to constitute ignorance? In 
Tsong khapa's case, it is to the extent that they obscure subtle realities from 
direct perception—thus they prevent an arya from grasping empty 
phenomena as empty or dependently arisen phenomena as dependently 
arisen. The non-deluded concealers thus constitute a form of ignorance even 
though they arise after the obliteration of deluded ignorance. For Go rampa, 
however, the distinction between deluded and non-deluded concealers is 
understood very differently. Go rampa borrows Jayananda's account 
according to which the types of ignorance are derived from different 
functions: "Ignorance is twofold, deluded and non-deluded. Deluded 
ignorance causes sariisara by generating clinging towards 'I' and 'Mine,' 
whereas non-deluded ignorance merely causes the appearances of physical 
forms and so forth. But it is not the cause of the conception of true existence 
[i.e. essence]".' The fact that arya-gravakas, arya-pratyekabuddhas and arya-
bodhisattvas, according to Go rampa and Jayananda, "cognise dependently 
arisen phenomena as mere conventionalities (kun rdzob tsam) akin to illusions 
and so forth precisely because they are still under the influence of the non-
deluded ignorance". This non-deluded ignorance is the concealer of true 
knowledge (shes bya'i sgrib pa, jrieyavarana). 'Non-deluded ignorance' (nyon 
mongs pa can ma yin pa) is so-described, because, unlike deluded ignorance "it 
does not conceive true existence, and therefore it does not give rise to other 
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delusions such as craving".' So far as Go rampa and Jayananda are 
concerned, an enlightened being who has eradicated not only deluded 
concealers, but also non-deluded concealers, "does not have the perception of 
even mere conventionalities (kun rdzob tsam), for buddhas do not have any 
cognitive experience of phenomenal appearances such as that of blue 
colour".' 
Inasmuch as both deluded and non-concealers are recognised as the 
'soteriological objects of negation', there is no apparent disagreement 
between Tsong khapa and Go rampa. Both of them vigorously argue for the 
negation of those concealers. So, the question then is, what is the significance 
and what are the implications of eradicating the deluded concealers (nyon 
sgrib, klegavaranas) and the non-deluded concealers (aklegavarana, nyon mongs 
can ma yin pa'i sgrib pa)? For both Tsong khapa and Co ra.mpa, the attainment 
of the soteriological goal is dependent on the eradication of the soteriological 
objects of negation. 
For instance, knowing all phenomena as essentially empty and selfless, 
and thus as dependently arisen, necessarily requires the eradication of the 
deluded concealers. Without the eradication of active reifying tendencies, 
Tsong khapa maintains, it is not possible to know the selflessness of person 
(gang zag bdag med, pudgala-nairatmya) or the selflessness of phenomena (chos 
kyi bdag med, dharmanairatmya or dharmaganyata). It is as a consequence of 
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eradicating the deluded concealers, and thereby coming to direct knowledge 
of persons and phenomena as selfless and empty, that the practitioner first 
attains total liberation from delusions and becomes an arhat, (Pali: arahat, Tib: 
dgra bcom pa—i.e. one who has totally destroyed enemies within). Similarly, 
the eradication of the non-deluded concealers or the concealers of true 
knowledge (shes bya'i sgrib pa, jileyavarana) has as its consequence (and is 
absolutely necessary for) the attainment of freedom from even the subtlest 
epistemic errors and from the subtlest cognitive and psychological 
conditioning (bag chags, vasana). In Tsong khap a's view, the thorough 
eradication of the soteriological objects of negation results in concurrent 
knowledge of the two truths. One of the chief consequences of eradicating the 
non-deluded concealers (the concealers of true knowledge) is thus the 
realisation of full enlightenment—perfect Buddhahood. 
It is important to note that for Tsong khapa, the idea of essence, both of 
the self and of phenomena, is essentially an episternic fabrication that also 
carries deep cognitive and psychological implications and that is a reification 
produced by deluded ignorance. The Buddha adds: "Monks, I do not 
envision even one other obstruction.. .like the obstruction of ignorance" [Iti 
I.14].' The conception of the essential self of person and the essential self of 
phenomena are thus both seen as forms of deluded concealer. By eradicating 
Chapter II 	 Meanings and definitions of the two truths 	Page 103 
ignorance at the cognitive level, along with its latent predispositions at the 
psychological level, both ideas of essence are likewise eradicated. 
By contrasting the conception of essential self of person and the 
essential self of phenomena, Go rampa, on the other hand, argues that the 
conception of the essential self of person is more superficial than the 
conception of the essential self of phenomena. The deluded concealers (nyon 
sgrib, klegavaranas) are thus exclusively based in the idea of the essential self of 
person, whereas the concealers of true knowledge (shes bya'i sgrib pa, 
irieyavarana) are said to be based exclusively in the conception of the essence 
of phenomena.' While the eradication of the deluded concealers (myon sgrib, 
klegavaranas) leads to the knowledge of selflessness or insubstantiality of the 
self of person (gang zag kyi bdag med. pudgala-nairatmya), Go rampa views the 
eradication of the concealers of true knowledge (shes bya'i sgrib pa, 
jrieyavarana) as leading to the knowledge of emptiness or the insubstantiality 
of the self of phenomena (chos kyi bdag med, dharmanairatmya or 
dharmalayata). Go rampa agrees with Tsong khapa to the extent that the 
eradication of conception of the essential self of person does not require the 
eradication of empirical truths, but Go rampa denies that the eradication of 
the concealers of true knowledge, that is, the eradication of the idea of the 
essence of phenomena, is possible merely through cognitive or psychological 
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transformation. What is actually required is the eradication of the ontological 
structures of empirical truths (tha snyad bden pa, vyavaharikasatya). 
The question of the nature of the soteriological objects of negation thus 
lies at the heart of the disagreement between Tsong khapa and Go rampa. 
While Tsong khapa maintains that eradication of the soteriological objects of 
negation does not lead to eradication of empirical truths, Go rampa and his 
allies persistently argue that the eradication of the soteriological objects of 
negation must also lead to the eradication of the entire system of empirical 
truths. Moreover, this point also extends to the idea of essence. Scholars such 
as Jayananda, kLong chen,' Red mda' ba (1349-1412),' Rong ston,' sTag 
tsang (1405-?),' akya mChog ldan (1428-1507), Mi pham,' dGe dun `Chos 
'phel,71 Singh,' Poussie Stcherbatsky,' Lindtrter, Th Mufti,' and—apart from 
some minor differences—all argue, along with Go rampa, that the eradication 
of the idea of the essence of the self entails the eradication of afflictive 
emotions such as craving, aversion and ignorance, while the eradication of 
the idea of the essence of phenomena necessarily entails the total eradication 
of dependently arising phenomena. Thus, all conventional phenomena, 
according to this view, are classified as soteriological objects of negation. For 
instance, dGe 'dun Chos 'phel writes: 
In short, the appearances which are apparent to us as ordinary beings 
and that which cannot be done away with even by way of 
disintegrating them into thousand parts through the Sevenfold 
Chapter II 
	
Meanings and definitions of the two truths 	 Page 105 
Reasonings is itself the concealer for true knowledge. Or it is due its 
power.. .The eradication of deluded concealer culminates with the 
complete disappearance of the world of appearances from the 
perspective of conceptual mind. While the eradication of the concealer 
of true knowledge culminates with a complete disappearance [of the 
world of appearances] from the perspective of perceptual mind. A.carya 
Candrakirti therefore holds that a buddha, who has completely 
abandoned both the concealers, experience no such appearance...Inner 
clinging onto the table constitutes deluded concealer whereas the visual 
perception of the existence of the table constitutes the concealer of true 
knowledge.' 
In short, it can be said that, for Go rampa, the eradication of the two types of 
ignorance—deluded and non-deluded—must lead to the eradication of the 
entire system of a dependently arisen world. Since all dependently arisen 
phenomena are seen as objects of negation, what is then left is ultimate reality - 
alone. Tsong khapa, on the other hand, argues that the eradication of the two 
types of ignorance cannot lead to the eradication of interdependent 
phenomena, since they are not the objects of negation. Thus, while Tsong 
khapa argues that the eradication of the soteriological objects of negation 
necessarily entails the eradication of delusions, rather than the ontological 
structures of empirical truths (tha snyad bden pa, vyavaharikasatya), Go rampa 
argues that the eradication of the soteriological objects of negation necessarily 
entails the eradication, not only of delusions, but also of the ontological 
structures of empirical truths. 
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Having thus completed the analysis of the meanings of sarhvrti, and the 
relation between these meanings and the epistemological and soteriological 
objects of negation, we shall turn next to a discussion of the meaning of 
paramarthsatya—ultimate truth. Before we move on, however, it is worth 
examining some other sources, inasmuch as they shed light on this matter 
concerning the soteriological objects of negation. The Buddha, for instance, 
has this to say: "No one other thing so obstructs people that they wander on, 
day and night, as when they are ensnared with delusion. But those who, 
letting go of delusion, shatter the mass of darkness, wander no further. Their 
cause is not found" Uti 1.14178 And from the Buddha again: "the passion for 
his resolve is .a man's sensuality, not the beautiful sense pleasures found in 
the world.. .the beauties remain as they are in the world, while the wise, in 
this regard, subdue their desire" [Nibbdedhika Sutta, AN V1.63] 78 antideva 
makes a similar point: "any consciousnesses that arise from seeing, hearing 
etc., are not negated here. What is negated here is the conception of true 
existence which causes suffering" [VI:26]. 8° There are also a number of 
discourses in the Pali Canon that explain very clearly that the mind is defiled, 
not by the five aggregates or the objects of six senses, but rather, due to an 
underlying ignorance of the ephemeral, essenceless and evanescent nature of 
things by clinging onto them as permanent, unchanging, and substantially 
existent. When Ven. ariputra is asked by Ven. Maha Kotthita "Now tell me, 
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friend ariputra, is the eye the fetter of forms, or are forms the fetter of the 
eye? Is the ear.. .Is the nose.. .Is the tongue.. .Is the body.. .Is the intellect the 
fetter of ideas, or are ideas the fetter of the intellect?" ariputra's replies: 
No my friend. The eye is not the fetter of forms, nor are forms the fetter 
of the eye. Whatever desire and passion arises in dependence on the 
two of them: That is the fetter there. The ear is not the fetter of 
sound.. .The nose is not the fetter of aromas.. .The tongue is not the 
fetter of flavours.. .The body is not the fetter of tactile sensations.. .The 
intellect is not the fetter of ideas, nor are ideas the fetter of intellect. 
Whatever desire and passion arises in dependence upon the two of 
them: That is the fetter there [Kotthita Sutta, SN XXXV.191]. 81 
ariputra clarifies the point even further: 
Suppose that a black ox and a white ox were joined with a single collar 
or yoke. If someone were to say, 'The black ox is the fetter of the white 
ox, the white ox is the fetter of the black'—speaking this way, would he 
be speaking rightly?" [Ven. Maha Kotthita]: "No my friend. The black 
ox is not the fetter of the white ox, nor is the white ox the fetter of the 
black. The single collar or yoke by which they are joined: that is the 
fetter there". [ariputra]: "In the same way, the eye is not the fetter of 
forms, nor are forms the fetter of the eye. Whatever desire and passion 
arises in dependence on the two of them: that is the fetter 
there... [Kotthita Sutta, SN XXXV.191].' 
As is the case with Tsong khapa, -ariputra and the Buddha's refusal to 
identify conventional phenomena as the objects of negation would appear to 
be directly at odds with Go rampa's account of the objects of negation and so 
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of ignorance and its scope. While the Buddha and his chief disciple argue for 
the eradication of defiled emotions and need for transformative change in this 
respect, Go rampa argues, not only for the eradication of defilements, but for 
the eradication of all conventional phenomena. 
3. Meanings of paramarthasatija 
The most remarkable distinction between Tsong khapa and Go rampa in 
terms of their positions regarding the meaning of paramarthasatya (don dam 
bdetz pa) lies in the criterion they apply to determine param (dam pa), meaning 
'ultimate,' and artha (don), meaning 'object'. It will be shown that, for Tsong 
khapa, param (dam pa) is the ultimate qualification of artha (don), that is, of the 
object as such, whereas for Go rampa param (dam pa) is the ultimate 
qualification of the apprehending consciousness. For Tsong khapa, paramartha 
(don dam pa) is the ontological characteristic of both apprehended objects and 
apprehending subjects and is not imposed upon the object by the subject. Go 
rampa argues, in opposition, that ultimate truth is none other than 
apprehending consciousness itself. 
We first consider Candrakirti's explanation of paramarthasatya (don dam 
bden pa) which is as follows. "Because it is an object, at the same time it is the 
ultimate, it is the ultimate object (don dam pa, paramartha) and because it is 
truth, it is the ultimate truth (don dam bden pa, paramarthasatya)" . 83 Tsong 
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lchapa while commenting on Candrakirti's statement argues that within the 
compound term paramartha (don dam bden pa), satya (bden pa), meaning 'truth', 
is that which is both artha (don), meaning 'object' (yu/, visaya), and param (dam 
pa), meaning 'ultimate'. In this situation, "both artha (don) and param (dam pa) 
are taken into account as the paramarthasatya (don dam bden pa), meaning 
'ultimate truth' per se". ' As we can see, param (dam pa) is taken as the 
qualification of artha (don), the object, rather than the qualification of 
apprehending consciousness. In emphasising this approach, Tsong khapa 
argues that the meaning of paramarthasatya (don dam bden pa) is not purely 
epistemological in character. Whether or not phenomena are considered in 
relation to their respective apprehending consciousnesses, the ultimate mode 
of the truth of phenomena is seen as invariable. Tsong khapa argues that 
ultimate truth is described as 'truth' in order to contrast it with conventional 
truth, "because of its non-deceptive (mi slu ba) identity. Ultimate truth does 
not deceive sentient beings ('jig rten) by presenting a mode of appearance 
which is different from its mode of being"." Conventional truth, on the other 
hand, does deceive ordinary sentient beings by presenting ,a mode of 
appearance that is contradictory to its mode of being. 
Since the ultimate mode of being of all empirically given phenomena is 
not something imposed from outside, whether or not it is properly 
understood, its true mode of being is nonetheless unvarying. Since the 
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ultimate nature of phenomena is invariable, then if the term 'ultimate' is 
treated as a qualification of the apprehending consciousness, rather than of 
the phenomena themselves, so ultimate truth would have to be taken as 
simply imposed on phenomena by the apprehending consciousness. This 
would mean, however, that it would then be mistaken of the Buddha to 
claim, as he does, that: "whether or not there is the arising of Tathagatas, this 
property stands—this regularity of the Dhamma, this orderliness of the 
Dhamma: All processes are inconstant...All processes are dukkha...All 
phenomena are not-self" [Dhamma-niyama Sutta, AN III.137].87 Similarly, it 
would be erroneous for the Buddha to make the following statement: 
Now, what is dependent co-arising? From birth as a requisite condition 
comes aging and death. Whether or not there is the arising of 
Tatluigatas, this property stands—this regularity of the Dhamma, this 
orderliness of the Dhamma, this this/that conditionality. The Tat hagata 
directly awakes to that, breaks through to that. Directly wakening and 
breaking through to that, he declares it, teaches it, describes it, sets it 
forth. He reveals, it explains it, makes it plain and says, "Look. From 
birth as a requisite conditions comes aging and death" [Paccaya Sutta, 
SN 
In fact, both these statements very clearly suggest that for the Buddha, the 
ultimate mode of phenomena is objective and invariable rather than imposed. 
Unlike Tsong khapa, Go rampa characterises param, 'ultimate', in the 
paramarthasatya (don dam bden pa), as the qualification of the apprehending 
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consciousness with art ha as its corresponding object. The apprehending 
consciousness in this context refers to the very specific transcendental 
perspective that belongs to arya's ('jig rten las 'das pa'i yeshes, lokottarajriana). 
The meaning attributed to paramarthasatya (don dam bden pa) grants, in Go 
rampa's view, an overriding primacy to the transcendental wisdom of arya 
over the ontological structures of conventional phenomena. Go rampa 
explains: 
Don (artha) refers to 'reality' (chos nyid, dharmata), i.e., the object of 
engagement by an arya's ultimate wisdom (yeshes dam pa), for it is either 
cognisable (rtog par bya ba) or analysable (brtag par bya ba). Since there is 
no other object, as supreme as this, it is the ultimate (param, dam pa). It is 
[also] truth (satya, bden pa), for it is a non-deceptive. Thus they are 
conjunctively unified.' 
Go rampa's account of the meaning of paramarthasatya appears to have come 
straight from Jayananda's commentary on the Madhyamakavatara, where he 
writes: 
Dam pa, refers to transcendental wisdom ('jig rten las 'das pa'i yeshes, 
lokottarajiiana), whereas don (arth), meaning 'object,' is its [apprehended] 
object, thus, [their conjunction forms] don dam pa (paramartha), meaning 
'ultimate object'. This is also bden pa (satya), meaning 'truth,' because it 
is non-deceptive (mi slu ba). Or, don dam pa (paramartha), means 
'supreme object' (mchog tu gyur ba'i don), i.e., the emptiness, for there is 
no other supreme object which overshadows emptiness.' 
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Both Jayananda and Go rampa consider param (dam pa) as the ultimate 
qualification of an arya's transcendental wisdom and artha (don) as a 
corresponding object of that consciousness. In this sense, it is the subjective 
consciousness that is taken as the criterion that determines ultimate truth. 
Since no empirical object comes into the equation of ultimate truth, so the 
term artha (don) is, in Go rampa's sense, more metaphorical than actual. 
"There is no realisation and the realised object, nor is there object and 
subject". 91 sTag tsang echoes the comment: "a wisdom without dual 
appearance is without any object". 92 Strictly speaking, transcendental wisdom 
itself becomes the ultimate truth. There is no ultimate truth apart from this 
wisdom. Go rampa equates ultimate truth with the arya's transcendental 
wisdom. Hence for him, the sense of paramarthasatya cannot have, as it has for 
Tsong khapa, any ontological grounding. 
The differences between Tsong khapa and Go rampa's analyses of the 
meaning of paramarthasatya are significant, in that they reflect Tsong khapa 
and Go rampa's deep disagreements on the question of 'what is divided into 
the two truths?' For Tsong khapa, the division between the two truths arises 
because of the dual natures of each empirically given truth. The two truths 
are posited precisely because they are equivalent to the conventional and 
ultimate natures of each empirical phenomenon. Go rampa, however, divides 
the truths on the basis of two different perspectives. 93 He argues that the two 
Chapter II 
	
Meanings and definitions of the two truths 	Page 113 
truths cannot be posited within the framework of a particular empirical 
object. All empirical objects, according to him, have one and the same nature, 
and that nature is itself conventional truth. "Ultimate truth is to be 
experienced (myang bar bya) under a total cessation of dualistic appearance 
through drya's personal wisdom (1phags pa'i so sor rang rig pa'i yeshe)", and he 
goes to claim: "Anything that has dualistic appearance, even the omniscience 
(rnam mkhyen) must not be treated as ultimate truth".' kLong chen,' Sa pan,' 
akya mChog Rong ston" and Mi skyod rDo rje—all adopt Go 
rampa's line of argument and insist on equating ultimate truth with the drya's 
transcendental wisdom. 
So far, we have examined the meanings attributed to sarrivrti and 
paramarthasatya, the nature and the scope of the objects of negation, and the 
significance of eradicating the objects of negation—this has made up the first 
part of this chapter. In the second part of this chapter, we shall compare 
Tsong khapa and Go rampa's positions on the issues related to the definitions 
of the two truths, and as we proceed important differences at issue will 
become even clearer. 
4. Definitions of the two truths 
The criteria Tsong khapa and Go rampa apply in determining the definitions 
of the two truths play the most significant role in contrasting the two 
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accounts. For Tsong khapa, the ontological status of each empirical 
phenomenon satisfies the definitions of both truths. Each phenomenon, as he 
sees it, possesses two natures that serve as the locus of the definitions of the 
two truths. For Go rampa, however, the ontological status of each empirical 
phenomenon satisfies only the definition of conventional truth. He argues 
that each phenomenon has only an empirical nature, as opposed to having 
two natures, and that ultimate truth has a distinct ontological status. 
Tsong khapa claims that each empirical phenomenon satisfies the 
criteria of both conventional and ultimate truth, and he also claims that each 
cognitive agent is capable of knowing both truths exhaustively. Each 
cognitive agent, according to him, is equipped with the two types of valid 
cognitions—empirically valid cognition and ultimately valid cognition—that 
are required to verify the defining characteristics of both truths. In contrast, 
just as the two truths are maintained as ontologically distinct, Go rampa 
argues that each truth must be verified by a different individual and that one 
individual cannot access the two truths exhaustively—a cognitive agent who 
knows conventional truth cannot know ultimate truth, and the one who 
knows ultimate truth cannot know conventional truth. 
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4.1. Candrakirti's definition of the two truths 
There are two slightly different definitions of the two truths that we should 
take into account at this point: the definition of the two truths offered by 
Candrakirti and that offered by Nagarjuna. We will compare Tsong Ichapa 
and Go rampa in relation to Candrakirti's definitions in this section and then 
go on to Nagarjuna's definition in the next. In the sixth chapter of the 
Madhyamakavatara, Candralcirti defines the two truths as follows: 
[The Buddha] said that all things have two natures— 
Those found by perceivers of reality and of falsities (brdzun pa)— 
Objects of perceivers of reality are things as they are 
Objects of perceivers of falsities are conventional truths [V1:23].' 
Go rampa reads brdzun pa, meaning 'falsity,' as an adjective describing the 
perceiver, rather than as referring to the perceived object. However, as Guy 
Newland correctly points out Tsong khapa reads brdzun pa as referring to the 
perceived object, and not as describing the perceiver.' As a natural 
consequence, Tsong khapa defines "sathvrtisatya (kun rdzob bden pa) as [an 
object] found by empirically valid cognition (tha snyad pa'i tshad ma) which 
perceives false objects of knowledge",' while "ultimate truth is defined as an 
object (yul, visaya) found by reasoning consciousness (rigs shes) perceiving, 
seeing reality"." In his commentary to the Mulamadhyamakakarika of 
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Nagarjuna, Tsong khapa applies these two definitions with respect to the two 
natures of the sprout: 
Each individual phenomenon—exterior' or interior'—possesses dual 
natures—one of the ultimate and the other of the empirical. Consider 
the sprout for example, it possesses a nature, which is found by a 
reasoning consciousness perceiving reality, i.e., a non-deceptive 
knowable; and a nature, which is found by an empirical consciousness 
perceiving a deceptive object, i.e., a false knowable. The former is the 
spout's nature of ultimate truth and the latter, the sprout's nature of 
empirical truth.' 
One of crucial points to be noted in Tsong khapa's definition is his insistence 
on grounding the two truths in the two natures of each individual 
phenomenon. Candrakirti also makes the same point. "The Bhagvan 
Buddhas, who flawlessly mastered the defining characteristics of each of the 
two truths, have shown that all phenomena, i.e., interior and exterior, such as 
conditioned phenomena and a sprout, have two types of natures".' 
There are two central ideas embedded in Candrakirti and Tsong khapa's 
grounding of the two truths on the two natures of each phenomenon. The 
first idea is that the two truths are conceptual distinctions applied with 
respect to some particular empirical phenomenon, since each such 
phenomenon fulfils the criterion of both the truths. The second idea is that 
the two truths should not be construed as merely one specific nature of a 
phenomenon mirrored in two different perspectives. Given the fact that each 
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phenomenon, according to them, possesses two natures, so each verifying 
consciousness has a different nature as its referent, in spite of the fact that 
there is only one ontological structure involved. The two truths, argues Tsong 
khapa, "indicate that if the characteristics of even one ontological 
structure—the sprout for example—are divided, it has two natures, viz., 
conventional and ultimate. It does not however indicate that one nature per se 
is divided into the two truths with respect to [the contrasting perspectives] of 
ordinary beings (prthagjana, so so skye bo) and the aryas".'. 
So, according to Tsong khapa, the ontological identity of one particular 
phenomenon, the sprout for instance, is categorised into two natures—its 
conventional nature and the ultimate nature. The conventional nature of the 
sprout is its deceptive or false nature—thus it appears in one way, while it 
exists in another way; it appears to have a self-sufficient existence, while in 
reality it is a dependently arisen phenomenon. The ultimate nature of the 
sprout, however is given in terms of its non-deceptive ultimate characteristics 
and these characteristics are such that the way the sprout appears to its 
apprehending consciousness also accords with the way it actually exists. 
Conventional truth is therefore defined as deceptive or false, whereas 
ultimate truth is defined as non-deceptive. 
Candrakirti's definition of the two truths is, according Go rampa, based 
in the idea, to which Go rampa himself holds, that the two truths are to be 
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associated with two different perspectives (blo ngor)_ In this regard, Go rampa 
reads the two verses VI:23 and VI:28 of the Madhyarnakavatara of Candrakirti 
together. The first of these verses defines the two truths, whereas the second 
verse deals with the different senses of sathvrti. The phrase brdzun pa mthong 
ba, meaning 'perceiver of falsities' in verse VI:23 is synonymous, for Go 
rampa, with gti mug, meaning 'ignorance,' or 'ccincealer; in verse VI:28. 
Similarly, Go rampa treats kun rdzob bden pa, conventional truth as grasped by 
the perceiver of falsities, in the verse VI:23, as synonymous with kun rdzob, 
ignorance or concealer, in the verse VI:28. 
Like Huntington, who translates yang dag mthong pa as 'correct 
perception,' rather than 'perceiver of reality,' and mthong ba brdzun pa as 
'incorrect perception,' instead of 'perceiver of falsity,' Go rampa reads brdzun 
pa 'falsity' as an adjective referring to a perceiver a.s opposed to a perceived 
object.' The equating of 'correct perception' with 'perceiver of reality,' and 
'incorrect perception,' with 'perceiver of falsity,' plays a vital role in Go 
rampa's definition of the two truths. It allows him to argue that two 
conflicting perspectives are indeed the underlying basis for the differentiation 
between the two truths. His argument is as follows: 
Since it is the cognition that grasps the two natures, ultimate truth is an 
object (yul) of a reality perceiving cognition (rnthong ba yang dag) 
whereas the conventional truth is an object of a falsity perceiving 
cognition (mthong ba brdzun pa).11° 
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When the Bhagvan Buddha disclosed reality as it is to his 
disciples from the empirical standpoint, he demonstrated that all 
phenomena are constitutive of the two natures—conventional and 
ultimate. And the doctrine of the two truths based on the empty nature 
of all phenomena found by the wisdom of firya's meditative equipoise, 
and the existent nature found by the power of falsity (rdzun pa'i 
stobs)—false perceiving cognition of the ordinary beings (prthagjana, so 
so slcye bo). 111 
But then, he states: 
Here in the Madhyamika system, the object itself cannot be divided into 
two truths. Empirical truth and ultimate truth are divided in terms of 
the mode of apprehension (mthong tshul): in terms of the subject 
apprehending falsehood and subject apprehending truth, or mistaken 
and unmistaken apprehension ('khrul ma 'khrul), or deluded or 
undeluded apprehension (rmongs ma rmongs), or erroneous or 
nonerroneous apprehension (ph yin ci log ma log), or valid or invalid 
cognitions (tshad ma yin min). 112 
It is a unanimous agreement amongst all the Prasarigikas and the 
Svatantrikas of India that [the two truths] are posited by the object-
possessing mind (yul can gyi blo). Because the two truths are posited in 
terms of the object-possessing mind (yul can gyi blo) depending on 
whether it is a deluded (rmongs) or non-deluded (ma rmongs), a 
perception of falsity (brdzun pa thong ba) or perception of truth (yang dag 
mthong ba) and a mistaken (khrul) or an unmistaken cognition (ma 
khrul). 113 
Although the first two paragraphs are somewhat ambiguous, and do not 
expressly highlight distinctive features of Go rampa's view, the third and the 
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fourth paragraphs set forth the characteristic features of Go rampa's position . 
with considerable clarity. Go rampa's commitment to a subject-based 
definition of the two truths sharply marks off his position from Tsong 
khapa's. As far as Go rampa is concerned, the definition of the two truths is 
entirely determined by the two contradictory cognitive perspectives 
associated with ignorance on the one hand and wisdom on the other and that 
it cannot be based in any reference to the object. 
Go rampa also reinforces the 'subject-based definition' by explicitly 
rejecting Tsong khapa's 'object-based' definition (based in the two natures of 
each empirical phenomenon): 
[If it were true that each phenomena has two natures], it would 
absurdly follow, that even one particular phenomenon such as the 
sprout must possess [two] empirically retrievable imputed objects [or 
natures] merely by designating the two truths. This must follow, for the 
sprout would have two natures which would be the bases of the two 
truths. [If you accept this], it would then follow that the object found by 
the false perceiving consciousness must also be absurdly found by an 
arya's subject of the meditative equipoise. Since the two [apprehended] 
objects have a single ontological identity, the object [verified by the 
false perceiving consciousness] would affirmatively grasp the object 
verified by the reality perceiving consciousness."' 
Furthermore, he states: 
The conventional nature of the sprout would absurdly become its 
ultimate nature, for the two [natures] have only one [phenomenal] 
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characteristic. If you accept this, then, it would follow that the nature 
verified by the false perceiving consciousness would also be absurdly 
the nature verified by the reality perceiving consciousness. If you 
accept this, it would then follow what is to be verified by the false 
perceiving consciousness must absurdly be found by the reality 
perceiving consciousness. If you accept this, then, it must follow that 
these two [verifying cognitions] are not different insofar as their modes 
of the verifying the natures of objects.' 15 
While these two passages directly criticise Tsong khapa's account of the two 
natures, they also shed light, albeit indirectly, on Go rampa's own definition 
and its determining criterion. Go rampa opposes the view that advocates dual 
natures for each empirical phenomenon arguing instead that each empirical 
phenomenon has only one nature, namely, its conventional nature. The so-
called 'ultimate nature' cannot be verified in any empirical phenomenon. If a 
sprout, for example, actually did possess two natures—one conventional and 
the other ultimate, as proposed in Tsong khapa's definition—then, according 
to Go rampa, each nature would have to be ontologically distinct. Since the 
ontological structure of the sprout cannot be separated into a so-called 
conventional and ultimate nature, the sprout must possess only one 
phenomenal nature. That nature, as Go rampa understands it, is the 
conventional nature of the sprout. This nature is found only under the spell 
of ignorance, however, and hence it can be verified only under the empirical 
cognitions of ordinary beings (prthagjana, so so skye bo) and of unenlightened 
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aryas in post-meditative equipoise (rjes thob, Prstha-labdha). However, ultimate 
truth is totally beyond the reach of ordinary beings and is found only through 
the transcendental wisdom of arya. 
The two immediate passages cited above also demonstrate, of course, 
that the defining characteristics of the two truths cannot, in Go rampa's view, 
be posited from within the framework of empirically given phenomena alone. 
Any such phenomenon can only satisfy the definition of conventional truth, 
and cannot satisfy the defining characteristics of ultimate truth. The ultimate 
truth of the sprout, for example, is totally distinct from the empirical 
existence of the sprout. The ontological status of the sprout, as sprout, is 
understood in terms of conventional truth, for it is false and deceptive. The 
ultimate truth of the sprout is beyond its conventional existence, beyond its 
existence merely as sprout. It is therefore not possible, in Go rampa's view, to 
confine the definition of ultimate truth within the framework of empirical 
phenomena. 
Ultimate truth, for Go rarnpa, requires the metaphysical transcendence 
of empirical or conventional existence. Unlike conventional phenomena, it is 
neither presupposed nor projected by ignorance. Ultimate truth "is 
inexpressible through words and is beyond the scope of mind". 116 The mind, 
as Go rampa understands it, is always conceptual and thus deluded. "Yet, 
ultimate truth" as he argues, "is experienced by an arya in their meditative 
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equipoise, and is free from all conceptual categories (spros pa dang dral ba). It 
can neither be expressed through definition nor through any defined object 
nor through anything else". 117 In Lindtner's words, Go rampa's argument can 
be summarised thus: "reality (tattva) is beyond all ontological and 
epistemological dualities (dvaya), while the empirical world of origination, 
destruction, and so forth is illusory—due merely to ignorance (avidya)". 118 
Another important issue that arises in relation to Go rampa's definition 
is his characterisation of verifying cognitions. He agrees with Tsong khapa 
about the need for two different cognitive resources, viz., 'reality-perceiving 
cognition' (yang dag mthong ba) and 'falsity-perceiving cognition' (brdzun pa 
mthong ba). Both thinkers agree that 'reality–perceiving cognition' verifies 
ultimate reality, whereas 'falsity–perceiving cognition' verifies conventional 
truth.' This agreement is, however, superficial. In contrast with Tsong 
khapa, who argues that each cognitive agent should possesses both cognitive 
modes, Go rampa argues that an enlightened being has consciousness 
realising ultimate truth, but does not have consciousness realising 
conventional truth, whereas an ordinary being has consciousness perceiving 
conventional truth, but does not have consciousness realising ultimate truth. 
The only possible exception here is an arya, who is neither ordinary nor fully 
enlightened and who has, according to Go rampa, both verifying 
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consciousnesses. This general line of argument appears to come directly from 
Jayananda: 
Perceivers of reality consist of the Bhagvftn Buddhas, who flawlessly 
understand the natures of things. [Ultimate] reality (de kho na nyid, 
tathata) amounts to their [apprehended] objects. However their 
apprehended objects and subjects comprised of unperceived objects 
and [unperceived] subjects... Perceivers of falsities are erroneous, for 
they do not realise reality. Besides, they grasp onto false things. Objects, 
that they apprehend are conventional truths (kun rdzob bden pa, 
sathvrtisatya). 120 
Jayananda argues that an enlightened being perceives only ultimate truth and 
possesses only the transcendental wisdom. Ultimate truth is an object 
certified by the transcendental wisdom. But as Lindtner puts it, "the ultimate 
truth is the object of a cognition without an object (advayajnana), and thus 
only an object metaphorically speaking (upadayaprajfiapti)". 121 Yet, ultimate 
truth, "as it is beyond all categories of thoughts, is cognitively experienced 
without duality of subject and object".' As matter of fact, "in the ultimate 
context", says jayananda, "there is not even the slightest existence of object 
and subject".' Go rampa agrees. 
In concluding this section, we can say that in Tsong khapa's view, the 
criteria that determine the defining characteristics of the two truths are the 
two natures of each empirical phenomenon and they are verified by their 
corresponding valid cognitions. By rejecting the two natures of each 
empirically given phenomenon, Go rampa, however, considers wisdom and 
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ignorance as the criteria that determine the defining characteristics of the two 
truths. Like Go rampa, kLong chen,' Sa pan,' Red mda' ba,i26  Mi pham,' 
Sakya mChog ldan,' sTag tsang,' Rong ston,' Mi skyod rDo rje,' and dGe 
'dun Chos 'phel," all formulate the definitions of the two truths in terms of 
the distinctions between the ignorant experiences of ordinary beings (so skye, 
prthagjana) and the experiences of an arya's wisdom. They are unanimous in 
asserting that ultimate truth is that which is certified by wisdom, while 
conventional truth is that which is certified by ignorance. In like fashion, the 
definitions offered by modern interpreters such as, Murti, Singh,' 
Poussin,' Huntington,' Williams' etc., all ground the two truths in these 
two contradictory viewpoints. 
Yet among modern thinkers, although Huntington and Williams do 
indeed emphasise 'correct perception' and 'delusory perception' as the basis 
of the distinction between ultimate and conventional truth, they nevertheless 
also attempt to preserve the compatibility between emptiness and dependent 
arising. "Emptiness", as Huntington puts it, "must resonate far down into the 
core of everyday experience"." Similarly, Williams argues that "emptiness 
and dependent origination mutually imply each other".' In arguing thus, 
Williams and Huntington seem to rather unwittingly adavance what are 
actually contradictory positions— it is as if they would put one foot into Go 
rampa's shoe and the other into Tsong khapa's. If empirical truth were purely 
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reified by delusory perceptions, as the 'Go rampan' definition to which they 
commit themselves implies, then Huntington and Williams would have to 
deny the possibility of the perception of dependently arisen phenomena by 
an enlightened being. Since the manner in which they define the two truths 
means that the realm of conventional truth is the realm exclusively verified 
by delusory cognitive experience, and since an enlightened being has 
supposedly eradicated all such delusion, then according to Huntington and 
William's definition, an enlightened person must not have the cognitive 
experience of dependently arisen phenomena. Yet since they also claim that 
emptiness and dependently arisen phenomena are mutually interlocking, so 
without dependently arisen phenomena, there cannot be empty phenomena. 
The seemingly inevitable conclusion is that an enlightened being, lacking any 
experience of dependently arisen phenomena, cannot have the cognitive 
experience of emptiness. It appears that Huntington and Williams must either 
relinquish their commitment to a mutual entailment between emptiness and 
dependent arising, or else relinquish their definition of two truths as based in 
incompatible cognitive capacities and experiences. Either way, they cannot 
plausibly retain both commitments. Neither Tsong khapa nor Go rampa face 
this dilemma. The former maintains the compatible relationship between the 
two truths, but utterly rejects the idea that the conventional truth is the 
construct of ignorant consciousness; the latter utterly rejects any compatibility 
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between the two truths, advocating instead that conventional truth is indeed 
the construct of ignorant consciousness. 
To summarise then: in the first definition (that of Candrakirti), the 
debate between Tsong khapa and Go rampa regarding the definitions of the 
two truths emerges out of their disagreement as to the proper criteria that 
determine the defining characteristics of the two truths. Tsong khapa 
considers the two natures of each phenomenon, as verified by the two 
corresponding cognitive resources of each cognitive agent, as determining the 
respective characteristics of the two truths. The conventional nature of 
empirical . phenomenon, as verified by empirically valid consciousness, 
determines the definition of conventional truth; the ultimate nature of the 
same empirical phenomenon, as verified by the ultimately valid 
consciousness, determines the definition of ultimate truth. Since, ultimate 
truth and conventional truth are both ontologically, as well as 
epistemologically interdependent, knowledge of empirically given 
phenomena as dependently arisen suffices for knowledge of both truths. Go 
rampa, as we have seen, rejects Tsong khapa's 'dual nature' account, treating 
each empirical phenomenon as satisfying only the definition of conventional 
truth and taking the definition of ultimate truth to be ontologically and 
epistemologically distinct from conventional truth. It is through the ordinary 
senses of either an ordinary being or an unenlightened arya that the definition 
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of conventional truth is verified—no fully enlightened being verifies the 
defining characteristics of conventional truth at all. Similarly, no ordinary 
being can verify the definition of ultimate truth. Since ultimate truth 
transcends conventional truth, the knowledge of empirically given 
phenomena as dependently arisen could not satisfy the knowledge of 
ultimate truth. 
4.2. Nagarjuna's definition of the two truths 
Let us now move on to consider Tsong khapa and Go rampa's view 
regarding the definition of the two truths offered by Nagarjuna in the 
Millamadhyamakakarika. Nagarjuna first defines ultimate truth in the following 
words: 
Not to be realised from the other, peaceful, 
Not elaborated by elaborations, 
Not conceptualised and not a separate identity. 
That is the characteristic of [ultimate] reality [)(VIII: 9].' 
Now we turn to Tsong khapa and Go rampa's comments on this statement. 
First Tsong khapa: 
[Ultimate truth] is not to be realised from another. Other persons can 
merely explain it, but cannot [make the meditator] directly realise it. 
Instead, it is to be personally realised through an undefiled wisdom 
(zag med kyi yeshes). It is peaceful. Just as a person without cataracts 
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does not see falling hairs, [ultimate truth] is free from inherent essence. 
It cannot thus be elaborated through the vocal elaborations, meaning, it 
cannot be expressed. 'Conceptualisation' refers to the operations of 
mind. At the point when the true nature of things as they are, is 
consummated, the operations of mind however, temporarily ceases. It 
is thus not conceptualised. In whatever way should one phenomenon 
fulfil the criterion of ultimate truth, [the ultimate truth] of all other 
phenomena have the same identity. Thus, from the ultimate standpoint, 
there are no separate identities!' 
Next Go rampa: 
Ultimate truth must not be realised by the naive ordinary beings by 
means of the other's [explanatory] terms or logical reasons etc., as it 
actually is. Instead, it is rather to be realised by drya's personal wisdom 
in the meditative equipoise by way of not seeing anything at all. Since 
nothing is established primordially, it is peaceful. Since it is not an 
object to be expressed through vocal elaboration by way of clinging 
towards it, [ultimate truth], is not elaborated. It is beyond the scope of 
mind and the mental factors, thus no conception whatsoever can 
conceptualise it. Since no distinction whatsoever exists, there are no 
separate identities. These fivefold features are thus defining 
characteristics of the reality of ultimate truth (don dam pa'i de kho na 
nyid).' 
Except for some minor differences in their choice of words, Tsong khapa and 
Go rampa render Nagarjuna's statement in terms that appear, on the face of 
it, to be virtually identical. A closer look at these two interpretations, 
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however, shows that they imply quite different and irreconcilable 
conclusions. 
Go rampa interprets Nagarjuna's account on the assumption that 
Nagarjuna is making metaphysical claims about the nature of ultimate truth. 
This mode of interpretation is not surprising given Go rampa's commitment 
to a conception of ultimate truth as ontologically, epistemologically and 
soteriologically transcendent of conventional truth. In fact, in order to 
reinforce the metaphysical nature of ultimate truth, Go rampa goes so far as 
to combine its definition with that of essence (rang bzhin, svabhava). In his 
commentary on the Mulamadhyamakakarika [XV:2], in the chapter on the 
'Analysis of Essence', Go rampa contentiously identifies ultimate truth with 
the defining characteristics of essence: 
[Question]: But what is the nature of the reality of phenomena? 
[Reply]: It is not possible to reveal its exact nature. However, to 
facilitate its understanding by the disciples, the real nature of 
phenomena is disclosed as the apprehended sphere of the 
uncontaminated wisdom. It constitutes three main defining 
characteristics: namely, a nature which is not created by causes and 
conditions; exists independently of the conventions and the other 
phenomena; and does not change. For example, the transcendence of 
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Go rampa's commitment to the absolute characterisation of ultimate truth is 
nowhere expressed so clearly or boldly as in the above statement in which he 
uses Nagarjuna's definition of essence as a means to define ultimate truth. 
Like Nagarjuna's hypothetical essence, Go rampa argues that ultimate truth is 
'ontologically unconditioned', and, hence, it is not a dependently arisen 
phenomenon; it is distinct from empirical phenomena in every sense of the 
word; it is independent of conceptual-linguistic conventions; it is an 
absolutely timeless and eternally unchanging phenomenon. It is crucial to 
read Go rampa's interpretation of Nagarjuna's definition of ultimate truth 
against this background. If we do this, it becomes clear that, for Go rampa, 
Nagarjuna's statement [XVIII:9] is only concerned with metaphysically 
unitary and ineffable ultimate truth. 
Go• rampa applies the same metaphysical interpretation to the 
Buddha's following statement on ultimate truth. 
There is, monks, an unborn, unbecome, unmade, unfabricated. If there 
were not that unborn.., there would not be the case that emancipation 
from the born, become, made, fabricated would be discerned. But 
precisely because there is an unborn..., emancipation from the born... is 
thus discerned. The born, become, produced, made, fabricated, 
impermanent, composed of aging and death, a nest of illness, perishing, 
come from nourishment and the guide [that is craving] is unfit for 
delight. The freedom from that is calm, permanent, beyond inference, 
unborn, unproduced, the sorrowless, stainless state, the cessation of 
stressful qualities, the stilling of fabrications, bliss [Iti 43].' 
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And as the Buddha also states: 
Freed, dissociated and released from ten things, the Tathagata dwells 
with unrestricted awareness, Vahuna. Which ten? Freed, dissociated 
and released from form... feeling... perception... processes... 
consciousness... birth...aging...death...dukkha...defilement, he dwells 
with unrestricted awareness. Just as a red, blue, or white lotus born in 
the water and growing in the water, rises up above the water and 
stands with no water adhering to it, in the same way the 
Tathagata —freed, dissociated and released from these ten 
things—dwells with unrestricted awareness [Bahuna Sutta, AN X.81]. 145 
For Tsong khapa, on the other hand, both Nagarjuna's definition and the 
Buddha's statements do not in anyway present an account of the 
metaphysically transcendent nature of ultimate truth. According to Tsong 
khapa, Nagarjuna's definition and the Buddha's statements on ultimate truth, 
although they have ontological implications, they directly attend to 
psychological, cognitive and epistemological issues related to the experiential 
nature of ultimate truth. Since it is not possible for ultimate truth to be known 
merely by another's verbal explanations, so, Tsong khapa argues, it is 
experienced personally within one's own psychophysical aggregates by one's 
own valid consciousness. In Kalupahana's words, "it is knowledge for which 
one does not depend upon another, primarily because it pertains to arising 
and ceasing of empirical phenomena. It involves personal verification, a 
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verification that can be accomplished by someone before one begins to 
formulate any right-view".' In this sense, not only is ultimate truth beyond 
linguistic descriptions, but it is also beyond the conceptual mind. Thus the 
Buddha explains how ultimate truth (i.e. nirvana) is transcendentally 
experienced as follows: 
Monks, that sphere should be realised where the eye (vision) stops and 
the perception (mental nothing) of form fades. That sphere is to be 
realised where the ear stops and the perception of sound fades.. .where 
the nose stops and the perception of aroma fades.. .where the tongue 
stops and the perception of flavour fades.. .where the body stops and 
the perception of tactile sensation fades.. .where the intellect stops and 
the perception of idea /phenomena fades: That sphere should be 
realised [SN XXXV.116].' 
Finally, to put the above considerations into clearer perspective, let us 
consider one last point, namely, the relationship between the concepts of 
dependent arising (pratityasamutpanna) and dependently arisen phenomena 
(pratityasamutpada), and the concept of ultimate truth. In highlighting the 
nature of dependent arising, Nagarjuna makes the following statement: 
Whatever arises in dependence upon whatever 
Is neither identical to it 
Nor is it different from it. 
It is therefore, neither annihilated nor eternal [XVIII: 10].148 
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Tsong khapa reads this statement as Nagarjuna's definition of 'worldly' or 
'mundane' reality ('jig rten pa'i de kho na nyid kyi mtshan nyid),' while Go 
rampa interprets it as the definition of 'conventional reality' (kun rdzob kyi de 
kho na nyid).' Although there is sharp difference in their usage of the terms at 
issue here—'worldly' or 'mundane' versus 'conventional' reality, this is not 
the key issue. In fact, both Tsong lchapa and Go rampa tend to use these two 
expressions interchangeably. What matters in this context is what Tsong 
khapa and Go rampa each aim to achieve by means of their respective 
readings. By taking verse XVIII:10 as giving a definition of 'worldly' or 
'mundane reality' ('jig rten pa'i de kho na nyid kyi mtshan nyid), Tsong khapa 
draws a contrast with verse XVIII:9 of the Malamadhyamakakarika in which 
Nagarjuna defines 'transworldly' or 'supramundane reality' ('jig rten las 'das 
pa'i de kho na nyid). In making this contrast, Tsong khapa is also contrasting 
the truth verified by empirically valid consciousness (worldly or mundane 
consciousness) with truth verified by ultimately valid consciousness 
(supramundane or transcendental consciousness). In treating verse XVIII:10 
as defining 'conventional reality' (kun rdzob kyi de kho na nyid), Go rampa, 
however, aims to contrast the 'truth verified by ignorance' (incorrect 
perception) with the 'truth verified by wisdom' (transcendental mind). 
Although Tsong khapa and Go rampa both make use of the principle of 
dependent arising, and therefore of emptiness, as a logical principle to 
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explain the nature of dependently arisen phenomena and their relation to 
emptiness, on the most crucial issues—namely, the compatibility between the 
principle of emptiness and empty phenomena, and between the principle of 
dependent arising and dependently arisen phenomena—the differences 
between the two positions are irreconcilable. Tsong lchapa mobilises the 
principle of dependent arising, and so of emptiness, to establish the ultimate 
truth of all phenomena as dependently arisen, and, therefore, as empty. In 
contrast, Go rampa mobilises the principle of dependent arising, and so of 
emptiness, to reject the idea of dependently arisen, and therefore empty, 
phenomena as the ultimate truth of all phenomena. 
For Tsong khapa, just as there is an essential compatibility between 
dependently arisen and empty phenomena, so too is there an essential 
compatibility between the two truths. As dependently arisen, empty 
phenomena are not constructions of ignorant consciousness, neither is 
conventional truth such a construction. Both truths are actual truths that 
stand on an equal footing. Moreover, whosoever knows conventional truth, 
either directly or inferentially, also, according to this view, knows ultimate 
truth; whosoever knows ultimate truth also knows phenomena as 
dependently arisen, and hence knows phenomena as empty. On the other 
hand, whosoever does not know conventional truth also does not know 
ultimate truth; whosoever does not know ultimate truth., also does not know 
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phenomena as dependently arisen, and hence does not know phenomena as 
empty. For Go rampa, however, just as is the case with respect to 
dependently arisen and empty phenomena, so are the two truths entirely 
inconsistent with one another. Accordingly, whosoever knows conventional 
truth does not know ultimate truth, whereas one who knows ultimate truth 
does not know conventional truth; whosoever knows phenomena as 
dependently arisen does not know phenomena as empty, whereas whosoever 
knows phenomena as empty does not know phenomena as dependently 
arisen. 
Let us now close the second part of this chapter with a brief review. 
Granting ultimate truth a metaphysically independent status, Go rampa 
interprets both Nagarjuna's definition and the Buddha's statements as 
demonstrations of the metaphysically unconditioned and transcendental 
nature of ultimate truth. This interpretation is central to Go rampa's 
formulation of an absolutist view of ultimate truth and his denial of the 
credibility of dependently arisen phenomena. This allows Go rampa to 
formulate ultimate truth or Tathagata as ontologically absolute. Since ultimate 
truth is transcendent of empirical truth in every sense, so, as Murti puts it, 
"the absolute is beyond the scope of discursive thought, language and 
empirical activity.. .It is in fact the unutterable (anabhilapya), the unthinkable, 
unteachable".' In contrast, since Tsong khap a maintains the mutual 
Chapter H 
	
Meanings and definitions of the two truths 	Page 137 
interlocking of the two truths, he argues that both Nagarjuna and the 
Buddha's position on ultimate truth does not, in any way, affirm the 
metaphysical or transcendental ontological status of such truth. The Buddha 
and Nagarjuna's statements, as Tsong khapa sees the matter, point instead to 
the transcendental experience of the very same empirically given 
phenomenon (i.e. one's own psychophysical aggregates) as realised by means 
of valid consciousness. Thus Nagarjuna writes: "without relying upon 
empirical (truth), the meaning of the ultimate cannot be disclosed. Without 
realising the meaning of the ultimate, nirvana is not attained" [XXIV:101 1' 
and "sarhsara and nirvana do not exist as two [individuals]. The exhaustive 
knowledge of sarhsara is itself defined as nirvana" [6].' 
Conclusion 
Tsong khapa and Go rampa's definitions of the two truths are completely 
divergent and irreconcilable. The divergence between them is most clearly 
visible in relation to their respective accounts of the meanings of the term 
saihvrti. Excluding essence superimposed by ignorance (i.e., a concealer), 
Tsong khapa argues that all empirically given truths (tha snyad bden pa, 
vyavaharikasatya) or conventional truths (kun rdzob bden pa, sathvrtisatya) are 
not posited by ignorance. Therefore, empirical truths do not arise as result of 
ignorance. On the other hand, Go rampa argues that all empirically given 
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truths and their experiences, either perceptually or conceptually, are 
ultimately reducible to the effects of ignorance, since they are wholly posited 
by ignorance. Whether the phenomenal world is described in terms of 
conventional truth (kun rdzob bden pa, sathvrtisatya) or empirical truth (tha 
snyad bden pa, vyavaharikasatya), or even in terms of dependently arisen 
phenomena (pratityasamutpanna-dharma), so far as Go rampa is concerned, it is 
only under the spell of ignorance that we experience the empirical world. 
Regarding their positions on the cognitive agents of the two truths, 
Tsong khapa not only categorises aryas and buddhas as the appropriate 
cognitive agents of ultimate truth, but he also allows that ordinary beings (so 
skye, prthagjana) who are conceptually familiar with the Madhyamika 
philosophy may be categorised in this way. Each cognitive agent, according 
to Tsong khapa, is equipped with the necessary cognitive and epistemic 
resources—ultimately valid consciousness and the empirically valid 
consciousness—to verify both the truths, and this is so in spite of the fact that 
the way in which the truths are accessed varies from direct realisation to 
inferential realisation. In clear contrast, Go rampa refuses to accept ordinary 
beings as cognitive agents of ultimate truth or buddhas as cognitive agents of 
conventional truth. As he sees it, no ordinary being is able to realise ultimate 
truth and no buddha experiences conventional truth. 
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Since Tsong khapa grounds the defining characteristics of the two truths 
on the two natures of all empirically given phenomena, and treats empirically 
valid consciousness and ultimately valid consciousness as their determining 
criteria, the two truths are not reducible to two contradictory perspectives. 
Although the defining characteristics of the two truths are verified through 
separate epistemic pathways—namely, empirical truth through empirically 
valid consciousness and ultimate truth through ultimately valid 
consciousness—they are nonetheless everywhere inextricably joined. Thus 
the two truths, according to Tsong khapa, stand on an equal epistemological 
and ontological footing. This allows him to argue that the knowledge of 
conventional truth requires the knowledge of ultimate truth, and, similarly, 
that the knowledge of ultimate truth requires knowledge of conventional 
truth. The equal status of the two truths also allows Tsong khapa to argue 
that the knowledge of phenomena as dependently arisen (rten cing 'brel bar 
byung ba'i chos, pratityasamutpanna-dharma) amounts to knowing phenomena 
as essentially empty (stong pa, lanya,) and that knowing phenomena as 
essentially empty amounts to knowing them as dependently arisen. 
Go rampa, however, grounds the definition of the two truths on the two 
contradictory perspectives associated with the cognitive experiences of 
ordinary beings (so skye, prthagjana), on the one hand, and those of aryas, on 
the other. Conventional truths are reducible to ignorance, while ultimate 
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truth is equated with transcendental wisdom, or Tathagata. As ordinary 
beings are deluded beings, their experiences are, in their entirety, based on 
conventional truth and thus they have strictly no access to ultimate truth. 
Fully enlightened beings, however, experience ultimate truth exclusively. 
Closely tied to the meanings and definitions of the two truths is the 
nature and scope of the objects of negation—concealers (sgrib pa)—one of the 
central points of disagreement between Tsong lchapa and Go rampa. The 
implications of the way in which the objects of negation are understood have 
reverberated throughout this chapter. The meanings and definitions of the 
two truths proposed by Tsong lchapa and Go rampa can be seen as being 
derived from their views regarding the objects of negation. As we have seen, 
Go rampa identifies empirical senses, their corresponding objects, and 
resultant consciousnesses, as the objects of negation, or, to be precise, as 
concealers. Tsong khapa on the other hand, categorically rejects this view. 
According to Go rampa, not only defilments, but also senses, objects and 
consciousnesses—all conventional truths—are concealers of true knowledge, 
and so are objects of negation. His definition of the two truths is formulated 
accordingly. 
CHAPTER III 
LANGUAGE, CONCEPTUAL MIND & ULTIMATE TRUTH 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I pursue a comparative analysis of the two Tibetan Prasangika 
accounts by focusing on the question, 'Is ultimate truth an object of 
knowledge of the conceptual mind?' This will entail an examination as to 
whether or not ultimate truth is linguistically expressible and conceptually 
knowable. The first and second sections will illustrate the ineffable and the 
inconceivable nature of ultimate truth by analysing the limits of language and 
the limits of conceptual mind, making particular reference to the much-used 
'cataract' analogy. In the third section, we will analyse the validity and 
significance of the conceptual right-view—itself a topic closely related to the 
issues concerning the limits of language and conceptual mind. 
The analysis of the validity and the significance of the conceptual right-
view is important for two reasons. First, the validity of the conceptual right-
view is closely connected to the capacity of conceptual mind to make the 
ultimate truth intelligible. Second, the idea of the right-view occupies a 
central position in the Buddhist account of the path by which epistemological 
and soteriological perfection is achieved. The Buddha himself considers the 
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right-view as the forerunner of all spiritual practices. The analysis of the 
validity of the conceptual right-view will also enable us to draw clear 
distinctions between Tsong khapa and Go rampa's views on the limits of the 
conceptual mind. It will also set the stage for the discussions in the next 
chapter wherein the 'non-conceptual right-view', or, as it is also known, the 
'experiential right-view', is examined in detail. 
1.The limits of language and the limits of conceptual mind: The 
cataract analogy and its applications 
In most of the Madhyamika philosophical literature, the ineffability and 
inconceivability of ultimate truth is illustrated by employing, as an analogy, 
the contrast between impaired and healthy vision. For example, Candrakirti 
states in the Madhyamakfivatara: "Due to cataracts (or opthalmia), one sees 
illusions such as falling hairs, which are false with respect to the object. One 
with clear vision sees them as they are. [The perception of ultimate truth] 
must be understood in this way" [VI: 29].' In commenting on this analogy, 
Tsong khapa2 and Go rampa3 both agree that a person with cataracts might 
see hairs falling from the sky, while the person with clear vision will not see 
such falling hairs anywhere. In such a circumstance, if a visually unimpaired 
person tells a visually impaired person 'there is no hair falling from the sky 
anywhere', acceptance of this statement by the one whose vision is impaired 
Chapter III 
	 Language; conceptual mind and ultimate truth 	Page143 
will nevertheless not prevent that person from seeing the hairs. On this point 
Tsong khapa and Go rampa agree, but they disagree as to how this should be 
interpreted and, in particular, as to whether or not this really does mean that 
the person with impaired vision has understood the nonexistence of the hairs. 
The fact that mere assent to a statement describing some visual, or 
other appearace, as illusory, typically does not prevent the illusion from 
being experienced—in the same way that the person with cataracts, even 
though they may assent to the claim that the falling hairs they see are not real, 
will nevertheless continue to see falling hairs—indicates, for both Tsong 
lchapa and Go rampa, the limited power of linguistic expression over our 
cognitive and perceptual processes, and so indicates also the limited power 
and role of conceptual mind. 
Although a visually impaired person might understand the illusory 
character of the falling hairs, he cannot have direct perception of the 
nonexistence of falling hairs. Therefore, the experience of falling hairs by a 
visually impaired person persists despite his own conceptual understanding 
of the real state of affairs. The only solution for the visually impaired person, 
if the appearance of falling hairs is to cease, is therefore to develop better 
perceptual abilities—to be cured of the cataracts. When we look to the 
example of the person with cataracts, no matter what their conceptual 
understanding, that understanding is always inadequate to dispel the illusion 
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of falling hairs and thus we see the limited character of conceptual 
understanding. When we look to the case of the person without cataracts, 
whose vision is unimpaired, his inability to communicate his conceptual 
understanding to one whose vision is impaired demonstrates the limits of 
linguistic expression. 
So far as Tsong Ichapa is concerned, a person with cataracts can form 
some conceptual understanding of the illusory character of the falling hairs 
that appear in his vision by hearing an account that explains those hairs as 
indeed illusory. Similarly, when ordinary beings listen to explanations 
concerning ultimate reality, they too can form some conceptual 
understanding of ultimate truth. Go rampa argues, however, that a person 
with cataracts cannot form any understanding of the illusory nature of the 
falling hairs they see. To form such an understanding, according to Go 
rampa, would actually require direct experience of the reality—that is, visual 
experience from which the illusory falling hairs were absent. In the same 
way, Go rampa argues, ordinary beings cannot form any understanding 
concerning ultimate reality merely by listening to explanations of ultimate 
reality—only an arya who personally and directly experiences ultimate reality 
can develop such an understanding.' 
Both Go rampa and Tsong Ichapa use the cataract analogy, though to 
different ends, in a way that explicitly treats the cognitive abilities of ordinary 
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beings (so skyes, prthagjana) on the model of the visual capacities of persons 
whose vision is impaired and that treats the cognitive capacities of fully 
enlightened beings on the model of the visual capacities of those whose 
vision is normal and unimpaired. The cognitive ability of ordinary beings is 
obscured by the delusion of primal ignorance in the same way that vision is 
impaired by the presence of cataracts. It is due to the influence of primal 
ignorance that ordinary beings continue to reify essences. In contrast, the 
cognitive capacities of fully enlightened beings are, analogously with the 
vision of those whose eyesight is clear and healthy, totally free from 
ignorance and the predispositions generated by prior ignorance. An 
enlightened being is thus free from all reifying tendencies. Moreover, just as a 
visually impaired person does not have immediate access to the non-illusory 
or unimpaired visual experience, neither does an ordinary person have direct 
access to ultimate truth—thus even a fully enlightened being will not be able 
to provide an ordinary being with the ability to perceive directly the 
nonexistence of essences. 
The differences between ordinary and enlightened beings in their ability 
to gain access to ultimate truth can be further elucidated through 
consideration of the limits of language and of conceptual mind—each of 
which is, of course, dependent on the other. Tsong khapa and Go rampa 
argue that, so far as expressing the nature of ultimate reality is concerned, the 
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power of language is quite limited. Linguistic discourse depends upon 
linguistic convention, but ultimate reality goes beyond those conventions. 
Moreover, linguistic discourse only makes complete sense when what is 
being expressed, or the expressions used, are already known or are to some 
extent familiar to the listeners. The less the listeners are familiar with what is 
being expressed or with the expressions used, or the less these things are 
already known to the listeners, the less will what is said make sense to those 
listeners. 
Suppose the visually impaired person is born with cataracts and has 
never experienced the world visually without the presence of falling hairs. 
This person cannot make full sense of the descriptions of the nonexistence of 
falling hairs since he lacks any perceptual reference for those descriptions. 
Indeed, it will be impossible to impart to this person any real understanding 
of what it is like to see the world without the presence of falling hairs. The 
case is exactly the same for ordinary persons who have never had any 
experience of ultimate reality free from essences and who therefore cannot 
make real sense of any description of such a reality. The linguistic expressions 
used to explain ultimate reality can make full sense only when what is to be 
expressed is within the reach of the cognitive framework of the listener. 
Explaining the limits of language to the Venerable Mahakotthita the 
Venerable ariputra states: "As far, friend, as the six bases of sense-contact 
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(phassayatana) reach, so far reaches the (explainable) world of diffuseness 
(paparica); and as far as the world of diffuseness reaches, so far reach the six 
bases of sense-contact. Through the entire fading away and cessation of the 
six bases of sense-contact, the world of diffuseness ceases and is stilled" 
[AN.IV. 175]. 5 Inasmuch as ultimate reality is unknown to ordinary beings, 
linguistic discourse alone cannot fully bridge the gap between what is known 
and what is unknown to an ordinary being. In this sense, ultimate truth 
remains inexpressible. 
Language is strictly inadequate to fully communicate the cognition of 
ultimate reality from one person to another. But does an ordinary person 
have a capacity to achieve any understanding of ultimate reality at all? To put 
this another way: even if linguistic expression is inadequate to the 
communication of ultimate reality, could the conceptual mind nevertheless 
allow some grasp of ultimate truth? Different interpretations of the limits of 
conceptual thought and inference in knowledge generate different answers to 
this question. Go rampa argues that the conceptual mind has no capacity 
whatsoever to comprehend ultimate reality. Tsong khapa, on the other hand, 
argues that the conceptual mind, although it does not comprehend ultimate 
reality directly and fully, does comprehend ultimate reality conceptually and 
partially. In fact, Tsong khapa considers conceptual understanding as a 
stepping-stone to eventual direct personal realisation of ultimate reality. 
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"Ordinary beings", argues Go rampa, "simply could not understand 
ultimate reality either by means of listening to other's words or by means of 
reasoning or by using any other means". 8 He insists that ultimate reality 
"cannot be elaborated through vocal expressions; hence it is beyond verbal 
elaborations (ngag gi spros pa). And it is also beyond the comprehension of 
mind and mental factors; thus no conceptual thought whatsoever can 
possibly encompass it"? As Go rampa sees it, ordinary beings (so skye, 
prthagjana) are not cognitive agents of ultimate truth and are totally incapable 
of understanding ultimate reality. Hence, listening to a discourse explaining 
ultimate reality cannot lead ordinary beings to comprehend ultimate reality. 
If, for some reason, they manage to form some ideas through inference, those 
ideas, and the 'knowledge' that they comprise, must be thoroughly 
incoherent. Strictly speaking, the conceptual cognitions of ordinary beings 
are, according to Go rampa, utterly inadequate to the task of comprehending 
ultimate reality. 
One of the primary reasons behind Go rampa's claim that conceptual 
cognition cannot access ultimate truth is that such cognition depends upon 
'universals'. Go rampa argues that "any cognition analysing the nature of 
reality is simply the conceptual thought grasping to a conjunctive compound 
of the term [universal] and the object universal". 8 Conceptual mind or 
thought is analysed by Go rampa as comprising both conceptual/perceptual 
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awareness and universals—including the 'term universal' (sgra spyi) and 
'object universal' (don spyi)—the latter being the objects of conceptual 
thought. The 'term universal' (sgra spyi) refers to the concept of an object 
formed as a result of listening to descriptions about the object without 
actually seeing it. The 'object universal', (don spyi) on the other hand, is the 
concept of an object formed as result of seeing the object without having any 
prior descriptive knowledge about the object. Both of these two universals, if 
taken independently, make little sense, since the former is description 
without reference and the latter reference without description. Go rampa 
argues that these two universals must therefore work together in order for 
language and thought to be practical and meaningful. 
The 'term universal' and 'object universal' conjointly form the object of 
thought. Conceptual thought, moreover, functions strictly within the 
conventional domain. It has no access whatsoever to ultimate truth since 
ultimate truth is utterly beyond any linguistic and conceptual conventions. 
Hence all conceptual cognitions, as Go rampa understands them, "are 
confined to grasping either one of the four extreme views, and therefore it is 
impossible to repudiate the conceptual categories of four extremes 
simultaneously".9 Since the goal of enlightenment is to transcend the 
conceptual categories, so the repudiation of the conceptual categories is 
absolutely essential. Moreover, conceptual cognitions are seen as themselves 
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responsible for multiplying the conceptual categories rather than assisting the 
process of transcendence. 
Recognising Go rampa's views concerning the extreme limitation of 
language and conceptual thought in relation to ultimate truth, Dreyfus 
writes: "the Sa-gya tradition insists that concepts apply only to conventional 
reality. Ultimate truth in Madhyamaka is completely beyond the reach of 
concepts. It is utterly ineffable, in the strong sense of the word". 1° Dreyfus 
also notes that, "for the Sa-gya tradition in general and Go-ram-ba in 
particular, the key concept in Madhyamaka philosophy is not the absence of 
real existence but freedom from elaborations (prapafica, spros pa). Ultimate 
truth is utterly beyond the reach of elaboration". 11 On this matter, as on 
others, Go rampa thus exemplifies a more widely held view—one that is 
shared, notably by -alcya mChog ldan,12 sTag tsang,' Mi pham,' mKhan po 
Kun bzang dPal ldarim and dGe 'dun Chos 'phe1. 16 Interestingly, however, 
some of Go rampa's usual allies, such as kLong chen, 17 Sa part" and Rong 
stony' are more sympathetic to Tsong khapa's view. Like Tsong khapa, this 
latter group argue that logical inference must enable some form of conceptual 
grasp of ultimate reality—thereby providing the means that eventually leads 
to the direct personal realisation of ultimate reality.• 
Given the close link between the limits of language and the limits of the 
conceptual mind, Go rampa argues that while an enlightened person could 
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not coherently explain ultimate reality, neither could an ordinary being 
realise ultimate reality. Therefore he concludes: "It is not possible to explain 
ultimate truth either through definition, or through defined object, or by any 
other means in the manner it is experienced during the meditative equipoise 
which is free from any conceptual elaborations (spros pa, praparica). This is 
because ultimate truth", in Go rampa's view, "is inexpressible through 
language and is not an apprehended object of the mind".' Tsong khapa only 
partly agrees with Go rampa on this point. To the extent that Tsong lchapa 
holds that an ordinary being could not have a direct non-conceptual 
realisation of ultimate reality, he is in agreement with Go rampa; to the extent 
that Tsong khapa holds that an ordinary being does form a conceptual 
realisation of ultimate reality (which realisation is useful in realising ultimate 
reality), he is in disagreement with Go rampa. 
An ordinary being does, according to Tsong Ichapa, have the capacity to 
form a conceptual understanding of ultimate reality by .listening to 
discourses. While a conceptual understanding (an inferential knowledge) of 
ultimate reality is mistaken, since it assumes the universal of ultimate reality 
to be ultimate reality, it is nonetheless an essential prerequisite for the direct 
personal realisation of ultimate truth. Here it is important to distinguish 
Tsong khapa's view on the 'universal of ultimate reality' from his view 
concerning 'ultimate reality' itself and so to distinguish his view regarding 
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the universal from his view regarding the particular. The universal of 
ultimate reality is constructed through conceptual-linguistic conventions. 
Ultimate reality, however, is not itself a conceptual-linguistic construction 
and is beyond the reach of any such conceptual-linguistic conventions. Thus 
the universal of ultimate truth pertaining to material form, for example, is 
constructed on the basis of the linguistic descriptions and the conceptual 
grasping of emptiness of the material form, but the empty mode of the 
material form is not itself constructed on the basis of conceptual-linguistic 
conventions. So even though the universal of ultimate truth of material form 
is constructed on the basis of conceptual-linguistic conventions, the ultimate 
truth of material form is not entirely dependent on conceptual-linguistic 
conventions. The ontological character of empty form consequently retains its 
true identity in spite of the fact that different universals, both coherent and 
incoherent, are imposed upon it. 
Confusion between the universal of ultimate truth, as universal, and 
ultimate truth itself, as particular, is somewhat analogous to the confusion 
that may arise between a face and the reflection of that face. Just as we may 
mistake the reflection for the actual face, so conceptual cognition mistakes the 
universal of ultimate truth for ultimate truth itself, thus the conceptual 
consciousness that realises ultimate truth is seen as erroneous. The confusion 
here arises partly because the conceptual mind does not have direct access to 
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ultimate truth, but only to the universal of ultimate truth that mediates 
between the conceptual mind and empty phenomena (we may say that it 
thereby blocks direct access to ultimate truth, but if so, it also enables indirect 
access). Lacking clarity on the nature of the access it does have, conceptual 
mind assumes that its access to the universal of ultimate truth is access to 
ultimate truth itself—in fact, its only knowledge of ultimate truth is 
inferential. The fact that inferential knowledge of ultimate truth does not 
constitute direct access to ultimate truth does not mean, however, that such 
inferential knowledge is useless. As we have already noted, for Tsong khapa, 
it constitutes an important epistemic relation to ultimate reality. If inferential 
knowledge of ultimate truth is based on valid empirical premises, rather than 
mere fictions or imaginations, then the inferential knowledge of ultimate 
truth provides the scaffolding that enables direct non-conceptual access to 
ultimate truth. 
Tsong khapa maintains that there is a clear-cut distinction between the 
direct non-conceptual realisation of ultimate truth and the conceptual 
realisation of such truth. An ordinary being is not in a position to have direct 
non-conceptual realisation of ultimate reality and so, according to Tsong 
khapa, Cartdrakirti's use of the cataract analogy only indicates "the listener's 
failure to realise exactly what is explained, but this does not rule out [the 
listener's conceptual] realisation of the nonexistence of hair". 21 By listening to 
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descriptions, a person with cataracts could inferentially grasp the 
nonexistence of hairs in spite of the fact that he does not have the capacity to 
see this directly. Similarly, when ultimate truth is explained linguistically, 
ordinary beings afflicted by deluded ignorance cannot form an 
understanding of ultimate truth to the level of those who are enlightened. So 
long as a person remains afflicted by deluded ignorance, his tendency to reify 
ultimate reality persists—everytime he sees things, he presupposes the 
existence of essences. There is no possibility, therefore, that a person afflicted 
in this way could directly realise ultimate truth just by listening to 
descriptions and explanations. 
Yet since ultimate truth is not entirely ineffable, and not entirely 
incomprehensible, linguistic descriptions and explanations can be conducive 
to the formation of a conceptual view of ultimate reality. Consider what 
Tsong khapa has to say as follows: 
Although the explanation of ultimate truth through an analogy does 
not lead to its realisation (rtogs pa) just as the way [ultimate truth] is 
seen (mthong ba) by those who are free from the affliction of the cloud of 
ignorance. This does not indicate that [Candrakirti] accepts reality as 
non-realisable in a general sense. Hence, ultimate truth is not ineffable 
for definitive scriptural texts embodied by profound meanings and 
their verbal descriptions. Furthermore, it is not the case that [ultimate 
truth] is unrealisable by the mind associating with [verbal descriptions]. 
Therefore, every single statement explaining the meaning of reality (de 
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kho na nyid kyi don) as beyond the scope of consciousness and verbal 
description must be understood in the same light. 23 
Tsong khapa also argues for a significant role for language and conceptual 
mind in forming a bridge between conventional knowledge and ultimate 
knowledge. In this respect, an inferential understanding of ultimate truth is 
not only possible, but is, in fact, essential as a step on the path to the direct 
realisation of ultimate truth. Conceptual realisation, argues Tsong khapa, 
serves as the causal nexus between the naïve cognitive states of an ordinary 
being and the eventually evolved wisdom of an arya—it forms the epistemic 
link between the naïve reifying tendencies of an ordinary being and the direct 
realisation of ultimate reality. The conceptual understanding of ultimate 
truth, no matter how trivial it might be, acts as an epistemic bridge or vehicle 
that enables us to move from the conventionally known field of empirical 
truth to the conventionally unknown field of ultimate truth. 
Inasmuch as it must be based on valid empirical premises, so the 
inferential knowledge of ultimate truth is linked to the experience of ordinary 
beings. Inasmuch as it involves an understanding of ultimate reality on the 
logical level, so it is linked to the transcendental experience of an arya. In this 
way the conceptual realisation of ultimate truth gradually paves the way for 
the most enlightened wisdom of Buddhahood. Consequently Tsong khapa 
argues that the conceptizal understanding of ultimate truth is absolutely 
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required for the possibility of such enlightenment. For Go rampa, on the 
other hand, the realisation of ultimate truth is perfectly sui generis. It has no 
prior causal conditions. It spontaneously arises when •a person attains the 
state of aryahood. As the conceptual knowledge of an ordinary being, in Go 
rampa's view, does not contribute anything to the eventual realisation of the 
non-conceptual ultimate reality, so nothing whatsoever is required to bridge 
the gap between the conventional knowledge of an ordinary being and the 
ultimate knowledge of an arya. The transition from the ordinary state to the 
state of aryahood is thus seen as a leap rather than a gradual progression. 
Another important point to be noted here is that, for Go rampa, "the 
only non-deceptive subjective consciousness is the arya's meditative 
equipoise. That which is non-deceptive from this perspective amounts to 
ultimate truth".' Therefore, nothing whatsoever is capable of realising 
ultimate reality except the wisdom of meditative equipoise. What is the cause 
of meditative wisdom? Is there a causal link between the ordinary cognitive 
state and the cognitive state of an arya? For Go rampa, as pointed out earlier, 
the answer is simply 'no'. An arya's wisdom irt meditative equipoise arises 
without any traceable prior causal event. It cannot be traced back to the 
deluded cognitive state of an ordinary being.. The direct non-conceptual 
realisation of ultimate truth during an arya's meditative equipoise arises from 
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nowhere. Ultimate truth is therefore ineffable and inconceivable for Go 
rampa. 
Moreover Go rampa explicitly rejects the role of reasoning 
consciousness in realising ultimate truth, arguing that "valid reasoning 
consciousness belongs to the conventional realm and cannot be a bridge 
between the two sides, despite its claim to have the realisation of ultimate 
truth likened to its realisation during an arya's meditative equipoise"?' 
Dreyfus also draws attention to this point: "when analysing the way in which 
inference relates to emptiness, Go-rampa uses the concept of object 
universal.. .Go-ram-pa's point is that inference does not apprehend emptiness 
itself...Emptiness lies beyond the grasp of thought and language, which has 
access only to the object universal of emptiness".' Dreyfus argues that Go 
rampa's view, although familiar within the Dharmakirtian tradition, "has no 
obvious place in Madhyamaka, especially when understood from 
Candrakirti's perspective". Dreyfus also notes that "the notion of object 
universal seems to be tied down to the foundationalist standpoint of the 
epistemologists. Nevertheless, Go-ram-ba is quite happy to use this notion to 
strengthen his analysis of emptiness as being beyond thought and 
language"?' 
We must now bring this discussion of the limits of language and 
conceptual mind to its conclusion. As we have seen, so far as Go rampa is 
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concerned, language and conceptual mind have no soteriological value 
whatsoever. Any knowledge founded on conventional truth, ac -cording to his 
view, is useful only within the conventional realm. Since, metaphysically 
speaking, ultimate truth stands beyond the conventional world, so ultimate 
truth is utterly inaccessible to the conventional constructions of language and 
conceptual mind. A correct understanding of ultimate truth unfolds only 
with the total eradication of the empirical world and the only way to 
understand ultimate reality is through non-conceptual immediacy. Yet unlike 
Go rampa, and as we shall see in more detail below, Tsong khapa argues that 
language and conceptual mind are vehicles to a direct non-conceptual 
understanding of ultimate truth and so he maintains that language and 
conceptual mind are indeed soteriologically valuable. 
2. Ineffability and inconceivability of ultimate truth 
At this point we shall consider a couple of important passages from the 
pioneers of the Madhyamaka tradition and then consider the Tibetan 
interpretations of these passages. In his major philosophical treatise 
Malamadhyamakakarika [XVIII: 7], in the course of his analysis of the 
ineffability and inconceivability of ultimate reality, Acarya Nagarjuna writes: 
What is to be expressed has ceased 
For, the engaged sphere of thought has ceased. 
Like nirvana, the ultimate reality (dharmata, chos nyid) 
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Is non-arisen and non-ceased." 
In the Prasannapada, Candrakirti glosses the above statement of Nagarjuna in 
the following words: 
If there is something to be expressed here, indeed it should be 
explained. However, when what is to be expressed has ceased, and in 
the context where the expressions (tshigs) do not have their referent 
objects, buddhas teach nothing whatsoever. Why is there no referent to 
be expressed? Because as it says, "an engaged sphere of thought (sems, 
citta) has ceased". Engaged sphere of thought means, 'engaged sphere 
of thought'. Engaged sphere is an object, meaning 'an apprehended 
object'. If there were any engaged sphere of thought, then, one could 
argue that designations through linguistic superimposition would 
make sense. As [ultimate reality] is not intelligible to be an engaged 
sphere of thought, what would language represent through logical 
superimposition? 
Why is there no engaged sphere of thought? Because, as it says, 
"like nirvana, ultimate reality is non-arisen and non-ceased". As the 
ultimate reality (chos nyid, dharmata) is non-arisen and non-ceased, the 
nature of phenomena (chos kyi ngo bo) and defining characteristics of 
phenomena (chos kyi rang bzhin) are posited as equivalent to nirvana. 
Thought, therefore does not engage with [ultimate reality]. Without 
thought's engagement with it, there is no ground whatsoever for 
linguistic superimposition. Furthermore, without having [a sphere to be 
engaged], what reference would language represent? For this reason, a 
statement "buddhas taught nothing whatsoever", still stands.' 
Reflecting further on the same issue in the Madhyamakavatarabhasya, 
Candrakirti says that "because it is ineffable (brjod du med, avyakrta), and 
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because it is not an object of consciousness, [ultimate truth] cannot be actually 
explained"." Let us now consider the two Tibetan readings of these 
statements from Nagarjuna and Candrakirti. 
First, let us turn to Tsong khapa. In reading these passages, Tsong 
khapa emphasises the distinction between the standpoints of the ultimate and 
of the empirical. As far as Tsong khapa is concerned, any realisation, whether 
of conventional or ultimate truth, as well as any explanation of either of the 
two truths, is possible only from the empirical standpoint. The ultimate 
standpoint refers to the vantage point of transcendental wisdom. When 
transcendental wisdom engages with the transcendental mode of things, it 
does so by penetrating and transcending all conceptual categories. The fact 
that both Nagarjuna and Candrakirti take ultimate reality to be an 
inexpressible (brjod par bya ba min pa, avyakrta,) and non-engaged sphere of 
thought (sems kyi spyod yul min pa) means, according to Tsong khapa, that 
both Nagarjuna and Candrakirti can be interpreted as speaking exclusively 
from the ultimate vantage point. "If there is anything expressible from the 
ultimate standpoint," Tsong khapa says, "it should be expressed. From the 
ultimate standpoint however, what is to be expressed has ceased and thus it 
appears to be nonexistent".' Transcendental wisdom engages with the 
ultimate truth by dissolving all conceptual objects. Consequently, from the 
ultimate standpoint, no phenomenon, argues Tsong khapa, retains its 
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discreteness, shape, colour, taste etc. when it is penetrated by the 
transcendental wisdom—by ultimate valid consciousness. All five aggregates 
are directly experienced by this wisdom as ultimately non-arisen and non-
ceased, not coming and not going, not permanent and not annihilated, 
peaceful and beyond thought constructions. This profound experience itself 
amounts to experiencing nirvana. Tsong khapa therefore sees no 
inconsistency in arguing that, from the perspective of the ultimate, "buddhas 
taught nothing whatsoever".35 
In Go rampa's view, the distinction between ultimate and empirical 
standpoints is understood very differently. For him, the empirical standpoint 
refers strictly to the perspective of an ordinary being, while the ultimate 
standpoint refers to an arya's wisdom of the meditative equipoise. Go rampa 
argues that language is utterly incapable of capturing the meaning of ultimate 
reality. He also argues that conceptual mind is utterly incapable of grasping 
the meaning of ultimate reality. Therefore, regardless of the empirical and the 
ultimate standpoint, ultimate truth is, for Go rampa, always linguistically 
inexpressible and conceptually inconceivable. Hence the distinction between 
ultimate and empirical standpoints does not apply. Moreover ultimate truth, 
according to Go rampa, is nothing other than the transcendental wisdom or 
transcendental consciousness, Buddha or Tathfigata. They are all one and the 
same. He argues that "eventually the cognition itself becomes an undefiled 
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cognitive sphere and that itself is the ultimate Buddha, who is adorned with 
the perfections of abandonment and realisation", and further that "ultimate 
reality, empirical reality and subjective wisdom—all three lose their 
contradistinctions", thus becoming one with the transcendental 
consciousness.' Thatagata is, he says, by definition a transcendental 
phenomenon, while conventionalities, are, by definition, mundane 
phenomena projected by ignorance. "Prapaiica is a characteristic feature of 
causally effective things. The Tathagata [i.e. ultimate truth] is however not a 
thing, hence it is not a category of praparzca, but is transcendent of praparica".' 
Conventional truths include anything, but not what is ultimate. 
"Conventional truth (kun rdzob bden pa, sarhyrtisatya)", as Jayananda puts it 
"includes conceptual fabrications such as that of existence and nonexistence 
of phenomena by ordinary beings (so sor skyed ho, prthagjana). Such natures 
are nonexistent, because existence, nonexistence and so forth are logically 
unacceptable".' So long as there is an existence, either as a subject or as an 
object, then it cannot, according to Go rampa, be identified as ultimate truth. 
Subject and object, this and that, existence and nonexistence—all these 
dualities are categories of deluded thoughts, and ultimate truth must 
transcend all dualities. 
Since ultimate truth is beyond language and thought, it cannot be an 
object of knowledge. If ultimate truth were an object of knowledge at all, 
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therefore knowable, according to Go rampa, "then it should be expressible by 
means of linguistic expressions. However, because [ultimate truth] is not an 
engaged sphere of thought, no linguistic expression whatsoever can express 
it".41 Ultimate reality (de bzhin nyid) is primordially non-arisen, non-ceased 
and non-dualistic, not only epistemologically, but also in a metaphysical 
sense. Therefore, "mind with dualistic appearances cannot by any means 
apprehend the aspect [of non-dual ultimate reality]".  But why is an ultimate 
truth not an engaged sphere of mind?—"because non-arisen, non-ceased and 
non-dual ultimate reality is itself the nature of phenomena. And since the 
nature of phenomena is posited as synonymous with nirvana, mind cannot 
engage with it".' Go rampa goes on: "Since mind does not engage with 
[ultimate reality], there is no reason why [ultimate reality] should be 
linguistically expressed. As [mental engagement] is nonexistent, no words 
can capture it. In this sense buddhas taught nothing whatsoever".' Words 
convey meaning only if there is a point of reference for those words. Should 
there be no point of reference verified by mind, there is simply no object to be 
expressed. The words are meaningless inasmuch as they do not have an 
affirmative message to convey. "If [ultimate truth] were an expressible object 
-L 
at all," says Go rampa, "there is certainly no reason why it should not be 
explained, however, because ultimate reality is free from any the obsession of 
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linguistic determinations (sgras bzhin pa), [buddhas] refused to teach anything 
at air.' 
Although Go rampa unequivocally maintains that ultimate truth is 
beyond the description of words and beyond the comprehension of thought, 
this claim does not prevent him from holding the view that buddhas do 
provisionally teach the doctrine of ultimate reality in conventional terms by 
employing what he describes as "linguistic superimposition (sgro brtag, 
samaropa)" . 46 Go rampa, and most of his Tibetan counterparts—such as Mi 
pham,' Sakya mChog ldanu—are generally opposed to the distinction 
between ultimate and conventional standpoints as articulated by Tsong 
khapa. In dealing with the issues related to the ineffability and the 
inconceivability of ultimate reality, they all treat this distinction as essentially 
metaphorical and therefore maintain that ultimate truth is utterly ineffable 
and conceptually unknowable. Modern interpreters such as Murti, Singh' 
and Narain also strongly endorse Go rampa's line of argument here.' Murti 
for instance argues that "the real is utterly devoid (1.-inya) of these and other 
conceptual constructions; it is transcendent to thought and can be realised 
only in non-dual knowledge —prajna or Intuition which is the Absolute 
itself"." Harsha Narain also argues that "[Nagarjuna's] whole endeavour is to 
demonstrate beyond the shadow of doubt that his ,zinya is totally 
transcendent to all possible categories of reason".' 
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If language is utterly incapable of disclosing ultimate truth, then another 
important question arises: what is the point of the Buddha's active 
involvement in teaching about ultimate truth given the utter incapacity of 
words to express ultimate truth and the utter incapacity of the intellects of his 
disciples to grasp its meaning? As we shall see, neither Go rampa nor his 
traditional allies offer any convincing answer to this question. Hence as 
Narain puts it: 
the Madhyamika finds it extremely difficult to give us even the 
remotest idea of the deliverance of the ultimate experience or of 
enlightenment called Prapiaparamita and can do little better than to 
mutter that it is of the nature of silence (ticsnint—bhava), non-
apprehension (anupalambha) and cessation of all expression 
(prapancopasama). It has not knowing whatsoever (yatra jfidnasydpa a-
prcarah). 53 
By claiming that ultimate truth is conceptually unknowable, Go rampa does 
not mean to say that ultimate truth is thoroughly unknowable. For him, 
ultimate truth is knowable by means of non-conceptual wisdom. In fact, no 
matter how much the two Tibetan Madhyamikas are divided in their views 
regarding the intelligibility of language and the limits of conceptual mind, to 
the extent that they both accept ultimate reality as knowable by non-
conceptual wisdom, so they both speak with a single voice. The details of 
non-conceptual knowledge will be discussed in the next chapter, but before 
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we move on, we shall briefly examine the validity of the conceptual right-
view. 
3. The validity of the conceptual right-view 
There are three issues crucial to the analysis of the scope and the validity of 
the conceptual right-view: (i) the defining characteristics of right-view; (ii) its 
significance as the forerunner of the overall spiritual practices; and (iii) the 
types of right-view. Discussion of these three issues will be followed by a 
more focused comparative analysis of Tsong khapa and Go rampa regarding 
their respective accounts on the validity of the conceptual right-view. 
First, let us turn to the sutras and briefly summarise what they have to 
say on right-view. The Buddha offers the following defining characteristics of 
right-view. "What is . right-view? Knowledge with regard to dukkha, 
knowledge with regard to the origination of dukkha, knowledge of the 
cessation of dukkha and knowledge with regard to the way of practice leading 
to the cessation of dukkha: this is right-view" [Maha-satipatthana, DN 22].' 
Although this definition of right-view undoubtedly reflects the Buddha's 
practical and soteriological concerns, the emphasis here is on the correct 
knowledge of the fourfold noble truths. The reason for this is that the 
achievement of the soteriological goals indeed depends on correct knowledge 
of the four noble truths—but this in turn depends on the correct view with 
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respect to the nature of self or personal identity. The significance of having a 
correct view of self is made obvious in the Buddha's talk of 'a thicket of 
wrong-views': 
There is the case where an uninstructed, run-of-the-mill person.. .does 
not discern what ideas are fit for attention, or what ideas are unfit for 
attention. This being so, he does not attend to ideas fit for attention, and 
attends instead to ideas unfit for attention. This is how he attends 
inappropriately: "Was I in the past? Was I not in the past? How was I in 
the past? Having been what, what was I in the past? Shall I be in the 
future? Shall I not be in the future? What shall I be in the future? How 
shall I be in the future? Having been what, what shall I be in the 
future?" Or else he is inwardly perplexed about the immediate present: 
"Am I? Am I not? What am I? How am I? Where has this being come 
from? Where is it bound? 
As he attends inappropriately in this way, one of six kinds of 
view arises in him: The view "I have a self" arises in him as true and 
established, or the view "I have no self".. .or the view "It is precisely by 
means of self that I perceive self"...or the view "It is precisely by means 
of self I perceive not-self".. .or the view "It is precisely by means of not-
self that I perceive self" arises in him as true and established. Or else he 
has a view like this: "This very self of mine—the knower that is 
sensitive here and there to the ripening of good and bad actions—is the 
self of mind that is constant, everlasting, eternal, not subject to change, 
and will endure as long as eternity". This is called a thicket of views, a 
wilderness of views, a contortion of views, a writhing of views, a fetter 
of views. Bound by a fetter of views, the uninstructed run-of-the-mill 
person is not freed from birth, aging, and death, from sorrow, 
lamentation, pain, distress and despair. He is not freed, I tell you, from 
suffering and stress. 
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The well-instructed disciple of the noble ones... discerns what 
ideas are fit for attention, and what ideas are unfit for attention. This 
being so, he does not attend to ideas unfit for attention, and attend 
[instead] to ideas fit for attention... He attends appropriately, "This is 
dukkha... This is the origination of dukkha...This is the cessation of 
dukkha...This is the way leading to the cessation of dukkha". As he 
attends appropriately in this way, three fetters are abandoned in him: 
identity-view, doubt and grasping at precepts and practices [Sabbasava 
Sutta, MN 2].' 
The definition of the right-view is also contrasted with the definition of the 
wrong-view in terms of the capacity to produce skillful virtues. The fact that 
our perspectives on the crucial issues of reality and value have a bearing that 
goes well beyond mere theoretical convictions signifies the importance of 
right-view. Our views govern our attitudes, our actions, and our whole 
orientation towards life. Our views might not be clearly systematised in our 
mind—we might have only a hazy conceptual' grasp of our belief 
systems—but whether systematised or not, overtly expressed or retained in 
silence, as Bhikkhu Bodhi puts it "these views have a far-reaching influence. 
They structure our perceptions, order our values, crystallise into the 
ideational framework through which we interpret to ourselves the meaning 
of our being in the world". % These views not only condition our physical and 
vocal actions, but they also determine our cognitive states and psychological 
well-being. Depending on the views we hold, we determine our choices and 
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goals. In this way ideals are turned into actuality. Although actions 
themselves determine their consequences, the type of actions along with the 
consequences that follow from them, hinge on the views from which those 
actions arise. Since views are not mere hypotheses, they imply an 'ontological 
commitment'—they involve ontological judgments and decisions on the 
question of what is true and what is false. Thus, in contrasting the right-view 
from the wrong-view, the Buddha also says: 
I do not envision any one other quality by which unarisen unskilful 
qualities arise, and arisen unskilful qualities go to growth and 
proliferation, like wrong-view. When a person has wrong-view, 
unarisen unskilful qualities arise, and arisen unskilful qualities go to 
growth and proliferation. I do not envision any one other quality by 
which unarisen skilful qualities arise, and arisen skilful qualities go to 
growth and proliferation, like right-view. When a person has right-
view, unarisen skilful qualities arise, and arisen skilful qualities go to 
growth and proliferation. 
Just as when a nimb-tree seed, a bitter creeper seed, or a bitter 
melon seed is placed in moist soil, whatever nutriment it takes from the 
soil and the water, all conduces to its bitterness, acridity and 
distastefulness. Why is that? Because of the evil nature of the seed. In 
the same way, when a person has wrong-view, whatever bodily deeds 
he undertakes in line with that view, whatever verbal deed.. .whatever 
mental deeds he undertakes in line with that view, whatever intentions, 
whatever determinations, whatever vows, whatever fabrications, all 
lead to what is disagreeable, unpleasing, unappealing, unprofitable and 
stressful. Why is that? Because of the evil nature of the view... 
Just as when a sugar cane seed, a rice grain, or a grape seed is 
placed in moist- soil, whatever nutriment it takes from the soil and the 
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water, all conduces to its sweetness, tastiness and unalloyed 
delectability. Why is that? Because of the auspicious nature of the seed. 
In the same way, when a person has right-view, whatever bodily deeds 
he undertakes in line with that view, whatever verbal deeds.. .whatever 
mental deeds he undertakes in line with that view, whatever intentions, 
whatever vows, whatever determinations, whatever fabrications, all 
lead to what is agreeable, pleasing, charming, profitable and easeful. 
Why is that? Because of the auspicious nature of the view [AN I. 181- 
182, 189-90].' 
The second issue to be discussed here concerns the role of right-view as the 
forerunner of the entire Buddhist path, the guide for all the other factors. As 
the above suttas expressly state, the significance of right-view is at the very 
core of the Buddha Dharma. It enables the practitioner to understand his 
starting point, his destination, and the successive landmarks as his practice 
advances. To attempt to engage in the practice without a foundation in the 
right-view is to risk getting lost in the futility of undirected and misguided 
activities. It would be analogous to wanting to drive somewhere without 
consulting a roadmap or not listening to the suggestions of an experienced 
driver. One might get into the car and start to drive, but rather than 
approaching nearer to one's destination, one is just as likely to move farther 
away from it. To reach the desired destination, one must, at the very least, 
have some idea of its general direction and which roads lead to it. The 
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practice of the path, similarly, takes place within the framework of an 
understanding established by the right-view. 
In recognition of the importance of right-view, the Buddha rightly 
places it at the very beginning of the noble eightfold path. "Bhikkhus, just as 
the dawn is the forerunner and first indication of the rising of the sun, so is 
right-view the forerunner and first indication of wholesome state" [AN 
X.121]. All other meaningful spiritual practices leading to right knowledge 
and right freedom have right-view as their forerunner. 
For one of right-view, bhikkhus, right intention springs. For one of 
right intention, right speech springs up. For one of right speech, right 
action springs up. For one of right action, right livelihood springs up. 
For one of right livelihood, right effort springs up. For one of right 
effort, right mindfulness springs up. For of right mindfulness, right 
concentration springs. For one of right concentration, right knowledge 
springs up. For one of right knowledge, right deliverance springs up 
[AN X.121].' 
Right-view is also characterised as the forerunner of the practices in the sense 
in which it leads to freedom from the wrong-view. 
How is right-view the forerunner? One discerns wrong-view as wrong-
view, and right-view as right-view. This is one's right-view.. .One tries 
to abandon wrong-view and to enter into right-view: This is one's right 
effort. One is mindful to abandon wrong-view and to enter and remain 
in right-view: This is one's right mindfulness. Thus these three 
qualities—right-view, right effort, and right mindfulness—run and 
circle around right-view [Mahti-Cattarisaka, MN 117[.' 
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The third issue at stake here concerns the different types or aspects of right-
view. In its fullest measure, right-view involves a correct understanding of 
the entire Dharma—both mental and material phenomena—and thus its 
scope is equal to the range of the Dharma itself. Righ-view can also be 
understood in a more restricted sense. For example in the Sammaditthi Sutta 
[MN 9], ariputra considers sixteen different aspects of right-view. He 
expounds principles of right-view that pertain to the efficacy of moral and 
immoral actions, that pertain to the four nutriments of life, 61 that pertain to 
the four noble truths, that pertain to the twelve factors of dependent arising,' 
and that pertain to the taints as the conditions for breeding ignorance. 
However, for practical purposes, all aspects of right-view are broadly 
classified under a twofold division: 'conceptual right-view' and 'experiential 
right-view'. 
The 'conceptual right-view', in technical terms, is known as lokika-
sarriyagdrsti (Skt; Pãli lokiya-sammaditthi, Tib. 'jig rten pa'i yang dag pa'i lta ba), 
meaning 'mundane right-view'. In Pali it is also described as saccanulomika-
samadhitthi the 'right-view in conformity with truths'. This view is primarily 
concerned with a correct conceptual understanding of those empirical truths 
that operate entirely within the confines of the world. Conceptual right-view 
is, in most circumstances, considered equivalent to the understanding of the 
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efficacy of the moral laws governing the material and spiritual worlds, 
particularly the enunciation of how and why it is essential to abide by those 
laws to achieve the final goal. 
The 'experiential right-view', the second of the two types of the right-
view distinguished above, is known in technical terms as lokottara-sathyak-
drsti (Skt; Pali lokuttara-samaditthiti, Tib. 'jig rten las pa'i yang dag pa'i lta ba), 
meaning, 'supramundane right-view'. In Pali this is also described as 
saccapativedha-samaditthi 'experiential right-view'. This right-view is primarily 
concerned with an immediate understanding of truths within the confines of 
one's own psychophysical aggregates. Although, it too operates entirely 
within the confines of the mundane world, it penetrates, transcends and 
directly reveals the supramundane nature within oneself. 
Having thus briefly discussed the defining characteristics of right-view, 
its significance and its types, we now turn to Tsong khapa and Go rampa in 
order to compare their views on the validity of conceptual right-view. For 
both Tsong khapa and Go rampa, conceptual right-view consists of the 
intellectual grasp of principles enunciated in the Buddha's teaching. It is 
called right-view because it conforms with the truths, although it does not 
fully disclose those truths„ The conceptual right-view is constituted by the 
correct conceptual understanding of the truths arrived at by listening and 
studying the Buddha's teaching, followed by deeper personal examinations 
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of their meanings on the conceptual level. The experiential right-view is 
constituted by the penetration of the truth enunciated in the Buddha's 
teachings through one's own immediate experience. Precisely for this reason, 
it is called 'right-view that penetrates the truths' (Pali saccapativedha-
samaditthi). It should be noted, however, that, on Tsong khapa's approach, the 
conceptual right-view conforms to both ultimate and conventional truth, 
since the two truths are mutually interlocking. On Go rampa's approach, on 
the other hand, the conceptual right-view, although it conforms with 
conventional truth, is inconsistent with ultimate truth. Just as the two truths 
are mutually contradictory and hierarchical, so the conceptual right-view and 
the experiential right-view are also mutually contradictory and hierarchical. 
So far as the scope and the validity of conceptual right-view are 
concerned, Tsong Ichapa and Go rampa are clearly divided. For Tsong khapa, 
conceptual right-view is undeniably critical to the development of 
experiential right-view, whereas, for Go rampa, conceptual right-view is 
valid only in terms of grasping conventional truths by ordinary beings—it is 
utterly invalid so far as concerns its potential for developing the experiential 
right-view. These two opposing positions regarding the validity of 
conceptual right-view are not surprising. They are, in fact, consistent with 
Tsong khapa and Go rampa's earlier arguments regarding the limits of 
language and of the conceptual mind. 
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We have seen that, for Tsong khapa, ultimate truth is an object of 
conceptual knowledge. Ultimate truth is to a certain degree, he claims, both 
linguistically expressible and conceptually knowable. Consistent with that 
position, Tsong khapa maintains that the conceptual right-view is valid even 
in terms of its capability to guide the experiential right-view inasmuch as the 
conceptual right-view acts as forerunner for the experiential. In Bhikkhu 
Bodhi's words, "when.. .driven by keen aspiration to realise the truth 
embedded in the formulated principles of Dhamma, it serves as a critical 
phase in the development of wisdom (patina), for it provides the germ out of 
which experiential right-view gradually evolves". Experiential right-view, 
for Tsong khapa, is essentially generated by the practice of insightful 
meditation guided by a correct conceptual understanding of the truths. One 
must thus begin with a correct conceptual grasp of the teachings in order to 
comprehend fully the scope of the Buddha Dharrna within immediate 
experience. 
By using a correct conceptual understanding as the scaffolding for 
immediate experience and by cultivating the threefold training—morality, 
concentration and wisdom—intellectual comprehension is eventually 
transformed into immediate perception. This is how, according to Tsong 
khapa, one arrives at the stage wherein one directly penetrates empirically 
given truths through an immediate personal experience. "If conceptual right- 
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view can be compared to a hand—a hand that grasps the truth by way of 
concepts", as Bhikkhu Bodhi rightly points out—"then experiential right-
view can be compared to an eye—the eye of wisdom that sees directly into 
the true nature of existence ordinarily hidden from us by our greed, aversion 
and delusion".' 
Given Go rampa's commitment to the idea that ultimate truth is strictly 
linguistically inexpressible and conceptually unknowable, so the conceptual 
right-view must, according to Go rampa, be utterly irrelevant so far as 
concerns its capacity to lead to experiential right-view—it has no such 
capacity. Conceptual right-view is, in Go rampa's sense, valid only within the 
conventions of ordinary beings, but provides no scaffolding for the 
development of experiential right-view. Experiential right-view, according to 
Go rampa, comes only with penetration into a higher ultimate truth and is 
reserved for an arya and a buddha. Conceptual right-view is properly so-
called only in the sense that it is 'right' or 'consistent' with the truths in the 
world of the conceptual-linguistic conventions of ordinary beings. In Go 
rampa's view, just as there is only one truth, there is only one right-
view—and that is the experiential right-view. Conceptual right-view is totally 
flawed when compared with experiential right-view. It has no validity 
whatsoever in terms of realising ultimate truth. The conceptual 
understanding of a table for example, is a conceptual right-view since it is 
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acceptable within the conventions of ordinary beings. It is real or true insofar 
as it is conceptually grasped as real or true. On the other hand, conceptually 
grasping the existence of the rabbit's horn must be a wrong-view, for it is 
unacceptable as a right-view even within the conventions of ordinary beings. 
Similarly, the conceptual grasp of a mirage as water is also a wrong-view for 
ordinary beings. There is no water in the mirage, even though it appears that 
way. The validity of conceptual right-view, according to Go rampa, is thus 
applicable only within the conventions of ordinary beings. Once a person 
becomes an arya, his conceptual right-view becomes totally invalid, and 
obsolete. From an arya's perspective, as Go rampa understands it, everything 
in the world is a projection of ignorance. As a result, there is nothing in the 
world that really conforms to ultimate truth. Hence, any conceptual view is 
inevitably flawed and thus obstructs us from achieving the experiential right-
view that actualises ultimate truth. 
The conceptual right-view is also known as 'mundane right-view' (Pali 
lokiya-samaditthiti). For Go rampa, it is mundane right-view in the sense that 
this right-view applies only within the domain of mundane beings as 
opposed to aryas and buddhas. It is right-view strictly from the perspective of 
a mundane being who has no access whatsoever to ultimate truth. 
Experiential right-view, on the other hand, is called 'supramundane right-
view' (Pali lokuttara-samaditthiti). It is supramundane right-view in the sense 
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that it can access that which is metaphysically higher and nobler than 
conventional truth. Supramundane right-view, is reserved only for an arya 
and a buddha. As a buddha has exclusive access to supramundane truth, 
only the supramundane right-view is applicable. On the other hand, an arya, 
although a cognitive agent of both mundane and supramundane truths, 
possesses only the supramundane right-view. From the perspective of an arya 
the mundane right-view has no application. An arya realises that the 
mundane truths are mere illusions and projections of ignorance without any 
truth. Hence any view representative of mundane truths is always flawed 
and mistaken from an arya's perspective. It cannot be considered a right-view. 
As right-view implies ontological commitment, Go rampa argues that aryas 
and buddhas are only committed to the ontological status of ultimate truth 
and any mundane view committed to the ontological status of conventional 
truth is, for them, invalid. By contrast, as an ordinary being is committed to 
the ontological status of mundane truths only, so the mundane right-view is 
valid for him. 
Unlike Go rampa, Tsong lchapa maintains that conceptual right-view, 
"though it is conceptual in nature, is closely connected with non-conceptual 
wisdom since it serves as the causal condition for the arising of the non-
conceptual wisdom". 65 He argues that merely having the non-conceptual 
experience, according to Tsong Ichapa, does not necessarily mean that it 
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satisfies the criterion of non-conceptual wisdom—equivalent to experiential 
right-view. If it is a valid non-conceptual experience, it must have a capacity 
to eradicate reifying afflictive tendencies. Only then would it satisfy the 
criterion of non-conceptual wisdom. "Such a non-conceptual wisdom", 
according to Tsong khapa, "must be preceded by critical personal analysis 
through conceptual wisdom".' 
The causal relationship between conceptual right-view and experiential 
right-view, or between mundane right-view and supramundane right-view, 
is crucial to Tsong khapa's argument. In spite of the apparent discordance 
between the 'views' at issue, Tsong khapa claims there is nonetheless an 
inevitable causal relation between conceptual right-view and non-conceptual 
right-view. "Without this causal nexus", argues Tsong khapa, "it would be 
impossible for an uncontaminated path to arise from the contaminated ones. 
Thus no ordinary person would ever be able to attain the aryahood"5 There is 
an infinity of legitimate causal relations, according to Tsong lchapa, wherein 
the relationship between causes and their effects appears to be somewhat 
discordant, but still they are perfectly efficacious. Blue sprouts, for example, 
germinate from white seed, smoke arises from fire, man arises from woman, 
and so on. A similar causal relationship is at work, argues Tsong khapa, 
between the conceptual right-view and the non-conceptual right-view. "The 
arya's non-conceptual wisdom directly realises person and phenomenon to be 
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selfless and empty. In order to arouse arya's non-conceptual wisdom realising 
empty and selfless modes of person and phenomena," in this view, "the prior 
conceptual analysis of the identities of person and phenomena is essential. 
Only through developing a sound conceptual understanding, can one 
actualise its meaning by way of engaging in the non-conceptual 
meditation".69 
Therefore, as Tsong khapa sees matters (and in clear contrast to Go 
rampa), a person possessing right-view can be one of three kinds: an ordinary 
person, an arya, or a buddha. An ordinary person initially does not have an 
experiential right-view. Beginning with a conceptual right-view, his practices 
eventually culminate in the initial penetration of the supramundane 
experience when reached on the path of seeing (Skt. dariana marga, Tib. 
mthong lam). The first phase of the direct culmination of the supramundane 
right-view uproots all afflictive defilements such as greed, aversion, and 
ignorance, transforming the conditions of a person from an ordinary state . 
into an arya—a noble person—allowing him to enter irreversibly upon the 
path to liberation. An arya, not only has a supramundane right-view, but also 
must have a mundane right-view. The second phase of the direct culmination 
of the supramundane right-view manifests itself with the purgative capacity 
to uproot even the underlying latent predispositions of the previously 
existent afflictive defilements. This leads to the attainment of the eight 
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bodhisattva bhami or the attainment of an arahathood—total personal liberation. 
ariputra's discourse on the right-view, for instance, highlights this point: 
When a noble disciple has thus understood the unwholesome, the root 
of the unwholesome, the wholesome, and the root of the wholesome, he 
abandons the underlying tendency to lust, he abolishes the underlying 
tendency to aversion, he extirpates the underlying tendency to the view 
and conceit "I am", and by abandoning ignorance and arousing true 
knowledge he here and now makes an end of suffering. In that way too 
a noble disciple is one of right-view, whose view is straight, who has 
perfect confidence in the Dhamma and has arrived at this true Dhamma 
[Sammaditthi Sutta, MN 91.7° 
The third phase of the direct supramundane right-view culminates with the 
attainment of perfect Buddhahood—full enlightenment. This direct 
supramundane right-view has the purgative capacity to eradicate even the 
subtlest epistemic errors—the subtle misconception of the dualistic 
appearances—conditioned by the previously existent latent dispositions of 
defilements that obstruct the attainment of full enlightenment or 
Buddhahood. Unlike Go rampa, Tsong khapa argues that a buddha, like an 
arya, possesses both supramundane and mundane right-views. In fact, at the 
level of buddhahood, conceptual right-view and non-conceptual right-view 
are mutually entailing. Hence, a buddha's conceptual knowledge of 
phenomena as dependently arisen and the non-conceptual knowledge of 
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Therefore, the validity of conceptual right-view and the validity of 
experiential right-view, according to Tsong khapa, are mutually reinforcing. 
The validity of conceptual right-view has application for all cognitive 
agents—an ordinary person, an arya and a buddha—while experiential right-
view (conforming to ultimate truth) has application only for an arya and a 
buddha. An ordinary person is yet to achieve the direct penetration of the 
supramundane path. Therefore, according to Tsong khapa, the right-view, 
conceptually grasped by the wise ordinary being, and transformed into direct 
perception with the attainment of the 'path of seeing' (mthong lam, bhavana 
marga), reaches its consummation with the arrival of the final goal of Buddha 
Dharma—the attainment of complete Buddhahood. Conceptual right-view, 
for Tsong lchapa, is thus the forerunner of all subsequent achievements. 
The Buddha himself explains that he sees no single factor so responsible 
for the arising of unwholesome states of mind as wrong-view, and no factor 
so helpful for the arising of wholesome states of mind as right-view; he says 
that there is no single factor so responsible for the suffering of living beings 
as wrong-view, and no factor so potent in promoting the good of living 
beings as right-view [AN 1:16.2]. Therefore, in Bhikkhu Bodhi's words, 
"though our conceptual orientation towards the world might seem innocuous 
and inconsequential, when looked at closely it reveals itself to be the decisive 
determinant of our whole course of future development". 71 When the 
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Venerable Katyayana (Skt; Pali Kaccayana) asked Buddha, "Sir, right-view, 
'right-view,' it is said. To what extent is there right-view?" [Buddha replies]: 
This world, Kaccayana, is generally inclined towards two [views]: 
existence and nonexistence. But when one perceives the origination of 
the world as it actually is with right wisdom, the notion of 
"nonexistence" with reference to the world does not occur to one. 
When one perceives the cessation of the world as it actually is with 
right wisdom, the notion of "existence" with reference to the world 
does not occur. 
By and large, Kaccayana, this world is in bondage to attachments, 
clingings and biases. But one such as this does not get involved with or 
clinging to these attachments, clingings, fixations of awareness, biases, 
or latent tendencies; nor is he resolved on "my self".He has no 
uncertainty or doubt that, when there is arising, only dukkha is arising; 
and that when there is passing away, only duklcha is passing away. In 
this, one's knowledge is independent of others. It is to this extent, 
Kaccayana, that there is right-view [Kaccayanogotta Sutta, SN XII.151. 72 
The Brahmajala Sutta depicts sixty-two types of views prevalent during the 
Buddha's time.' Although the Buddha must have studied them, he realised, 
following his enlightenment, that none of them were satisfactory, and thus he 
rejected all as incoherent. All sixty-two views enumerated in the Brahmajala 
Sutta represent, in one way or another, an extension of two basic 
metaphysical views—essential existence (Pali atthita, Sk. astitva, Tib. yod pa) 
and essential nonexistence (Pali n'athita, Sk. nastitva, Tib. med pa). In order to 
reject these two basic metaphysical views, the Buddha says: "when one sees 
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the origination of the world as it actually is with right wisdom, the notion of 
'nonexistence' with reference to the world does not occur to one. When one 
sees the cessation of the world as it actually is with right wisdom, the notion 
of 'existence' with reference to the world does not occur" [Kaccayanogotta 
Sutta SN XII.15].' Nagarjuna pays respect to the Buddha by echoing the same 
point: "I pay homage to Gautama who, out of compassionate mind, has 
taught the noble Dharma in order to relinquish all views" [XXVII:301. 76 
Conclusion 
Against the background of their views concerning the limits of language and 
conceptual mind, and the positions they hold regarding the validity of 
conceptual right-view, Tsong khapa and Go rampa arrive at radically 
different conclusions concerning the positions of the Buddha and of 
Nagarjuna. For Tsong khapa, the Buddha and Nagarjuna reject only 
metaphysical views—to be precise, wrong-views—underpinned by the 
assumption of essence.' They certainly do not reject right-views founded on 
a correct understanding of what is empirically given. Garfield echoes this 
same point: "they [i.e. dGe lugs pas] simply argue that when Nagailuna 
speaks of relinquishing "all views," he means "all false views," or "all views 
according to which things are inherently existent"?' Therefore Tsong lchapa 
argues that the Prasangika Madhyamikas have positions based on right- 
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views and so they do indeed have a view, or views, to be presented and 
considered. Garfield for instance suggests an example of one such view that 
Tsong khapa would not relinquish: "Emptiness, for Madhyamika, is an 
ultimate truth. One can achieve a correct view—a view of things as they in 
fact are. Such as this view surely should not be relinquished, for this would 
be to relinquish the soteriological goal of all Buddhist practice"?' Garfield 
therefore points out "the dGe-lugs pas argue, one must read Nagarjuna as 
suggesting straightforwardly, rationally, and without even a hint of paradox, 
that one should relinquish all false views, and that for the one who views 
emptiness as inherently existent there is no hope".' 
In clear contrast, Go rampa concludes that the Buddha and Nagarjuna 
categorically reject all views. They express preferences between right and 
wrong-views and any view formulated on empirically given truths, according 
to Go rampa, is always underpinned by the assumptions of essence. Go 
rampa argues that, from the Prasafigika Madhyamika perspective, any so-
called correct understanding of empirically given truths amounts to a 
metaphysical view—either it constitutes the extreme view of existence or the 
extreme view of nonexistence.' Since the Prasangika Madhyamikas do not, 
strictly speaking, have any views to be presented,' Go rampa maintains that 
"the Madhyamikas do not have any position whatsoever".' Accordingly, 
except as a way of refuting the views presented by the non-Madhyamika 
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philosophers through reductio ad absurdum, the Madhyamikas themselves 
have no affirmative position whatsoever to be established. Moreover, from 
Go rampa's standpoint, what is true for the Prasafigika Madhyamikas is 
something other than what is empirically given to sense experience. What is 
empirically given to sense experience is true and real only for ordinary 
beings. Therefore, only ordinary beings adhere to views based on the 
understanding of empirical truths, and thus they alone have views to be 
presented. 
For Tsong khapa, it makes no sense to assume that the Buddha, after 
rejecting the sixty-two 'metaphysical views, and appraising so much about 
right-view, avoided propounding any view whatsoever. On Tsong khapa's 
view, the Buddha's emphatic distinctions between right-view and wrong-
view, coupled with his treatment of right-view as the forerunner of all 
beneficial practices and of wrong-view as the source of all problems, is 
sufficient to prove that the Buddha did not seek to relinquish all views 
indiscriminately. The criterion of right-view is the correct conceptual 
understanding or immediate experience of empirically given truths. This 
holds true even in the Prasafigika Madhyamika case. The Prasafigika 
Madhyamikas, according to Tsong khapa, have views of their own and 
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There is another crucial distinction of which we should be aware. For 
Tsong khapa, the transition from the ordinary state to Buddhood is smooth 
and gradual. This transition is essentially comprised of chains of events that 
evolve one after the other, wherein past practices generate present effects, 
and present and past practices generate future effects. This transition is a 
gradual progression and enhancement of the conceptual right-view of an 
ordinary sense founded on the ordinary sense perception of the law of 
impermanence—of the arising and cessation of the phenomenal world. At 
least in this instance, the sense perception of the arising and ceasing of 
phenomena does not refer to a privileged or higher insight of an anja or a 
buddha that is not shared by the ordinary person. "The perception of arising 
and ceasing of phenomena conditioned by various factors," as Kalupahana 
puts it, "is available even to ordinary people who have not been able to 
completely free themselves from prejudices. Thus, there is a common 
denominator between the perceptions of an ordinary person and those of the 
enlightened one".' 
Tsong khapa therefore argues that all kinds of higher forms of 
knowledge, including conceptual right-view and experiential right-view of 
the most enlightened person, have the conceptual right-view of the ordinary 
state as their foundation. This is because wisdom, free from the conception of 
essence, depends on the understanding of the nonexistence of essence. The 
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understanding of the nonexistence of essence in turn develops from the 
correct conceptual analysis of the nature of essence, which eventually 
eradicates the conception of essence. What makes the difference, however, is 
the fact that the perceptions, or the sense experiences of the ordinary person 
are coloured by prejudices predisposed by underlying defilements, whereas 
the perceptions or the sense experiences of an enlightened being are totally 
free from such prejudices, since all defilements and their latent dispositions 
have been eradicated. 
Go rampa, of course, is quite opposed to Tsong khapa in viewing the 
transition from the ordinary state to Buddhahood as thoroughly 
discontinuous and abrupt. The sensory experience of empirically given 
truths, including the arising and cessation of the phenomenal world and the 
wisdom of an enlightened person, are mutually contradictory. All empirical 
experiences, both perceptual and conceptual, are representative of delusional 
experiences. They cannot, at any cost, be causal conditions for enlightenment. 
There is thus no common denominator between the perceptions of a person 
in an ordinary and an enlightened state. Yet this makes it extremely puzzling 
as to how an ordinary person could elevate himself from the ordinary state to 
the noblest enlightened state given that s/he has no cognitive capacity 
whatsoever that can provide the basis, the seed, for such a transition. It 
appears, at least to Go rampa, to involve a metaphysical leap from the 
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conditioned world of empirical truths to an unconditioned world of nirvana. 
Harsha Narain rightly points out the inherent problem in Go rampa's view: 
"If all views are abolished, what remains? The truth, whatever it be 
like—truth, the apology for truth, the substitute for truth—is believed to 
transcend all speech and thought, to totally elude the grasp of reason, to be 
wholly incommunicable". 87 Narain also asks whether the• truth can as 
discontinuous with human reason as Go rampa makes it out to be and he 
adds: "If the answer is in the affirmative, Sarinsara and Nirvana turn out to be 
two different orders not only totally discontinuous and non-interactive but 
also impenetrably autonomous, thereby reducing the Madhy.amika to the 
status of an uncompromising dua1ist".88 
CHAPTER IV 
REALISING ULTIMATE TRUTH 
Introduction 
As far as the limits of language and conceptual mind are concerned, the two 
Tibetan Prasafigikas are, as we have just seen, far removed from one another. 
By arguing that language can partly express ultimate truth, although not 
entirely, and by arguing that the conceptual mind has some access to ultimate 
truth, although not fully, Tsong khapa is able to advance the view . that 
ultimate truth can be an object of knowledge even with respect to the 
conceptual mind. In contrast, by arguing that language is utterly incapable of 
expressing ultimate truth, and by arguing that the conceptual mind is utterly 
incapable of knowing ultimate truth, Go rampa is able to advance the view 
that ultimate truth is not an object of knowledge with respect to the 
conceptual mind at all. 
The debate that we are about to explore in this chapter, however, is not 
primarily about whether or not ultimate truth is an object of knowledge. Both 
Tsong khapa and Go rampa are alike in claiming that ultimate truth is an 
object of knowledge at least inasmuch as it is accessible to non-conceptual 
Chapter IV 	 Realising ultimate truth 	 Page191 
wisdom. Not only Tsong khapa and Go rampa, but all the Tibetan Prasangika 
Madhyamikas i are unanimous on this point. In this chapter, the debate 
between Tsong khapa and Go rampa is instead focused specifically on the 
analysis of how, and in what ways, ultimate truth can be realised by non-
conceptual wisdom. In pursuit of this aim, we shall consider the issues in 
relation to three different epistemological approaches: 
• seeing ultimate truth by way of not seeing it; 
• seeing ultimate truth by transcending conceptual elaborations; 
and 
• seeing ultimate truth non-dualistically. 
Although the emphasis is slightly different in each of these approaches, they 
are nevertheless alike in that they all represent epistemic pathways geared 
towards the same non-conceptual realisation of ultimate truth. 
Since the aim of this chapter is to provide a comparative analysis of the 
different epistemological models of Tsong khapa and Go rampa, so we will 
not, except in certain respects that are especially relevant, deal with their 
respective ontological positions in any detail. In this regard, however, there is 
one point that is worth mentioning before we go any further with the 
analysis: What motivates Tsong khapa and Go rampa to adopt the radically 
opposing epistemological viewpoints that we are about to explore? One 
possible answer to this question can be found in their disagreement regarding 
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the scope and nature of the objects of negation (dgag bya ngos 'dzin). As we 
saw in the second chapter above, for Tsong khapa, what obstructs sentient 
beings from attaining transcendental knowledge is concerned with 
defilements such as craving, aversion and delusion and with the reified 
conceptual essences associated with these. Reifying tendencies and reified 
essences are thus considered as objects of negation. Go rampa agrees with 
Tsong khapa inasmuch as he recognises reifying tendencies such as craving, 
aversion and delusion as objects of negation, but he disagrees with Tsong 
khapa so far as the scope and nature of reified essence is concerned. While 
Tsong khapa sees essence as a purely conceptual construction—as an 
empirically nonexistent and abstract entity that is projected and imposed 
upon conventional truth from within—Go rampa equates 'essence' with 
conventional truth. Thus he views, not merely essence, but both essence and 
conventional truth as purely conceptual constructions projected from within 
due to powers of ignorance. 
Since the soteriological agenda of the Prasafigika Madhyamika calls for 
the rejection of essence as part of the objects of negation, Tsong khapa argues 
for the eradication of underlying reifying tendencies, such as delusion, along 
with conceptually reified essence. Go rampa, on the other hand, not only 
argues for eradicating the underlying reifying tendencies, but the entire 
matrix of the conventional world also. Their disagreements on the nature and • 
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the scope of the objects of negation, as we shall see, form the basis of the 
arguments related to their disagreements on epistemological and 
soteriological matters. 
One more point should be borne in mind before we approach the actual 
discussion: unlike the more analytic language employed in other chapters, the 
language at work in some sections of this chapter is intentionally descriptive. 
Given the nature of topics—the dynamics of meditative experiences and their 
philosophical implications—a purely analytical approach is often inadequate 
to attend to many of the crucial problems at stake. Modern scholars working 
on Madhyamika philosophy usually tend to set aside anything that is related 
to meditative experiences. In my view, to follow such an example would be to 
do a serious injustice to the epistemological systems of the Madhyamikas in 
general, and of Tsong lchapa and Go rampa in particular. Since Tsong khapa 
and Go rampa's rather distinct epistemological models arise directly out of 
their different interpretations of the implications of certain meditative 
experiences, so both descriptive and analytical styles are needed in order to 
compare them. 
1. Seeing ultimate truth by way of not seeing it 
We begin the section on the analysis of 'seeing ultimate truth by way of not 
seeing it' with a few introductory remarks from Candrakirti. This will be 
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followed by a descriptive explanation of what 'seeing ultimate truth by way 
of not seeing it' means and how it is experienced in the process of meditative 
equipoise. We then turn to a comparative analysis of the views of Tsong 
Ichapa and Go rampa concerning the matters at issue. 
In the Madhyamakavatarabhasya, Candrakirti explains that ultimate truth 
is realised exclusively through personal experience. "Only through exclusive 
personal experiences (rang gi myong ba nyid du), does the true nature [of 
ultimate reality] become clearer to those enthusiastic listeners", he writes.' In 
the Prasannapada, Candrakirti reiterates the same point: 
Because [ultimate reality] is not realised through another it is called an 
unrealisable through another. This means that it is not realised through 
another's explanation. Rather the meaning is that it is to be realised 
personally [or individually] (rang nyid)2 ...One realises ultimate reality 
personally by way of not realising it. True nature pertaining to things is 
thus not realised through anyone else, and that itself is ultimate reality.' 
The way in which ultimate truth is seen 'by way of not seeing it' is explained 
by Candrakirti in the Madhyamalcavatarabhasya. He writes: 
[Question]: Is it not 	true that [ultimate reality] is not seen with 
characteristic of such [dualistic] appearance? So, how do they [i.e. 
aryas] see it? [Reply]: Yes, it is true that [ultimate reality is not seen 
with dualistic appearances]. Yet, [the Prasafigika Madhyamikas] assert 
that they 'see it by way of not seeing'. 
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Since 'seeing it by way of not seeing it' is a description of both the cognitive 
state of a meditator engaged in the meditation on ultimate truth and the 
meditative process itself, so it is essential to understand both the process and 
the state arrived at. Tsong khapa and Go rampa agree that, while noticing the 
bodily and mental processes as they arise and cease, a meditator also 
discerns: 'Just now it arises, just now it dissolves and ceases'. When the 
knowledge of the momentary and fleeting nature of aggregates becomes 
matured, keen, and strong, the initially discontinuous awareness of arising 
and cessation unfolds uninterruptedly. When keen knowledge thus carries 
on, intensifying its acuteness, then neither the arising of each bodily and 
mental process, nor its middle phase known as 'presence', nor the continuity 
of bodily and mental processes known as 'occurrence as unbroken flux', is 
apparent to the meditator. Nor are the shape of the hand, the foot, the face, 
the body, and so on, apparent to him either. What is apparent to the 
meditator "is only the ceasing of bodily and mental processes, called 
'vanishing,' or 'dissolution'". 6 In the mediatative state, all objects of 
meditation, bodily as well as mental, seem to the meditator to be entirely 
absent, void, empty, or to have become nonexistent. Consequently, in this 
state of knowing, it -appears to the meditator as if what is seen has already 
become absent or nonexistent by having had it vanish from being seen. Thus 
as the Venerable Mahasi Sayadaw rightly points out "the consciousness 
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engaged in noticing appears to have lost contact with the object that is being 
noticed. It is for that reason that a meditator may here think: 'I have lost the 
insight' but he should not think so". 7 
Initially the meditator's consciousness takes delight, as usual, in 
conceptual elaborations, for instance, of shapes (Pali santhana-patiriati), of the 
concepts of individual identity derived from the continuity of serial 
phenomena (Pali santati-pafiriati), and the collective concepts derived from the 
agglomeration of phenomena (Pali samuha-pcniriati). 8 Even up to the 
knowledge of arising and cessation, the meditator fastens onto structures or 
features—such as any mark, sign, idea or image—of objects conceived or 
perceived. All graspable conceptual objects remain apparent to the 
meditator's senses. But once the knowledge of 'dissolution' is achieved in the 
way described above, no such conceptual formations or structures appear to 
consciousness. Since, at this point, cognition does not involve any graspable 
object, but is nonetheless engaged, albeit with an empty, cognitive sphere, so 
the process is fittingly described as 'seeing by way of not seeing'. 
Tsong khapa and Go rampa agree with the description thus far. We now 
turn to a closer comparative examination of Tsong khapa and Go rampa on 
the issues raised by Candrakirti in relation to 'seeing ultimate truth by way of 
not seeing it'. We first turn to Tsong khapa and analyse how he interprets 
Candrakirti's point. But before we straightaway examine how Tsong khapa 
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interprets Candrakirti, there is one key issue that needs out attention. This 
issue—namely, the distinction between the cognitive role of conceptual and 
non-conceptual wisdom forms, as we shall see, the backdrop against which 
Tsong Ichapa sets out his interpretation of Candralcirti's position. According 
to Tsong Ichapa, it is crucial to be clear as to the distinction between the roles 
of the two cognitive resources, namely, conceptual wisdom—otherwise 
known as 'empirically valid cognition' or 'empirical wisdom'—and non-
conceptual wisdom—otherwise known as 'ultimately valid cognition' or 
'ultimate wisdom'. The former, as Tsong Ichapa characterises it, cognises 
things that are presented to it without analysing their ultimate mode of being, 
while the latter cognises the ultimate nature of things only by way of such a 
critical analysis. In spite of this distinction, these two valid cognitions, 
according to Tsong lchapa, are always mutually supportive and mutually 
dependent, and one cannot function effectively without the support of the 
other. Whether the concerned cognitive agent is a buddha, or another arya, or 
even an ordinary being, these distinctions and the mutually supportive 
relation between them, remain epistemically important. 
Against this background, Tsong khapa explains the position taken by 
Candrakirti as follows: 
Yes, it is true that [the non-conceptual wisdom] does not see [ultimate 
reality] by way of [seeing] dualistic appearances, because dualistic 
appearances do not withstand the critical perspective of the [wisdom] 
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realising things as they truly are (de kho na nyid kyi gzigs ngor). 
However, [the Prasafigika Madhyamikas] assert that arya's see 
[ultimate truth] by way of not seeing.9 
The key issues raised in Candrakirti's passages concern how, and in what 
ways, ultimate truth is realised. As a result, the distinction between the roles 
of the two cognitive resources, and the way in which ultimate and 
conventional truth relates to them, is of central importance. Tsong khapa 
insists that ultimate truth is the object of non-conceptual wisdom. He argues 
that from the vantage point of the non-conceptual wisdom, all dualistic 
appearances of conventional truths disappear. Such wisdom sees phenomena 
as having no discrete identities or positive or affirmative qualifications 
whatsoever. All phenomena present themselves to such wisdom initially as in 
flux, as insubstantial, and eventually, as selfless and empty. The empty mode 
of phenomena is seen by non-conceptual wisdom through the penetration of 
all dualistic appearances. 
Tsong khapa argues, in fact, that a direct realisation of the empty mode 
of phenomena is possible only by the cutting through all conventional truths 
by ultimate wisdom. Hence, "a mode of realising realities as they truly are (de 
kho na nyid, tathata) is by way of not seeing the appearances of 
conventionalities such as psychophysical aggregates". 1° In other words, 
ultimate wisdom realises ultimate truth by directly perceiving the ultimate 
characteristics of phenomena (i.e., their empty mode) without actually 
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perceiving the characterised phenomena as such." This means that the 
ultimate truth of phenomena, such as the psychophysical aggregates, is 
indeed seen by way of not seeing those very phenomena. 
Let us now turn to Go rampa. Unlike Tsong khapa, Go rampa takes the 
distinction between the conceptual wisdom and non-conceptual wisdom to 
be of significance only in the case of an arya's mode of cognition. Go rampa 
considers the arya who is still in training as the sole cognitive agent of both 
conventional and ultimate truth. In the case of a buddha or of an ordinary 
being, the distinction between conceptual wisdom and non-conceptual 
wisdom has no relevance or application. A buddha, according to Go rampa, 
is not a cognitive agent of conventional truth, hence a fully enlightened being 
does not require non-conceptual wisdom or empirical wisdom that would 
enable the realisation of conventional truth. A buddha cognises ultimate truth 
exclusively, and thus requires only non-conceptual or ultimate wisdom. An 
ordinary being does not, however, have access to ultimate truth, and thus 
does not require non-conceptual or ultimate wisdom—conceptual or 
empirical wisdom serves as the sole epistemic resource for ordinary beings in 
their quest to understand conventional truth. 
What is at issue here is not just a matter of distinguishing between an 
arya and a buddha inasmuch as they are different cognitive agents, but 
instead concerns the role of ultimate wisdom as that is shared by both a 
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buddha and an arya. From the vantage point of non-conceptual wisdom, Go 
rampa maintains that all conventionalities disappear. Ultimate wisdom, he 
argues, "does not possess apprehension of even the slight dualistic 
appearance [both in the conventional or in the ultimate sense], for it is 
thoroughly free from all epistemic misconceptions, including predisposition 
without any trace". 12 When it comes to the question of how and in what ways 
ultimate reality is realised, at least so far as this is to be given linguistic 
description, Tsong khapa and Go rampa thus seem quite close. Like Tsong 
khapa, Go rampa argues that ultimate truth is realised by way of not seeing 
it—namely, by way of dissolving all dualistic appearances of 
conventionalities or by abjuring any positive account of ultimate truth. Both 
hold that conventional truth is always realised by way of engaging with 
dualistic appearances, while ultimate truth is realised by way of dissolving all 
dualistic appearances. Yet whereas Tsong khapa argues for the mutually 
supportive relation between conceptual wisdom and non-conceptual 
wisdom, even in the case of the realisation of ultimate truth, Go rampa argues 
that non-conceptual wisdom alone is capable of such realisation. In fact, he 
claims the exact opposite of Tsong khapa: Go rampa argues that non-
conceptual wisdom—ultimate wisdom—can have no empirical grounding 
and, in gaining access to ultimate truth, it must operately entirely without 
reliance on any empirical epistemic resources. 
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Tsong khapa and Go rampa's disagreement about the status of 
empirical wisdom stems from their disagreement about the efficacy of 
conventional truth, this stems from their disagreement about the nature and 
the extent of the objects of negation, which in turn stems from their 
disagreement about the relationship between the two truths. Tsong lchapa 
argues for the unity between the two truths, and thus does not consider 
conventional truths as objects of negation. Go rampa, on the other hand, 
argues for disunity between the two truths and does consider conventional 
truths as objects of negation. Similarly Tsong khapa argues for a unity 
between the two cognitive resources, so that even a buddha is said to be 
equipped with both empirical and ultimate wisdoms. Go rampa argues for 
the disunity between the two cognitive resources, so that a buddha is said to 
have only ultimate or non-conceptual wisdom. 
In spite of vast differences regarding their treatments of conventional 
truth, of the cognitive resources and of the criterion of objects of negation, 
Tsong khapa and Go rampa agree on the way ultimate truth is realised by the 
non-conceptual wisdom corresponding to it. They both agree that ultimate 
truth is seen by way of not seeing it. But what does this latter statement 
actually mean? In Tsong khapa's view, the phrase 'seeing by way of not 
seeing it' refers to the same idea as that expressed in the claim: "without 
seeing constitutes the noble seeing".' The phrase 'seeing it by way of not 
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seeing it' is not a contradictory statement, for in Tsong khapa's view, the 
Prasangikas "do not accept seeing nothing as seeing [the ultimate reality]' , . 14 
For Tsong khapa, the terms 'seeing' and 'not seeing', used within the same 
phrase, imply two different objects of reference, and for this reason, Tsong 
khapa argues that "not seeing conceptual elaborations (spros pa, praparica) is 
itself posited as seeing the transcendence of conceptual categories (spros brat, 
aprapatica)". 15 The term 'seeing' has 'transcendence of the conceptual 
elaborations' (S pros dral, aprapatica) as its referent, while the term 'not seeing' 
has 'conceptual categories' (S pros pa, prapaiica) as its referent. In other words, 
that which is seen is the empty mode of being of phenomena, while that 
which is not seen is the conventional mode of existence of those pheneomena. 
Since the phrases 'seen' and 'not seen' take different objects (the 'it' to which 
they refer is equivocal), so the phrase 'seeing it by way of not seeing it' need 
not be self-contradictory. It is an appropriate way to describe how ultimate 
truth is presented to its cognising consciousness. Go rampa agrees with this 
latter point.' Although he does not elaborate much on the phrase, Go rampa 
does hold that a mode of realising ultimate reality is by way of not seeing the 
dualistic appearances. On Go rampa's account, the terms 'seeing' and 'not 
seeing' also take different referents. 'Seeing' refers to 'ultimate reality' or the 
'transcendence of conceptual categories', while 'not seeing' refers to 
'empirical reality' or 'conceptual categories'. 
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Inasmuch as they both hold that ultimate truth is 'seen by way of not 
seeing it', and that the terms 'seen' and 'not seen' each have a different 
referent, so Tsong khapa and Go rampa agree. We should not assume, 
however, that the two thinkers are in total agreement as to what the terms 
'seen' and 'not seen' imply. The truth is that there is a clear difference in the 
way Tsong khapa and Go rampa each understand the terms and phrases at 
issue. The point of disagreement between the two accounts, as will be seen 
below, concerns what it is in which 'seeing it by way of not seeing it' is taken 
to consist. The question is: does 'seeing the ultimate by way of not seeing it' 
constitute an engagement with a particular cognitive content, or does it . 
constitute simply the engagement with a total absence—is 'seeing it by way 
of not seeing it' a contentless wisdom? 
2. Transcendental epistemology 
Since 'seeing ultimate truth by way of not seeing' also means 'transcending of 
conceptual elaboration', the distinctions between Tsong khapa and Go 
rampa's positions regarding the way in which ultimate truth is realised can 
be further articulated by considering the criterion that determines the 
'transcendence of conceptual elaboration'. At issue here are a number of 
questions including the question whether the transcendence of conceptual 
elaboration calls for a total obliteration of conceptual categories?—Is there 
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perhaps a way of transcending conceptual elaborations without actually 
eliminating them? 
2.1. Proliferation of 'conceptual elaboration' (praparica) 
But first let us find out what 'conceptual elaboration' really is. 'Conceptual 
elaboration' is indeed a rough translation' of the Sanskrit term prapatica (Pali 
papaiica, Tib. spros pa). A precise English equivalent for the term is very hard 
to find. This is partly because the concept expressed by the term prapafica is 
totally foreign to the English-speaking world and partly, as Thanissaro 
Bhikkhu suggests, because none of the early texts in the Buddhist Canon 
offers a clear and a precise definition of what the word prapafica means.' 
However, the Buddhist Canon "does give a clear analysis of how paparica 
arises, how it leads to conflict, and how it can be ended. In the final analysis," 
as Thanissaro Bhikkhu righly points out "these are the questions that 
matter—more than the precise definition of terms". 19 
In some of his discourses, the Buddha 'maps out' the causal process that 
gives rise to prapa fica and that eventually leads to conflict.' In the Sakka-pa fiha 
Sutta [IDIN 21], the mapping reads like this: The perceptions and categories of 
pap. mica leads to thinking, and thinking leads to desire, desire in turn leads to dear 
and not dear, to envy and stinginess, to rivalry and hostility. In the Kalaha-vivada 
Sutta [Sn. IV.11] the mapping reads: perception leads to the categories of papaiica 
Chapter IV 
	
Realising ultimate truth 	 Page205 
(or) perception leads to mentality and materiality, mentality and materiality lead to 
contact with the world, the contact with the world in turn leads to appealing and 
unappealing, to desire, to dear and not dear, to divisiveness, quarrels, disputes, 
lamentation, sorrow and so forth. In the Madhupinclika Sutta [MN 18], the causal 
chain is mapped thus: contact leads to feeling, feeling leads to perception, the 
perception in turn leads to thinking, to perceptions and categories of papatica. This 
third 'mapping' is more formally restated in the sutta as: "Depending on eye 
and forms, eye-consciousness arises (similarly with the rest of six 
consciousnesses). The meeting of the three is contact. With contact as a 
requisite condition, there is feeling. What one feels, one perceives. What one 
perceives, one thinks about. What one thinks about, one paparices".21 
In spite of the variation in some details, the suttas all depict the essential 
basis that gives rise to the proliferation of praparicas. Although part of a larger 
causal nexus, it is the unskilful habit of the mind called praparica that is taken 
to lies at the heart of all conflicts both within and without. Praparica is 
essentially the blind tendency of the mind to proliferate that issues from the 
sense of 'self'. Praparica thereby cloaks the normal processes of cognition, 
permeating thought patterns with distortion and error. Consequently, 
phenomena present themselves to cognition in modes contradictory to their 
actual mode of being—they appear substantial, self-subsistent, isolated units 
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locked up in themselves, even, at times, having an immutable core of identity 
(an 'essential nature') intrinsic to themselves. 
The sphere in which the illusion of prapafica is most immediately felt is 
the experiential domain—that is, the sphere of psychophysical aggregates. 
The experiential domain is putatively divided into two elements—a cognitive 
or subjective element comprised of consciousness and its adjuncts, and a 
cognised or objective element comprised of cognitive data. Although the 
subjective and objective elements are interlocking and mutually dependent, 
the operation of praparica leads to the conceptual bifurcation of those elements 
and their reduction to the dichotomy of subject and object. Just as the 
cognitive element is split off from the nexus of experiential events, and is 
erroneously conceived as a 'subject' distinct from the cognitive act itself, so 
also the objective 'element is conceived as the external world of 'objects' and 
as equally distinct from the nexus of experiential events. This cognitive error 
leads consciousness to view itself as a persisting ego standing against the 
world of changing phenomena—this solidification of the ego engenders the 
idea of the self as a substantial and independently existing entity. Thanissaro 
Bhikkhus thus suggests "that the root of the categories of paparica is the 
perception, "I am thinker". 22 He further argues that from such self-reflective 
elaboration (in which one constructs a 'self' corresponding to the 'I') a 
number of categories can be derived: categories of 'being' and 'not-being', of 
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'me' and 'not me', of mine' and 'not mine', of 'doer' and 'done to', of 
'signifier' and 'signified'. 
Once the ego is solidified through the processes of praparica, it constantly 
seeks self-affirmation and self-aggrandisement. Yet because the ego is an 
utter illusion, utterly empty, utterly void, so the appearance of selfhood itself 
generates a nagging sense of insufficiency—the ego cannot be adequate to 
that which it projects itself as being. Consequently, on both emotional and 
intellectual fronts, the ego experiences an aching sense of incompleteness, an 
inner lacking requiring a perpetual filling, and the lurking suspicion of an 
ultimate lack of identity. The result is an inner disquietude and a chronic 
anxiety that is expressed in a compulsion to build and to fortify the sense of 
self-identity and self-substantiality. This process leads to greed, to desire, to 
relentless craving—for pleasure, wealth, power and fame—all as a means to 
satisfy the need for self-security. In turn, this results in hatred, selfishness, 
and violence. Thus, as the Madhupinclika Sutta [MN 18] points out, through 
the process of praparica, the agent becomes a victim of his own ignorance and 
misconception: "Based on what a person paparicises, the perception and 
categories of paparica assail him/her with regard to past, present and future 
forms cognisable via the eye (as with the remaining senses)".' 
In summarising how the unskilful habit of praparica victimises the agent, 
Thanissaro Bhildthu writes: "once one's self becomes a thing under the rubric 
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of these categories, it is impossible not to be assailed by the perception and 
categories derived from these basic distinctions". When the sense of self-
identification arises in relation to experiences, then based on the feelings 
arising from sensory contact, obviously some feelings will seem 
appealing—worth getting for the self—and others will seem 
unappealing—worth pushing away. "From this there grows desire, which 
comes into conflict with desires of others who are also engaging in papalica. 
This is how inner complications (papartca) breeds external contention"?' This 
analysis of the process of the proliferation of prapafica and the way in which it 
victimises the agent is largely accepted by both Tsong khapa and Go rampa. 
Where they part company is on the characterisation of the nature of paparica 
and the way in which the proliferation of the categories of prapatica is brought 
to an end. 
As in the suttas set out above, Tsong khapa advances the view that 
praparica is a reifying cognitive process that originates in habitual clinging to 
the substantiality and essences of things: 
[Interlocutor]: By means of ending what leads to the end of 
defilements? [Response]: Reproductive karma that gives birth . in 
sarhsara arises from defilements. Although, defilements in themselves, 
are not self-evidently existent, they arise from the erroneous 
conceptions engaging with the false notions such as 'appealing' and 
'not-appealing'. The erroneous conceptions engaging with the false 
notions, in turn arise from the begirmingless habituations with the 
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grasping to true existence (i.e. essence) in relation to the diverse 
categories of praparica. Included in them are cognitions and cognised 
objects, expressions and expressed, jars and mattresses, male and 
female, gain and loss, etc. The praparica, which grasps to the true 
existence of these things is possible to be eradicated by means of the 
practical orientations directed towards seeing the emptiness of those 
things." 
Ultimate wisdom is the only means by which the cognitive distortions 
perpetuated by praparica can be eradicated, and so Tsong khapa and Go 
rampa both approach the categories of praparica from the vantage point of 
this wisdom rather than from any more generalised perspective. 
Conseqently, Tsong khapa takes prapaiica to mean not only the categories 
that are conceptually reified through the assumption of the existence of 
essences (the categories that are generally classified as the objects of 
negation), but he argues that "the categories of appearances are also 
included in praparica in this context [the vantage point of ultimate 
wisdom}". 28 Likewise, Go rampa argues that "far from being the only true 
existent entity or a negative entity, prapafica includes all signs of phenomena, 
both positive or negative that provoke mental engagements and 
distractions"?' As Georges Dreyfus puts it "by elaboration [praparica], Go 
rampa means more than holding to things as really existing or 
understanding emptiness to imply a commitment to a positive entity. He 
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means all signs, positive or negative, through which objects can be 
conceptualised"?' 
As has so often been the case in the discussion so far, the initial 
agreement between Tsong khapa and Go rampa in their characterisations of 
praparica is underlain by a deeper level of disagreement. On the one hand, 
Tsong khapa offers two contextually dependent characterisations of prapafica. 
One emphasises an epistemic process—the mental tendency to 'essentialise' 
that leads to the proliferation of the categories of praparica—the other 
emphasises something more ontological—the contents or categories of 
praparica as grasped from the transcendental vantage point. Go rampa, on the 
other hand, offers only one characterisation of praparica that places the 
emphasis solely on the contents of praparica. The characterisation of praparica 
as an epistemic process allows Tsong khapa to argue that conventional 
phenomena are not the objects of negation, the characterisation of praparica in 
terms of its categories or contents allows Go rampa to argue that the objects 
of negation comprise all conventional phenomena. 
2.2. Transcending 'conceptual elaborations' 
The emergence of disagreement between Tsong khapa and Go rampa on the 
understanding of praparica becomes clearer as we enter the second phase of 
the analysis, namely, the analysis of the transcendence of praparica. Since, as 
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we noted above, Tsong khapa approaches the issue of prapafica from the 
perspective of ultimate wisdom, so he classifies all conventional appearances 
as part of the categories of praparica. In Tsong khapa's view, however, the 
transcendence of the categories of prapaiica cannot be equated with "the 
absence of the prapafica of appearances".' Tsong khapa argues instead that 
"transcendence of the categories of prapcifica should be understood as a 
dissolution of all dualistic appearances from the vantage point of the direct 
perception of things as they really are".' 
Although it is not entirely without ontological implications, Tsong 
khapa does not view the transcendence of the categories of praparica as 
implying metaphysical transcendence. What is transcended in the 
transcendence of prapafica is thus, for Tsong khapa, the conventional 
understanding that is associated with the dualistic appearance of things—but 
this does not entail the ontological transcendence. That this is so follows from 
Tsong khapa's prior commitment to a transcendental epistemological 
perspective as that on the basis of which the essenceless, relational and 
contingent nature of phenomena is established. In spite of the fact that the 
cognitive agent experiences a total transcendence of the categories of prapafica 
in the realisation of ultimate truth during meditative equipoise, Tsong khapa 
takes this experience of transcendence to operate strictly within the epistemic 
domain and so within the structure of the psychophysical aggregates which 
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are not themselves transcended or dissolved. It is thus that the notion of 
transcending the categories of praparica must not be construed as a form of 
metaphysical transcendence. 
The characterisation of praparica offered by Go rampa, however, has 
strong metaphysical implications. "Praparica", says Go rampa, "is the 
characteristic feature of causally effective things. The Tathagata, however is 
not a thing, hence the categories of praparica do not apply to it. Therefore 
Tathagata is transcendent of praparica". Go rampa makes it very clear that 
just as he does not regard praparica as merely a cognitive process, neither is 
the transcendence of prapafzca merely epistemic in character. Praparica is 
constitutive of all causally effective phenomena, and so the transcendence of 
the categories of praparzca means the transcendence of all empirical 
phenomena, including the empirical consciousness. Thus the transcendence 
at issue in the transcendence of praparica is a transcendence of the very 
structures that appear to be constitutive of cognition, and so a transcendence, 
one might say, even of cognition itself (or at least of cognition as it is part of 
the system of conventional appearances). 
Like Go rampa, many of his traditional allies—Red mda' ba,' Mi 
pham,' Rong ston,' akya rnChog ldan," Mi skyod rDo rje,' dGe 'dun Chos 
'phe139—also treat praparica as simply synonymous with the system of 
conventional truth and pursue no distinction whatsoever between the 
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structures of understanding that are themselves part of the system of 
conventional truth (the fact of understanding as itself a conventional 
phenomenon) and the understanding of the structures of that system of 
conventionalities (understanding of the fact of the conventionality of 
phenomena). In equating praparicas with the entire system of conventionalities 
without qualification, they also equate the entire system of conventionalities 
with ignorance and the effects of ignorance. Thus they all agree, like Go 
rampa, that praparicas such as the impressions of existence and nonexistence 
appear so long as metaphysical transcendence is not achieved.' 
There is no doubt that Tsong khapa and Go rampa differ markedly in 
their understanding of what the transcendence of the categories of praparica 
must entail. For Go rampa, it is contradictory to hold that one can retain any 
connections with the conventional world while at the same time achieving 
transcendence from the categories of praparica—any relation with the 
conventional world is seen as having detrimental affects on the pursuit of the 
soteriological goal. The transcendence of the categories of praparica means, 
therefore, the achievement of total ontological and epistemological separation 
from the conventional world.' Given Go rampa's insistence on the primacy 
of ultimate truth and ultimate wisdom over conventional truth and empirical 
wisdom, his insistence on the need for metaphysical transcendence is by no 
means surprising—it is consistent with his overall soteriological agenda. In 
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contrast, Tsong khapa's philosophy is not commited to maintaining the 
primacy of ultimate truth and ultimate wisdom over conventional truth and 
empirical wisdom—the two truths and their cognitive counterparts are seen 
as interdependent and mutually entailing, and this holds true even in the case 
of transcendental epistemology. In Tsong khapa's view, the mutual 
interconnection of the two truths and the coordination between the two 
cognitions is not severed even in the process of the transcendence of the 
categories of praparica. "Because the characteristic of reality and the praparica 
of the characterised appearances are mutually inseparable, the existence of 
ultimate truth would be impossible [without the characterised objects as its 
basis]", argues Tsong khapa. Tsong lchapa's insistence on the epistemic 
rather than metaphysical character of the transcendence at issue is thus 
clearly consistent with his emphasis on the unity between the two truths. Yet 
while the consistency of their respective positions may be evident, it 
nevertheless still remains for us to provide a fuller account of the 
considerations that underlie the radically different accounts of transcendence 
adopted by Tsong khapa and Go rampa. 
The issues at stake here come into sharpest relief when we consider the 
way in which the transcendence of the categories of praparica applies to the 
praparicas of personal identity—the five psychophysical aggregates. In Go 
rampa's transcendental epistemology, the transcendence of the categories of 
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prapafica requires a total elimination of all five psychophysical aggregates 
since those aggregates are unequivocally identified with the categories of 
prapcnica. The transcendental wisdom that is arrived at through the 
transcendence of the categories of prapalica is ontologically independent of 
the conventionalities of the five psychophysical aggregates and occurs only 
after the severance of every connection with conventional knowledge. The 
dissolution of those aggregates is therefore a necessary condition for the 
achivement of transcendental wisdom and does not undermine it. In Tsong 
khapa's transcendental epistemology, on other hand, the transcendence of the 
prapaficas of personal identity must be achieved by the transcendental 
wisdom within the framework of the prapaticas of personal identity—namely, 
within one's five psychophysical aggregates. The transcendence of the 
prapalicas of personal identity is soteriologically significant only if it is 
personally experienced within the bound of one's psychophysical aggregates, 
but such transcendence must, therefore, be epistemic and cannot entail 
complete metaphysical transcendence of conventionalities or their total 
dissolution. 
On the view espoused by Tsong khapa, ultimate wisdom (non 
conceptual wisdom or ultimately valid cognition) is described as 
'transcendental wisdom' in the sense that it is directed to the transcendental 
sphere—towards supramundane or unconditioned nirvana—but it is 
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nevertheless mundane in terms of its scope and its nature. Transcendental 
wisdom still operates entirely within the range of the conditioned world—it 
is itself dependently arisen and does not imply a shift to a metaphysically 
unconditioned sphere. Only reality as it is given within their own five 
aggregates is accessible to yogis and knowable directly through their 
personal experience. The transcendence of the categories of praparicas is 
directed towards just such direct, personal, transcendental wisdom. It is this 
wisdom, according to Tsong khapa, that liberates beings from the obsession 
with conceptual elaborations such as those associated with the notions of an 
independent and substantial self—T, 'Mine', 'Me'. 
The true and essential characteristic of transcendental knowledge thus 
consists in a precise understanding of the conditioned world itself. In 
Bhikkhu Bodhi's words: "though the realisation of the unconditioned 
requires a turning away from the conditioned, it must be emphasised that 
this realisation is achieved precisely through the understanding of the 
conditioned". Wheras Go rampa argues that a practitioner must break off all 
ties with the conditioned world in order to attain unconditioned nirvana, 
Tsong khapa claims that the practitioner must view things as they are by 
means of direct awareness. This idea is again nicely captured by Bhikkhu 
Bodhi: "nibbana cannot be reached by backing off from a direct confrontation 
with sarilsara to lose oneself in a blissful oblivion of the world":" 
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Emphasising exactly the same point, Nagajuna also claims that "sarhsara and 
nirvana are not distinct. The understanding of sarinsara is itself posited as 
nirvana" [6].' 
It is crucial for Tsong khapa to emphasise the connection between 
transcendental and empirical wisdom, and therefore also the connection 
between sariisara and nirvana, since it is on this basis that Tsong khapa 
argues that transcendental knowledge is equivalent to the knowledge of 
phenomena as dependently arisen. Hence he argues that "dependently 
arisen, i.e. reality in its true nature, as seen by an arya, is free from all 
categories of prapafica such as the expression and the expressed objects, 
definitions and defined objects and the like". In other words, as Bhiklchu 
Bodhi puts it, "the path to liberation is a path of understanding, of 
comprehension and transcendence, not of escapism or emotional self-
indulgence. Nibbana can only be attained by turning one's gaze towards 
sarhsara, and scrutinising it in all its starkness".' 
So the transcendence of the categories of praparica need not and does not 
threaten the interlocking relationship between the two truths. The 
transcendental experience remains firmly grounded in empirical reality, 
while also allowing for epistemic transcendence—transcendental wisdom, 
underpinned by right-view and by firm ethical foundations, directs the mind 
upon the unconditioned so as to penetrate and cut through all the categories 
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of praparica. "By penetrating the conditioned to its very bottom and most 
universal features, the yogi passes through the door leading out of the 
conditioned to the supreme security of the unconditioned", as Bhikkhu Bodhi 
puts it. In this manner, transcendental wisdom effectively transcends the 
rigidity and the corporeality of the categories of praparica. 
In spite of the fact that transcendental wisdom destroys the mental 
tendencies for the proliferation of praparica, such wisdom nevertheless leaves 
the categories of praparzca intact. Just as a lamp simultaneously burns the 
wick, dispels the darkness, creates light, and consumes the oil, so 
transcendental wisdom simultaneously understands things as they are, 
abandons ignorance and the obsessions to proliferate prapaficas, realises the 
nirvana, and develops the path to liberation. The key to transcendental 
knowledge, therefore, lies in the wisdom capable of penetrating the 
conceptual world—penetrating the five psychophysical aggregates of the 
knower. Such wisdom involves a direct experience that operates within the 
confines of one's own five psychophysical aggregates and yet 'sees through' 
those aggregates. As Bhikkhu Bodhi points out, "the path to nibbana lies 
through the understanding of sarilsare for the reason that the experiential 
realisation of the unconditioned emerges from a prior penetration of the 
fundamental nature of the conditioned, without which it is impossible"?' 
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Go rampa's transcendental epistemology, as we have seen, is geared 
towards the postulation of metaphysical transcendence. This consequently 
leads him to argue in favour of the absolute existence of the transcendental 
Tathagata, the• latter itself being taken as identical with transcendental 
wisdom,' while he also insists on the necessity of the absolute elimination of 
all the categories of praparica—of the entire conventional system. On the other 
hand, while Tsong khapa does argue in favour of epistemic transcendence, he 
also insists that transcendental knowledge is not based in the actual 
elimination of all conceptual categories. As far as he is concerned, "the 
transcendence of conceptual categories means dissolving all the categories of 
prapa fica —dualistic appearances—from the vantage point of the 
transcendental wisdom capable of directly realising ultimate reality".' Once 
transcendental knowledge is achieved, the meditator still makes use of 
dualities in respect of certain practicalities—to distinguish between, for 
instance, skilful and unskilful action, afflictions and non-afflictions—and yet 
the habitual tendency to proliferation of prapatica ceases since the meditator 
has become aware of the fact that such dualities are part of ongoing 
processes, rather than inherently persisting discrete entities. 
The main thrust of the arguments adavanced by Go rampa in favour of 
his alternative transcendental position derives from his emphasis on the two 
truths, and their cognitive counterparts, as completely distinct from one 
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another which are hierarchically related. Since ultimate truth, and 
transcendental wisdom along with it, are viewed as ontologically and 
epistemologically independent of their conventional counterparts, so it 
follows directly, on Go rampa's account, they must also be completely 
transcendent of those counterparts—both epistemically and ontologically. It is 
Tsong khapa's contrasting emphasis on the unity of the two truths that is the 
basis for his insistence on the merely epistemic character of the transcendence 
associated with ultimate truth and transcendental wisdom. The unity of the 
two truths, and the modes of understanding associated with them, thus 
cannot be violated even at the climax of the transcendental experience. As 
Bhikkhu Bodhi puts it, "the understanding of the conditioned and the 
realisation of the unconditioned are found to lock together in direct 
connection", and he goes on, "this principle—that the understanding of the 
conditioned is the way to the unconditioned—holds true not only in the 
general sense.. .but in a deeper, more philosophical sense as well"?' The two 
modes of understanding are thus viewed by Tsong khapa as mutually 
entailing in the same way as are the two truths themselves. In conclusion, 
then, it may be said that while Go rampa mobilises his transcendental 
epistemology so as to enable the formulation of a non-duality that is 
metaphysical, Tsong khapa mobilises his transcendental epistemology so as 
to enable the formulation of a non-duality that is merely epistemic. At this 
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point, however, the idea of non-duality itself comes to the fore and it is to this 
that we must turn in the next section. 
3. Non-dual epistemology 
Since the two Tibetan Prasafigikas agree that the direct personal realisation of 
ultimate truth requires the transcendence of all conceptual elaborations 
(praparica), which is in turn dependent on the attainment of what is known as 
'non-dual knowledge,' so a detailed analysis of the status of non-duality is 
crucial to our discussion. This analysis will involve the examination of a 
number of issues including: how and when the non-dual state is attained; 
whether the non-duality at issue is epistemic or metaphysical; and what is 
implied by the attainment of the non-dual state—particularly in relation to 
the dichotomy of subject and object. 
So far as Tsong khapa is concerned, the non-dualistic personal 
realisation of ultimate truth is an epistemic event rather than a metaphysical . 
process. In non-dualistic realisation, as Tsong khapa understands matters, it 
is possible for non-dualistic realisation to be achieved, and yet the 
apprehending consciousness—transcendental wisdom—is able to retain its 
ontological distinctness as subject, while the cognitive sphere—ultimate 
reality—is likewise able to retain its ontological distinctness as object. Go 
rampa argues, however, that non-dualistic personal realisation is a process 
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geared towards the formation of a single metaphysical reality—a total 
integration and unification of subjectivity and objectivity. Only such a 
complete integration, according to Go rampa, resolves the problems 
pertaining to duality.. Thus, while Tsong khapa and Go rampa agree 
superficially that, from the standpoint of non-dual wisdom,' the meditator 
experiences a total dissolution of even the subtle duality between subjective 
sector and objective sector, they disagree on the implications of this non-
dualistic experience. The achievement of non-dualistic wisdom is not 
equivalent, according to Tsong khapa, to the cessation of cognitive activity, 
whereas, for Go rampa, it is equivalent to such cessation. 
Tsong khapa's descriptive account of the way in which the meditator 
arrives at the state of non-dualistic understanding proceeds as follows. A 
concerned cognitive agent experiences the fusion between subjectivity and 
objectivity—subjectivity and objectivity refer here, not to self and outside 
world, but rather to elements within the structure of the meditator's own 
psychophysical aggregates. The meditator remains introspective, sometimes 
with eyes closed, not interacting with the outside world, but the outside 
world as such does not disappear. What occurs in this experience Of 
subjective-objective fusion is instead a total cessation of the dualities between 
subject 'I' and object 'Mine', between 'thinker' and 'thought', between 'feeler' 
and 'feelings', between 'mind' and 'body', between 'seeing' and 'seen' and so 
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forth. % To begin with, a meditator perceives, for instance, that in each act of 
seeing, two factors are always present, the object seen and the mental state of 
seeing it. While each single instance of the act of seeing involves dissolution 
and vanishing, the object seen and the act of seeing actually consist of 
numerous physical and mental processes that are seen to dissolve serially and 
successively.' Eventually, the meditator also notices the dissolution of the 
dissolution itself—in other words, the meditator first realises the fluctuating 
and transitory character of the five aggregates, this realisation is then 
followed by the further realisation of the aggregates as empty and selfless, 
and finally by the realisation of the emptiness of even the empty and selfless 
phenomena. Non-dual knowledge is thus arrived at, in Tsong khapa's view, 
through the direct personal experience of seeing or noticing truths within the 
framework of one's own aggregates, rather than through being convinced of 
the truth of certain opinions through abstract rational argument or 
persuasion. Since the process at issue here is a cognitive experience that 
operates entirely within the domain of one's own psychophysical aggregates, 
so it is an epistemic non-duality, but not a metaphysical non-duality. 
This is how, according to Tsong khapa, an arya, as a cognitive agent, has 
a direct non-conceptual and a non-dualistic access to the transcendental 
nature of his own five psychophysical aggregates during the meditative 
equipoise. In the wake of the meditative equipoise, an arya engages with 
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dualistic worldly activities such as taking part in philosophical discourse, 
practising different social conventions and so on. The arya will thus employ 
particular socio-linguistic conceptions, but since the arya has eradicated all 
reifying tendencies, so even these worldly dualistic cognitive engagements 
will be seen as consistent with non-dualistic wisdom. Both non-dualistic and 
dualistic wisdoms, especially in the case of a buddha are, Tsong khapa 
argues, fully commensurable. 
, Go rampa's version of non-duality stands in direct opposition to Tsong 
khapa's. As far as Go rampa is concerned, any dichotomy is inconsistent with 
non-duality and so with the idea of non-dual knowledge. The key to the 
attainment of non-dual knowledge is the eschewal of the dichotomy between 
the objectivity of ultimate reality and the subjectivity of transcendental 
wisdom. In Go rampa's view, it is not possible to achieve non-duality so long 
as the dichotomy between subjective and objective persists. The fundamental 
criterion of Go rampa's non-duality is thus a complete metaphysical oneness 
requiring a total fusion of transcendental wisdom with ultimate reality. They 
become a unified entity, which he interchangeably describes as 
'transcendental wisdom', 'Buddha"Tathagata', 'ultimate truth', or 'ultimate 
reality' (dhe kho na nyid). "Because one has realised emptiness and attained a 
perfect orientation with it", says Go rampa, "the adventitious stains wear out. 
Eventually the cognition itself becomes an undefiled cognitive sphere. This 
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itself is the ultimate Buddha, who is adorned with the perfections of 
abandonment and realisation".' From this point onwards, "ultimate reality, 
empirical reality and subjective wisdom—all three lose their 
contradistinctions" . 59 
Go rampa argues that 'existence', 'nonexistence', 'both' and 'neither' 
constitute the four extreme conceptual elaborations. "Once they are 
simultaneously extirpated, the individuality of cognising mind and cognised 
reality ceases to exist".' He claims that "the cognising mind inseparably 
embraces the transcendence of conceptual elaboration as its object, and that 
itself is designated as ultimate truth".' In other words, as alcya mChog ldan 
puts it: "the actual cognitive sphere of the [non-dualistic] wisdom of the 
meditative equipoise directly realising emptiness is the wisdom itself". 62 For 
both Go rampa and akya mChog ldan, then, "this wisdom is the ultimate 
truth. For it is the actual cognitive sphere of the wisdom of the meditative 
equipoise...This holds true because this wisdom is the direct personal 
wisdom".' 
The advocacy of such an absolute non-dual wisdom is not unique to Go 
rampa and akya mChog ldan. In spite of some minor differences, several 
Tibetan Prasafigikas hold a similar view. Like Go rampa, Mi skyod rDo rje 
emphasises the synthesis between transcendental wisdom and ultimate truth. 
Mi skyod rDo rje does this by arguing that "there is neither separate ultimate 
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truth apart from the transcendental wisdom nor transcendental wisdom apart 
from the ultimate truth".61 Mi pham, on the other hand, makes use of a more 
idealistic route to ascend to an absolute non-duality: "In the end, there are no 
external objects. It is evident that they are apparent due to the force of mental 
predisposition. All literatures that supposedly demonstrate the existence of 
external objects are provisional [descriptions of] their appearances". 65 
Consequently, whatever is posited as existent, according to Mi pham, "is like 
horse or elephant appearing in the dream. When it is subjected to logical 
analyses, it finally boils down to the interdependent inner predispositions. 
And this is at the heart of Buddhist phi1osophy". 66 The climax of this absolute 
non-duality, for these thinkers, is the absolute realisation of transcendental 
wisdom and the complete collapse or dissolution of the entire conventional 
system. Identical with ultimate truth, transcendental wisdom survives as the 
as the one and only truth. Transcendental wisdom becomes timeless, 
absolute, and unaffected by change. Even the concept of time is no longer 
applicable since transcendental wisdom endures eternally—"it neither arises 
nor ceases", as Go rampa puts it. 67 
Central to Go rampa's doctrine of non-duality are several of the key 
idealistic conceptions. Go rampa does not hesitate to impose conceptions 
derived from Yogacara or Vijnanavada—such as that of vijnapti-matra (blos 
bzhag tsam), 'representation-only', or of citta-matra (sems tsam) 'mere- 
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mind'—on Prasangika Madhyamaka. He argues that the external world is a 
system of purely mental constructs and claims that the five sensory 
consciousnesses perceiving the phenomenal world arise from the 
'foundational consciousness' called alayavijriana (kun gzhi rnam 
shes)—literally, it means 'storehouse consciousness'. This latter idea 
constitutes one of the fundamental doctrines of Yogacara Idealism. 
Alayavijriema is characterised as devoid of 'purposive activity', 'self-luminous' 
and 'auto-cognisant', and is seen as the 'basis of all sensory activities'—the 
storehouse of all past karmic seeds, adventitious potential defilements and 
intrinsically pure virtues. Alayavijriana is thus regarded as the 'fundamental 
root' or more philosophically, the 'foundational root' of both sarhsara and 
nirvana. This consciousness is, according to both Go rampa and the 
proponents of Yogacara Idealism, transcendent of the dualism of 'subject' and 
'object', 'existence' and 'nonexistence', 'death' and 'birth', 'purity' and 
'defilements', 'arising' and 'cessation', and is described as the Dharma-dhettu, 
or nirvana, or tathagata-garbha. 
In defending the conception of the 'fundamental root,' Sogyal Rinpoche 
for example writes: "There is the very nature of mind, its innermost essence, 
which is absolutely and always untouched by change or death. At present it 
is hidden within our own mind, our sems, enveloped and obscured by the 
mental scurry of our thoughts and emotions", 69 but, he goes on, "just as 
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clouds can be shifted by a strong gust of wind to reveal the shining sun and 
wide-open sky, so, under certain special circumstances, some inspiration may 
uncover for us glimpses of this nature of mind".' Sogyal Rinpoche also 
explains that, in spite of having varying depths and degrees, these glimpses 
each bring some light of understanding, meaning and freedom. "This is 
because the nature of mind is the very root itself of understanding. In Tibetan 
we call it Rigpa, a primordial, pure, pristine awareness that is at once 
intelligent, cognisant, radiant, and always awake. It could be said to be the 
knowledge of knowledge itself".' 
Yet the conception of the 'fundamental root' has not gone unchallenged, 
and perhaps the most significant challenge comes directly from the Buddha 
himself in the very first sutta of Majjhima Nikaya—the Midapariyaya Sutta. This 
sutta is, according to Thanissaro Bhikkhu (and as indicated in its 
commentary), the Buddha's response to a particular school of Brahmanical 
thought developing in his time—the classical Sarilkya, which posited the 
'root' as an abstract principle out of which all things are said to have 
emanated and that was immanent in all things.' This sutta is clearly one of 
the Buddha's critiques of the idea of a 'fundamental root'. As Thanissaro 
Bhildchu rightly suggests, "any teaching that follows these lines would be 
subjected to the same criticism that the Buddha directed against the monks 
who first heard this discourse". tm Tibetan metaphysicians have a common 
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tendency to create systems of Buddhist metaphysics in which the experience 
of emptiness, the unconditioned, the Dharma-realm, the Dharma-body, Buddha-
nature, Rigpa, alayavijnana, etc., is said to function as the ground of being from 
which the 'All'—the entirety of our sensory and mental experience—arises 
and to which it returns. Such metaphysical systems seem strikingly parallel to 
classical Saihkhya thought—wherein the common root is accepted as 
constituting prakrti (matter) and purusa (consciousness). 
First, in the Mfdapariyaya Sutta, the Buddha expressly attacks the core of 
the abstract notion of the 'fundamental root' mocking the person who 
advocates such a view "as an uninstructed, run-of-the-mill person": 
There is the case, monks, where an uninstructed run-of-the-mill 
person—who has no regard for nobles, is not well-versed or disciplined 
in their Dhamma; who has no regard for men of integrity, is not well-
versed or disciplined in their Dhamma—perceives earth as earth. 
Perceiving earth as earth, he conceives [things] about earth, he 
conceives [things] in earth, he conceives [things] coming out of earth, 
he conceives earth as 'mine,' he delights in earth. Why is that? Because 
he has not comprehended it, I tell you.. .He perceives nibbana as nibbana. 
Perceiving nibbana as nibbana, he conceives things about nibbana, he 
conceives things in nibbana, he conceives things coming out of nibbana, 
he conceives nibbana as 'Mine,' he delights in nibbana. Why is that? 
Because he has not comprehended it, I tell you [Millapariyaya Sutta, MN 
1174 
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Second, the Buddha instructs the trainees to the effect that, if they are keen to 
properly understand things as they really are, they should avoid adopting 
such a view and should avoid conceiving nirvana and the like as the root: 
A monk who is a trainee—yearning for the unexcelled relief from 
bondage, his aspirations as yet unfulfilled—directly knows earth as 
earth. Directly knowing earth as earth, let him not conceive things 
about earth, let him not conceive things in earth, let him not conceive 
things coming out of earth, let him not conceive earth as 'mine,' let him 
not delight in earth. Why is that? So that he may comprehend it.. .He 
directly knows nibbana as nibbana. Directly knowing nibbana as nibbana, 
let him not conceive things about nibbana, let him not conceive things in 
nibbana, let him not conceive things coming out of nibbana, let him not 
conceive nibbana as 'mine,' let him not delight in nibbana. Why is that? 
So that he way comprehend it [Millapariyaya Sutta, MN 1.1. Th 
Third, the Buddha rejects the idea of the 'fundamental root' on the ground 
that it is not verified by the wisdom of fully liberated beings. He explains 
how a fully liberated person, an arhat, directly knows reality without 
conceiving the root. Moreover, a careful reading of the sutta also reveals that 
the Buddha takes the idea of the 'fundamental root' to be a consequence of 
conceptual fraud and reification and as totally without direct perceptual 
foundation. The Buddha stresses that the arhats directly perceive "nirvana as 
nirvana", and indicates that they strictly do not conceive "nirvana as the 
primordial ground of other phenomena": 
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A monk who is a Worthy One, devoid of mental defilements—who has 
attained completion, finished the task, laid down the burden, attained 
the true goal, destroyed the fetters of becoming, and is released through 
right knowledge—directly knows earth as earth. Directly knowing 
earth as earth, he does not conceive things about earth, does not 
conceive things in earth, does not conceive things coming out of earth, 
does not conceive earth as 'mine', does not delight in earth. Why is 
that? Because he has comprehended it, I tell you... He directly knows 
nibbana as nibbana. Directly knowing nibbana as nibbana, he does not 
conceive things about nibbana, does not conceive things in nibbana, does 
not conceive things coming out of nibbana, does not conceive nibbiina as 
'mine', does not delight in nibbana. Why is that? Because he has 
comprehended it, I tell you.. .Because, with the ending of passion, he is 
devoid of passion, I tell you.. .Because, with the ending of aversion, he 
is devoid of aversion, I tell you... Because, with the ending of delusion, 
he is devoid of delusions, I tell you... [Malapariyaya Sutta, MN 1].' 
Fourth, the Buddha rejects the 'fundamental root' on the ground that it is not 
verified by an enlightened wisdom. The Buddha explains that a fully 
enlightened being, a Tathagata, directly sees phenomena as they are, and yet 
does not conceive nor perceive the fundamental root: 
The Tathagata—as worthy one, rightly self-awakened—directly knows 
as earth. Directly knowing earth as earth, he does not conceive things 
about earth, does not conceive things in earth, does not conceive things 
coming out of earth, does not conceive earth as 'mine', does not delight 
in earth. Why is that? Because the Tathagata has comprehended it to 
the end, I tell you.. .He directly knows nibbana as nibbana. Directly 
knowing nibbana as nibbana, he does not conceive things about nibbana, 
does not conceive things in nibbana, does not conceive things coming 
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out of nibbana, does not conceive nibbana as 'mine', does not delight in 
nibbana. Why is that? Because the Tathagata has comprehended it to the 
end, I tell you... .Because he has known that delight is the root of 
suffering and stress, that from coming-into-being there is birth, and that 
for what has come into being there is aging and death. Therefore, with 
the total ending, fading away, cessation, letting go, relinquishment of 
craving, the Tathagata has totally awakened to the unexcelled right self-
awakening, I tell you [Malapariyaya Sutta, MN 1].77 
It is hard indeed to imagine how Go rampa and like-minded thinkers could 
reconcile absolute idealism alone, let alone their idea of the 'fundamental 
root', with the Prasafigika Madhyamaka. The words of both Candrakirti and 
the Buddha make crystal clear how material and mental aggregates must be 
treated as having an equal status and as being mutually dependent. 
Candrakirti argues, for example, that: "if form does not exist, then do not 
hold to the existence of mind; and if mind exist, then do not hold to the 
nonexistence of form" [VI:91]78 Similarly the Buddha states: "The thought 
occurred to me, 'consciousness exists when what exists? From what as a 
requisite condition comes consciousness?' From my appropriate attention, 
there came the breakthrough of discernment: 'Consciousness exists when 
name and form exists. From name and form as requisite condition comes 
consciousness" [Nagara Sutta, SN XII.65].' From Buddha's appropriate 
attention, there came the breakthrough of discernment: "Consciousness does 
not exist when name and form does not exist. From the cessation of name and 
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form comes the cessation of consciousness" [Nagara Sutta, SN XII.65].' The 
Buddha elucidates the interdependence of mind and matter even more 
clearly by employing a famous metaphor—the 'sheaves of reeds'. He says 
that it is as if two sheaves of reeds were to stand leaning against one another: 
"In the same way, from name and form as a requisite condition comes 
consciousness, from consciousness as a requisite condition comes name and 
form" [Nalakalapiyo Sutta, SN XII.67].' The sheaves of reeds are mutually 
supportive of each other, so that if one were to pull away either of those 
sheaves, the other would fall: "In the same way, from the cessation of name 
and form comes the cessation of consciousness, from the cessation of 
consciousness comes the cessation of name and form" [Nalakaltipiyo Sutta, SN 
XII.67] . 82 
At this point we need to summarise the considerations set out above. 
We have seen that in the non-dualism postulated by Go rampa, the ultimate 
task of wisdom is to break through the diversified appearances in order to 
discover the unifying non-dual reality. This way of understanding the task of 
wisdom involves a clear metaphysical commitment to abolishing the validity 
of all conventional dualities including the duality between subject and object. 
In Lindtner's terms: "reality (tattva) is beyond all ontological and 
epistemological dualities (dvaya), while the empirical world of origination, 
destruction, and so forth is illusory—due merely to ignorance (avidya)". By 
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using the epistemology of non-duality, Go rampa argues for a metaphysics of 
non-duality. As we shall notice in the next section, the formulation of his 
metaphysical non-duality reaches its culmination with Go rampa's 
proposition of 'nothingness' in place of 'emptiness'. As opposed to the non-
dual metaphysical doctrine of Go rampa, however, is Tsong khapa's idea of 
an epistemic non-duality. By arguing that the consummation of the profound 
and complete non-dual state need not be bought at the price of losing the 
conventional distinctions, Tsong khapa holds that even the highest level of 
wisdom preserves duality and diversity. He argues that Prasafigika 
Madhyamaka draws our attention to empirical dualities—among them the 
duality of morality and immorality—and takes them as the indispensable 
basis for any honest search for liberating wisdom. To put the point in 
Bhildthu Bodhi's words: "It is precisely these antitheses—of good and evil, 
suffering and happiness, wisdom and ignorance—that make the quest for the 
enlightenment and deliverance such a vitally crucial concern". At the 
summit of these pairs of opposites stands the duality of the conditioned and 
the unconditioned: sarhsara, wherein all phenomena are impermanent, 
subject to change, and liable to suffering, and nirvana, the state of final 
freedom. Although nirvana is definitely presented as ultimate reality, and not 
merely as a moral or psychological state, "there is not the least insinuation", 
as Bhikkhu Bodhi points out, "that this reality is metaphysically 
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indistinguishable at some profound level from its manifest opposite, 
sarhsara". 85 On the contrary, the Buddha's repeated advice is that "sariasara is 
the realm of suffering governed by greed, hatred, and delusion...while 
nibbana is irreversible release from saiiisara, to be attained by demolishing 
greed, hatred, and delusion". It is clear then, that the conception of non-
duality in Tsong khapa's sense takes it to be strictly an epistemic process. 
This view will be reinforced in the next section, wherein it will be shown that, 
for Tsong khapa, even non-dual knowledge is consistent with knowing 
phenomena as empty (ianya, stong pa). It follows, therefore, that non-dual 
knowledge is equivalent to knowing phenomena as dependently arisen, and 
is therefore conistent with dual knowledge. 
3.1. Seeing phenomena as 'nothing' 
In the preceding discussions, it became clear that Go rampa takes 
transcendental wisdom to exist as an absolute and that he also holds that the 
attainment of this wisdom amounts to the realisation of non-dual reality. But 
the answer to at least one question remains unclear: Does transcendental 
wisdom involve any cognitive activity? That this question is important 
becomes evident when we consider the possible answers that may be 
advanced. If the answer is positive, so that transcendental wisdom, 
understood as 'seeing by way of not seeing', is indeed taken to involve a form 
of cognitive activity, then why should the 'seeing' involved in transcendental 
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wisdom be characterised as a 'not seeing'? If the answer is negative, so that 
transcendental wisdom, understood as 'seeing by way of not seeing', is taken 
not to involve any form of cognitive activity, then why is the 'not seeing' of 
transcendental wisdom characterised as a 'seeing'? To put matters slightly 
differently: either transcendental wisdom involves a form of cognition, in 
which case it requires a distinction between cogniser and that which is the 
object of cognition, or else there is no distinction between cogniser and the 
object of cognition, in which case transcendental wisdom is not a form of 
cognition. 
Even among his closest allies, Go rampa's treatment of the 
transcendental nature of conceptual elaboration in a non-dual state is highly 
contentious. It depends upon two important moves: first, arguing that the 
transcendence of conceptual elaborations in a non-dual state is equivalent to 
engaging with an 'utter absence' or 'nothingness'; and second, arguing that 
the ultimate cognition does not depend upon a dichotomous relation between 
subject and object. Go rampa writes that "the transcendence of conceptual 
elaboration is equivalent to an utter absence of any established entity (ci yang 
ma grub pa)", but he also insists that "in order to ensure the realisation of that 
'utter absence' per se by the devotees, the transcendence of conceptual 
elaboration is presented as an arbitary model (mtshan gzhir sgro btags nas 
bsnyad pa) of ultimate truth".87 According to this view "a model that actually 
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represents the characteristic [of ultimate truth] cannot exist". 88 However, for 
the benefit of devotees, "ultimate truth is said to have been provisionally 
presented by means of the threefold conventional fabrications—definition 
(mtshan nyid, laksarm), definiendum (mtshon bya, laksman) and the defined 
model (mtshan gzhi, laksya). In this sense alone ultimate truth can be treated as 
the counterpart of conventional truth".89 It turns out, therefore, that ultimate 
truth is not an object of knowledge in the sense that it can become known to 
its cognising consciousness. It is just an utter absence of anything empirical. 
In order to establish the non-dual character of ultimate cognition, Go 
rampa attempts to resolve the apparent dichotomy between transcendental 
wisdom (as the putative subjective element in such cognition) and emptiness 
(as the putative objective element): 
[Interlocutor]: When you earlier defined the 'transcendence of 
conceptual elaboration,' you mentioned that it is free from all symbols 
of the expressions and the object of expression; object and subject; and 
negation and affirmation, here you appraised it. Is this not like 
describing the qualities of the sky-flower [i.e., a nonexistent entity] 
which are not possible to know? 
[Go rampa]: Yes, [you are right. Talking about the transcendence 
of conceptual elaboration is exactly like describing the qualities of 
something that is nonexistent]. However, its description even in this 
context is not meant to suggests the existence of [duality] between the 
consciousness realising [the transcendence of conceptual elaboration] 
and its experienced object or an object to be experienced [in the non-
dual state]. Because... the elimination of the entire conceptual 
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elaboration by arya's non-conceptual wisdom is itself considered as the 
realisation of emptiness, or is merely expressed as seeing the truth. If 
any object either to be conceptualised or to be experienced were 
involved [in the non-dual state], at the best, it would be a universal or a 
thing [but not ultimate truth]. 9° 
Given his commitment to a metaphysical non-duality, any subject-object 
duality is a problem for Go rarnpa. He is therefore determined to eliminate all 
possible dichotomies. In order to achieve this, he equates the status of 
apprehending objects with 'universals'. Here 'universal' does not have the 
usual sense of abstractness, but rather refers to the objects themselves. Go 
rampa therefore argues that if, in the non-dual state, there is an object to be 
either conceptualised or experienced, then "at the best it would be a 
'universal' or a 'thing'. Since 'thing' or 'universal' cannot be an ultimate 
truth, 'emptiness', in Go rampa's sense, must mean the utter absence of 
empirical truth. In this way transcendental wisdom is undifferentiated from 
nothingness. This undifferentiated transcendental wisdom does indeed 
satisfy the definition of being 'non-dual' in the most complete sense—it is 
beyond all cognitive activities, both perceptual and conceptual. It would 
seem that so long as the cognitive activities between cognising subject and 
cognised object persist, so the mind must always remain caught up in 
perceptual or conceptual operations. Moreover, both thought and perception 
operate always within the domain of duality between subject and object. 
Since the persistence of such dualities constitute, in Go rampa's view, 
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obstacles to the achievement of the non-dual state, so, if that state is to be 
achieved, then those obstacles must be removed. 
In the non-dual system advocated by Go rampa, there cannot even be 
any form of transcendental cognitive 'content' apart from transcendental 
cognition, since this would constitute a version of what is, for Go rampa, the 
highly problematic dichotomy between subject and object. Since the presence 
of any cognitive activity between subject and object threatens the 
achievement of non-duality, Go rampa insists that emptiness must be an utter 
absence—it cannot be an object of knowledge or a cognitive content, and non-
dual wisdom must embrace it without any duality or dichotomy. By treating 
emptiness as an utter absence rather than a cognitive content, Go rampa 
effectively resolves the problem of the apparent dichotomy between the 
objectivity of ultimate reality and the subjectivity of transcendental wisdom. 
Thus what remains is an absolute, non-dual and transcendental subject. 
The view that equates emptiness with an 'utter absence' is, once again, 
not a view that is unique to Go rampa. In fact sTag tsang,' along with the 
modem Tibetan polemical writer dGe dun Chos 'phel, explicitly endorses this 
view. dGe dun Chos 'phel, for instance, argues that in the meditative 
equipoise there is no apprehended object whatsoever: "When it is fused with 
the appearance in the post-meditative equipoise (rjes thob, prstha-labdha), the 
union is formed in between the nothingness during the meditative equipoise 
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and the appearances of something during the subsequent attainment". 92 This 
is how "the meaning of the 'establishment of ultimately nothing' and the 
'establishment of empirically something' should be understood". 93 
This view that equates emptiness with nothingness, although it has 
many non-dGe lugs pa admirers, is vigorously challenged not only by 
numerous dGe lugs pa philosophers—such as Tsong khapa," mKhas grub 
rje,95 and 'Jam dbyangs bZhad pa, 96 but also by several non-dGe lugs pa 
thinkers such as Sa part, 97 Rong ston and Mi pham. In criticising the doctrine, 
Rong ston, for example, points out that the equation of 'seeing nothingness' 
with the 'non-dual state in the meditative equipoise' would entirely 
incapacitate the purgative potency of vipalyana—penetrating wisdom 
(literally, 'special insight'). Given the fact that the most important task of the 
wisdom of vipagyana is the eradication of latent defilements, this is a serious 
objection. If meditative equipoise were equivalent to seeing nothingness, 
"like a non-discerning meditative trance ('dus shes med pa'i snyoms 'jug, 
asamjriata-samapatti)", then meditative equipoise "would utterly lack the 
active penetrating insight of vipalyana (lhag mthong) seeing emptiness".98 
Moreover, if the equivalence of meditative equipoise with seeing nothingness 
was accepted, "even sleep, falling into coma etc., would equally purge [the 
latent defilements] since they also possess mere non-discernment". 99 In 
similar fashion, Mi pham joins Rong ston in challenging the equation of 
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'seeing nothingness' with the non-dual wisdom of meditative equipoise. 
While reinforcing Rong ston's criticisms, Mi pham brands Go rampa's view 
as quietism—a view, also attributed to the Chinese Hva-shang (ci yang yid 
la me byed pa'i lta ba), that takes cognitive disengagement to be a matter of 
ceasing all cognitive activities. To take the validity of meditative equipoise as 
consisting in seeing nothingness is equivalent, in Mi pham's view, to 
endorsing Hva Shang's insistence on stilling thoughts and becoming almost 
zombie-like: "As it is the stilling of mind to attain the quietism without 
analysis, it would lack the illuminating power of vipagyana. Thus, like a stone 
at the ocean-bed, one eternally remains in the ordinary state". 1°1 The 
attainment of total freedom from latent impurities would then become 
impossible. Mi pham reveals another absurdity inherent in the doctrine that 
equates 'emptiness' with 'nothingness': 
If one maintains 'not seeing' as the 'seeing emptiness', as the mode of 
reality is so profound, there is an acute danger of erring. As mind is not 
an object bearing a physical form, nobody is possible to see its colour 
etc. To think that merely 'not seeing' constitutes 'realising emptiness' is 
certainly committing a grave error. It is not possible to see a cow's horn 
on the man's head even after analysing it hundred times. It would be 
easy indeed for anyone, if 'not seeing' itself satisfies 'realising its 
emptiness'.' 
For the erroneous view which apprehends nothing whatsoever, 
no-thing whatsoever is established. There is no way to develop the 
ascertainment. It will have thus no capacity whatsoever to eliminate 
obstructions [of nirvana and buddhahood]. Therefore, just as the fire is 
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inferred from the smoke, the difference between the two [vipagyana and 
seeing nothingness] should be understood on the account of its 
conduciveness to the realisation [of reality] and the abandonment [of 
defilements].' 
Go rampa's claim is that 'seeing nothing' constitutes the criterion of 'seeing 
emptiness'. If that is so, as Mi pham points out in the above statement, we 
should consider "not seeing a cow's horn on man's head" as equivalent to 
seeing emptiness. However, since "not seeing a cow's horn on man's head" 
has no purgative capacity whatsoever, it can not be taken as equivalent to 
seeing emptiness. Or else seeing emptiness should also be considered as 
cognitive process without having purgative or purifying capacity. 
In short, by proposing, as we saw in the previous section, a doctrine of 
absolute transcendental wisdom, and by proposing, as we have seen here, a 
doctrine of nothingness, Go rampa argues that a non-dual state, strictly 
speaking, must refer to a transcendental wisdom that is totally free of all 
cognitive content and actitivity. His emphasis on metaphysical non-duality 
leads him to disparage all cognitive content and activity as utterly 
inconsistent with such non-duality. Because he takes non-duality to be 
absolute, Go rampa must insist on the complete elimination of the 
phenomenal world as the object of negation, he must also equate emptiness 
with nothingness,' and he must also take the full realisation of non-duality 
to be arrived at only when the subject-object dichotomy utterly collapses. As 
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Peter Harvey puts it: "the experience of transcendent knowledge, which is an 
undifferentiated unity, beyond the subject-object duality and a concept of any 
kind, even 'thought'. It is thought which is no longer what is usually meant 
by 'thought', as it is without object, contentless".' It is little wonder, then, 
that the water analogy strikes Go rampa so powerfully. Just as two jars of 
clear water form an inseparable mixture, Go rampa's non-dualism requires a 
total fusion between subject and object. Tsong khapa, on the other hand, as 
we have already seen above and as we will explore further below, argues 
only for epistemic non-duality. His account of non-duality does not require 
the suspension of cognitive contents and activities, it does not require the 
treatment of the phenomenal world as the object of negation that must be 
eliminated, and it does not require the equation of emptiness with 
nothingness—yet Tsong khapa argues that it is possible, nevertheless, to 
achieve non-dual awareness. 
3.2. Seeing phenomena as 'empty' 
As we have seen in earlier sections, Tsong khapa is entirely opposed to the 
formulation of a metaphysical non-duality and instead directs his efforts 
towards the defence of a non-duality that is epistemic. Thus he argues that it is 
possible to attain non-dual awareness even though the metaphysical 
distinction between subjectivity and objectivity remains. But how credible is 
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Tsong khapa's non-dual system if it retains the metaphysical duality of 
subject and object? 
To see ultimate truth non-dualistically is, so far as Tsong khapa is 
concerned, to see phenomena as empty (unya, stong pa), and given the 
conceptual unity between emptiness (unyata, stong pa nyid) and dependent 
arising (pratityasamutpada, rten cing 'brel bar byung ba), so, in experiential 
terms, to see phenomena as empty is also to see phenomena as dependently 
arisen (pratityasamutapanna). It is critical, therefore, to understand the nature 
of the conceptual unity between emptiness and dependent arising, for the 
same principle of conceptual unity as applied between them, needs to be 
applied on the experiential level in order to resolve the tension between 
knowing phenomena as empty (unya, ston pa), therefore non-dualistically, and 
knowing them as dependently arisen (pratityasamutpanna-dharma), therefore 
dualistically. Here the issue of the unity of the two truths becomes central. 
Candrakirti and Tsong khapa both defend the validity of non-dual 
epistemic access to ultimate truth by applying the conceptual unity between 
emptiness and dependent arising on the empirical, experiential level. In 
commenting on Aryadeva's Catuhiataka [XV:10], Candrakirti argues that 
seeing phenomena as empty should not be equated with seeing "the son of an 
infertile woman"—which is to say that seeing phenomena as empty should 
not be construed as seeing 'nothingness' or the 'mere absence of empirical 
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realities'.' Given the compatible relationship between dependent arising and 
emptiness, "a correct seeing of phenomena as dependently arisen should lead 
to seeing them as illusory, and strictly should not [lead to seeing] the son of 
an infertile woman".' Candrakirti argues that "the Prasangika 
Madhyamikas....do not undermine dependently arisen phenomena, instead 
they posit things as illusory and the like because they fear that it might 
otherwise absurdly leads to undermining the existence of dependently arisen 
phenomena. They do not agree with such [nihilistic] advocates."." 
Candrakirti further explains: "when things are subjected to logical 
analysis.. .because the essence of things remains unestablished, the illusory-
like nature of each individual object should remain as the remainder".' 
Tsong khapa also reiterates that "there is no inconsistency whatsoever should 
the repudiation of the essence be followed by a cognition of objects as having 
mere illusory meaning. It is, in fact vital". 110 
However, the cognition of anything positive by the ultimately valid as 
opposed to empirically valid consciousness—even the cognition of an illusory 
object—is seen as problematic from that ultimate perspective. All the 
Prasangika Madhyamikas agree that the ultimately valid consciousness does 
not itself positively affirm any object. For it to do so would be tantamount to 
an affirmation of the existence of essence in the face of analysis, but this 
would be radically inconsistent with the central metaphysics of the 
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Prasafigika Madhyamika, namely, the thesis that nothing in the world has an 
essence that can defy or withstand critical analysis. "It would therefore be 
inconsistent for the reasoning consciousness—analysing whether or not 
essence has existence—itself to cognise even the existence of a mere illusory 
object". 111 
Even so, just as not seeing ultimate reality by the dual empirically valid 
consciousness does not imply the nonexistence of ultimate truth, so too, 
argues Tsong khapa "not seeing conventionalities in the non-dual state does 
not lead to the breakdown of the unity between characterised objects and 
their characteristics since their relationship is not posited from the vantage 
point of the reasoning consciousness realising ultimate reality". 112 From the 
perspective of the empirically valid cognition that verifies things such as 
colour and shape, ultimate truth is nonexistent. But it does not follow from 
this that ultimate truth is itself nonexistent. It simply demonstrates, according 
to Tsong khapa, that while ultimate truth and its verifying transcendental 
wisdom are directly related, dual empirical wisdom and non-dual ultimate 
truth are not directly linked, although they are related indirectlylq—they are, 
in fact, mutually supportive. Indeed, without mutual support between these 
cognitive resources, namely, empirical wisdom and transcendental wisdom, 
the attainment of a non-dual state is, in Tsong khapa's view, impossible. Since 
the two truths, and the two modes of understanding, are mutually 
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interlocking, so, in spite of the non-duality of experience during the 
meditative equipoise, this non-dual experience still operates within the 
epistemic domain and therefore has to have an empirical ground. 
Thus, although non-dual transcendental wisdom gives access to 
ultimate truth, Tsong khapa argues that this wisdom does not do so in 
isolation from dual empirical wisdom. Non-dual transcendental wisdom is 
itself an empirical phenomenon, and it is not, therefore, an empirically 
transcendent truth, as Go rampa would argue. Just as non-dual wisdom 
requires dual empirical wisdom as its grounding, so dual empirical wisdom 
requires non-dual wisdom to validate its epistemic authority. In this way, 
both cognitive resources mutually support each other thereby enabling the 
concerned agent to realise the truth pertaining to the five psychophysical 
aggregates from both dual and non-dual standpoints. Just as seeing 
phenomena as empty and seeing them as dependently arisen interlock in all 
circumstances, so, Tsong khapa argues, the non-dual knowledge of ultimate 
truth and the dual knowledge of conventional truth everywhere interlock 
epistemologically and ontologically. 
If Tsong khapa were to argue that the ultimate reasoning consciousness, 
in isolation from empirical consciousness, sees things as dependently arisen, 
then Tsong khapa would incongruously be forced to suppose that an arya or a 
buddha sees conceptual elaborations while in the non-dual state and so to 
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deny the possibility of the transcendence of conceptual elaborations even in 
that state; this would then force Tsong khapa to accept conceptual 
elaborations as withstanding or defying ultimate analysis, which would 
imply the existence of their essences. According to the standard Madhyamika 
position accepted by Tsong khapa, a failure to transcend conceptual 
elaborations by non-dual or transcendental wisdom would mean a failure to 
grasp the true meaning of ultimate reality. "If ultimate truth were seen in 
terms of discrete objects such as psychophysical aggregates perceived for 
instance as a domain of touch, of expression, and of mind from the vantage 
point of consciousnesses realising ultimate, rather than seeing them by way 
of not seeing", then, Tsong khapa argues, "ultimate truth would not be 
beyond conceptual elaborations"." 4 It therefore makes sense to argue that 
seeing ultimate truth free from any duality is coherent and non-contradictory 
from the vantage point of non-dual wisdom, as opposed to the vantage point 
of dual empirical wisdom. 
It is important to note, however, that to see ultimate truth, as non-dual 
wisdom sees it, without seeing phenomena in discrete terms, does not mean 
that non-dual wisdom is seeing 'nothing' or is devoid of cognitive content or 
activity. For Tsong khapa, non-dual wisdom 'sees' the empty or ultimate 
mode of one's identity and of one's five psychophysical aggregates, while 
dual wisdom sees the conventional, dependently arisen mode of one's 
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identity and of one's five aggregates. The only contrast between these two 
modes of seeing is that the former sees its object negatively while the latter 
sees its object positively. The dual and non-dual knowledge of an arya or 
buddha, in particular, stand on an equal footing so far as their validity is 
concerned—the wisdom that understands phenomena as empty also 
understands phenomena as dependently arisen and vice versa. Even a non-
dual experience of ultimate truth, on this view, does not undermine the status 
of conventional truth, since, after all, the realisation of ultimate truth is seen 
as equivalent to the realisation of conventional truth. It follows, therefore, 
that if non-dual knowledge is a correct knowledge of ultimate truth, then 
non-dual knowledge should necessarily be equivalent to the dual knowledge 
of phenomena as dependently arisen. 
So, as far as Tsong khapa is concerned, there is no contradiction in 
claiming that, from the empirical standpoint, on the one hand, non-dual 
wisdom constitutes the subjective pole of consciousnesses with ultimate truth 
as its objective counterpart; 115 from the ultimate vantage point, on the other 
hand, non-dual wisdom and ultimate truth, "are free from the duality of act 
(bya ba) and object acted upon (byed pa)". 116 In the non-dual state, even the 
cognitive interplay between subject and object appears, from the meditator's 
point of view, completely to cease. This is because, as Tsong khapa points 
out, "duality of act and object acted upon is posited strictly from the 
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perspective of empirical cognition".117 Although the dual appearances of 
subject and object completely dissolve from the perspective of non-dual 
wisdom, and thus the meditator does not experience the mutual interaction 
between distinct and separate elements—between the seer and the seen—the 
meditator nonetheless engages in an act of 'mere seeing'. As the Buddha 
explains to Bahiya: 
In reference to the seen, there will be only the seen. In reference to the 
heard, only the heard. In reference to the sensed, only the sensed. In 
reference to the cognised, only the cognised. That is how you should 
train yourself [Ud I. 10]... then Bahiya, there is no you in terms of that. 
When there is no you in terms of that, there is no you there. When there 
is no you there, you are neither here not yonder nor between the two. 
This, just this, is the end of stress [Ud I. 101. 118 
The experience of 'mere seeing' in a non-dual form is valid only when it is 
empirically grounded and when there is cognitive activity occurring between 
non-dual wisdom and non-dual ultimate truth. Tsong lchapa maintains, in 
fact, that the activity between subject and object is inevitable in any 
acquisition of valid knowledge. It is thus consistent to argue that non-dual 
wisdom involves a knowing subject and ultimate truth involves a known 
object."9 
In any case, for Tsong khapa, the main purpose in attaining non-dual 
knowledge is not to eschew the subject-object dichotomy, but rather to purify 
deluded cognitive states, to destroy ego-tainted emotions and to transcend 
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false constructions of duality. The Buddha, for instance, explains what 
transcendence means as follows: "owing to the fading of ignorance and the 
arising of clear knowing (thoughts)—'I am', 'I am this', 'I shall be', 'I shall not 
be', 'I shall be possessed of form', 'I shall be formless', 'I shall be percipient', 'I 
shall be non-percipient', 'I shall be neither percipient nor non-percipient'---do 
not occur to him" [Samanupassana Sutta SN XXII.47]. 12° Perhaps even more 
importantly, the Buddha makes a direct connection between the 
understanding of phenomena as dependently arisen and the abolition of 
dualities: 
When a disciple of the noble ones has seen well with right discernment 
this dependent co-arising and these dependently co-arisen phenomena 
as they are actually present, it is not possible that he would run after 
the past, thinking, 'Was I in the past? Was I not in the past? What was I 
in the past? How was I in the past? Having been what, what was I in 
the past?' or that he would run after the future, thinking, 'Shall I be in 
the future? Shall I not be in the future? What shall I be in the future? 
How shall I be in the future? Having been what, what shall I be in the 
future?' or that he would be inwardly perplexed about the immediate 
present, thinking, 'Am I? Am I not? What am I? How am I? Where has 
this being come from? Where is it bound?' Such a thing is not possible. 
Why is that? Because the disciple of the noble ones has seen well with 
right discernment this dependent co-arising and these dependently co-
arisen phenomena as they are actually present [Paccaya Sutta, SN 
Xl1.20] .121 
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We can thus summarise our discussion of non-duality as follows. Tsong 
khapa's account of non-dual knowledge rests heavily on the unity of the two 
truths and therefore of emptiness and dependent arising. He argues that the 
validity of non-dual knowledge depends on preserving the unity between the 
understanding of the two truths, and therefore, between the understanding of 
emptiness and of dependent arising. The attainment of non-dual knowledge, 
according to Tsong khapa's view, requires an eradication of ignorance and 
other reifying tendencies and does not require any metaphysical shift—more 
specifically, the attainment of non-dual knowledge does not require the 
establishment of a metaphysical unity between subject and object nor the 
eschewal of conventionalities. Go rampa, however, has a very different view 
on these matters from Tsong khapa. He claims that non-dual wisdom 
necessarily undermines the acceptance of conventionalities. Indeed, so long 
as recognition is given to dependently arisen phenomena, so he holds that the 
attainment of non-dual knowledge will be impossible—he claims that this 
will be so even for an arya or a buddha who instead of experiencing ultimate 
truth during the state of meditative equipoise, would experience only 
conceptual elaborations, that is, conventionalities. The fact that 
conventionalities are not seen during meditative equipoise, argues Go rampa, 
suggests that the status of dependently arisen phenomena is effectively 
undermined by the attainment of non-dual wisdom. Dependently arisen 
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phenomena are thus taken to be the objects to be eradicated by non-dual 
transcendental wisdom and nowhere enter into the cognitive domain of the 
non-dual wisdom of an drya or a buddha. From Go rampa's perspective, the 
non-dual knowledge of ultimate reality is valid only when that knowledge is 
totally divorced from the realisation of phenomena as dependently arisen; 
from Tsong khapa's perspective, the non-dual knowledge of ultimate reality 
is valid only when that knowledge is tied together with the realisation of 
phenomena as dependently arisen. 
Conclusion 
In the Condensed Perfection of Wisdom Stara (Prafriaparamitasatra, sher ph yin 
sdud pa), the Buddha says: 
Forms are not seen; and sensations are also not seen; unseen is 
recognition; and unseen is mind. Wherever consciousnesses (shes pa, 
plata), mind (sems, citta) and mental cognition (yid, manas) are unseen, 
that itself is explained as seeing dharma by Tathagatas. Sentient beings 
express through terms that [they have] seen space. Examine how they 
see space. Tathagata explains that similar is case with seeing dharma 
[ultimate reality]. No other example could illustrate the seeing of 
[ultimate reality].' 
Tsong khapa and Go rampa are in basic agreement in recognising ultimate 
truth as an object of knowledge and transcendental wisdom—non-conceptual 
wisdom—as the corresponding mode of knowing consciousness; they both 
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accept the negative approach—'seeing by way of not seeing'— as necessary in 
order to arrive at knowledge of ultimate reality; and they both view the 
achivement of ultimate truth by its cognising consciousness as possible only 
through the transcendence of conceptual categories. It is when we come to 
consider the issues of transcendental knowledge non-dual knowledge that 
the huge gulf that nevertheless exists between these two thinkers comes most 
clearly into view. In relation to non-dual knowledge for instance, Tsong 
khapa argues for an epistemic non-duality, while avoiding a metaphysical 
non-duality. In spite of the fact that he takes ultimate reality to be realised by 
way of not seeing any dualistic appearance from the vantage point of 
transcendental wisdom, Tsong khapa refuses to draw a metaphysical 
conclusion that would abolish the usual dichotomy of subjectivity and 
objectivity. On the contrary, by means of an epistemic model of non-duality, 
Go rampa arrives at a metaphysical non-duality as his conclusion. As 
ultimate reality is seen without seeing any dualistic appearance, so, Go rampa 
argues, from that point onwards, ultimate reality and non-conceptual 
wisdom lose the contradistinctions of subjectivity and objectivity; from that 
point onwards, he claims, the transcendental subject and the transcendental 
object form a single metaphysical unity that can be interchangeably described 
as transcendental wisdom, Buddha, or Tathiigata. 
Chapter IV 	 Realising ultimate truth 	 Page255 
Tsong khapa consistently maintains the idea of cognitive interaction 
between ultimate truth and ultimate wisdom throughout his transcendental 
and non-dual epistemology. Ultimate truth is consistently recognised as an 
object of knowledge, while transcendental wisdom is recognised as its 
knowing, hence 'subjective', counterpart. In Go rampa's case, having argued 
for the legitimacy of a metaphysical non-duality, and, therefore, for the 
existence of an absolute transcendental wisdom that has no cognitive 'sphere' 
associated with it, the claim that ultimate reality is an object of knowledge is 
taken as largely metaphorical. All of Go rampa's arguments pertaining to 
'seeing by way of not seeing' and to transcendental and non-dual knowledge 
are motivated by the view that the only true and reliable knowledge is 
completely non-dual. Hence Go rampa constantly insists on the eschewal of 
the cognitive resources of conventional knowledge and its counterpart, 
conventional truth. In order to ensure that there is no duality whatsoever, he 
even rejects the dichotomy between the transcendental sphere and 
transcendental wisdom—the transcendental sphere, namely, emptiness, is 
equated with nothingness, while transcendental wisdon is itself a becoming 
one with that nothingness. Thus Go rampa is able to formulate an account of 
non-dual wisdom as being without content and without activity—as 
involving no object of knowledge distinct from the cognising consciousness. 
Transcendental wisdom itself becomes both subject and object such that, 
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strictly speaking, there is nothing to be known and only the non-dual knower 
remains. 
Both Tsong khapa and Go rampa describe non-dual knowledge as being 
like a process of mixing water. They argue that the fusion between 
subjectivity and objectivity, from the meditator's point of view, reaches its 
climax in their non-dual state in a way that is like mixing clean water from 
two different jars by pouring it all into one jar. Tsong khapa for example 
argues: "from the vantage point of the wisdom that directly realises ultimate 
reality, there is not even the slightest duality between object and the object-
possessing consciousness. Like mixing water with water, [yogi] dwells in the 
meditative equipoise".' Tsong lchapa insists, however, that this metaphor 
should not be taken too far or too literally. It refers only to the cognitive 
process that occurs in total dissolution, and to the experience associated with 
that process, and must not be taken to represent the achivement of a 
metaphysical unity. Go rampa, on the other hand, insists on taking this 
analogy in its most literal sense: just as the clean water from the two separate 
jars, when poured together, merge without any trace of their prior separation, 
so, with the achivement of transcendental wisdom and the realisation of 
ultimate reality, the elements that appeared previously to be separate are 
merged in a single, complete, metaphysical unity. As Go rampa sees it, only 
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So far as the unique cognitive abilities of a fully enlightened being are 
concerned, Tsong khapa and Go rampa are committed to the standard 
Madhyamika position. They both agree that a buddha is an all-knowing 
cognitive agent and that enlightenment represents an unparalleled cognitive 
achievement. Yet, although both agree also that an enlightened being is able 
to know all objects of knowledge in the span of a single temporal instant, they 
disagree on a number of crucial issues concerning the nature of 
enlightenment, including the question of exactly how, and in what ways, an 
enlightened wisdom knows all objects of knowledge. 
In this final chapter, we compare Tsong khapa and Go rampa's 
positions regarding the nature of enlightenment, the characteristics of 
enlightened knowledge, and how such knowledge is different from and 
superior to the knowledge of the other aryas. In the course of this comparison, 
we will see that, for Tsong lchapa, the unparalleled cognitive potential of 
enlightenment lies in its ability to access the two truths simultaneously within 
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a single event of wisdom, whereas, for Go rampa, it lies in its capacity to 
access just one truth—metaphysically transcendent ultimate truth—within a 
single event of wisdom. Consequently, in the analysis that follows, the 
discussion of Tsong khapa's account will focus on how an arya knows the two 
truths alternately and what prevents an arya from knowing the two truths 
simultaneously. This will be followed by an examination of how, in Tsong 
khapa's view, an enlightened wisdom knows the two truths instantly yet 
simultaneously. The main focus of the discussion of Go rampa, on the other 
hand, will be on how the subtle misconception of dualistic appearance 
mentally conditions an arya to perceive conventional truths during the post- 
meditative state, thereby preventing an arya from grasping the universal 
character of ultimate reality. This will be followed by an examination of how, 
in Go rampa's view, an enlightened being knows metaphysically 
transcendent ultimate truth without any empirical grounding. The chapter 
will end with a brief critical analysis of Go rampa's account of enlightenment. 
To begin with, however, we will undertake an analysis of the concept of 
the 'universality of ultimate truth' and its implications. The 'universality of 
ultimate truth' is directly related to the way in which an enlightened wisdom 
knows reality as it pertains to all objects of knowledge. Both Tsong khapa and 
Go rampa argue that it is precisely because the universality of ultimate truth 
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is exhaustively embraced by an enlightened wisdom, that such wisdom can 
be said to know the ultimate truth of all objects of knowledge. 
1. The universality of ultimate truth 
We will first consider Candralcirti's comments on the universality of ultimate 
truth, then turn to the two Tibetans. In explaining the unique mode of 
realising reality by an enlightened being, Candrakirti writes in the 
Madhyamakavatara [XI:11], that: 
Despite the divisions created by vessels, space is itself without any 
divisions. Similarly, any division created by things is not present in 
[ultimate] reality. Hence, by fully accomplishing the realisation of the 
uniformity [of all phenomena], You! The Noble Knower (mkhyen bzang 
khyed kyis), comprehend [all] objects of knowledge in a single instant. 1 
Commenting on this passage, Tsong khapa and Go rampa make use of very 
similar terminology. Despite the fact that space is variously divided through 
vessels and other containers, the space inside those vessels is characterised as 
a 'mere absence of all obstructing entity'. The space inside the vessels thus 
remains uniformly undivided. Similarly, although, there are manifold 
divisions of .phenomena produced by their respective causes and conditions, 
the ultimate truth pertaining to them shares the same uniform nature. The 
ultimate truth of each conditioned phenomenon possesses the characteristic 
of non-arising, and this characteristic of non-arising is uniformly (ro mnyam 
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pa, samata) shared by all other phenomena. In this sense, ultimate reality is 
shared by all phenomena without any division, just as the space inside 
various vessels and containers is nevertheless one and the same space. 
Thus far Tsong khapa and Go rampa agree,' but when matters are 
considered more closely, the two accounts reveal striking differences. 
Ontologically, as we shall see later, Tsong khapa maintains his pluralistic 
standpoint in contrast to the monism of Go rampa. In spite of his 
commitment to the universality of ultimate truth, according to which ultimate 
truths share similar natures or characteristics (ro gcig, eka-rasa), Tsong khapa 
argues that each empirical truth has its own ultimate truth. On the other 
hand, precisely because of his commitment to the universality of ultimate 
truth, Go rampa argues that only one ultimate truth is associated with the 
diversity of empirical phenomena. Epistemologically, Tsong khapa argues 
that an enlightened wisdom always accesses the universality of ultimate truth 
in virtue of the fact that an enlightened being has knowledge of both the 
empirical and ultimate truths; Go rampa, on other hand, argues that an 
enlightened wisdom always accesses the universality of ultimate truth in 
virtue of the fact that the enlightened person has knowledge of ultimate truth 
alone. 
These claims need to be examined in more detail—we will turn first to 
consider matters from the ontological standpoint. Although all empirically 
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given truths such as the aggregate of form, feelings etc., are contingently 
produced and have diverse conventional characters, all of them, according to 
Tsong khapa, are ultimately empty of the inherent arising. They share the 
universal characteristic (ro gcig, eka-rasa), literally, the same 'taste'. The 
Buddha, for example, makes this statement: "just as the great ocean has but 
one taste, the taste of salt, even so does this dharma and discipline have but 
one taste, the taste of release" [AN VIII.19]. 3 The Samadhirajasatra (ting nge 
'dzin rgyal po'i mdo) tells us: "By knowing one all are known. And by seeing 
one all are seen. Despite many things are said about [ultimate truth] in the 
conventional terms, no haughtiness should arise from it",' and furthermore, 
"Just as you have recognised (Wu shes) personality, even so you should apply 
the same insight with respect to all [phenomena]. All phenomena are of the 
[same] nature like a clear space".5 In the Gaganagamjasamadhi (Nam mkha'i 
mdzod kyi ting nge 'dzin), it is stated that: "Whoever by meditating on one 
phenomenon knows all phenomena as apprehensible like illusions and 
mirages, and knows them as hollow, false and ephemeral will before long 
reach the summum bonum (snying po) of enlightenment".6 And Aryadeva also 
tells us that "whosoever sees one is said to see all. That which is emptiness of 
one is the emptiness of all" [VIII:191]. 7 Referring to this last passage from 
Aryadeva, Candrakirti has this to say: 
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The emptiness of the essence of form is itself the emptinesses of the 
essences of aggregates such as feeling. Similarly, the emptiness of the 
essence of eye-source is itself the emptinesses of the essences of all 
twelve sources. Likewise, the emptiness of the essence of eye-
constituent is itself the emptinesses of the essences of all eighteen 
constituents. Equally so are [the emptinesses of the essences of] the 
infinite categories of things due to the distinct divisions in things, 
spaces, times and references. For whatever is the emptiness of the 
essence of one thing, is itself the emptinesses of the essences of all 
things. In spite of the fact that jars and bowls for example are distinct, 
space is not distinct. While things such as form are distinct, insofar as 
they all lack of essential arising of the form etc., they are not distinct. By 
understanding the lack the essential arising of merely one 
phenomenon, one understands the lack of the essential arising of all 
phenomena.' 
Since all phenomena are empty of any substance or essence, they are all 
dependently arisen and relational entities. Tsong khapa agrees.' Yet to 
endorse the claim that the ultimate nature of all phenomena is fundamentally 
the same does not, in Tsong khapa's view, make one a monist. While 
accepting this account of the ultimate nature of things, Tsong khapa remains 
committed to a pluralistic view. "A pluralistic view of the world", as 
Kalupahana puts it, "is not incompatible with dependent arising 
(pratityasamputpada). Pluralism in the context of dependent arising does not 
imply the existence of self-contradictory truths. It need not necessarily lead to 
a notion of an Absolute that transcends such self-contradictory truths". 1° As 
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far as Tsong khapa is concerned, the ultimate reality of, for instance, the table 
in front of my eyes, cannot be treated as simply identical with the ultimate 
reality pertaining to the chair that I am sitting on. The empty table cannot be 
the taken as identical with the empty chair since the emptiness of the table is 
constitutive, not only of the empty table, but of the empty conceptual-
linguistic conventions imposed upon it as well. Those conventions belong 
exclusively to the ultimate truth of the table and are not present in the chair. 
According to Tsong khapa, however, conceding this much does not prevent 
one from arguing for the universality of ultimate truth. Just as different 
objects occupy different spaces, and yet the space those objects occupy has 
the same 'non-obstructive' characteristic, so the ultimate realities of both table 
and chair are different, notwithstanding the fact that two ultimate realities 
have identical natures—they share 'the same taste'. Both of these emptinesses 
imply insubstantiality and essenceless in the negative sense, as well as 
dependently arisen and relational nature in the affirmative sense. 
It can therefore be said that, according to Tsong khapa, an identical 
nature is universally shared by the ultimate realities of every empirical 
phenomenon. When the Buddha says that "the truth is one, there is no 
second" [Cala-viyiiha Sutta, Sn I1.12]," Tsong khapa takes the Buddha to refer 
to the dependently arisen as the criterion of truth rather than to an absolute 
truth that transcends all forms of duality and plurality. Tsong khapa remarks 
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that "whatever you (the Buddha) have spoken has reference to dependent 
arising. For this leads to nirvana. None of your action fails to lead to peace" 
[38]. 12 Tsong khapa further argues that the Buddha has excelled everyone in 
terms of his knowledge and teachings of dependent arising: "Amongst 
teachers is the one who teaches dependent arising, and amongst knowledge 
is the wisdom of dependent arising reign supreme. These two are like the 
powerful monarchs ruling the world systems" [37] •' 
Given the fact that each dependently arisen phenomenon occupies a 
different space and time, the concept of the universality of ultimate reality 
does not threaten Tsong khapa's commitment to a pluralistic account. In quite 
contrary fashion, however, Go rampa mobilises the universality of ultimate 
reality to reinforce his monism. "Since its nature is one and the same like 
space", Go rampa argues, "it does not have different divisions". 14 As far as Go 
rampa is concerned, there is a clear incompatibility between a pluralistic 
account of ultimate reality and the commitment to its having a single uniform 
nature. On the other hand, commitment to a monistic ontology and to the 
universality of ultimate truth are seen to be compatible, and, indeed, as 
mutually reinforcing. 
The ultimate reality of the table is, in Go rampa's view, equivalent in 
every respect to the ultimate reality of all other phenomena. There is no 
difference whatsoever between the ultimate reality of the table and the 
Chapter V 
	
Enlightenment 	 Page 266 
ultimate reality of the chair—or of anything else for that matter. Just as space 
is the same for all the different objects that occupy it (it is, one might say, the 
objects that differ, and not the space), so it is one and the same ultimate 
reality that universally underlies all empirical phenomena. The universality 
of ultimate truth could not, as Go rampa sees it, be maintained if the same 
ultimate reality were not shared by all empirical phenomena. If there were an 
ultimate truth that pertained to each phenomenon, then so would the 
ultimate truths of those phenomena, like the phenomena themselves, be 
confined within the bounds of those phenomena. In that case, there would be 
no universal ultimate truth, no universally applicable characteristics. Any 
pluralistic account of ultimate reality is thus seen, by Go rampa, as 
contradictory to the notion of the universality of ultimate reality. 
Against the backdrop of these divergent ontological accounts, we shall 
now turn to the epistemological aspect of the claim concerning the 
universality of ultimate truth. Since ontology and epistemology are typically 
interdependent, so the two distinct ontological positions of Tsong khapa and 
Go rampa regarding the universality of ultimate truth provide the basis for 
the emergence of two distinct epistemological positions. For Tsong khapa, the 
unity between empirical and ultimate knowledge is the secret of the most 
enlightened wisdom. Given the inseparable ontological unity between the 
two truths, the knowledge of one of the two truths necessarily entails the 
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knowledge of the other. A fully enlightened being thus "perfectly knows the 
universality of [ultimate truths] within the span of a single instance of 
wisdom. Hence, the Noble-knower [a buddha] is said to acquire the wisdom 
that knows all objects of knowledge within a single instant". 15 
Go rampa agrees with Tsong khapa that a buddha is all-knowing and 
that a buddha knows the universality of ultimate truth within a single instant. 
However, in Go rampa's view, an enlightened wisdom accessing the 
universality of ultimate truth operates entirely independently of any 
empirical truths. For this reason, Go rampa holds that it is necessary that an 
enlightened wisdom sever all epistemic connections with empirical 
knowledge. "When the universality of ultimate truth of all phenomena is 
understood as Dharmadhatu", Go rampa says, "a single event of wisdom 
knows this within a single moment. This is followed by the disappearance of 
distinctions between ultimate reality (ji lta ba), empirical reality (ji snyed pa), 
and apprehending wisdom (yul can yeshes)" . 1' Consequently these latter three 
form a non-dual, absolute and independent transcendental wisdom wherein 
all dualities fuse. At this point the knowing wisdom and the object known 
literally become one. 
For an arya, who is yet to be fully enlightened, the wisdom• that 
embraces the universality of ultimate truth arises only during the meditative 
equipoise and not during the post-meditative equipoise. In fact, for a fully 
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enlightened being, there is no such cognitive event as the post-meditative 
equipoise—an enlightened being, as Go rampa holds it, remains eternally 
absorbed with the universality of ultimate truth. This, as he sees it, is the 
highest cognitive virtue of an enlightened being.' It is crucial to note that for 
Go rampa, knowing the universality of ultimate truth is not a matter of 
engaging with ultimate truth. With the attainment of full enlightenment, the 
duality between the subject and the object totally disappears. The interaction 
between what is to be known and the knower comes to an end. The 
knower—transcendental wisdom—alone survives. This is, as Go rampa holds 
it, the way an enlightened being directly and personally knows (so so rang rig 
pa) the universality of ultimate reality without any duality. To make this 
point more explicit, knowing the universality of ultimate truth means to 
become one with the unconditioned and transcendental ultimate truth. The 
knower becomes timeless, neither arising nor ceasing.' 
If it were true that an enlightened being knows all objects of knowledge 
within the span of a single instant, as both Tsong khapa and Go rampa claim, 
the question then arises: how is this possible? In order to answer this 
question, we will first explore why it is that other sentient beings (particularly 
the three types of aryas, namely, arya-aravakas, arya-pratyekabuddhas and arya-
bodhisattvas) lack the understanding of all objects of knowledge within a 
single instant and then return to the analysis of an enlightened being's 
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superior ways of knowing. Like Tsong khapa, Go rampa 19 acknowledges the 
significance of exploring the ways in which an arya (yet to be enlightened) 
knows the two truths. This exploration, according to both of them, facilitates 
the understanding of an enlightened being's exceptional ways of knowing. A 
precise evaluation of the cognitive framework within which the knowledge of 
sentient beings operates is seen as pedagogically useful for the analysis of the 
cognitive operation of an enlightened being. Understanding the limits and 
scope of the cognitive potential of sentient beings is thus instrumental in 
gauging the unparalleled cognitive potential of a buddha—of a fully 
enlightened being. 
2. Arya's modes of knowing the two truths 
Consistent with the standard Madhyamika position, both Tsong khapa and 
Go rampa maintain that, with the exception of buddhas (fully enlightened 
beings) and including arya-gravakas, arya-pratyekabuddhas and arya-bodhisattvas 
of the tenth bhami and below, all sentient beings are under the influence of 
different degrees of misconception regarding the two truths. Ordinary beings 
(so skye, prthagjana) are predominantly influenced by the underlying reifying 
ignorance and afflictive defilements. Ordinary beings are actively reifying 
cognitive agents who superimpose absolute characteristics such as essences, 
substantiality or permanence, on to the nature of things, processes or. events. 
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However, arya-bodhisattvas (from the eight bhami and below) are free from 
the active reifying tendencies and afflictive defilements. As they have directly 
experienced ultimate truth, so they have eradicated all negative emotions, 
including deluded ignorance, and yet they are still under the influence of 
latent defilements. Due to the continued and sustained orientation towards 
ultimate truth that is directly and personally realised in meditative equipoise, 
Arya-gravakas, arya-pratyekabuddhas and the arya-bodhisattvas of the eighth to 
the tenth bha mi are, however, totally free of even the subtlest latent reifying 
tendencies.' Yet notwithstanding their very high spiritual qualifications, 
these three types of aryas are still under the influence of what is called 'non-
deluded ignorance'—the conditioned state of mind to which there remains a 
predisposition in virtue of the previously existent latent conception of essence 
(bden 'dzin gyi bags chags). This means that although arya-gravakas, arya-
pratyekabuddhas and the arya-bodhisattvas of the eighth to the tenth bhismi no 
longer have even the latent reifying psychological tendencies, they are yet to 
be fully enlightened, and, on the cognitive level, they still have very subtle 
limitations. They remain predisposed to the assumption of dualities (rather 
than the reification of dualities) that is deeply habituated by the previously 
existent latent reifying tendencies. Often the subtle misconceptions possessed 
by the three types of aryas are described as 'predisposed misconceptions of 
dualistic appearance' (gnyis snang 'phrul ba'i bag chags).21 
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To this point both Tsong khapa and Go rampa are in agreement. But 
what constitutes the 'misconception of dualistic appearance' (gnyis snang 
'phrul ba)? And how should it be defined? To begin with, both the Tibetan 
Madhyamikas consider the misconception of dualistic appearance to consist 
in a very subtle tension between the mode of phenomenal existence and how 
that existence is understood—it involves a minimal conflict between 
ontological status and the corresponding epistemic state. However, on closer 
observation, it becomes evident that Tsong khapa and Go rampa offer 
strikingly different accounts of what is at issue here: Tsong khapa's ontology 
of ultimate truth has to accommodate the status of conventional truth, 
consequently his non-dual epistemology must necessarily accommodate the 
understanding of conventional truth; Go rampa's ontology of ultimate truth 
necessarily excludes the status of conventional truth, and consequently his 
non-dual epistemology must necessarily exclude the understanding of 
conventional truth. 
'The dualistic appearance', as Tsong khapa understands it, is a subtle 
misconception that pertains to the nature of both truths. It is described as 
dualistic appearance because of the persisting subtle conflict between the 
ontological status of ultimate truth and its concurrent epistemic status due to 
the presence of the subtle epistemic error. The solution to a dualistic 
appearance lies, therefore, in a purging of the epistemic error. The presence of 
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a mere dichotomy between the subject and the object, in Tsong khapa's view, 
is not part of the problem. In fact, the mere dichotomy between subject and 
the object is, as Tsong khapa understands it, inevitable for even the most 
evolved wisdom. No knowledge whatsoever is possible without the 
interaction between cognition and cognitive field. In the Dvaytanupassana 
Sutta, the Buddha also points out that dualities in themselves are not 
problems, so long as they are understood properly: 
Monks, if there are any who ask, 'Your listening to teachings that are 
skilful, noble, leading onward, going to self-awakening is a prerequisite 
for what?' they should be told, 'For the sake of knowing qualities of 
dualities as they actually are'. 'What duality are you talking about?' 
'This is dukkha. This is the origination of dukkha': this is one 
contemplation. 'This is the cessation of dukkha. This is the path of 
practice leading to the cessation of dukkha': this is the second 
contemplation. For a monk rightly contemplating this duality in this 
way—heedful, ardent and resolute—one of the two fruits can be 
expected: either gnosis right here and now, or—if there be any remnant 
of clinging-sustenance—non-return... 
Now, if there are any who ask 'Would there be the right 
contemplation of dualities in yet another way?' they should be told, 
'There would'. 'How would that be?' Whatever dukkha comes into 
play is all from ignorance as a requisite condition': this is one 
contemplation. 'From the remainderless fading and cessation of that 
very ignorance, there is no coming into play of duldcha': this is a second 
contemplation. For a monk rightly contemplating this duality in this 
way—heedful, ardent and resolute—one of the two fruits can be 
expected: either gnosis right here and now, or—if there be any remnant 
of clinging-sustenance—non-return [Dvayatanupassana Sutta, Sn III.12].n 
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• Like Tsong khapa, Go rampa's concept of dualistic appearance also refers to a 
conflict between the ontological status of ultimate truth and the concurrent 
epistemic state. Nevertheless, unlike Tsong khapa, Go rampa views the 
conflict as one between the ultimate subject and the ultimate object. As far as 
he is concerned, the subject-object dichotomy is at the heart of the problem 
and the only solution is to eschew the objective element in order to embrace a 
metaphysical non-duality—so long as the interaction between the 
apprehending consciousness and apprehended object is maintained, so also, 
in Go rampa's view, is the misconception of the subtle dualistic appearance 
maintained. 
Having explained what 'dualistic appearance' means, the next question 
to be addressed is: what harm does this duality actually cause?—What is 
wrong with maintaining this subtle dualistic appearance? Both Tsong khapa 
and Go rampa argue that it is the presence of the misconception of dualistic 
appearance that prevents the three types of aryas—arya-iravakas, arya-
pratyekabuddhas and the arya-bodhisattvas—from accomplishing the 
simultaneous realisation of the universality of ultimate reality; it is the 
presence of the misconception of dualistic appearance that means that they 
can only know conventional truths and ultimate truth interchangeably. The 
subtle misconception of dualistic appearance is, therefore, seen as an 
obstruction that retards the cognitive potential of those three types of aryas. 
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Go rampa maintains that the presence of this conception of dualistic 
appearance prevents the three types of dry. as from simultaneously accessing 
the non-dual universality of ultimate reality within a single temporal instant. 
The presence of this subtle dualism allows them to access ultimate reality 
only interchangeably with the empirical. He argues that the three types of 
aryas perceive empirical truths in their post meditative equipoise entirely 
because of the misconception of dualistic appearance. "Because of the fact 
that they have not yet eradicated the predisposition of dualistic appearance", 
Go rampa argues, "their subsequently attained wisdom (rjes thob yeshes, prstha 
labdha jfiana) perceives the plurality of characterised objects (chos can, dharmin) 
associated with arising and cessation". 23 As long as the perception of 
characterised objects with the characteristics of arising and cessation persists, 
it is not possible for the three types of aryas to engage with the universality of 
ultimate reality. The plurality of empirical realities that these aryas experience 
during the post-meditative equipoise, thus prevents them, according to Go 
rampa, from accessing ultimate reality; the wisdom of the meditative 
equipoise, on the other hand, immediately presents them with that 
reality—"During the meditative equipoise, they realise ultimate reality; 
hence, neither arising nor cessation is perceived".' The alternation between 
knowledge of conventionalities and ultimate reality, as Go rampa sees it, "is 
an indication that these aryas have yet to accomplish the perfection of 
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knowing the universality of all phenomena in terms of their dharmadhatu (chos 
dbyings)".25 That they have yet to do so is precisely because of the presence of 
the subtle misconception of dualistic appearance. 
On this, as on so many other matters, Tsong khapa's view differs 
markedly from that held by Go rampa. Indeed, it is very useful here to recall 
Tsong khapa's emphatic distinction between the role of ultimately valid 
cognition—transcendental wisdom, non-conceptual wisdom—and 
empirically valid cognition. Certainly it is true, according to Tsong khapa, 
that when the three types of aryas directly and personally know ultimate 
truth by means of ultimately valid cognition, they do not concurrently, or 
simultaneously, know conventional truth. Likewise, when these aryas directly 
and personally know conventional truth, they do not concurrently, or 
simultaneously know ultimate truth. The two kinds of knowledge operate 
alternately. Hence Tsong khapa argues that "so long as Buddhahood is not 
attained, it is not possible for a single cognition simultaneously to perceive 
characterised phenomena each individually while at the same directly 
cognising ultimate reality within a single temporal instant"?' Instead, "these 
two kinds of knowledge come about interchangeably"?' This does not mean, 
however, that, in the direct knowledge of ultimate truth, the ultimately valid 
cognition of the three aryas operates independently of its 
counterpart—empirically valid cognition. Similarly, it is not meant to suggest 
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that, in the direct realisation of conventional truth, these aryas' empirically 
valid cognition operates independently of its counterpart—ultimate valid 
cognition. Realising the two truths, either alternately or simultaneously, 
necessarily requires mutual support between the two valid cognitions. As far 
as Tsong khapa is concerned, this mutual collaboration between the two 
cognitive resources is one of the essential conditions for any intelligible and 
coherent knowledge. Without such coordination between the two cognitive 
resources, neither the realisation of ultimate truth, nor the realisation of 
conventional truth is possible. For Tsong khapa, to say that the two cognitive 
resources mutually support one another is thus not to suggest that a 
concerned cognitive agent has simultaneous knowledge of both truths. Even 
the alternate knowledge of the two truths by these aryas requires mutual 
support between the two cognitive resources. Indeed, the cognitive capacity 
to have either successive or simultaneous knowledge of the two truths 
depends on the same epistemic conditions. 
In Tsong khapa's view, there are two different approaches to the 
question as to how, and in what ways, the subtle misconception of duality 
imposes limits on the knowledge of the three types of aryas. It can be 
approached either from the standpoint of meditative equipoise ( the ultimate 
standpoint) or from the post-meditative equipoise (the empirical standpoint). 
From the former standpoint, the issue is how the subtle misconception of 
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duality imposes limits on the scope of these dryas' knowledge of all 
phenomena as empty (iimya, stong pa). From the latter standpoint, the issue is 
how the subtle misconception of duality imposes limits on the scope of these 
dryas' knowledge of all phenomena as dependently arisen 
(pratityasamutpanna, rten cing 'brel bar 'byung ba'i chos). In the case of the 
approach from the standpoint of meditative equipoise, Tsong khapa 
maintains that, while the three types of dryas dwell in the meditative state, 
they have direct knowledge of ultimate truth, and consequently they know 
that all phenomena are empty. Because of the limits imposed by the subtle 
misconception of duality, however, they still do not have direct knowledge of 
the emptiness of empty phenomena (idnya-idnyata, stong pa stong pa nyid) 
itself. To know empty phenomena themselves as empty, these dryas have 
directly to know all empty phenomena as equivalent to dependently arisen 
phenomena from the ultimate standpoint. This insight requires the fullest 
possible understanding of how the non-conceptual knowledge of phenomena 
as empty is equivalent to the conceptual knowledge of phenomena as 
dependently arisen. This in turn requires the cognitive capacity to form the 
empirical world-view of Madhyamaka from the ultimate vantage point. And 
this depends on the simultaneous knowledge of the two truths. However, as 
long as the scope of dryas' knowledge is deficient in virtue of the subtle 
misconception of duality due to previously existent mental predispositions, 
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the simultaneous knowledge of the two truths is not achievable. Since these 
aryas still have tendencies towards the dichotomisation of the two truths, so 
they also retain tendencies towards the dichotomisation of empty and 
dependently arisen phenomena. 
In the case of the approach from the post-meditative standpoint, Tsong 
khapa maintains that when the three types of aryas are engaging in practical 
activities in the post-meditative state, they directly know conventional truth, 
hence aryas know that all phenomena are dependently arisen. However 
because of the limits imposed by the subtle misconception of duality, they 
still do not know dependently arisen phenomena themselves as dependently 
arisen. The latter knowledge requires the direct understanding of how 
dependently arisen phenomena are empty from the conventional standpoint 
without relying on inference. This in turn requires the fullest possible 
understanding of how the conceptual knowledge of phenomena as 
dependently arisen is equivalent to the non-conceptual knowledge of all 
phenomena as empty. In other words, aryas have to know the compatibility 
between the ultimate and the conventional views of Madhyamika. Again this 
understanding depends on the simultaneous knowledge of the two truths as 
in the first approach. But because aryas of the three kinds are not yet free from 
the tendency to dichotomise the two truths, therefore, to dichotomise empty 
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and dependently arisen phenomena, simultaneous knowledge is not possible 
for them. 
Based on the arguments relating to the two different approaches, Tsong 
khapa maintains that aryas of the three kinds have only alternate knowledge 
of the two truths. Either they directly know conventional truth in the 
meditative equipoise, or they directly know ultimate truth in the post-
meditative equipoise. One thing that is certain, however, is that these three 
types of aryas could not have concurrent knowledge of both the truths, and 
therefore could not have concurrent knowledge of empty and dependently 
arisen phenomena. Since it is clear that the subtle misconception of duality is 
taken to have a significant negative impact on the scope of knowledge of the 
three types of aryas, it is no wonder that Tsong khapa sees the eradication of 
the subtle misconception of duality as soteriologically indispensable in order 
to reach Buddhahood. As a consequence, it is claimed that only buddhas, 
namely, perfectly enlightened beings, are capable of having a direct 
knowledge of both the truths simultaneously, and hence are capable of 
knowing empty and dependently arisen phenomena concurrently. 
With this, we complete our analysis of Go rampa and Tsong khapa's 
positions relating to the scope of the knowledge of arya-gravakas and arya-
pratekyabuddha and arya-bodhissattvas of the tenth bhamis. In short, they both 
agree that all aryas, except arya-buddhas, are incapable of knowing the 
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universality of ultimate truth within a single cognitive event. They also agree, 
therefore, that, due to the influence of the subtle misconception of duality, 
aryas of the three kinds do not have an exhaustive knowledge of all knowable 
objects. The two Tibetans nevertheless disagree inasmuch as Go rampa insists 
that it is entirely due to the subtle misconception of duality that aryas 
mistakenly perceive empirical truths in the post-meditative state, while Tsong 
khapa insists that it is due to such misconception that the three types of aryas 
are prevented from simultaneous knowledge of the two truths. 
3. A buddha's exceptional mode of knowing the two truths 
Having discussed the cognitive scope of aryas and the limits imposed by the 
subtle misconception of duality, our focus in the next two sections will be on 
the exceptional cognitive scope of the fully enlightened being who is free 
from even this subtle misconception. Given that Tsong khapa and Go rampa's 
treatments of this exceptional knowledge of a buddha are totally distinct, we 
shall discuss them separately to preserve their distinctive characteristics. 
First, we shall turn to Go rampa's treatment of enlightened knowledge and 
then, second, to Tsong khapa's. 
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3.1. Knowing the two truths from the two conflicting 
perspectives 
For Go rampa, the subtle misconception of dualistic appearance is none other 
than the conception of the duality of subject and object. This duality is the 
sublest object of negation. It is also called the 'subtlest obstruction of 
knowledge' (shes bya'i sgrib pa phra mo).' The fact that an arya experiences 
empirical truths, the objects of knowledge, during the post-meditative state 
and cannot embrace the universality of ultimate truth in all circumstances is, 
argues Go rampa, entirely due to this misconceived dichotomy. 
Enlightenment therefore, culminates with the total eradication of the subject-
object dichotomy. The attainment of enlightenment means the attainment of 
the absolute non-dual wisdom. This wisdom, as Go rampa argues, is 
metaphysically transcendent. It is free from any empirical basis. 
In Go rampa's epistemology, enlightened wisdom is seen as involving 
two distinct ways of knowing—knowing things from an 'enlightened 
perspective' and knowing things from the 'other's perspective'. The chief 
feature of the enlightened knowledge is its capacity to cognise the 
universality of ultimate truth. The most crucial condition necessary to attain 
this wisdom is the eradication of the subject-object dichotomy. The 
eradication of this dichotomy, in Go rampa's view, is the only possible way to 
achieve the eschewal of empirical truth and of the empirically valid 
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consciousness that verifies it. Hence Go rampa argues that: "conventional 
truths enunciated in those contexts are non existent [from an enlightened 
consciousness]. Since, there is no erroneous apprehending subject, its 
corresponding object—[conventional truth]—does not exist".' The 
"erroneous apprehending subject" in this context refers to all empirically 
valid consciousnesses. The empirically valid consciousness verifying 
empirical truths is, in Go rampa's view, representative of the ignorant 
cognitive activities that involve the subject-object dichotomy. Since an 
enlightened person is free from ignorance, so the empirically valid 
consciousness is also absent. Thus, empirical truths projected by ignorance 
and verified by the empirically valid consciousness are not verified by an 
enlightened wisdom: 
Despite the fact that [a buddha] does not perceive appearance of the 
conventional categories—arising, cessation etc., explained to the 
disciples, [a buddha] does perceive the appearance of the non-
differentiated being (dbyings) of the ultimate reality... Even then, there 
is no appearance which leads to duality in perception, for even the 
slightest fallacious inclinations [of committing to duality] has already 
been eschewed.' 
In short, the eight entities including arising, cessation etc., 
discussed in the preamble of the Malamadhyamalcarilal are all conceptual 
elaborations; even so, are twenty-seven analysable factors—from the 
conditions up to views—examined throughout the twenty-seven 
chapters, and the entire conventional system including all empirical 
entities. In the buddha-realm, they are realised by an enlightened being 
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within a span of a single instant of the enlightened wisdom. Although, 
those conceptual elaborations remain unseen, there is no contradiction 
in saying that they are perceived as Dharmadhatu, inalienably fused 
with the universality of ultimate truth.' 
Jayananda, Red mda' ba,m alcya mChog ldan, sTag tsang,' Kun mkhyen 
Pedkar, Mi skyod rDo rje,37 Mi pham,' dGe 'dun Chos 'phel'—all defend Go 
rampa's view. They all argue that enlightenment is transcendent of empirical 
experiences. For example, Kun mkhyen Pedkar writes: 
To the extent the remaining obstructions (sgrib pa lhag ma) exist, to that 
extent multifaceted appearances are perceived as illusory etc., during 
the post meditative state. However, from the moment all latencies [of 
previously existent defilements] are exhaustively [eliminated], 
conventional phenomena (kun rdzob kyi chos) are eternally not 
perceived. Instead one eternally dwells on essence (rang bzhin) of the 
meditative equipoise. 4° 
Go rampa's account of enlightened wisdom, characterised as metaphysically 
absolute, non-dual and transcendent, clearly indicates his unrelenting effort 
to impose the Alayavijiiiina, the 'foundation consciousness'' of the Yogacara 
Idealism (or Vijriavada, the Mind Only school), on the Prasafigika 
Madhyamaka system. "The Prasangika Madhyamika", claims Go rampa 
"must accept the empirical existence of the Alayavijriana since it is revealed in 
the Bhagvan's discourses. Acarya [Candrakirti] also says that it is an 
empirical truth' and a vehicle to understand ultimate truth"." A/ayavijriana is 
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a "sheer luminous consciousness. Though it is not totally distinct from the 
aggregates of six [consciousnesses], it" according to Go rampa, "endures 
uninterruptedly through to the level of the Buddhhood right from the 
[ordinary state of] sentient being"." The enlightened wisdom is recovered, 
then, from the foundational consciousness that is already existent in each and 
everyone—including even ordinary beings. It is this wisdom that alone exists 
after the total elimination of the empirical system. It exists unconditionally 
and non-relationally: "The process of arising and cessation is not perceived, 
hence it is neither conditioned nor impermanent phenomena".' 
Elsewhere Go rampa argues that "because every conditioned 
phenomenon is momentary, it arises and ceases. Hence both [arising and 
cessation] are untenable [as features of enlightened wisdom]".  rampa 
goes on: "Whatever is conditioned would inevitably bear false and deceptive 
characteristics. And, so long as the perception of arising and cessation exists, 
the meaning of dependently arisen would not be one of non-arising".' "To 
the extent the appearance of conventionalities are not ceased and to the extent 
the reference of consciousness is not done away with", as dGe 'dun Chos 
'phel puts it, "to that extent, in spite of having a direct knowledge of 
emptiness, one is forced to be committed to the previously accepted 
[essentialist's] views". Furthermore, Go rampa argues, "impermanent, 
conditioned, false and deceptive phenomena are experienced by aryas in 
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lower levels of the noble path, they must be nonexistent for an enlightened 
wisdom".' Phenomena are nonexistent not only in the ultimate sense, but 
also in the empirical sense at this point. "The ultimate nonexistence of 
[impermanent etc.,] is also experienced even by aryas in the lower scale of the 
noble path", therefore, it does not demonstrate any exceptional cognitive 
potentials on the part of an enlightened person.' But the nonexistence of 
impermanent, conditioned, false, and deceptive phenomena, from the 
empirical standpoint, does indeed demonstrate the exceptional qualities of an 
enlightened wisdom. 
To reinforce the non-dual character of enlightened wisdom, Go rampa 
argues for the non-differentiated integration between wisdom and ultimate 
truth. Here he uses two slightly different approaches: First, Go rampa argues 
that, with the attainment of Buddhahood, consciousness itself is transformed 
into the ultimate truth. "Having realised emptiness, and having it thoroughly 
familiarised, all adventitious stains are eradicated", states Go rampa, adding 
that "mind itself is transformed into the uncontaminated sphere (zag med kyi 
dbyings). This is the ultimate buddha, an embodiment of virtues of the 
abandonment and the realisation".' Second, Go rampa makes much more 
explicit the fusion between enlightened wisdom and ultimate truth. 
Having burnt all the fuels of the conceptual elaborations—the objects of 
knowledge such as arising and cessation, permanence and 
annihilation—through the Vajra -like meditative stabilisation. 
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Dharmadhatu, free from all conceptual elaborations, sustains. So, too, the 
continuum of the previously existent consciousness becomes free from 
the conceptual elaborations such as arising and cessation. The 
[enlightened] wisdom is thus formed by the inseparable nature.' 
In defending his idea of the non-differentiated character of enlightened 
wisdom, Go rampa even dismisses the existence of mind and mental factors 
that might otherwise be thought to persist in an enlightened person. So long 
as "mind and the mental factors exist, the subject-object duality is 
inevitable... Thus would exist differentiation on the basis of the perception of 
objects and the perception of their particularities, and even so among the 
particularities of the objects, exist different types of perceptions".' However, 
"once a non-differentiated consciousness—which is free from all conceptual 
elaborations, the objects of knowledge such as arising, and cessation—is 
attained there is not the slightest dualistic appearance. Not even different 
modes of perception exist". Since non-duality is seen as the chief 
qualification of enlightened knowledge, so "the slightest involvement of 
duality, even in the case of enlightenment denies ultimate truth".' 
This absolute non-dualistic account gives rise to several pertinent 
questions. If it is true that an enlightened wisdom does not see anything from 
its own perspective, how could an enlightened being interact with others, 
with his followers, for example? How could a buddha determine what 
discourse is beneficial and appropriate for others if he does not see others? In 
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response to these questions, Go rampa introduces what he calls 'knowing 
from the other's perspective' (gzhan ngor shes pa). Although Go rampa claims 
that an enlightened being does not experience anything empirical from an 
enlightened perspective, he holds that an enlightened being nonetheless 
recognises and identifies empirical phenomena and interacts with other 
people from the 'other's perspective'. For example when the Buddha sees one 
of his disciples, say a.riputra, the Buddha sees and interacts with ariputra 
from ariputra's own perspective. Likewise, when the Buddha sees 
phenomenal objects, and engages with them, he does this from his disciples' 
points of view. Therefore knowledge from the other's perspective, although it 
is the second form of knowledge of an enlightened being, is not part of the 
cognitive operation of enlightened wisdom. 
Thus Go rampa is happy to maintain that knowledge from the 
enlightened perspective and knowledge from the other's perspective are 
contradictory and mutually exclusive. From an enlightened perspective, as 
Go rampa argued earlier, a buddha experiences nothing whatsoever, neither 
ultimately nor empirically. Go rampa, in fact, dismisses the distinction 
between the empirical and ultimate standpoints at the level of Buddhahood: 
"The empirical standpoint is accepted merely from the other's perspective. 
The distinction between the empirical and ultimate standpoints does not 
apply to the enlightened perspective". Thus, no world of empirical 
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experience exists for an enlightened being. Yet, from the other's perspective, 
namely, from the perspective of ordinary beings, Go rampa argues that an 
enlightened being experiences everything. An enlightened being experiences, 
engages, and interacts with the world from the point of view of ignorant 
ordinary beings. 
dGe 'dun Chos 'phel illustrates the concept of 'other's perspective' by 
using an analogy: 
When a magician conjures up an illusory elephant, the audience sees it 
as a real elephant. The magician plays his magical tricks in order to see 
something non-elephant as if it is a real elephant. Now, when the 
audience asks the magician: 'is this a real elephant?' [the magician] 
replies "yes". In this case, the magician accepts the elephant from the 
other's perspective.' 
Thus the world of empirical truths, reified by ignorance, is all of sudden 
experienced by an enlightened person from the other's perspective. It is, 
therefore, claimed that "both ultimate arising and empirical arising exist for 
[an enlightened person] from the other's perspective. That which is said to be 
non-arising is with reference to buddha's own perspective. From this 
perspective neither ultimate arising nor empirical arising exists". 58 It is worth 
reflecting on the key phrase Go rampa uses here. He claims that when a 
buddha engages with the world from the other's perspective, then a buddha, 
like the naïve ordinary beings, is said to reify, not only empirical arising, but 
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also ultimate arising. So, in this sense and according to this view, even an 
enlightened being is an essentialist or a reificationist as are ordinary beings. 
While it is true that, "from a buddha's own perspective, since arising and 
cessation are not perceived, there is neither conditioned nor impermanent 
phenomena. From the other's perspective, the perspective of his disciples," 
Go rampa argues, "[that an enlightened being experiences] arising and 
cessation, since arising and cessation of virtues exist".59 Although Go rampa 
insists that enlightened beings experience arising and cessation from the 
other's perspective, "it does not follow that an enlightened wisdom is itself 
characterised by arising and cessation. It simply shows how they appear to 
the minds of disciples", argues Go rampa." An enlightened person as 
mentioned earlier "perceives arising and cessation from the other's 
perspective (gzhan snang), but certainly not from his own-perspective (rang 
snang)"." 
Other supporters of Go rampa's doctrine of knowing from the other's 
perspective include Mi pham,' sTag tsane and Mi skyod rDo rje." They also 
advocate that the exceptional quality of enlightened knowledge consists in 
not experiencing anything empirical from the enlightened perspective but 
experiencing everything from the other's perspective. 
One thing that stands out as the essential feature of knowledge from the 
other's perspective is that it is, in every sense of the word, exactly equivalent 
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to the knowledge of ordinary beings. Just as an ordinary person reifies 
essence, claims Go rampa, so too, as we have just seen, does an enlightened 
being also reify essence. On this point, Rong ston, who is otherwise one of Go 
rampa's traditional allies, ridicules the doctrine of the other's perspective. To 
claim that the attaining of enlightenment requires knowledge from the 
perspective of ordinary beings is, according to Rong ston, tantamount to 
claiming that ordinary beings are accomplished enlightened beings and that 
enlightened beings are ordinary beings. Without expending any effort, 
ordinary beings are born with the ordinary perspectives, and they should 
therefore be inherently possessed with enlightened knowledge.' 
3.2. Knowing the two truths simultaneously 
Tsong khapa agrees with Go rampa in asserting that the attainment of 
Buddhahood culminates with the total eradication of the subtle object of 
negation—with the eradication of the misconception of duality. Among the 
many exceptional qualities of an enlightened person, Tsong khapa recognises 
the cognitive ability of an enlightened person to have direct and 
simultaneous realisation of the two truths within a single instant as one of the 
most significant abilities. In Tsong khapa's view, the coordination between a 
buddha's ultimately valid cognition and empirically valid cognition is 
absolutely essential to achieve this simultaneity. Without the coordination 
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between these two cognitive operations, he argues, it is not possible for an 
enlightened person to realise either of the two truths. The ultimately valid 
consciousness of an enlightened person is not capable of realising ultimate 
truth in the absence of its empirically valid cognition. Similarly, the 
empirically valid consciousness of an enlightened being is not capable of 
realising conventional truth in the absence of ultimately valid 
consciousness. 66 Thus two valid cognitive resources of an enlightened person 
are always mutually entailing. Not only they do not function independently 
of each other, but the two cognitive resources no longer know the two truths 
alternately, as they do in the case of other aryas. Prior to the total eradication 
of the subtle misconception of dualistic appearance (i.e., before the attainment 
of full enlightenment), then, as we saw earlier, these two cognitive resources 
know the two truths alternately and interchangeably depending on the 
emphasis of the practices embarked upon by the concerned cognitive agent. 
Either the coordination of the two cognitive resources culminates via directly 
knowing ultimate truth in the meditative equipoise, or their coordination 
culminates in the form of directly knowing phenomena as dependently arisen 
in the post-meditative states. It is not possible at this stage to have direct and 
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With the attainment of enlightenment, and with the eradication of even 
the most subtle epistemic error that is the misconception of dualistic 
appearance, Tsong khapa holds that every single enlightened consciousness 
manifests itself as a simultaneous interplay of these two cognitive resources. 
"When every misconception is eradicated without a trace", explains Tsong 
khapa, "even each individual moment of every single [enlightened] 
consciousness (yeshes) embodies an interplay of dual consciousness that arise 
uninterruptedly with the identical characteristics". 67 By knowing empirical 
truth, then, an enlightened being knows ultimate truth, and by knowing 
ultimate truth, an enlightened being knows empirical truth. In this way an 
enlightened being knows the two objects of knowledge (shes bya gnyis) 
simultaneously within the span of a single event of wisdom. This is possible 
here because_ the ultimately valid consciousness and the empirically valid 
consciousness of a buddha perform their functions in a way that makes these 
consciousnesses inseparably intertwined. The uncritical cognitive 
engagement of every single empirically valid consciousness of an enlightened 
person is accompanied by the critical cognitive engagement of every single 
ultimately valid consciousness of a buddha and vice versa. Recognising this 
mutually inclusive cognitive resources of a buddha, Tsong khapa argues that 
every single enlightened consciousness knows both the truths directly. 
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From a slightly different perspective, it can also be said that the 
previously alternating engagements between the 'meditative equipoise' 
(mnyam gzhag, samahita) and the 'subsequent attainment' (rjes thos, prstha-
labdha) now, with true enlightenment, achieve a perfect equilibrium. 
Previously, the wisdom of the meditative equipoise is directed more towards 
ultimate truth, while the wisdom of the subsequent achievement (post-
meditative state) is directed more towards empirical truth. The knowledge of 
the two truths is thereby somehow isolated. However, with the attainment of 
Buddhahood, the cognitive capacity to engage with ultimate truth and the 
cognitive capacity to engage with conventional truth becomes simultaneous. 
Tsong lchapa argues that "Once the predisposition of the conception of true 
existence is thoroughly eradicated, one attains the Buddhahood. Thereafter", 
he explains that "[a buddha] continuously abides in the meditative equipoise, 
directly realising ultimate truth. Thereafter the alternate [realisationl—i.e., 
not abiding in the meditative equipoise in their subsequent attainment—no 
longer applies".' In other words, whether or not a buddha appears to be in a 
meditative equipoise or appears to be engaged in other overt activities, the 
mind of an enlightened being is not deflected from direct knowledge of the 
two truths. Consequently, Tsong khapa therefore claims, in the following 
passage, that there is no qualitative distinction whatsoever between a 
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buddha's wisdom of the meditative equipoise and a buddha's wisdom of the 
subsequent achievement (the post meditative state): 
Because there is no wisdom of the subsequent attainment (rjes tho 
yeshes, Prstha-labdha-jfidna) realising phenomenal objects (je snyed pa) 
which is qualitatively distinct (ngo ho tha dad med) from the wisdom of 
meditative equipoise (mnyam gzhag yeshes, samahita-jiidna), it should be 
accepted that a single event of wisdom (yeshes gcig) knows all objects of 
knowledge comprising two truths.' 
With the end of the alternate (res 'jog) realisation of two truths,' the usual 
qualitative distinction between the cognitive status of the meditative 
equipoise and the post-meditative state no longer applies. Whether an 
enlightened being specifically engages in the meditation of ultimate truth or 
engages in other seemingly non-meditative cognitive activities, his wisdom 
invariably knows both truths. The validity of every enlightened cognitive 
episode is equivalent to the validity of meditative equipoise, and thus every 
enlightened cognitive activity is representative of a correct knowledge of 
ultimate truth. 
Tsong khapa's claim that there is no qualitative distinction between the 
wisdom of meditative equipoise and the wisdom of the post-meditative 
equipoise gives rise to a couple of questions: If it is true that every single 
enlightened consciousness knows both the truths directly, does this mean 
that a buddha's empirically valid cognition alone is able to cognise ultimate 
Chapter V 
	
Enlightenment 	 Page 295 
truth independently of the role of his ultimately valid cognition? Similarly, 
does this mean that a buddha's ultimately valid cognition alone is able to 
cognise conventional truth independently from the role of his empirically 
valid cognition? 
In response to the first question, Tsong khapa says that it is not possible 
for the ultimately valid consciousness of a buddha to know conventional 
truth independently of empirically valid consciousness, and this is so for two 
reasons. First, if a buddha's ultimately valid consciousness knows 
conventional truth independently, then it would render the cognitive role of a 
buddha's empirically valid consciousnesses redundant, but Tsong khapa 
takes the function of verifying empirical truths to belong to empirically valid 
consciousness. Second, if a buddha's ultimately valid consciousness knows 
conventional truth independently, then this would threaten the internal 
consistency of Tsong khapa's own definitions of conventional truth, since 
Tsong khapa defines conventional truth in relation to the function of 
empirically valid consciousness. 
In response to the second question, Tsong khapa argues that the 
empirically valid consciousness of an enlightened person is not able to know 
ultimate truth independently from ultimately valid consciousnesses, and this 
is so, once again, for the two reasons that are analogous to those just cited. 
First, if the empirically valid consciousness of an enlightened person knows 
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ultimate truth independently of ultimately valid consciousness, then this 
would render the cognitive role of a buddha's ultimately valid consciousness 
redundant, but Tsong khapa himself assigns the verification of ultimate truth 
as the function of ultimately valid consciousness. Second, if the empirically 
valid consciousness of an enlightened person knows ultimate truth 
independently of ultimately valid consciousness, then this would threaten the 
internal consistency of Tsong khapa's definitions of ultimate truth, since 
Tsong khapa has previously defined ultimate truth in relation to the cognitive 
function of ultimately valid consciousness. 
It is worth giving some further consideration to Tsong khapa's defense 
of the claim that even the two valid consciousnesses of an enlightened being 
do not involve knowledge of ultimate truth in a way that is independent of 
one another. Although, insofar as both wisdoms are invariably valid 
representations of ultimate truth, the wisdom of the meditative equipoise and 
of the post-meditative state are both accepted as qualitatively identical (ngo bo 
gcig), Tsong khapa denies that this poses any contradiction. According to 
him, this identity neither makes the two wisdoms redundant nor threatens 
the internal consistency of the definitions of the two truths. While 
qualitatively identical, the two wisdoms are also distinct in terms of their 
mode of cognitive activity: 
Because [an object] is found by the wisdom knowing truths as they 
truly are (je lta ba mkhyen pa'i yeshes) it is a wisdom knowing truths as 
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they truly are (je lta ba, yathfi) with respect to that object. And because 
[an object] is found by wisdom knowing phenomenal objects (je snyad 
pa mkh yen pa'i yeshes), it is a wisdom knowing phenomenal objects (, je 
snyed pa, yavata) with respect to that object. Therefore, an enlightened 
mode of knowing ultimate and conventional truths should be 
understood with reference to the individual objects (yul so so la ltos 
nas).' 
Despite the fact that the ultimately valid consciousness of an enlightened 
being is a coherent representation of conventional truth, still, according to 
Tsong khapa's view, conventional truth per se is not found or verified by the 
ultimately valid consciousness of such a being. Rather, the ultimately valid 
consciousness of an enlightened being critically verifies the ultimate truth of 
the empirically given phenomena that is found by empirically valid 
consciousness. Because of its critical cognitive function, the ultimately valid 
consciousness of a buddha cannot provide a holistic view of the world. But a 
holistic view is essential to establish the validity of conventional truth. In the 
light of its critical function, the ultimately valid consciousness of an 
enlightened being is consistently described as the 'wisdom that knows 
phenomena as they truly are' (ii lta ba bzhin du mkh yen pa'i yeshes, yatha-bhata-
Plana) as opposed to being described as the 'wisdom that realises empirical 
phenomena' (ji snyed pa mkhyen pa'i yeshes, yavata-jana). Likewise, despite the 
fact that the empirically valid consciousness of an enlightened being is a 
coherent representation of ultimate truth, ultimate truth per se is not found or 
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verified by a buddha's empirical consciousness. The empirically valid 
consciousness of a buddha verifies, instead, conventional truth. Because of its 
=critical cognitive function, the empirically valid consciousness of a buddha 
consistently represents its corresponding objects holistically. It is, therefore, 
always described as the wisdom that realises the plurality of phenomenal 
objects (ji snyed pa mkhyen pa'i yeshes, yavata-jilana) and, strictly speaking, is 
not described as the wisdom that realises things as they truly are (ji lta ba 
bzhin du mkhyen pa'i yeshes, yatha- bhata-jUna). 
At the heart of Tsong khapa account, then, is his claim that every single 
enlightened consciousness knows the two truths simultaneously; hence both 
the empirically valid consciousness and the ultimately valid consciousness of 
a buddha are coherent representations of the two truths. Yet even so, Tsong 
khapa argues, neither the ultimately valid consciousness nor the empirically 
valid consciousness of a buddha knows the two truths independently of one 
another. Instead, the cognitive resources of a buddha operate simultaneously 
and collaboratively in the knowledge of either one of the two truths. 
Moreover, in consideration of the fact that the truths are said to exhaustively 
encapsulate the four noble truths (wherein the truth of suffering, the truth of 
origin, the truth of the path are classified under the conventional truth and 
the truth of cessation under the ultimate truth), Tsong khapa's claim that 
every single episode of enlightened consciousness concurrently knows the 
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two truths has some powerful canonical support. The Buddha, for example, 
states that: "Bhiklchus, he who sees suffering sees also the origin of suffering, 
sees also the cessation of suffering, sees also the way leading to the cessation 
of suffering" [SN V.437], etc., and so the same understanding should be 
applied to all the other three truths.' The Patisambhidamagga adds that: "the 
knowledge of one who possesses the path is knowledge of suffering and it is 
knowledge of the origin of suffering and it is knowledge of the cessation of 
suffering and it is knowledge of the way leading to the cessation of suffering" 
[Ps. I. 119]. Buddhagoga also explains that: "at the times of penetrating to the 
truths each of the four knowledges is said to exercise four functions in a 
single moment. These are full-understanding, abandoning, realising, and 
developing". Th Just as a lamp performs four functions simultaneously in a 
single moment, so too, argues Buddhagoga, does knowledge penetrate to the 
four truths simultaneously. As the lamp burns the wick, so knowledge fully 
understands suffering; as the lamp dispels darkness, so the knowledge 
abandons origin; as the lamp makes light appear, so the knowledge as right-
view develops the path; and as the lamp consumes up the oil, so the 
knowledge realises cessation which brings defilements to an end. 
It is very clear indeed that even the so-called 'exceptional way of 
knowing the two truths by a buddha' does not, according to the view held by 
Tsong khapa, go against the definitions of the two truths. Neither does it 
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make the cognitive functions of the two valid consciousnesses of an 
enlightened person redundant. The empirically valid consciousness of an 
enlightened person uncritically verifies empirical truths, while ultimately 
valid consciousness critically verifies the ultimate mode of empirical truths. 
But because the two cognitive resources are inextricably interwoven, every 
enlightened consciousness is a culmination of the two wisdoms. Every event 
of enlightened consciousness coherently represents things as they truly are. 
This is how, in Tsong khapa's view, even the most enlightened wisdom 
operates within the framework of the definitions of the two truths, while 
nevertheless achieving the realisation of both the truths simultaneously. In so 
doing, it avoids all contradictions. "Such is the exceptional qualities of a 
bhagvan, a buddha", says Tsong Ichapa: m 
With the reference to dharmata (chos nyid), it is a wisdom knowing 
things as they are (je lta ba). Here, every dual-appearance dissolves 
from the vantage point of that cognition (blo de'i ngor). Thus this 
wisdom, just like pouring water into water, embraces the universality 
(ro gcig). However, with respect to the phenomenal objects (chos can, 
dharmin), it is a wisdom knowing empirical truths (je snyed pa mkh yen 
pa'i yeshes). At this point, though the dualistic appearances perceiving 
distinct subject and object are involved, they are unmistaken dualistic 
appearances. Since the predisposition of the misconception pertaining 
to dualistic appearance is uprooted without trace, dualistic appearances 
are no longer misconception of the perceived object (snang yul).n 
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In Tsong khapa's view, then, an enlightened being has two different ways of 
knowing ultimate truth. One way is to realise it during the meditative 
equipoise by way of transcending all dualities. This way of knowing ultimate 
truth is described as knowing space-like-emptiness (nam mkha' lta bu'i stong 
nyid). 78 Ultimate truth is known through direct personal experience within the 
framework of one's body. As the Buddha explains: 
Monks, that sphere should be realised where the eye (vision) stops and 
the perception (mental noting) of form fades. That sphere is to be 
realised where the ear stops and the perception of sound fades.. .where 
the nose stops and the perception of aroma fades.. .where the tongue 
stops and the perception of flavour fades.. .where the body stops and 
the perception of tactile sensations fades.. .where the intellect stops and 
the perception of idea fades: That sphere should be realised ESN 
XXXV.116E . 79 
For Tsong khapa this sphere of non-differentiated, space-like experience does 
not in any way represent a metaphysical transcendence. The experience of 
such nature is entirely possible within the meditator's own "fathom-long 
body", as the Buddha puts it. 8° This transcendental state can be directly and 
personally experienced, but it cannot be intellectually known or linguistically 
described from the outside and neither can an enlightened person, even when 
actually experiencing it, offer any criterion to describe it. In the following 
discourse, the Buddha articulates this point: 
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There is, monks, that sphere where there is neither earth nor water, nor 
fire, nor wind, nor sphere of the infinitude of space, nor sphere of the 
infinitude of consciousness, nor sphere of nothingness, nor sphere of 
neither perception nor non-perception, nor this world, nor the next 
world, -nor sun, nor moon. And there, I say, there is neither coming, nor 
going, nor stasis, nor passing away, nor arising: without stance, without 
foundation, without support (mental object). This, just this, is the end of 
dukkha [Ud VIII.1].' 
What is All? Simply the eye and forms, ear and sounds, nose and 
aromas, tongue and flavours, body and tactile, sensation, intellect and 
ideas. This, monks, is termed the All. Anyone who would say, 
'Repudiating this All, I will describe another,' if questioned on what 
exactly might be the grounds for this statement, would be unable to 
explain, and furthermore, would be put to grief. Why? Because it lies 
beyond range [SN )00(11.23].' 
As a flame overthrown by the force of the wind goes to an end 
that cannot be classified, so the sage freed from naming (mental) 
activity goes to an end that cannot be classified.. .One who has reached 
the end has no criterion by which anyone would say that—for him it 
does not exist. When all phenomena are done away with, all means of 
speaking are done away with as well [Upasiva-manava-puccha, Sn V6].' 
The other way of knowing ultimate truth is during the subsequent attainment 
in the wake of meditative equipoise. Tsong lchapa describes this way of 
realising ultimate truth is as "knowing the illusion-like-emptiness (sgyu ma lta 
bu'i stong nyid)"." In this mode of knowing, argues Tsong khapa, phenomena 
are perceived as relational, interdependent, and illusory. Although the 
duality between subject and object is involved in this mode of knowing, it is 
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thoroughly compatible with the non-dual enlightened knowledge. The 
Buddha explains why knowing phenomena as dependently arisen does not 
constitute a misconceived duality: 
When a disciple of the noble one has seen well with right discernment 
this dependent co-arising and these dependently co-arisen phenomena 
as they are actually present, it is not possible that he would run after 
the past, thinking, "Was I in the past? Was I not in the past? What was I 
in the past? How was I in the past? Having been what, what was I in 
the past?" or that he would run after the future, thinking, "Shall I be in 
the future? Shall I not be in the future? What shall I be in the future? 
How shall I be in the future? Having been what, what shall I be in the 
future?" or that he would be inwardly perplexed about the immediate 
present, thinking, "Am I? Am I not? What am I? How am I? Where has 
this being come from? Where is it bound?" Such a thing is not possible. 
Why is that? Because the disciple of the noble ones has seen well with 
discernment this dependent co-arising and these dependently co-arisen 
phenomena as they are actually present [Paccaya Sutta, SN XII.20]. 86 
Since the duality between subject and object is totally free from any 
misconception, the mere presence of duality is not a problem. It is, in fact, an 
inevitable ground for coherent knowledge. "Once this point is understood", 
says Tsong khapa, "one can correctly understand how the meditation on the 
space-like-emptiness during the meditative equipoise reinforces the 
understanding of illusory-like-emptiness in the subsequent attainment".' The 
validity of knowing the illusory-like-emptiness and the validity of knowing 
the space-like-emptiness are therefore compatible in every respect.' By 
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knowing phenomena as illusory a buddha knows that phenomena are 
essentially empty; by knowing phenomena as essentially empty a buddha 
knows that phenomena are illusory. Hence, in Tsong khapa's view "there is 
no contradiction in saying that every single enlightened wisdom captures all 
objects of knowledge".' 
4. Goramapa's position reconsidered 
Go rampa's account of enlightened wisdom grants to such wisdom an 
absolute, non-dual, metaphysically transcendent and timeless ontological 
status that is utterly free from any cognitive activity and is strictly beyond 
any empirical experience whatsoever. Yet in proposing such an account, and 
if such an account is . a correct one, Go rampa not only questions, but perhaps 
inadvertently invalidates, the position taken by the Buddha himself in terms 
of his ontological, epistemological, ethical and soteriological standpoints. As 
we shall see, Go rampa's position contradicts the credibility of the Buddha's 
enlightenment, the path of the practice taught by the Buddha, and the moral 
and intellectual virtues attributed to an enlightened being. In the next three 
sections we shall briefly examine how and in what ways Go rampa's view is 
indeed contradictory to the position taken by the Buddha. 
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4.1. On the Buddha's enlightenment 
As long as I did not have direct knowledge of the fourfold round with 
regard to these five aggregates of clinging/sustenance, I did not claim 
to have directly awakened to the unexcelled right self-awakening. But 
when I did have direct knowledge of the fourfold round with regard to 
these five aggregates of clinging/sustenance, then I did claim to have 
directly awakened to the unexcelled right self-awakening in this 
cosmos [Parivatta Sutta, SN XXII.56].' 
As the above statement indicates, the Buddha declares the legitimacy of his 
full enlightenment by emphasising his fourfold knowledge of empirical' 
truths. And he explains in what this fourfold knowledge consists: "I had 
direct knowledge of form.. .of the origination of form... of the cessation of 
form.. .of the path of practice leading to the cessation of form (likewise with 
regard to four other aggregates)..."[Parivatta sutta, SN )0(11.561.91 Within each 
knowledge, all the four knowledges are contained. To attain one of the 
fourfold lcnowledges, for example, the direct knowledge of aggregates of 
form, the presence of the other three direct knowledges is necessary. If any 
one of the fourfold direct knowledges is not completed,' then all the rest 
remain incomplete also. On the' other hand, when any one of the fourfold 
direct knowledge is completed, all the rest become complete and attain full 
maturity. This is how, in the Buddha's view, the attainment of the fourfold 
knowledges is simultaneous. "Bhikkhus, he who sees suffering sees also the 
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origin of suffering, sees also the cessation of suffering, sees also the way 
leading to the cessation of suffering" [SN V.437] etc., and so the same 
understanding should be applied to all the other three truths.' As the 
Patisambhidamagga further states: "the knowledge of one who possesses the 
path is knowledge of suffering and it is knowledge of the origin of suffering 
and it is knowledge of the cessation of suffering and it is knowledge of the 
way leading to the cessation of suffering" [Ps. I. 119]." 
There is no ambiguity when the Buddha announces his full 
enlightenment precisely because of his understanding of the five aggregates. 
Thus it is clear that the attainment of enlightenment must entail the perfect 
understanding of conventional truths as they actually are. The Buddha 
reaffirms his position by describing a correct understanding of the five 
psychophysical aggregates in terms of the achievement of "right practice". 
"For any priests or conternplatives who directly know form in this way7 4 
directly know the origination of form in this way, directly know the cessation 
of form in this way, directly know the path of the cessation of form in this 
way, are" according to the Buddha, "practising for 
disenchantment—dispassion—cessation with regard to form, [hence] they are 
practising rightly" [Parivatta Sutta, SN XXII.56].95 What constitutes right 
practice is precisely that it is a practice based on the understanding of 
phenomena, processes, and events as they actually are. Right practice entails 
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liberating wisdom principally because right practice is founded on the direct 
knowledge of what is empirically given, namely, the five psychophysical 
aggregates. 
Since right practice is premised on the right understanding of empirical 
truths as they are, the Buddha also describes right practice as the key to moral 
perfection free from negative psychological impulses: "Those who are 
practising rightly are firmly based in this doctrine and discipline.. .From 
disenchantment, dispassion, cessation, lack of clinging/sustenance with 
regard to form—released, they are well-released. Those who are well-released 
are fully accomplished" [Parivatta Sutta, SN XXII.56].96 Elsewhere the Buddha 
explains: "Disenchantment, monks, also has supporting condition, I say, it 
does not lack a supporting condition. And what is the supporting condition 
for disenchantment? 'The knowledge and vision of things as they really are 
should be the reply" [Upanisa Sutta, SN XII.231.97 Furthermore he adds: "The 
destruction of the cankers, monks, is for one who knows and sees, I say, not 
for one who does not know and does not see".' 
All of the above quotations indicate that the attainment of full 
enlightenment, according to the Buddha's teaching, means the culmination of 
the fourfold knowledge within the framework of one's own psychophysical 
aggregates. "It is just within this fathom-long body, with its consciousness, 
that I declare that there is the cosmos, the origination of the cosmos, and the 
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path of practice leading to the cessation of cosmos" [Rohitassa Sutta, AN 
W.45].99 There can be, then, no uncertainty concerning the fact that the 
Buddha justifies his full enlightenment on the basis of the fourfold 
knowledge of empirical truths. Yet if we approach the rationale behind the 
Buddha's justification of his enlightenment from the soteriological standpoint 
taken by Go rampa, then we reach a totally opposite conclusion. All 
conventional phenomena, Go rampa claims, are the constructs of ignorance 
and this is at the very heart of his philosophy of non-duality. Any knowledge 
having reference to conventional phenomena has, therefore, no soteriological 
significance whatsoever. Since aggregates are conventional phenomena, and 
since conventional phenomena are the constructs of ignorance, it thus follows 
that the knowledge of aggregates entails merely the proliferation of 
ignorance. Consequently, the Buddha's announcement of his enlightenment 
on the basis of his understanding of aggregates can only indicate, on the basis 
of Go rampa's account, the Buddha's ignorance rather than justifying his 
enlightenment. 
4.2. On the path of practice taught by the Buddha 
In his forty-five year's of service to humanity, the Buddha is known to have 
given at least eighty two thousand discourses (excluding two thousands 
discourses given by senior disciples). He extended his open invitation to all. 
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He said 'come and see', ehipassiko (Pali), examine, verify, test and personally 
experience the dharma. In Pali he describes dharma as svakkha to 'well 
explained', sanditthiko 'to be personally realised', akaliko 'to be experienced 
here and now, with immediate result', opanayika 'capable of being entered 
upon', paccattarn veditabbo vitinahlti 'to be attained by the wise, each for 
himself'. The Buddha saw his role as a discover of Dharma, a skilful teacher 
and an expounder of Dharma. He employed various skilful pedagogical 
means to explain the Dharma he had discovered in order to guide any 
aspirant to the ultimate spiritual quest. From all this, perhaps the most well-
known techniques are the thirty-seven factors of enlightenment (Bodhipachika 
Dharma, byang phyogs so bdun). 
Briefly,' the thirty-seven factors of enlightenment consist of seven-sets 
of practices: namely, the four foundations of mindfulness (smrtyupasthana, 
dran pa nyer bzhag bzhi); the four right exertions (sarhyakaprhartani, yang dag 
spong ba); the four factors of psychic powers (rddhipadah, rdzu 'phrul gyi rkang 
pa), the five faculties (endriyarti, dbang po); the five strengths (bala, stobs), the 
seven factors of awakening (sambodhyariga, byang chub yan lag); and the 
eightfold noble path (aryastarigamarga, 'pags lam yan lag brgyad). All practices 
entailed in the thirty-seven factors of enlightenment can be circumscribed 
within one of the three trainings (giksa, bslab pa gsum): namely, morality (gila, 
tshul khrims), concentration (samadhi, ting nge 'dzin) and wisdom (prajii a, shes 
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rab). These three in turn can be further broken down into two key practices, 
namely, gamatha (zhi gnas), meaning, 'calm abiding' meditation and vipagyana 
(lhag mthong), meaning, 'penetrating insightful' meditation. Given the fact that 
the former is found in other traditions, notably in Brahmanism,' the latter 
forms the most distinctive feature of Buddhism. In the Pali canon, the Buddha 
extols vipagyana as "the only way" leading to the ultimate goal and prescribes 
Satipatthanas (Pali; Stk. smrtyupasthana, Tib. dran pa nyer bzhag bzhi), 'the four 
foundations of mindfulness', as the four main methods by which one 
practises vipagyana. 
Monks, this is the one and only way for the purification (of minds) of 
beings, for overcoming sorrow and lamentation, for the complete 
destruction of pain and stress, for attainment of the noble (arya) Magga, 
and for the realisation of Nibbana. That (only way) is the practice of the 
Four Foundations of Mindfulness, Satipatthana.102 
What are the four Satipatthanas and how are they practised? The Buddha 
answers: "Herein, a monk dwells observing body in the body.. .sensations in 
sensations... the mind in the mind.. .and mental objects in the mental objects, 
ardently with awareness and mindfulness, thus keeping away craving and 
sorrow in regard to the world" [Mahaparinibbana Sutta, DN 16].' A special 
emphasis on "observing body in body..." etc. is highly significant. It indicates 
that a correct vipagyana meditation should strictly involve observing one's 
psychophysical aggregates starkly as they really are. Since the four 
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foundations of mindfulness operate entirely within one's experiential 
domain, they are the only ways to directly understand the phenomena as 
impermanent, unsatisfactory, selfless, and empty and thereby to abandon the 
distorted perception of permanence, substantially persisting self, and 
inherently existing essence. 
Consider this following familiar passage in The Heart of the Perfection of 
Wisdom Sutra, the Bhagavatiprajriaparamitahrdyasatra. In this sutra exactly the 
same technique of insightful meditation is prescribed. When the venerable 
.ariputra asked the noble Avalokitegvara, "how should a son of good lineage 
who wishes to practice the profound perfection of wisdom train?" the latter 
offers this advice: 
-ariputra, a son of good lineage or a daughter of good. lineage who 
wishes to practice the profound perfection of wisdom should perceive 
things in this way: form is empty; emptiness is form. Emptiness is not 
other than form; form is not other than emptiness. In the same way, 
feeling, discrimination, conditioning factors, and consciousness are 
empty. Therefore, Ariputra, all phenomena are empty, without 
characteristic, unproduced, unceased, stainless, not stainless, 
undiminished, unfilled.Aariputra, a bodhisattva mahtzsattva should 
train in the profound perfection of wisdom in that way.104 
The Buddha, being impressed by the advice, expressly endorses noble 
Avalokitegvara's words: "Well said, well said, child of good lineage, it is like 
that. It is like that; the practice of the profound perfection of wisdom is just as 
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you have taught it". 105 It is clear, then, that the only way to cultivate the 
perfection of wisdom is by engaging in the practice of vipaiyana. That means 
even the most superior knowledge, as the Heart Sutra indicates, inevitably 
requires the five psychological aggregates as its foundation, and the 
interactions between the cognising subject and the cognised object. 
Yet once again, if we adopt Go rampa's non-dual perspective, any 
knowledge that allows empirical grounding, cognitive activities, and the 
subject-object dichotomy, must be viewed as necessarily flawed. In that case 
the path of practice taught by the Buddha must also be viewed as a flawed 
one just inasmuch as this path retains the usual subject-object dichotomy and 
allows for the persistence of cognitive activity. Perhaps more importantly, the 
Buddha insists on the psychophysical aggregates as the foundation of even 
the highest knowledge, such that even a fully perfected wisdom cannot lead 
to metaphysical non-duality, while Go rampa maintains that to take the 
aggregates as the basis of knowledge is tantamount to taking ignorance as the 
basis rather than wisdom and so the defining criterion of enlightenment 
must, in Go rampa's view, be the achievement of metaphysical non-duality. 
4.3.0n the virtues of a Tathfigata 
Another distinctive feature of Go rampa's non-dual soteriological account is 
the doctrine of perspectivism. This doctrine is arbitrarily introduced at the 
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last stage of the path in order to account for the virtues attributed to a . 
buddha. Here, Go rampa introduces two theses: first, he argues that a 
buddha, since he has no conventional knowledge, does not have any 
perspective on the conventional world of his own whatsoever; second, he 
argues that a buddha, since he knows the conventional world only from the 
other's perspective and reifies conventional truth just as any ordinary person, 
mistakenly conceives and reifies essences. Similarly, he claims that all sets of 
virtues attributed to a buddha are also purely from the other's perspective. 
In order to get a better picture of the qualities attributed to a buddha, 
and thereby to enable us to contrast them with Go rampa's soteriological 
account, we shall simply consider some of the lists of the virtues attributed to 
an enlightened being. As physical hallmarks, a buddha is attributed with 
sixty vocal qualities' and thirty-two major marks (mtshan bzang po sum bcu 
rtsa gnyis)' and eighty minor marks (dpe byed bzang pa brgyad bcu)."As 
intellectual hallmarks, a buddha is attributed with many lists of virtues. First 
is the list of the ten powers (data bala, stobs bcu). In the Mahavastu, when the 
venerable Maha-Kagyapa asked Maha-Katyayana on the ten powers of a 
buddha, the latter offers the following list:" A buddha knows what is and 
what is not a causal occasion; knows whither every course of conduct tends; 
knows various elements which make up the world; knows the diverse 
characters of beings; knows the merits of the conduct of other being; knows 
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• the good and bad force of karma; knows the fault and purification of 
attainments in meditation; knows many modes of his former lives; a buddha 
becomes endowed with the clear deva eye; and finally, attains the destruction 
of all defiling lusts [MN. 12; AN X. 21]. Second, a buddha is also attributed 
with the eighteen unparalleled cognitive skills (astadagavenika buddha dharmah, 
sangs rgyas kyi chos ma 'dres pa bco brgyad), Maha-Katyayana offers the 
following list: 110 A buddha has an infallible knowledge and insight of the 
past; the future; the present; all his acts of body; speech; and thought are 
based on knowledge and concerned with knowledge; there is no falling off in 
resolution; in energy; in mindfulness, in concentration; in insight; in freedom; 
there is no faltering; no impetuosity; mindfulness never fails; mind is never 
disturbed; no thoughtless indifference; and there is no preoccupation with the 
multiplicity of phenomena. Third, a buddha is also endowed with the four 
analytical knowledges (pratisathvidalkfriitna, so so yang dag pa'i rigs pa bzhid): 
namely, the analytical knowledge of the doctrine (dharmapratisatrividak chos so 
sor yang dag pa'i rig pa); the analytical knowledge of meaning 
(arthapratisathvidalt, don so sor yang dag pail rig pa); the analytical knowledge of 
the language (niruktipratisatrividah, nges tshig so sor yang pa'i rig pa); and the 
analytical knowledge of perspicacity (pratbhimapratisainvidah, spop pa so sor 
yang dag pa'i rig pa) (AN IV:173). Fourth, perhaps the most commonly known 
qualifications attributed to a buddha, reflecting both moral and intellectual 
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prowess, are the six perfections (paramita, phar phyin bcu) 111—namely, 
perfection of generosity (danaparamita, sbyin pa'i phar phyin); morality 
(gilaparamita, tshul khrims kyi phar ph yin); patience (Ksanti, bzod pa); energy 
(virya, brtson grus); serenity (dhyana, bsam gtan); and wisdom (prajria, shes Tab). 
In emphasising moral perfection, a buddha is attributed with another set of 
virtues. The key moral virtue being bodhicitta (byang chub kyi sems)—altruistic 
mind of enlightenment and the culmination of the fourfold divine virtues 
(Brahmaviharas, tshangs pa'i gnas), namely, equanimity (Pali upekha; Skt upeksa); 
compassion (kantrza); loving-kindness (Pali metta; Skt maitri); appreciative-joy 
(mudita). 
There are other lists of moral and intellectual virtues attributed to a 
buddha which could be added here, but these lists are more than sufficient to 
enable us to assess Go rampa's claim that the intellectual and moral virtues 
attributed to a buddha exist only as projections of ignorant and misguided 
disciples and that a buddha is transcendent of both moral and intellectual 
virtues. It should be especially noted that in relation to these lists, there is no 
ambiguity whatsoever that the relevant virtues are attributed directly to an 
enlightened person—there is no evidence whatsoever to suggest that these 
moral and intellectual virtues are merely attributed from the others' 
perspective. In fact, curiously, there is not even a mention of transcendental 
virtues in any of the lists. Consider how the Buddha himself describes the 
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attributes of an enlightened being: "This, monk, the Tathagata discerns. And 
he discerns that these standpoints, thus seized, thus held to, lead to such and 
such destination, to such and such a state in the world beyond. And he 
discerns what surpasses this" [Brahmajfila sutta, DN 1].' 12 The Buddha is also 
unequivocal in stating that a buddha knows about things through his own 
wisdom, rather than relying on the so-called 'others' perspective': 
The Tathagata—a worthy one, rightly self-awakened—directly knows 
earth as earth. Directly knowing earth as earth, he does not conceive 
things about earth, does not conceive things in earth, does not conceive 
things coming out of earth, does not conceive earth as 'mine', does not 
delight in earth. Why is that? Because that Tathagata has 
comprehended it to the end, I tell you [Mislapariyaya Sutta, MN. 1].' 
It is also worth drawing attention to the problems inherent in Go rampa's 
transcendental thesis in relation to the two truths. As it is a standard 
Madhyamika position to classify every object of knowledge into either 
conventional or ultimate truth, it is necessary for Go rampa to follow suit. Go 
rampa cannot however, classify the intellectual and moral virtues of a 
buddha as conventional phenomena. To do so would be tantamount to 
accepting conventional truth as having soteriological significance. This would 
directly undermine his own transcendental thesis, since in advancing the idea 
of a transcendental enlightened being, Go rampa also rejects the 
epistemological and ontological correlation of such a being with the 
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conventional world. Nor can Go rampa classify these virtues under the 
categories of ultimate truth, since being an avowed monist, he does not 
accept any other category of ultimate truth except its non-dual character. 
Moreover, the achievement of enlightenment presupposes the achievement of 
physical and mental qualities attributed to an enlightened being, which are, 
by definition, conventional phenomena. While Go rampa's transcendental 
thesis rules out the correlation between enlightenment and the enlightened 
virtues, a coherent account of enlightenment surely requires, of necessity, a 
correlation between these two. It is not possible to have the enlightened being 
without the enlightened virtues. In short, the transcendental thesis advanced 
by Go rampa absurdly attempts to validate the attainment of enlightenment 
by invalidating the criteria that define enlightenment—by rejecting the 
enlightened virtues, surely enlightenment itself is rejected also. It would seem 
clear, then, that Go rampa's notion that enlightenment utterly transcends 
conventional truth is not only contradictory to the spirit of the Buddha's 
teachings, but is also logically absurd and practically impossible. 
4.4. Does a Tathagata exist after death? 
The problems with Go rampa's transcendental position do not, however, end 
with these problems concerning the virtues of a Tat hagata. That position is 
also profoundly in conflict with the Buddha's discourses in their emphasis on 
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the ontological issues relating to the Tathagata. Since Go rampa advocates a 
view of an enlightened being as one who is metaphysically transcendent and 
non-empirical, so the only way he could possibly account for the existence of 
such an enlightened being is to advance the thesis that the Tathagata emerges 
and endures only after death. Such a thesis is hardly sustainable. Consider 
the following discourse wherein ftriputra explains that Tathagata is not 
posited as separate from the five aggregates: 
(ariputra): "How do you construe this: Do you regard form as the 
Tathagata? Do you regard feeling as the Tathagata? Do you regard 
perception as the Tathagata? Do you regard mental fabrication as the 
Tathagata? Do you regard consciousness as the Tathagata?"(Yamaka): 
"No, my friend". (ariputra): "How do you construe this: Do you 
regard the Tathagata as being in form?.. .Elsewhere than form?. ..In 
feeling?... Elsewhere than feeling?...In perception?...In 
fabrications?...Elsewhere than fabrications?...In 
consciousness?.. .Elsewhere than consciousness?" (Yamaka): "No, my 
friend". (ariputra): "How do you construe this: Do you regard the 
Tathagata as form-feeling-perception-fabrications-consciousness?" 
(Yamaka): "No, my friend". (ariputra): "Do you regard the Tathagata 
as that which is without form, without feeling, without perception, 
without fabrications, without consciousness?" (Yamaka): "No, my 
friend". (ariputra): 
"And so, my friend Yamaka—when you cannot pin down the 
Tathagata as a truth or reality even in the present life—is it proper for 
you to declare, "As I understand the teaching explained by the Blessed 
One, a monk with no more defilements, on the break-up of the body, is 
annihilated, perishes, and does not exist after death?"(Yamaka): 
"Previously, my friend ariputra, I did foolishly hold that evil 
Chapter V 	 Enlightenment 	 Page 319 
supposition. But now, having heard your explanation of the Dhamma, I 
have abandoned that evil supposition, and have broken through to the 
Dhamma [Yamalca Sutta, SN XXII.85]. 114  
Should we approach this dialogue from Go rampa's transcendental 
perspective, .ariputra and Yamaka must be taken to have completely 
misinterpreted the ontological issues related to tat hagata. While they conclude 
that a tathagata is dependent on his aggregates, and cannot be pinned down 
as an independent entity, from Go rampa's transcendental perspective, the 
existence of tathagata does not depend upon the aggregates—a tathagata 
emerges only after the total elimination of the five aggregates. Likewise, 
consider the Buddha's following discourse with Anuradha concerning the 
nature of tathagata: 
"And so, Anuradha—when you cannot pin down the Tathagata as a 
truth or reality even in the present life—is it proper for you to declare, 
'Friends, the Tathagata—the supreme man, the superlative man, 
attainer of the superlative attainment—being described, is described 
otherwise than with these four positions: The Tathagata exists after 
death, does not exist after death, both does and does not exist after 
death, neither exists nor does not exist after death?" "No lord" 
[Anuradha Sutta, SN XXII.86]. 115 
While the Buddha expressly rejects all the four possible metaphysical 
positions regarding the nature of Tathagata without any equivocation, Go 
rampa proposes the first position, claiming that the Tathagata is achievable 
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only after death. Yet when Vacchagotta asked the Buddha if the Tathagata 
reappears after death, the Buddha expressly rejects the very idea behind such 
a proposition: 
[The Buddha]: '...I will now put some questions to you. Answer as you 
see it. How do you construe this, Vaccha: If a fire were burning in front 
of you, would you know that, "This fire is burning in front of me"?' 
[Vaccha]:'...yes...'[The Buddha]: 'And suppose some one to ask you, 
Vaccha, "This fire burning in front of you, dependent on what is it 
burning?" Thus asked, how would you reply?" [Vaccha]: '...I would 
reply, "This fire burning in front of me is burning dependent on grass 
and time as its sustenance". [The Buddha]: 'If the fire burning in front 
of you were to go out, would you know that "This fire burning in front 
of me has gone out"?' [Vaccha]:...'yes...' 
[The Buddha]: 'And suppose some were to ask you, "This fire 
that has gone out in front of you, in which direction from here has it 
gone? East? West? North? Or south?" Thus asked, how would you 
reply?' [Vaccha]: 'That does not apply, Venerable Gotama. Any fire 
burning dependent on a sustenance of grass and timber, being 
unnourished—from having consumed that sustenance and not being 
offered any other—is classified simply as 'out' (nibbuto). 
[The Buddha]: 'Even so, Vaccha, any physical form by which one 
describing the Tathagata would describe him: That the Tathagata has 
abandoned, its root destroyed, like an uprooted palm tree, deprived of 
the conditions of existence, not destined for future arising. Freed from 
that classification of form, Vaccha, the Tathagata is deep, boundless, 
hard-to-fathom like the sea. "Reappears" does not apply. "Does not 
reappear" does not apply. "Both does and does not reappear" does not 
apply. "Neither reappears and nor does not reappear" does not apply 
[Aggi-Vacchagotta Sutta, MN 72] 116 
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If Go rampa were right that enlightenment is metaphysically transcendent 
and non-empirical, then there would be no reason for the Buddha to deny the 
reappearance of the Tathagata after death—in fact, it would be the most 
appropriate context for the Buddha to endorse the transcendental thesis. 
Instead, the Buddha metaphorically demonstrates the conditioned and 
empirical nature of the Tathagata and explains that an enlightened being is 
ontologically dependent upon its five aggregates. 
At this stage we could ask: But why is the Buddha so persistent in 
rejecting the four positions? What is wrong with these four theses? To 
understand the reasons behind the Buddha's categorical rejection of all four 
positions, we must first understand what these four positions imply. The four 
positions conceive and reify the essence of the Tathagata in terms of the 
category of selfhood, assuming that the liberated being is a substantial self. 
The proponents of the four positions formulate contradictory theses on the 
basis of that essential self. As Hellmuth Hecker correctly suggests, the first 
position, "which is conditioned by the craving for existence, maintains that 
those who have reached the highest goal continue on after death in some 
metaphysical dimension, either as distinct individuals or as absorbed into 
some transpersonal spiritual essence". 117 Hecker also rightly points out that 
"this answer is the one given by most religions, including several later 
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interpretations of Buddhism". 118 The second position—that a Tathagata does 
not exist after death—reflects the craving for nonexistence, for annihilation. 
The proponents of this view regard the Tathagata as truly existent self and 
liberation as the absolute dissolution of that self. Hence, Tathagata is seen as 
completely annihilated after death.' The third view seeks a compromise 
position: everything conditioned and impermanent in a Tathagata would be 
annihilated at death, but the permanent essence, the Tathagata-garbha would 
remain. The fourth position attempts to escape the predicament of the first 
three by formulating a sceptical approach: 'neither-nor' response. 
Nevertheless, the fourth view is underpinned by the same essentialist 
assumption that Tathagata is essentially real.' 
As we saw in the above quotations, "all four formulas have been 
rejected by the Buddha as wrong-views. They all presuppose that there is an 
'I' distinct from the world—an 'I' which is either raised to eternal life or 
annihilated in the abyss of nothingness", as Dr Hecker concludes.' In the 
Buddha's words, "If anyone were to say with regard to a monk whose mind 
is thus released that 'the Tathagata exist after death', is his view, that would 
be mistaken" [Maha-Nidana Sutta, DN 15]." Recognising the tendency to hold 
to the transcendental thesis in Buddhist metaphysicians such as Go rampa, 
Garfield also argues: "It is to combat this tendency to treat the conventional 
world as illusion through treating such apparently transcendental entities as 
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inherently existent that Nagarjuna develops these final chapter".' Among 
those transcendental entities, Garfield points out that "perhaps the most 
obvious candidate for reification in a Buddhist context is the Buddha 
himself". 124 This is where according to Garfield, Nagarjuna challenges the 
transcendental thesis: "The Tathagata is neither the aggregates nor different 
from the aggregates. The aggregates are not in him, nor is he in the 
aggregates. He does not possess aggregates. What then is Tathagata?" 
EXXII:11. 125 We can therefore maintain that "the Buddha does not exist 
inherently in virtue of his own essence. Nor does he exist inherently in virtue 
of some property of his aggregates or, for that matter, in virtue of anything 
else that is other, such as an inherently existing buddha-nature or state of 
nirvaria". 1  Nagarjuna also concludes: "since he is by nature empty, the 
thought that a Buddha exists or does not exist after nirvana is not 
appropriate" POUI:14].' 
There seems little doubt, then, that Go rampa's soteriological account is 
radically incompatible with the position the Buddha has taken to justify his 
enlightenment, with the path of practice taught by the Buddha, with the 
moral and intellectual virtues attributed to an enlightened being and with the 
ontological issues concerning Tat hagata. 
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Conclusion 
For both Tsong Ichapa and Go rampa, there is no doubt that enlightenment 
represents the summum bonum of Buddhism. It represents the most sublime 
wisdom and virtues. Enlightenment is the completion of the entire spiritual 
journey, the perfection of the three trainings—morality (Sila, tshul khrims) 
concentration (samadhi, bsam gtan) and wisdom (prajfia, shes rab). For this 
reason, the discussion in this chapter is particularly important in that it 
demonstrates the way in which the differences between Tsong khapa and Go 
rampa on the nature of the two truths culminate in their understanding of 
enlightenment itself. Because the two truths are given equal footing, Tsong 
Ichapa argues that enlightenment is the culmination of the simultaneous 
realisations of the two truths by every single event of enlightened wisdom. 
Tsong lchapa characterises this as the distinctive trademark of enlightenment. 
• In contrast, Go rampa argues that ultimate truth and ultimate wisdom have 
primacy over empirical truth and empirical consciousness. Consequently, for 
Go rampa, the achievement of enlightenment is the achievement of non-
differentiated and non-dual ultimate truth by ultimate wisdom through the 
transcending of empirical truths and empirical consciousness. 
The fundamental criterion of enlightenment is, according to Tsong 
khapa, a precise knowledge of empirical truths as they actually are. 
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Knowledge without empirical grounding is, as he argues, flawed and 
erroneous and such erroneous knowledge cannot be the basis of 
enlightenment. Knowledge of empirical truths as they are is itself considered 
equivalent to knowing ultimate truth. The empirical and the ultimate are thus 
not to be treated as two contradictory forms of knowledge. For Go rampa, 
however, matters are quite different. Enlightenment, as he presents it, is 
precisely freedom from empirical truth and empirical knowledge, since both 
empirical truth and empirical knowledge are conditioned, false, deceptive, 
and projected by ignorance. Knowing empirical truths and knowing ultimate 
truth are thus contradictory and independent of one another—indeed, the 
former has no soteriological significance whatsoever. 
Ordinary beings, according to Tsong khapa, do not have direct 
knowledge of empirical truth, for they always reify truth and presuppose the 
existence of essence. The fact that the Buddha emphasises the two truths as 
the twofold noble truths indicates, argues Tsong khapa, that only the noble 
beings, aryas and buddhas have direct knowledge of empirical truth. Only 
buddhas are said to possess simultaneous knowledge of both the truths and 
the attainment of such knowledge is characterised as the exceptional 
cognitive skill of an enlightened person. Once again, however, when we turn 
to Go rampa, we find a very different story. Ordinary beings, according to Go 
rampa, have direct knowledge of empirical truths. But, of course, such 
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knowledge serves no soteriological purpose. In fact, Go rampa treats the 
direct knowledge of empirical truths as an object to be negated, since this 
knowledge is due to the operation of ignorance. Go rampa argues that the 
direct knowledge of empirical truths consists of dualities that interrupt and 
obstruct arya-bodhisattvas (from eighth to the tenth bhamis), arya-gravakas and 
arya-pratyekabuddhas from embracing the non-dual and transcendental 
ultimate truth. When all the objects of negation—the entire system of 
empirical truth and the empirical senses—are abolished, only then does the 
sublime wisdom of enlightenment dawn. The most exceptional cognitive skill 
of an enlightened being is, according to Go rampa, the attainment of a 
complete departure from the empirical world. 
An enlightened wisdom, in Tsong khapa's view, manifests itself in two 
different modes of knowing, both of which are mutually compatible and 
mutually reinforcing. Enlightened wisdom knows ultimate truth by way of 
knowing phenomena as dependently arisen. In such wisdom, and the 
knowledge associated with it, there remains a duality between subject and 
object. But because this duality does not comprise even the subtlest 
misconception, it does not constitute a problem. The second mode of 
knowing by an enlightened wisdom is by way of transcending dualities. This 
transcendence is, however, strictly epistemological in nature. It operates 
entirely within the framework of psychophysical aggregates of the 
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enlightened person himself and does not in any way represent a form of 
metaphysical transcendence. Go rampa also postulates two different modes 
of knowing by the enlightened being: knowing from one's own perspective 
and knowing from the other's perspective. But in contrast to Tsong khapa's 
account, the modes of knowing are here seen as fundamentally contradictory. 
Knowing from others' perspective is irrelevant to actual enlightenment and is 
equated with the knowledge of ordinary beings. Just as ordinary beings reify 
essence, so does this mode of knowing. However, when an enlightened being 
knows from his own perspective, then the knowledge is strictly non-
differentiated, non-dual and transcendental. Such knowledge does not allow 
for even the duality between subject and object. Instead a fusion is achieved 
between metaphysically transcendent ultimate truth and ultimate wisdom. 
This non-dual state is itself considered to be ultimate knowledge. 
CONCLUSION 
Inasmuch as Tsong khapa and Go rampa share identical soteriological 
objectives, employ similar methodologies, employ the same Indian 
Prasafigika Madhyamika sources, and work within same linguistic and 
dialectical conventions, so there are undeniable similarities that run 
throughout their two philosophical systems. From the arguments presented 
in the preceding five chapters, however, it is also clear that the disagreement 
between the two Tibetan Madhyamikas regarding their interpretations of the 
two truths is equally pervasive. Since they have already been summarised in 
the conclusions of each of the preceding chapters, I do not intend to restate 
each of the separate points of disagreement here. Nonetheless, we shall 
undertake a brief review of the major differences between Tsong khapa and 
Go rampa's accounts in regard to each of the main areas of soteriology and 
psychology, ontology, epistemology and also, briefly, morality. 
Soteriological and psychological perspectives 
It should be noted that neither Tsong khapa nor Go rampa recognise the 
attainment of nirvana as the highest goal. Since both of them are Mahayana 
advocates, the highest ideal of bodhisattva is always Buddhahood, rather 
than the arhathood of gravakas and Pratyekabuddhas. They agree that 
Buddhahood constitutes the summum bonum of Mahayan practice, which is 
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attained through the culmination of rupakaya—the consequence of the 
accumulation of moral virtues, and dharmakaya—the consequence of the 
accumulation of wisdom. However, they each conceive of Buddhahood in 
radically different ways that correspond to their opposing treatments of the 
two truths. Even at the level of Buddhahood, Tsong khapa argues for a 
harmonious relationship between the two truths, while Go rampa rejects such 
harmony, insisting on the absolute character of ultimate truth and the 
rejection of conventional truth. Tsong khapa argues that the accomplishment 
of the ultimate goal provides the most coherent epistemic access to the 
climactic unity between the two truths and thus the simultaneous knowledge 
of the two truths is reserved only for the fully enlightened beings. In contrast, 
Go rampa argues that the accomplishment of the ultimate goal leads to the 
ultimate breakdown of all the connections between the two truths and thus 
he holds that realisation of the ultimate disunity between the two truths is a 
cognitive achievement reserved only for those who reach the highest goal. 
For Tsong khapa, Tathagata—one who achieves the highest goal—is a 
conventional and dependently arisen phenomenon. For Go rampa, however, 
whosoever achieves the highest goal is non-empirical and utterly 
unconditioned—hence a Tathagata is a transcendental and non-dual being. 
Since they consider arhat as one of the epithets applicable to a buddha, 
Tsong khapa and Go rampa both take the prior attainment of nirvana as one 
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of the essential conditions for the attainment of Buddhahood. Superficially, 
Tsong khapa and Go rampa appear to agree on the psychological 
transformations that arise as a result of achieving nirvana. Both acknowledge 
that the psychological dispositions of ordinary beings undergo radical 
transformations. The unhealthy psychological dispositions of the ordinary 
state—saritsaric predispositions—are replaced by the healthy psychological 
dispositions of the liberated state—the attainment of nirvana. In this way a 
radical dichotomy is apparent between sarilsara and nirvana. Saritsara here 
means 'round of rebirth', literally 'perpetual wandering'—a continual process 
of birth, growing old, suffering and dying. More precisely, saritsara is the 
unbroken chain of the five psychophysical aggregates. Saiilsara, as opposed 
to nirvana, comes to mean psychological bondage, moral corruption and a 
state of ever restlessness induced by craving, aversion, delusion etc. Nirvana, 
on the other hand, means 'psychological freedom' or 'moral perfection'. 
Nirvana (Pali nibbana, Tib. mnyang 'das) literally means 'extinction' (nir-vqva), 
'to cease blowing', 'to become extinguished' or 'freedom from desire' 
(nir+vana). In other words, and as the Buddha defines it, "extinction of greed, 
extinction of hate, extinction of delusion is called nibbana" [SN XXXVIII.1]. In 
this context, as Kalupahana rightly points out, "nirvana is the 'ultimate fruit' 
(paramatth), and culmination of the fruit (attha) of everyday life, the highest 
moral perfection involving the eschewing of all immoral conduct (sabb-papass 
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akaranam) and the promotion of good (kusalassa upasampada)". 1 This account 
fits well with Candralcirti's treatment of "empirical truth (tha snyad bden pa) as 
a means (thabs) while ultimate truth as its result (thabs byung)"[VI:80]. 2 
For Tsong khapa, nirvana is antithetical to sathsara, particularly when 
the emphasis is placed on the psychological and moral underpinnings of 
sarhsara and nirvana. Moreover, nirvana is not equated with ultimate truth 
nor is sarhsara equated with conventional truth. Since sarhsara and nirvana 
are, in this context, contrasted on the basis of their psychological and moral 
contents, they cannot be equated with the ontology of the two truths. Sarhsara 
represents moral bankruptcy, while nirvana represents moral perfection; the 
former represents psychological ills, while the latter represents freedom from 
psychological ills. On the other hand, considering Go rampa's commitment to 
the idea of alayvijnana, which is said to be the 'fundamental root' of both 
sarhsara and nirvana—of both primordial awareness and adventitious 
• defilements—it appears that sarhsara and nirvana, on his view, must co-exist 
at a psychological and moral level. 
The ontological perspective 
Tsong khapa's ontology treats the two truths as mutually entailing. He argues 
that the two truths share the same ontological status, and that they are empty 
and dependently arisen phenomena (pratityasamutpanna). The same principle 
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applies to his ontology of sarhsara and nirvana. Since both saritsara and 
nirvana are dependently arisen and empty, they stand on an equal 
ontological footing. Go rampa's ontology treats the two truths as hierarchical 
and mutually contradictory. He argues that the ontological status of 
conventional truth and ultimate truth are distinct and independent. The same 
distinction is applied in the way he treats saihsara and nirvana ontologically. 
While conventional truth and sarhsara are treated as dependently arisen, and 
thus as ontologically conditioned (samskrta, 'dus byas), Go rampa argues that 
ultimate truth and nirvana are ontologically unconditioned (asamskrta, 'dus 
ma byas) and transcendental. The spirit of Go rampa's transcendental 
ontology is well expressed in Spiro's words: "From an ontological point of 
view, Buddhism postulates the existence of two planes which, like parallel 
lines, never meet. One the one hand there is sarhsara, the worldly (lokiya) 
plane; on the hand there is nirvana, the otherworldly (Pali: lokuttara) or 
transcendental plane"? 
The epistemological perspective 
The knowledge of conventional and ultimate truths—of sarirtsara and 
nirvarta—are, according to Tsong khapa's epistemology, mutually 
complimentary. They are yoked together and cannot be isolated from one 
another. Just as the knowledge of conventional truth depends on the 
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knowledge of ultimate truth, so the knowledge of sarhsara depends on the 
realisation of nirvana. One who directly knows conventional truth and 
sarhsara as dependently arisen and empty thus also knows ultimate truth and 
nirvana as dependently arisen and empty. This means that without knowing 
ultimate truth and nirvana as dependently arisen and empty, it is not possible 
to know conventional truth and sarhsara as dependently arisen and empty. 
In contrast, according to Go rampa's epistemology, knowledge of each of the 
two truths—of sarhsara and nirvana—is inconsistent with knowledge of the 
other. The knowledge of conventional truth and saihsara as dependently 
arisen is distinct from and autonomous with respect to the knowledge of 
ultimate truth and nirvana. The knowledge of conventional truth and 
sarhsara as dependently arisen is a mundane knowledge based on a 
knowledge of both conventional truth and sarhsara as ontologically 
conditioned, whereas the knowledge of ultimate truth, and of nirvana, 
constitutes transcendental knowledge since it is based on knowing ultimate 
truth and nirvana as ontologically transcendent. 
In terms of the epistemological resources by means of which the two 
truths are verified, the distinctions are again sharply marked. Tsong khapa 
considers empirically valid cognition and ultimately valid cognition as the 
two verifying consciousnesses. Although empirically valid cognition verifies 
conventional truth and ultimately valid cognition ultimate truth, Tsong 
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khapa holds that empirically valid cognition itself does not know 
conventional truth. Likewise, ultimately valid cognition itself is not a 
sufficient condition for knowledge of ultimate truth. In order to have a 
coherent knowledge of either of the two truths, Tsong Ichapa argues that the 
two verifying consciousnesses must support each other. While Tsong khapa 
sees the mutual support between the two cognitive resources as the 
absolutely indispensable condition in developing correct knowledge of both 
conventional and ultimate truth, Go rampa takes a very different approach. 
He considers ignorance and wisdom as the two verifying 
consciousnesses—and he sees those two consciousnesses as mutually 
contradictory and as each operating in a way that is utterly independent the 
other. 
The ethical perspective 
The disagreements between Tsong lchapa and Go rampa do not stop at the 
ontological and epistemological levels. There is yet another important 
perspective from which the differences between them can be pursued. 
Although this thesis does not directly explore Tsong khapa and Go rampa's 
treatment of morality, the comparative analysis of the doctrine of the two 
truths that has been advanced would remain incomplete without some 
reflection on the ethical implications of the differences between the two 
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truths. Since Tsong khapa is committed to the mutually compatible 
relationship between the two truths and the two corresponding cognitive 
processes, he is also committed to the mutually compatible relationship 
between non-conceptual wisdom (i.e., meditative equipoise) and conceptual 
wisdom (i.e., the post-meditative equipoise). Tsong khapa argues that the 
dualistic cognitive • engagements of an enlightened being—namely, the 
activities of practical orientation—are consistent with non-conceptual 
wisdom—the wisdom of ultimate truth in a buddha's meditative equipoise. 
Just as non-conceptual wisdom enhances the authority of conceptual wisdom, 
so too does the conceptual wisdom of a buddha reinforce the authority of 
non-conceptual wisdom. In this way, Tsong khapa holds that the elements of 
the threefold training (tri-liksa, blab pa gsum)—training of morality (gdaliksa, 
tshul khrmis kyi bslab pa), training of concentration (samadhiliksa, ting nge 'dzin 
gyi blab pa), training of wisdom (prajtialiksa, shes rab kyi bslab pa)—each 
provide support for the other. The intensity of the penetrating wisdom that is 
geared towards attaining enlightenment arises from concentrated mind. A 
concentrated mind arises from a firm moral foundation. The eightfold path 
fused together into the unity of a single cohesive path reflects the fact that the 
threefold training constitutes a unity of mutually interdependent elements 
that also support a larger structure each of the elements that make up that 
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training makes its own vital contribution to the path that leads towards the 
ultimate goal. 
Tsong khapa maintains that the factors of moral discipline—right 
speech (sarhyakvak, yang dad pa'i ngag), right action (saihyakkarmanta, yang dag 
pa 'i las kyi mtha') and right livelihood (sathyagajiva, yang dag pa 'i 'tsho 
ba)—keep the tendencies towards ethical transgression in check and thus 
prevent even the thought of unethical conduct. He argues that by avoiding 
mental distraction and forgetfulness, the three factors of concentration—right 
effort (sarhyagvyayama, yang dag pa'i rtsol ba), right mindfulness (sathyaksmrti, 
yang dag pail dran pa) and right concentration (sathyaksamadhi, yang dag pa'i 
ting nge 'dzin)—firmly anchor the mind upon the stream of bodily and mental 
processes and thus enable the cognitive agent to understand them as 
impermanent, selfless, and empty characteristics. A firm moral foundation 
accompanied by a fully concentrated mind leads to the growth of the two 
types of penetrating wisdom. First is the unfolding of experiential 
wisdom—the experiential right-view (sarhyakdrstti, yang dag pa'i lta ba)—that 
enables the cognitive agent to visualise the five psychophysical aggregates 
non-conceptually, and thus non-dualistically. Second is the unfolding of 
conceptual wisdom—the conceptual right-view (sarhyaksarizkalpa, yang dag pa'i 
rtog. pa)—that enables the cognitive agent to make correct conceptual 
judgements—ontological, moral and epistemological. The resulting benefits 
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of the development of the two types of penetrating wisdoms show 
themselves in the purity of psychological, moral and cognitive states. 
So far as Tsong khapa is concerned, then, the stages of the eightfold path 
are only linear in a 'metaphorical sense'. As Damien Keown puts it, "it does 
not list stages which are to be passed through and left behind so much as 
describe the dimensions of human good and the technique for their 
cultivation".4 Morality cannot be considered as a platform to enable some 
form of 'soteriological leap'. It rather forms the heart of the goal itself. The 
following of this path, as Damien Keown also points out, "is therefore best 
understood as the gradual cultivation of moral and intellectual virtue. 
Nirvana is the perfection of these virtues and not an ontological shift or 
soteriological quantum leap".5 Similarly, the scheme of personal 
development, including practices such as the ten perfections (daga-paramitd, 
phar ph yin drug) which are often expressed using linear metaphors of stages, 
hurdles, or rungs on a ladder, "can be misunderstood if it is not remembered 
that each of the stages is part of an overall pattern of cumulative 
development. Each stage develops out of and includes the previous ones". 6 It 
is therefore critical to Tsong khapa's view that the beginning and end of 
spiritual development must take place in the same continuum of the same 
person—otherwise, as Keown puts it, "the process could never begin at all".7 
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For the reasons set out above, Tsong khapa always retains a sharp and 
clear distinction between moral and immoral conduct, and their further 
ethical implications, all the way through to the consummation of the highest 
possible spiritual development. In fact, according to Tsong khapa, a buddha 
is an embodiment of the highest standards of moral integrity and wisdom, 
both in spirit and in action. This unity between wisdom and morality is 
justifiable given his commitment to the harmonious relationship of the two 
truths. 
The lesser role accorded to morality in Go rampa's soteriology is not 
immediately evident. Like Tsong lchapa, Go rampa generally affirms the 
importance of moral conduct as the basic starting point. The essential 
disagreement between them emerges, not at the outset, but only later—in the 
way they each evaluate the role of morality in the advanced stages of the 
path. Morality and enlightenment, so far as Go rampa is concerned, are 
distinct and can never meet. Morality leads in the direction of enlightenment, 
but must be finally discarded before enlightenment is attained. Since Go 
rampa is committed to disparaging conventional truths, arguing that they are 
projections of ignorance, or total illusions, so conventional practices, 
including adherence to moral values, are inevitably seen as objects to be 
discarded. Ultimately morality is irrelevant for the attainment of the 
soteriological goal—the latter being properly transcendent of moral value. 
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Go rampa's transcendental thesis seems to be inspired by the Buddha's 
remarks on the 'parable of the raft' where the Buddha states: "Even so, 
monks, is the parable of the raft dhamma taught by me for crossing over, not 
for retaining. You, monks, by understanding the parable of the raft, should 
get rid even of (right) mental objects, all the more of wrong ones" [MN 1.1341. 8 
Moreover, since transcendental wisdom as such is seen as identical with 
ultimate truth—which Go rampa characterises as an absolute that is timeless 
and unaffected by change—so no amount of moral or immoral activity 
should influence its basic nature. On this account, morality is at best 
gratuitous with no soteriological significance whatsoever. Go rampa argues 
that the absolute Tathagata, transcendental wisdom, transcends all empirical 
diversity. With the achievement of enlightenment, the distinctions between 
good and bad, moral and immoral, skilful and unskilful etc., lose their 
validity. "Such distinctions are valid only at the conventional level, not the 
level of final realisation; they are binding on the trainee, not on the adept", as 
Bhildthu Bodhi pejoratively puts it.9 
According to this view, the conduct of an enlightened being cannot be 
circumscribed by moral principles. Sogyal Rinpoche puts this point in 
particularly forceful fashion: "in the final state of mastery, liberation is like a 
chief entering an empty house; whatever arises neither harms or benefits a 
true Dzogchen yogin. Even in the greatest yogin, sorrow and joy still arise 
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just as before".' Inasmuch as an enlightened being has transcended all 
conventional distinctions of moral and immoral, good and bad, so he acts 
spontaneously from his intuition of the ultimate non-duality. Thus an 
enlightened being is, as Bhikkhu Bodhi sarcastically describes it, "no longer 
bound by the rules of morality valid for those still struggling towards the 
light. His behaviour is an elusive, incomprehensible outflow of what has been 
called crazy wisdom"." In the position taken by Go rampa, moral virtue and 
all that it represents can only inhibit and obstruct the attainment of the final 
goal. As King proposes it "[the enlightened being] must kick away from 
under him the laboriously built ladder of kammic merit from which he has 
risen towards sainthood, and take to the transcendental flight on the wings of 
super-normal (super kamrrtic) wisdom". 12 The moral virtue itself "which 
raises one to such a realm, and the love even of the highest kind of 
goodness... no matter how much preferable to the love of evil", explains 
King, "bind him more subtly and dangerously than before to the realm of 
time and space, that is, birth death and suffering". 13 So although morality is 
seen as a necessary condition for the attainment of enlightenment, it is also 
seen as simultaneously and paradoxically a hindrance to such attainment. Of 
course, if Go rampa were right in claiming that enlightenment is transcendent 
of moral virtues, then as Keown puts it, "the Buddha would have passed 
beyond the possibility of ethical predication and become a moral zero".14 
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Paradoxical though such a conclusion may appear, it nevertheless 
consistently reflects Go rampa's attitudes towards and treatment of 
conventional truth. 
In spite of the fact that this view has many adherents, it is hardly a 
sustainable one. There is ample evidence in the canon of the way the Buddha 
continues to characterise himself as being the one who has accomplished and 
perfected both wisdom and moral virtue. Thus, in the following discourse, 
the Buddha himself tells Kagyapa (Skt.) that he is perfect in lila: "There are 
some Samanas and Brahmanas, Kassapa (Pali), who lay emphasis on morality 
(sila). They speak in many ways in praise of morality. But so far as regards the 
most noble and highest morality I know of no one who is equal to myself, 
much less superior. For it is I who am the foremost in the highest morality 
(adhisila)" [D.I.174].' Similarly the Buddha states: "I, Moggallana, am 
perfectly pure in morality and know that I am. I know that my morality is 
perfectly pure, clean and stainless. My disciples do not supervise me in 
respect of morality and I do not expect them to" [A.111.126]. 16 Elsewhere he 
speaks of "three things which a Tathagata has not to guard against: 
Tathagata, friends, is pure in conduct whether of act, or speech or thought. 
There is no misdeed of any kind concerning which he must take care lest 
another should come to know of it" [D.1E217]. 17 The Buddha also tells us that 
even an arhat attains moral perfection and, in fact, goes on to argue that an 
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arhat has totally uprooted the tendencies to commit any immoral actions: "A 
monk who has destroyed the asavas [i.e. an Arahat] is unable intentionally to 
kill a living creature, to take by theft that which is not given, to have sexual 
intercourse, to tell a deliberate life, or to take pleasure in things stored up, as 
he did before as a layman" [D.III.235]. 18 And again: "The Arahats, as long as 
they live, abandon the slaying of creatures and hold aloof from it, laying 
aside the rod and the sword they are modest and kind and dwell friendly and 
compassionately with all living beings" [A.I.211]. 19 
If the conduct of a buddha, having transcended morality, were beyond 
moral circumscription, as Go rampa argues, then it would make no sense for 
the Buddha to give an evaluation of his or an arhat's moral excellence. 
Moreover, if a buddha or an arhat's perception of the world was ethically 
transparent in the way Go rampa suggests it should be, then, in the words of 
Keown's challenge, "why should what is conventionally described as 
'immoral action' be impossible for him? And conversely, why should actions 
which display moral perfection be the norm in his case"?' The only 
satisfactory answer here is to maintain that at the end of the entire spiritual 
journey, a buddha or an arhat "still stands within the same ethical continuum 
in which he began to tread the path to enlightenment".21 The Buddha actually 
provides a very good description of the scheme of progress from morality to 
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enlightenment that also fits with the idea that the achievement of moral and 
soteriological perfection is simultaneous: 
So, Ananda, good moral conduct (kusalani-silani) has freedom from 
remorse as its aim and advantage; freedom from remorse has joy; joy 
has rapture; rapture has calm; calm has happiness; happiness has 
concentration; concentration has knowledge and vision of things as 
they are;.. .disenchantment and dispassion;.. .release by knowledge and 
vision as their aim and advantage. So you see, Ananda, good moral 
conduct leads gradually up to the summit [AN V. 2]. 22 
In the Malulparinibbana Sutta, the Buddha also repeatedly declares: 
Such is sila, such is samadhi, such is pann. Samadhi, when based upon 
sila, is rich in result and of great effect. Patina, when based upon 
samadhi, is rich in result and of great effect. The mind, when developed 
through paiiria, is thoroughly liberated from the asavas, taints, namely, 
kamasava,bhavasava, and avijjasava [DN 16].' 
The relationship between moral virtues and enlightenment, and moral virtues 
and nirvana, is the relationship between ethics and soteriology. To quote 
from Keown once more: "Far from being incompatible there is an integral and 
inalienable relationship between moral goodness and enlightenment. Since 
the path is both the means and the end, there is no ontological gulf to be 
'crossed over'.' The sharp disagreement between Tsong khapa and Go rampa 
on the matter of the two truths thus also applies to their treatment of morality 
and its soteriological significance. 
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The comparative analysis undertaken here clearly shows that the positions 
taken by the two Tibetan Prasafigika Madhyamikas are quite distinct and, in 
fact, irreconcilable. Tsong khapa's commitment to the unity between the two 
truths, and the unity between the two corresponding epistemic pathways, 
lays the foundation of the distinctive features of his entire philosophical 
system. In contrast, the distinctive features of Go rampa's account rest on his 
deep commitment to the mutually contradictory relationship between the 
two truths and the respective verifying cognitions. There is little doubt 
indeed that these two Tibetan Prasatigilca Madhyamikas represent almost 
entirely distinct adaptations and interpretations of the conceptions of the two 
truths in the Indian Prasatigika Madhyamaka. Consequently, there can be 
little doubt either that the two Tibetan Prasafigika Madhyamaka traditions 
represented by Tsong Ichapa and Go rampa stand in direct opposition to one 
another—at least in terms of the four major philosophical areas of ontology, 
epistemology, soteriology and, not least, morality. 
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Notes on Introduction 
1 There is no definite division between the uses of Madhyamika and Madhyamaka. Both can 
be used interchangeabley and both are defensible. However, throughout the thesis, when the 
word is used in association with the person who holds the view I use Madhyamika while 
when the term is used in association with the view itself, literature, system or tradition 
reflecting the view, I tend to use Madhyamaka. 
2 For a review of the numbering systems used by many Pali Scholars, see 'The Contents and 
Structure of the Pali Canon and its Commentaries,' by the UK Association for Buddhist 
Studies at the University of Sunderland on: 
http:/ /www.sunderland.ac.uk/—os0dwe/bs12.html. 
3 For a review of the numbering conventions used on 'Access to Insight's' translations, see 
'Sutta Reference Numbers' on http:/ /www.accesstoinsightorg/abbrev.html#suttaref 
Notes and Tibetan citations on Chapter I 
1 See Newland, The Two Truths, pp. 59-75; and Hopkins, Meditation on Emptiness, pp. 413-417. 
2 The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, (p. 871) states: "thing', in its most general sense, is 
interchangeable with 'entity' or 'being' and is applicable to any item whose existence is 
acknowledged by a system of ontology, whether that item be particular, universal, abstract, 
or concrete". 
3 Bod rgya tshig mdzod chen mo, p. 633: ngo bo/ rang bzhin clang gnas lugs/ 
4 Ibid., p. 633: ngo bo gcig pa/ rang bzhin tha mi dad pa/ dper na bum pa dang mi rtag pa lta 
bu'o/ 
5 Ibid., p. 633: ming gi mam grangs la rang bzhin gcig pa dang/ bdag nyid gcig pa'o/ / 
6 Cabezon, A Dose of Emptiness, p. 364 also translates ngo bo cig as a 'single-nature'. 
7 See Hopkins, Meditation on Emptiness, p. 413 and Newland, The Two Truths, pp. 59. 
8 Cabezon, A Dose of Emptiness, (p. 364) writes, "the two truths are of the same nature but 
have different opposites". 
9 Dreyfus, Recognising Reality, pp. 165-170. 
1° As suggested by Prof. Garfield on my draft chapter. 
Bod rgya tshig mdzod chen mo, p. 1458: rtog pa rigs mi mthun pa'am tha dad pa las log par 
snang ba'i chos/ dper na/ bum pa ma yin pa las log tsam gyi cha ni bum pal ldog pa yin pa 
ste rtog pa la snang ba'i gzugs lta bu'o/ / 
12 Recognising Reality, p. 166. 
13 Recognising Reality, p. 165. 
Bod rgya tshig mdzod chen mo, p. 663:ngo bo gcig la ldog pa tha dad pa/ rang bzhin so so ba 
ma yin zhing rang gi ldog pa tha dad du gnas pa ste/ bum pa dang shes bya gnyis dang/ mi 
rtag pa dang dngos po/ mi dang mi'i nyer len gyi bum po'o// 
13 Grub mtha'i rnam bshad, pp. 849-852. 
16 Meditation on Emptiness, pp. 406-412. Hopkins also considers 'Jam dbyangs bZhad pa's 
objections to those six different positions regarding the basis of the divisions of the two 
truths. 
17 The Two Truths, pp. 40-50. 
18 dGongs pa rab bsal, p. 176: bden pa gnyis kyi dbye gzhi la 'dud tshul me 'dra ba mang mod 
kyang/ 'dir shes bya la bya ste/ / His followers unanimously accept 'objects of knowledge' as 
the basis of the division of the two truths. For example, mKhas grub de (see Cabezon, A Dose 
of Emptiness, pp. 357-360), wherein he not only proposes 'objects of knowledge' as the basis of 
the division of the two truths but also refutes the position of rNgog who discounts ultimate 
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truth from the objects of knowledge. See also 1Cang skya, Grub mtha' mdzes rgyan, pp. 317- 
318; and 'Jam dbyangs bZhad pa, Grub mtha' rrzam bshad, pp. 849-852. 
19 Toh. no. 60, dKon brtsegs nga, folio 62b:'de ltar de bzhin gshigs pas kun rdzob dang don 
dam pa gnyis thugs su chud de/ shes bar bya ba yang kun rdzob dang don dam pa'i bden pa 
'der zad de/ de yang bcom ldan ldas kyis stong pa nyid du rab tu gzigs rab tu Inkhyen/ legs 
par mngon du byas pas de'i phyir thams cad mkhyen pa zhes bya'o/ / Cited in the dGongs pa 
rab gsal, p. 176; InKhas grub rje (see Cabezon, A Dose of Emptiness, p. 357). 
Toh no.6o, dkon brtsegs nga, folio 61b. Cited in the dGongs pa rab gsal, p. 178: 'jig rten mkhen 
'pa'i gzhan la ma gsan par/ bden pa de gnyis nyid kyis stong par mrzad/ gang gi kun rdzob 
de bzhin don dam tse/ bden pa gsum pa gang yang ma mchis so// 
21 Bod rgya tshig mdzod chen mo, p. 2862: shes bya/ blo'i yul du bya rung ba ste/ ka ba dang 
bum pa la sogs pa'i chos gang dang gang yin rung kyang/ sems can nas sangs rgyas kyi bar 
gyi blo spi'i yul du bya rung ba'o/ / 
n Meditation on Emptiness, p. 418. 
23 dGongs pa rab gsal, p. 173: 'dis ni myu gu lta bu gcig gi ngo bo la yang phye na kun rdzob 
yin pa dang/ don dam yin pa'i ngo bo gnyis yod par ston gyi ...// As Tsong khapa further 
explains, "the ultimate reality of the sprout is its [ultimate] characteristic (rang bzhin), thus it 
is called sprout's nature. The sprout's colour, shape etc., are also its features, therefore they 
too are its nature' (rTsa shes tik chen, p. 406: myu gu'i chos nyid ni de'i rang bzhin yin pas de'i 
ngo bo zhes bya la myu gu'i kha dog dang dbyibs la sogs pa yang myu gu'i bdag nyid yin 
pas de'i ngo bo'o//) 
24 dGongs pa rab gsal, p. 173: 'des ni myu gu lta bu gcig gi ngo bo la yang phye na kun rdzob 
yin pa dang/ don dam yin pa'i ngo bo gnis yod par ston gyi myu gu'i ngo bo gcig nyid so 
skye dang 'phags pa la ltos nas bden pa gnyis su bstan pa gtan min no/I 
25 Hopkins also states, "the division of the two truths is not an ontological division... The 
division of the two truths emphasises two types of objects of consciousness, truths and 
falsities. Both, however, are falsely existent or falsely established because neither is 
independent; each depends on its imputing consciousness and on the other". See Meditation 
on Emptiness, p. 414 
26 The Two Truths, p. 49. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Nges don rab gsal, p. 374a-b 
29 Ibid., p. 374a-b 
3o Ibid., p. 374a-b: yul gyi gnas tshul gyi ngos nas bden pa gyis su med kyang blos gnas tshul 
mthong ba clang ma mthong ba'i sgo nas bden pa grtyis su dbye zhes pa'i don du snang bas 
shin tu legs so// des na gnas tshul rang ngos nas mtshan mtshon dang/ dbye gzhi dang 
dbye ba sogs byar med kyang tha snyad bden par sgro brtag nas gdul bya la bstan pa'i dbye 
ba'i ya gyal yod pa ltar bdye gzhi'ang yod par bya dgos/ / 
'Ibid., p. 374b: gsung rub kyi brjod bya tsam dbyer gzhir byas na shin tu'ang 'thad te... dbu 
ma'i zhung lugs 'dir sgras bstan du med kyang tha snyad du sgras bstan pa dang/ bden pa 
gnyis po dbyir med kyang gdul bya la dbye ste bstan pa sogs gzhung 'grel gye dgongs pa 
gong 'og sgrigs na 'de nyid 'thad par sems so/ / 
32 Ibid., p. 374a-b: gnas tshul rang ngos nas mtshan mtshon dang/ dbye gzhi dang dbye ba 
sogs byar med kyang tha snyad bden par sgro btags nas gdul bya la bstan pa'i tshe bye ba'i 
ya gyal yod pa ltar dbye bzhi yod par bya dgos.../ / 
33 Nagarjuniana, p. 19. 
34 Nagarjuniana, p. 19-49n. 
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35 Nges don rab gsal, p. 374a—b. 
36 Ibid., p. 374b: bden pa gnyis ste/ yul can gyi blo sgo nas kun rdzob gyi bden pa dang don 
dam bden pa gnyis yin la/ / 
37 Ibid., p. 375b: dbu ma'i gzhun lugs 'dir ni yul rang ngos nas bden pa gnyis su dbyer 
med... / / 
1Ta ba ngan sel, f. 611: de yang gzhi gcig nyid snang tshul gyi sgo nas so sor phye ba yin gyi 
yul gyi ngos nas so sor yod pa zhig ma yin no!! Also see f. 603: de ltar blo'i sgo nas ngo bo 
gnyis 'dzin pa'i mthong ba yang dag pa'i yul ni don dam bden pa yin la/ thong ba rdzun 
pa'i yul ni kun rdzob bden pa'i/ / 
39 Nges don rab gsal, p. 375b: brdzun pa mthong ba dang/ yang dag mthong ba gnyis sam/ 
'khrul ma khrul griyis/ rmongs ma rmongs gnyis/ phyin ci log ma log gnyis sam/ tshad ma 
yin min gnyis kyis mthong tshul gyi sgo nas kun rdzob den pa dang/ don dam bden pa gyis 
su phye ba ste/ / Also see p. 375b—d for his detailed authentication of each of these assertions 
through citing various textual sources. 
4° Ibid., p. 384c: bden pa gnyis yul can gyi blo rmongs ma rmongs sam brdzun pa mthong ba 
dang/ yang dag mthong ba'am/ 'khrul ma 'khrul gyi sgo nas 'jog dgos pas yul can gyi blo'i 
sgo nas 'jog pa ni rgya gar gyi thal rang thams cad mthun par snang la!/ 
41 He argues that the division of the two truths is made depending on 'mistaken cognition' 
(blo 'khrul ba) and 'urunistaken cognition' (blo makhrul ba). See Grub mtha' mrdzod, ff. 201-202. 
gZhung lugs legs bshad pa, p. 72d: yul can gyi blo 'khrul pa dang/ ma Ichrul pa gnyis la ltos 
nas bden pa gnyis su nges pa yin no!! 
43 Mi pham's treatment of the two truths is quite inconsistent. Sometimes he appears 
strikingly similar to the view held by Tsong khapa, particularly in the Nges shes sgros me, ff. 
95-97 and his commentary to the Madhyamakavatara, i.e., Zia ba'i zhal lung ff. 81, 169. In the 
Shes 'grel ke ta ka, pp. 3-4, 90-92, Mi pham however explicitly endorses the perspective based 
division of the two truths. 
4° Rigs tsogs dka' gnad, f. 7: bden pa gnyis po yang yul la chos gnyis yod pa'i dbang gyis bzhag 
pa mm gyi/ shes ngo gynis la ltos nas gzhag pa ste/ / See also f. 11. 
45 Although, he claims 'mere objects of knowledge' (shes bya tsam) as the basis of the division 
of the two truths, it is obvious that he is more committed to a division based on two different 
perspectives. See Grub mtha' kun shes, f. 27; and Grub mtha'i rnam bshad, f. 206, where he 
argues that the Prasafigikas accept all conventionalities based on the perspectives of ordinary 
beings. 
46 Despite the fact that he claims 'mere truth' (bden pa tsam) as the basis of the division, his 
explanation is rooted in the notion that the two truths are distinguished on the basis of the 
correct perception and the incorrect perception. See bDen gnyis rnam gzhag, f. 15; also see (ff. 
3-4) for his objections to Tsong khapa's claim that the objects of knowledge (shes bya) is the 
basis of the divisions of the two truths. 
47 Dag brgyud grub pa'i shing rta, ff. 5, 306: 'jig rten pa gang dag de kno na nyid rtogs ched du 
'jig rten gyi bden brdzun gyi tha snyad sogs dang sgo bstun nas de ngor gcom ldan 'das kyis 
bden gnyis kyi mam gzhag mdzad kyi/ bdu ma pa rang lugs kyis grub pa ni ma yin no!! 
He argues that there is no two truths in the Madhyamaka system. They are purely posited 
from the perspective of ordinary beings. 
48 In his introduction to the Madhyamika Dialectic and the philosophy of Nagarjuna, he argues 
(pp. xxiv—xxvi), "paramarthasatya, or Absolute Truth is the knowledge of the real as it is 
without any distortion... Sainvrtisatya is Truth so-called;. Truth as conventionally believed in 
common parlance... There are not two different spheres or sets of objects... the difference is 
in our manner of looking at things". 
49 In his article 'Madhyamaka' in the Madhyamika Dialectic and the Philosophy of Nagarjuna, he 
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argues (pp. 152-153) "dharmas are like the hairs that a monk with diseased eyes thinks he sees 
in his alms bowl; ...This is proved by the fact that a man with the undiseased eyes has no 
though about these hairs at all..". 
5° In The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana he writes (p. 300): "The Absolute and the Empirical... 
are not two sets of separate realities set over against each other.. .The Absolute or Nirvana 
viewed through the thought-constructions (vikalpa) is sarhsara, the world or sarinsara viewed 
sub specie aeternitatis is the Absolute or Nirvana itself". Also he states (p. 71): "the universe 
viewed as a whole is the Absolute, viewed as a process, it is the phenomena". 
51 In Nagarjuniana, he writes (p. 276): "The two truths cannot be claimed to express different 
levels of objective reality since all things always equally lack svabhava. They are merely two 
ways of looking (dargana) at things, a provisional and a definite". 
52 In The Emptiness of Emptiness, he argues (p. 232) that all phenomena possess only one 
nature and that the second nature is obtained on the strength of false perceptions of common 
people. It is thus said "that all things bear a dual intrinsic nature". Also see pp. 39,40,231. 
53 The Two Truths, p. 47. 
54 As cited in Newland's The Two Truths, p. 47. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Meditation on Emptiness, p. 419. 
58 Madhyamkavatara, p. 155: dngos kun yang dag brdzun pa mthong ba yis/ dngos rnyed ngo 
bo gyis ni 'dzin par 'gyur/VI:23/ Cited in the Madhyamakatarabltasya, p. 98. 
59 Madhyamakatarabhasya, p. 98: 'du byed dang myu gu la sogs pa nang dang phyi ro gyi 
dngos po thams cad kyi rang gyi ngo bo rnam pa gnyis nye bar bstan ste/ / Cited in the rTs 
shes tik-chen, p. 406. 
Stong thun chen mo, f. 429: 'jug pa las/ dngos rnyed ngo bo gnyis ni 'dzin par 'gyur/ zhes 
sogs rtsa 'grel ggis gsung pa ltar kun rdzob dang don dam gyi chos thams cad la ngo bo yod 
la/ ngo bo yod na ngo bo gcid clang tha dad gang rung yin dgos ste yod na gcig dang tha 
dad gang rung yin dgos phyir ro/ / I borrowed the translation of this passage from 
Cabezon, A Dose of Emptiness, p. 363. 
Tsong khapa argues that there are only two possibilities, either the two natures are 
identical (ngo bo gcig) or distinct (ngo bo tha dad). See dGongs par rab gsal, p. 176: 'der ni gnyis 
ka la ngo bo yod la/ de la ngo bo gcig dang tha dad gang yang min pa mi srid pa'i phir/ 
62 dGongs pa rab gsal, p. 176: byas pa dang ml rtag pa lta bu ste/ / 
63 See Namdol, Acarya Naga- rjuna's Bodhicittavivarana and Acarya kamalagila's Bodhicitabhavana, 
pp. 45-45:kun rdzob las ni tha dad par// de nyid dznigs pa ma yin te/67/ kun rdzob stong 
pa nyid du bshad/ / stong pa lcho na kun rdzob yin/ /med na mi `byung nges pa'i 
phir/ /byas dang mi rtag je bzhin no/ 68/ Cited in the dGongs pa rab gsal, p.176; mIthas grub 
rje, sTong thun chen mo (see Cabezon, A Does of Emptiness, p. 364) and Newland, The Two 
Truths, p. 61. 
64dGongs pa rab gsal, pp. 176-177: rkang pa dang po bzhi'i don ni kun rdzob las ngo bo that 
dad par de kho na nyid yod pa min te/ kun rdzob pa mams bden pas stong pa yin pa'i phir 
dang/ bden stong nyid kyang gzhi kun rdzob la 'jog pa'i phir zhes pa 'o// de nas grtyis kyis 
ni de ltar yin dang med na mi 'byung ba'i 'brel ba nges la/ de yang bdag gcig pa'i 'brel pa 
yin pas byas ml rtag bzhin du ngo bo gcig par bstan no/I 
Stong thun chen mo, f. 429:del phyir bden gnyis ni ngo bo gcig la ldog pa tha dad cing med 
na mi 'byung ba bdag gcig 'brel grub pa byas mi rtag lta bu yin te.../ / See A Dose of 
Emptiness, (p. 364) for a slightly different way of translating this passage. 
66 The Two Truths, p. 60. 
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67 A Dose of Emptiness, p. 516-1128n. 
68 The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way, p. 276. 
69 Nges don rab gsal, p. 375d: spyir gnyis su dbye ba thams cad la bum snam 'tar rdzas tha dad 
dam/ byas mi rtag ltar ngo bo gcig la ldog pa tha dad dam/ zla ba dang bsil zer byed pa ltar 
mam grangs pa'i tha dad dam/ dngos po dang ngos med ltar gcig pa bkag pa'i tha dad yin 
zhes bya ba 'de dpyad dgos pas bden pa gnyis lasang de dpyad par bya'o// See also Sa pan, 
'Thub pa dgongs gsal, p. 31d. 
70 Nges don rab gsal, p. 376d: mdo las gcig dang tha dad la skyon brjod pa ni don dam gyi 
dbang du byas pa yin pas don dam par gcig dang gnyis las grol la/ /; also p. 376a: 'o na ci 
ltar gnas zhe na gcig dang tha dad las grol bar gnas te/ 
n Ibid., p. 377a: don dam par gcig dang tha dad las grol ba dang/ 'phags pa'i mnyam gzhag 
gi ngor gcig dang tha dad las grol ba don gcig pa'i phir.../ 1 
n Ibid., p. 377a: tha snyad du dngos po clang dngos med ltar gcig pa bkag pa'i tha dad yin ces 
gsungs pa 'de nyid rigs pas 'thad par mngon te/ / 
73 See Nges don rab gsal, p. 376d; and 1Ta ba ngan sel, ff. 604-605 for more on such criticisms. 
74 Nges don rab gsal, p. 376d: bden pa gnyis ngo bo gcig yin na dpe'i sgo nas rab rib can gyis 
mthong ba'i slcra shad dang/ mthong ba dag pas skra shad med par mthong ba gnyis ngo bo 
gcig tu thal te/ bden pa gnyis ngo bo gcig yin pa'i phir// 
75 Ibid., p. 375d: mdo sde dgongs 'grel las/ bden gnyis gcig pa dang tha dad pa'i phyogs la 
skyon bzhi bzhi gsungs tell 
76 Ibid., pp. 375d-376a: dang po ni bden pa gnyis gcig yin na/1/ byis pas kun rdzob 
gzugs dang sgra la sogs pa mngon sum du mthong ba de bzhin du don dam pa'i 
bden ba'ang mrtgon sum mthong bar thal ba clang/2/ kun rdzob las gzugs sgra la 
sogs pa spros ba'i dbye ba du ma yod pa de bzhin don dam pa la yang dbye ba du 
ma yod par thal ba dang/3/ kun rdzob kun nas nyon mongs pa'i rang bzhin nam 
mtshan nyid yin ba !tar don dam yang de liar 'gyur ba dang/4/ kun rdzob byis pas 
mthong ba la sogs pa'i don logs su btsan du med pa de bzhin du don dam pa'i bden 
pa'ang de ltar thal ba'o// 
77 Ibid., p. 376a: gnyis pa ni bden pa gnyis tha dad yin na... /1/ 'phags pa mams kyis don 
dam mngon sum du rtogs kyang kun rdzob kyi 'ching ba las mi grol bar thal ba dang/2/ 
chos nyid don dam de kun rdzob kyi spyi'i mtshan nyid ma yin par thal ba dang/31 'du 
byed kun rdzob rab tu ma grub pa'am/ bdag med de don dam a ma yin par thal ba dang/4/ 
gang zag gcig gi rgyud la kun nas nyon mongs kyi mtshan yid dang/ mam byang gi mtshan 
nyid gnyis dus gcig tu so sor grub par thal ba'o// 
78 Zab don gdams pa'i mig 'byed, p. 323m: ldog pa gcig yin na yang [1] bum pa'i chos nyid 
mngon sum du rtogs pa'i so skye yod pa dang/2/chos nyid de la dmigs nas chags sogs nyon 
mongs skye ba dang/3/de la kha dog dang dbyibs sogs grub par 'gyur zhing/4/mal 'byor 
pas chos nyid sgom pa'i 'bad pa don med du thal/ bum pa clang bum pa'i chos nyid !dog pa 
gcig yin pa'i phir/ / 
79 dGongs pa rab gsal, p. 177. 
80 sTong thun chen mo, f. 429:ngo bo tha dad yin na 'brel med don gzhan du 'gyur dgos tel 
ngo bo tha dad la bdag gdg 'brel mi srid pa'i phyir dang/ chos nyid 'dus ma byas yin pas de 
dang de 'byung du 'brel ba mi srid pa'i phyir ro// I borrowed the translation of this passage 
from Cabezon, A Dose of Emptiness, p. 363. 
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81 Thub stan Chos grags, sPyod 'jug 'grel bzhad„ pp. 701-702. Also see Newland, The Two 
Truths, pp. 63-66 for his comments on the works of 'Jam dbyangs bZhad pa and Nga dbang 
dPal ldan on the same issue. 
82 Zab don gdams pa'i mig 'byed, pp. 322-323: /1/ bum pa bden ston bum pa'i gnas lug min pa 
dang/2/bum pa bden stong rtogs pas bum ba bden 'dzin gyi sgro 'dogs mi gcod ba 
darig/3/bum pa bum pa bden grub kyi dgag gzhi yin pa sogs ml 'thad cing/4/ swigs 'phags 
kyi rgyud la bum pa bden stong rtogs pa'i yeshes dang bum pa bden 'dzin gnyis than cig tu 
med pa sogs mi thad par thal/ bum pa dang bum pa bden stong ngo bo tha dad yin pa'i 
phir/ / 
83 Grub mtha' mdzod, ff. 192-193: des na don dam pa'i bden pa spros pa thams cad dang dral 
ba de kun rdzob kyi bden pa las dngos po gzhan clang de nyid du'ang brjod du med pa/ 
gcig pa bkag tsam gyi tha dad yin no!! See ff. 191-192 for his criticisms on other views. 
8 Rigs tsogs dlca' gnad, f. 21-22: tha snyad du gcig pa bkag pa'i tha dad de/ skra shad dang 
skra shad kyis dben pa' tha dad bzhin no/ / As he simplistically states it, "it is like the 
difference between the [perception of] arrows of hairs and [the perception of] without hair". 
85 Zla ba'i zhal lung, f. 84: rnam grangs min pa kho na don dam dang/ tha snyad shes brjod 
'jug gsum gyi yul gyur thams cad kun rdzob byas na bden gnyis gcig pa bkag ba'i tha dad 
yin nam snyam/ / In this passage Mi pham agrees with kLong chen, his predecessor, for he 
argues that "from the standpoint of provisional ultimate (rnam grangs kyi don dam) or from 
the conventional standpoint, the two truths are distinct and incompatible (gcig pa dkag pa'i tha 
dad)". However, Mi pham does not maintain this position consistently. Elsewhere he argues 
that two truths have a single ontological identity but different conceptual identities (ngo bo 
gcig la ldog pa tha dad) from the standpoint of the non-provisional ultimate (rnam grangs min 
pa'i don dam). See Zla ba'i zhal lung, f. 81:bden pa gnyis ngo bo gcig la ldog pa tha dad pa'i ngo 
bo gcig pa de/ snang stong dbyer med ngo bo gcig yin la/ de ni bden gnyis dpyod pa'i tshad 
mas grub ste gang snang 'de stong/ stong pa de snang ba las tha dad du yod na/ chos de'i 
ngo bo mi stong bar 'gyur bas de gnyis tha dad du med do// ngo bo dbyer med par grub 
pa'i ngo bo ni mam grangs min pa'i don dam ste/ de la gang du'ang brjod mi shes te so sor 
rang rig gi yul lo!! Also see Shes 'grel ke ta ka, p. 4, for his criticism against the notion that the 
two truths are distinct or identical. Note, however the sentences structure. He argues that "if 
two truths are ultimately distinct (don dam par tha dad) and conventionally identical (kun rdzob 
tu gcig)", then there would be four fallacies each. Although Mi pham's dialectics seem very 
compatible with Tsong lchapa's, the underlying assumptions are totally different. From Mi 
pham's definitions of the two truths, it is clear that two truths must not have equal status. If 
this is a little too unconvincing, see Zla ba'i zhal lung, f. 159: mthar ni 'phi don med de bag 
chags kyi snartg ba tsam yin par dngos stobs kyis grub ste/ 
86 The criticisms dGe 'dun Chos 'phel advance against Tsong khapa's view are considered 
here primarily as means to indicate dGe 'dun Chos 'phel's rejection of the view that holds the 
mutual compatibility between the two truths. These criticisms are quite legitimate from the 
point of view held by Go rampa and dGe 'dun Chos 'phel. According them, the two truths 
are reducible to ignorance and wisdom. Whereas for Tsong khapa, the two truths must not 
be reducible to ignorance and wisdom since both have their ontological references. Therefore, 
the legitimacy of these criticisms should be understood properly by having proper 
perspectives of both these two different systems before applying them directly against Tsong 
khapa's view straightaway. 
kLu grub dgongs rgyan, p. 215: bden gnyis zung 'jug bya ba 'de 'phags pa'i yeshes dang 'jig 
rten phal pa'i mam rtog gnyis 'gal med zung du 'jug pa'i dus gcig srid na de dus 'ong bar 
nges kyi gzhan du nam yang srid pa'i skabs med do!/ Also p. 217: kun rdzob dang don dam 
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mi 'gal bya ba 'de bden gnyis gang gi dpyod lungs byed na yang thar pa'i go skabs ga la 
yod// 
88 Ibid., pp. 220-222: don la blun po'i mthar thug pa'i 'jig rten phal ba'i bsam mno dang/ 
mIchas pa'i mthar thug pa'i sangs rgyas kyi mkhyen lugs gnyis 'gal med zung 'jug te Ichas 
blang pa yin la/ de 'dra byed tshe ma rigs pa dang rigs shes gnyis kyi yul yang 'gal med 
zung 'jug tu mkhas blang na ci la mi chog/...mdor na bden gnyis 'gal med du 'dod pa 'de 
sangs rgyas nas sems can gyi bar bsam mno thams cad 'gal med du 'clod pa'i lugs yin no!! 
Thub pa dgongs gsal, p. 32a: don darn dang tha snyad pa'i rnam bzhag gnyis las/ dang po ni 
gcig dang tha dad kyi spros pa dang brat ba yin te...gnyis pa tha snyad pa'i mam gzhag ni/ 
gzhan sel gyi ngor ngo bo byed med ldog pa tha dad ces bya ba'am de nyid dang gzhan du 
brjod du med pa zhes bya ba gsungs pa de lcho na khas blang ngo/ / Sa part expressly rejects 
the notion of 'distinct that is incompatible with their unity' (gcig pa bkag pa'i tha dad). See 
gShung lugs legs bshad, p. 73a: gcig pa bkag pa'i tha dad kyang ma yin te/ gang rung dgnos 
por thal ba'i phir/ des na de nyid dang gzhan du brjord ba med de!! Go rampa, on other 
hand, candidly ascribes this view to Sa pan. See Nges don rab gsal, p. 376d: gsum pa ni dpal 
ldan Sa skya Pundita'i bshad pa... 
bDu 'jug rnam bshad, pp. 121-121: bden pa gnyis po 'de dag gcig gam tha dad ce na/ gcig 
pa'am ma yin/ tha dad pa'am ma yin te/ 'de dag phan tshun ltos nas rnam par 'jog pa'i phir 
ro/ gang zhig gang la ltos pa de ni de dang gcig ma yin te/ rang nyid rang la ltos pa la dgos 
pa med pa'i phir ro/ /gzhan nyid kyang ma yin te/ ltos pa po ma grub na ltos sa las gzhan 
nyid kyang ma yin la/ /grub na gzhan las ltos me dgos pa'i phir ro/ / The two truth can 
neither be expressed as identical nor different, they are relative as opposed to ontologically 
interdependent. If the relationship between the two truths is not understood in terms of 
subjective relativity, Red mda' ba would contradict the definitions of the two truths he 
provided earlier based on two conflicting perspectives. 
91 He maintains that the two truths are 'inexpressible' (brjob par bya ha ma yin pa) in terms of 
how they relate each other. They can neither be expressed as identical nor distinct in terms of 
their nature. This inexpressibility, he says, applies both in terms of the conventional stance 
and in terms of the ultimate stance. See bDen gnyis rnam gzhag, f. 33: myu gu dang de'i chos 
nyid stong pa nyid ni ngo bo gcig dang tha dad gang du yang brjod par bya ba ma yin te/ 
kun rdzob tu yang der brjod par bya ba ma yin don dam du yang der brjod par bya ba ma 
yin pa'i phir/ / See his objections to the notion of identity or difference based on the 
Sathdhinirmocana sutra (ff. 33-35); and his objections to Tsong khapa's position that the two 
truths have a single ontological identity with different conceptual identities (ff. 30-32). His 
criticisms for Tsong khapa, though, rest on many factors. One notable factor is his absolute 
denial of the very coherence of the so-called 'ontological identity' or 'single-nature' 
relationship in the Madhyamaka system. For instance he writes (ff. 31-32): chos thams cad 
ngo bo nyid med pa zhes bya ba 'de dbu ma'i lugs yin pa'i phir/ de yang dbu ma par rang 
lugs 'chad pa na kun rdzob kyi rang gi ngo bo ni rnam pa thams cad du 'gog pa kho nar nges 
La! don dam pa'i ngo bo ni gnas skabs gcig tu khas blangs kyang/ de ngo bo mtshan nyid pa 
ma yin la/ de yang mthar 'gog pa'i phir/ byang chub sems 'grel las/ med na mi 'byung nges 
pa'i phir/ /zhes 'byung ba de yang/ kun rdzob kyi ngo bo med pa'i shes byed yin te/ 
gzhurtg der kun rdzob kyi ngo bo med pa nyid don dam par bshad pa'i phir// 
D'ag brgyud grub pa'i shing rta, ff. 287-288: kho bo cag dbu ma pa la ni rnam par dpyad pa 
na bden gnyis gzhi grub pa clang ma grub pa gang du'ang smra bsam brjod pa clang dral pa'i 
phir/ bden grtyis ngo bo gcig dang tha dad gang du'ang rtog par ga la byed ces shes par 
bya'o/ / Also see his objections to Dol po pa's notion of distinct nature of the two truths, (ff. 
281-285); and the objections to Tsong khapa's notion of identical ontological characters of the 
two truths, (ff. 285-287). 
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93 sTag tsang holds that two truths are 'like characteristic and characterised, and that they are 
characteristically inseparable'. See Grub mtha'i rnam bshad, f. 268: kun rdzob rang stong dang 
don dam bzhan stong du 'dod pa ltar ngo bo tha dad ma yin gyi/ cho can dang de'i chos 
nyid dam gnas lugs yin pas bden gnyis ngo bo dbyer med du grlas shing/ / However, given 
his commitment to the subjective distinctions, it is puzzling as to how he could consistently 
sustain the argument that the two truths resemble characteristic and characterised. 
94 rTsa shes tik chen, p. 406: myu gu'i chos nyid ni de'i rang gzhin yin pas de'i ngo bo zhes bya 
la myu gu'i kha dog clang dbyibs la sogs pa yang myu gu' bdag nyid yin pas de'i ngo bo'o// 
98 Malamadhyamakakarika, p. 64: tha snyad la ni ma brtan par/ /dam pa'i don ni bstan mi 
nus/ /dam paii don ni ma rtogs par/ /mya ngan 'das pa thob m 'gyur /xxiv:10/ 
98 Ibid., p. 64: gang la stong pa nyid rung ba/ /de la thams cad rung bar 'gyur/ /gang la 
stong nyid ml rung ba/ /de la thams cad rung mi 'gyur/xxiv:14/ 
97 Vigrahavyavartani, p.135: gang la stong pa nyid srid pa/ /de la don mams thams cad srid/ 
/gang la stong nyid ml srid pa/ /de la ci yang ml srid do/ 70/ 
98 Midamadhyamakakarika, p. 65:rten cing 'brel bar 'byung ba gang/ /de ni stong pa nyid du 
bshad/ /de ni brten nas gdags pa ste/ /de nyid dbu ma'i lam yin no/xxiv:18/ 
99 Ibid., p. 135: gang zhig stong dang rten 'byung dag/ /dbu ma'i lam du don gcig par/ 
/gsungs mchog mtshungs pa med pa yi/ /sangs rgyas de la phyag 'tshal lo/71/ 
1°° Ibid., p. 65: gang phyir rten 'byung ma yin pa'i/ /chos 'ga' yod pa ma yin pa/ /de phyir 
stong pa ma yin pa'i/ /chos 'ga' yod pa ma yin no/xxiv:19/Similarly other notable verses in 
the Malamadhyamakakarika such as XXIV:10-11, XXIV:20, XXIV:36-37, XXIV:39-40 etc., also 
reinforce Nagarjuna's commitment to the mutually compatible relationship between the two 
truths. 
Madhyamakavatara, p, 158: dngos po stong pa gzugs brnyan la sogs pa/ /tshogs la ltos nas 
ma grags pa yang min/ /ji ltar der ni gzugs brnyan sogs stong las/ /shes pa de yi mam pa 
skye 'gyur ltar/vi:37/ 
Ibid., p, 158: de bzhin dngos po thams cad stong na yang/ stong nyid dag las rab tu skye 
bar 'gyur/ / 
" ibid., p. 158: bden pa gnyis su'ang rang bzhin med pa'i phyir/ /de dag rtag pa ma yin 
chad pa'ang min/vi:38/ 
104 rTen 'brel stod pa, p.11:kyod ni nam gzhig stong pa nyid/ /rten 'byung don do mthong pa 
na/ /rang bzhin gyis ni stong pa dang/ /bya byed 'thad pa'ang mi 'gal zhing/11/ de las 
bldog par mthong ba na/ stong la bya ba ml rung zhing/ /bya dang bcas la stong med pas/ 
mya ngan gyang du ltung bar bzhed/12/ 
Ibid., 15:de phyir rten nas 'byung ba las/ /ma gtogs chos 'ga' yod min pas/ /rang bzhin 
gyis ni stong pa las/ /ma gtogs chos 'ga' med par gsungs/ 14/ 
1°6 Ibid., 18:rang bzhin 'ga' yang med pa dang/ /'de la rten nas 'de 'byung pa/ /mam gzhad 
thams cad 'thad pa gnyis/ /mi 'gal 'du ba smos ci dgos/18/ 
107 Ibid.„ 27:de phyir rten nas 'bring ba gang/ /rang bzhin gyis ni gdod ma nas/ /rnam par 
dben yang der snang bas/ !'de kun sgyu ma bzhin du gsungs/27/ 
' Lam gtso main gsum, p. 252: gzhan yang snang bas yod mtha' sel ba dang/ /stong pas med 
mtha' sel zhing stong pa nyid/ /rgyu dang 'bras bur 'char ba'i tshul shes na/ /mthar 'dzin 
lta bas 'phrog par me 'gyur ro/13/ 
Lam gtso main gsum., p. 252: snang ba rten 'drel blu ba med pa dang/ /stong pa khas len 
dral ba'i go ba gnyis/ /ji srid so sor snang ba de srid du/ da dung thob pa'i dgongs pa rtogs 
pa med/11/ 
110 Ibid., p. 252: nam zhig ris 'jog med par cig car du/ /rten 'brel mi bslur mthong ba tsam 
nyid nas/ /nges shes yul gyi 'dzin stangs kun zhig na/ de tshe lta ba'i dpyad pa rtogs pa 
lags/12/ 
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tit The twofold bodies of a buddha—namely, the rapakaya (gzugs sku), literally 'form body is 
accomplished as a result of the exhaustive accumulation of meritorious deeds (bsod nams kyi 
tshogs, panya sarithhara) and the dharmaloya (chos sku), literally 'nature body', or 'truth body' is 
accomplished as a result of the exhaustive accumulation of penetrative wisdom (yeshe kyi 
tshogs, jriana sathbhara). 
112 Grub mtha'i rnam bshad, p. 898:bden pa gnyis la nye ring mi rig tel bden pa gnyis gang las 
nyams na phung par yang 'dra/ mthar ltong par 'dra/ ma nyams na tshogs gnyis rdzogs pa 
dang sku gnyis thob pa'i bar 'dra ba'i phyir te/ kun rdzob khas ma blangs par nyams na skur 
'debs kyi mthar ltong dge rtsa gcod 'bras bu ngan 'gror ltong/ gsugs sku sgrub byed dang 
de'i 'bras bu las nyams par 'gyur.../ / 
113 The twofold accumulations include the meritorious deeds (bsod nams kyi tshogs, panya 
sarhbhara) and the accumulation of penetrative wisdom (yeshe kyi tshogs, jflana santhhara). 
114 Grub mtha'i rnam bshad, p. 899:des na bden gnyis zung 'brel gces te/ de la mthar mi ltong 
ba dang mi phung ba dang tshogs gnyis dang de'i sku gnyis thob pa'i bar yin phyir te. . / / 
115 Yuktgaitika, p. 96:dge ba 'de yis skye bu kun/ /bsod nams yeshes tshogs bsags te/ /bsod 
nams yeshes las byung ba'i/ /dam pa gnyis ni thob par shog/60/ Cited in the Yuktgaltikavrti, 
f. 59. Also see the Master of Wisdom, (p. 93) for Lindtner's slightly different way of translating 
this verse. 
"'Cited in the Visuddhi Magga of Buddhagosha, p. 809. 
117 Ibid. 
The noble truth of suffering, the noble truth of origin of suffering, and the noble truth of 
path leading to the cessation of suffereing belong come under conventional truth while the 
noble truth of the cessation of suffering is categorised under ultimate truth. 
119 bDen gnyis rnam gzhag, p. 140:yeshes chos sku dang longs spyod rtogs 	sku grtyis dngos 
rgyu tshogs pa'i tshar gcig la rags las kyi 'brel pa grub pa yin la/ dus cig car du mngon du 
byed pa yin no/ / ...des na gzhi'i bden pa gnyis zung du 'jug pa clang/ /lam tshogs grtyis 
zung du 'jug pa dang/ 'bras bu cho gzugs gnyis zung du 'jug pa rigs pa'i lam rtas drangs... 
120 e the Malamadhyamakakarika of Nagarjuna, p. 69 for his introductory notes. 
171 In contrast Garfield, The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way, p. 297-108n argues, 
"despite their ontic unity, the ultimate truth is epistemologically and soteriologically more 
significant than the conventional". 
Prasannapada, p. 416:sangs rgyas bcom ldan las mams kyis chos bstan pa ni / bden pa gnyis 
po 'de la brten nas 'jug pa yin no/I 
123 Madhyamakavatarabhasya, p. 69:bden pa bzhan gang cung zad cig yod pa de yang ci rigs par 
bden pa gnyis kyi khongs su gtogs pa kho nar nges par bya'o/ / 
124 rTsa shes tik chen, p. 411: don dam bden pa'i bden tshul nil mi slu ba yin la de yang gnas 
tshul gzhan du gnas shing snang tshul gzhan du snartg nas 'jig rten la mi slu basi phir/ / 
" Yuktisastikavrtti, f. 14: gal te de lta na'ang je ltar myang ngan las 'das pa don dam pa'i bden 
par gsungs she na/ de'i bdag nyid du 'jig rten la mi slu ba'i phir 'jig rten gyi tha snyad kho 
nas de don dam pa'i bden par gsungs so/ / Cited in the rTsa shes k-chen, p.411. 
126The Fundamental Wisdom of The Middle Way, p. 208. 
127Ibid. 
128 Malamadhyamakakarika, p. 31: bcom ldan 'das kyi chos gang zhig/ slu bade rti brdzun zhes 
gsungs/ /'du byed thams cad slu ba'i chos/ /de na de dag 'rdzun pa yin/xiii:1 / I borrowed 
the translation from Garfield, The Fundamental Wisdom of The Middle Way, p.206. 
129 The Fundamental Wisdom of The Middle Way, p. 208. 
130 Ibid. 
131 Cala-Viyaha Sutta, Sn IV.12 (trans. by Thanissaro Bhildthu). 
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132 rTsa shes tik chen, p. 412: 'o na rigs pa dgrug cu pa las/ myang ngan 'das pa bden gcig bu/ 
rgyal ba rnams kyis nam gsungs pa/ de tshe lhag ma log min zhes/ inkhas pa su zhig rtog 
par byed/ ces myang 'das gcig bu bden gyi gzhan rnams mi bden zhes gsungs pa je ltar 
drangs snyam na/ / 
133 Yuktisastikavrtti, ff.14-15: 'o na bcom ldan ldas kyis/ dge slong dag bden pa dam pa 'de ni 
gcig ste/ 'de lta ste mi slu ba'i chos can mya ngan las 'das pa'o/ /zhes gang gsungs pa de ji 
ltar zhe na/ /je ltar 'dus byas log par snang bas byis pa imams la slu bar byed pa yin pa de 
bzhin du/ /mya ngan las `das pa ni ma yin tel rtag tu skye ba med par'i rang bzhin gyis ngo 
bo kho nar gnas pa nyid kyi phir ro/ /de ni byis pa rnams la yang 'dus byas ltar skye ba'i 
ngo gor nam yang mi snang ngo/ /de'i phir mya ngan las 'das pa ni rtag tu kho nar mya 
ngan las 'das pa nyid du gnas pa'i phir jig rten gyi tha snyad Icho nas bden pa dam par 
gsungs kyi.../ / Cited in the rTsa shes tik chen, p. 312; and inKhas grub rje's Stong thun chen mo 
(see Cabezon. A Dose of Emptiness, p. 360. 
134 The Fundamental Wisdom of The Middle Way, pp. 296-297. 
Nges don rab gsal, p. 377a: mthar thog bden pa gnyis su dbyer med pas grangs nges byar 
med de/ mdo las bden pa dam pa ni gcig Icho na ste/ 'de lta ste/ mi slu ba'i chos can gyi 
myang ngan las 'das pa'o/ / 
136 Yuktisastika , pp. 91-92: mya ngan 'das pa bden gcig bu/ rgyal ba rnams kyis nam gsungs 
pa/ de tshe lhag ma log min zhes/ michas pa su zhig rtog par byed /35 / I borrowed the 
translation of this verse straight from Chr. Lindtner, Master of Wisdom, p. 35. 
137 1Ta ba ngan sel, f. 606: 'on na kun rdzob bden pa zhes pa'i tha snyad kyang mi 'thad par 
'gyur te/ kun rdzob yin na bden pa yin pa 'gal ba'i phir/ de ni blo kun rdzob pa'i ngo bor 
bden ba la 'jog pas skyon med do/ yang dag kun rdzob ces pa yang/ blo kun rdzob pa la ltos 
nas yang dag tu 'jog pas skyon med doll 
"8 Yang dag lta ba'i od zher, p. 287c: med bzhin du snartg ba sgyu ma dang tshungs/ / 
139 gZhug lugs legs bshad, p. 72a: kun rdzob tu chos thants cad chu'i zlaba ltar med bzhin du 
snang par rtog pa yin la// 
140 Ibid., p. 72b: kun rdzob kyi bden pa'i mtshan nyid ni yod pa ma yin pa'i don snartg ba'o/ / 
141 Nges don rab gsal, p. 377a: thabs clang thabs byung gi dbang du byas na tha snyad mthong 
pa'i blos dngos por gzung ba de nyid la gnas lugs dpyod pa'i blos ngos po ma myed pa nyid 
la don dam du 'jog dgos pa'i phir/ 
142 Ibid., p. 370b: 'o na gdul byas don dam pa rtogs pa'i thabs med par 'ghur ro snam na gdul 
byas de rtogs pa'i don du tshig gyi brtod bya clang/ sems kyi spyod yul du tha snyad kyi 
bden par sgro btags nas bstan pa ste/ / 
143 Ibid., pp. 370a-371a: He offers an explicit and a lengthy discussion on the superimposition 
of conventional truth and how it serves the purpose to reach the ultimate truth. 
144 When the truth is explained from the standpoint of the ordinary disciples ('dul bya'i ngor), 
Go rampa maintains the four precise enumerations of the truth. They are apprehending 
subjects (yul can), apprehended objects (yul), actions (byed pa) and potentials (nus pa). See 
Nges don rab gsal, p. 377a-b:gdul bya ngor bstan pa'i tshe/ yul can dang/ yul dang/ byed pa 
dang/ nus pa'i sgo nas grangs nges pa dang bzhi las dang po ni... yul can gyi blo la rmongs 
marmongs sogs gnyis su grartgs nges pa'o/ grtyis pa rui gzhugs sogs kyi snang ba gcig nyid 
la'ang ma dpyad pa'i blo ngor de dang der bden pa dang/ dpyad na mi rnyed pa gnyis su 
nges pa'o/ gsum pa ni 'ching bar byed pa dang/ grol bar byed pa gnyis su nges pa'o/ bzhi 
pa ni bsod nams kyi tshogs bsag pa dang/ yeshes kyi tshogs bsag pa'i gzhir gyur pas skyu 
gnyis thob pa gnyis su thugs pa'o/ / 
145 He stresses the notion that the enumeration of truth represents the two conflicting 
perspectives, and thus they are contradictory. "A mistaken cognition and an unmistaken 
cognition", as he argues, "are directly contradictory". For there is neither a thing that 
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belongs to both categories that can be positively affirmed nor a thing that does not belong to 
either one of the two categories that can be repudiated. Hence the existence of the third 
alternative is not possible'. Therefore, twofold truth is a precise enumeration. See Thub pa 
dgongs gsal, p. 32a-b: bden pa bzhi dang bcu drug la sogs pa gsungs bzhin du gnyis su grangs 
nges pa'i rgyu mtshan ci yin zhe na/...'dir ngos 'gal gyi mtha' mam par dpyod pa las gnyis 
su nges te/ 'de ltar blo 'Ichrul ma 'Ichrul gnyis dngos 'gal yin la/ de'i sar na gnyis ka yin 
bsgrub phyogs dang/ gnyis ka ma yin pa dgag phyogs kyi phung po gsum pa mi srid pas 
bden ba gnyis su grangs nges so!!; gZhung lugs legs bshad, p. 72d: yul can gyi blo 'Ichrul pa 
dang/ ma khrul pa gnyis la ltso nasbden pa gnyis su nges pa yin no!! 
146 Proposes enumeration based on direct contradiction between the transcendence and the 
non-transcendence of elaborations (S pros pa las grol ma grol). See Grub mtha' mdzod, ff. 205-206: 
spros ba las grol ma grol dngos 'gal du nges pas bsgrub phyogs dang dgag phyogs kyi 
phung po gsum ba khegs pas gnyis su grangs nges so!! mam pa gcig tu na yul main ni yul 
can las ltos nas 'jog pa na yul can ni mthar mthog pa 'Ichrul pa'i blo dang/ mthar thog pa ma 
'Ichrul pa'i blo gnyis las mi 'da'/ de la 'khor ba'i chos mams ni 'khrul pa dang chos nyid ni 
ma 'Ichrul pa'i yul yin pas blo'i dbang gis gnyis su bzhag ste/ / 
147 dBu tsa'i rnam bshad zab mo, p. 287: yul can mthong ba brdzun pa clang/ mthong ba yang 
dag pa gnyis su nges pas/ grtyis su grangs nges par bzhad ste/ / Also see Rigs tsogs dka' gnad, 
f. 22: yul can gyi blo la gnas tshul la zhugs ma zhugs gnyis su nges pa'i dbang gis yul gnyis 
su nges par bzhag ste/ phung po gsum pa gzhan med pa'i phir blo la ltos nas bden pa gnyis 
su nges so!! 
148 bDu 'jug rnam bshad, p.122: bden pa la hos nas brdzun par mam par 'jog la/ brdzun pa la 
ltos nas bden par mam par 'jog pa'i phir ro/ / 
148 Grub mtha'i rnam bshad, f. 263: 'di'i dbye bar bya ba'i ngo bo'am ris ni gnyis kho na ste/ slu 
chos kun rdzob kyi bden pa dang/ bslu med don dam gyi bden pa'o...rig pa yang/ thabs 
phyogs gtso bor byas pa'i blang dor la kun rdzob ming du mi rung zhing/ blang dor gtso bo 
mam dag gi dmigs pa la don dam med du ml rung bas nyung na mi 'du zhing de tsam gyis 
skyes bu'i don thams cad tshogs par 'gyur bas mang mi dgos pa'i phir ro/ / 
150 Sakya mChog ldan is a monist as far as his claim about the truth. He explicitly criticises the 
concept of the enumeration of truth while proving logical plausibility of a single truth. See 
bDen gnyis rnam gzhag, ff. 7-8: Here Sakya mChog ldan attacks mKhas grub rJe's 'precise 
enumeration of the two truths'. He does this by vigorously defending his view that ultimate 
truth is the only truth, therefore, truth itself cannot be divided. Yet he does enumerate the 
truth based on contradictions between the deceptive and the non-deceptive standpoints. For 
this see dBu rtsa'i rnam bshad 'jug ngog, f. 222: grangs nges pa yin tel bslu ml slu phan tshun 
spangs te grtas pa'i 'gal ba yin pas so// 
151 kLu grub dgongs rgyan, pp. 214-215,222,277. 
182 bDen gnyis rnam gzhag, ff. 9-10: bod snga ma mams kyi bden pa grtyis kyi mam gzhag 
'chad pa de ni yul can gi blo 'lchrul ma 'khrul gnyis su grangs nges pa'i rgyu mtshan gyis de 
gnyis la phung sum sel ba'i mam gzhag mdzad pa yin gyi/ phi rabs pa mams 'chad pa ltar 
yul bden pa grtyis kyis grangs nges tshad mas grub par 'chad pa ni gcig kyang mi snang 
no// 
153 Grub mtha' mdzod, f. 145:kun rdzob bden pa'i mtshan nyid ni chos can gang zhig rig pas 
dpyad mi bsod pa/ don dam bden pa'i mtshan nyid gang zhig rig pas dpyad bzod pa!! 
Also f. 200: de ltar rigs shes rjes dpag gyi rang bzhin skye med spros pa la dpyad bzod don 
dam bden pa'i mtshan nyid yin no shes dbu ma rang rgyud par mains 'dod pa yin no!! 
154 bDen gnyis rnam gzhag, f. 6: mdor na dbu ma'i rang lugs la kun rdzob bden pa yod par 
khas len pa 'de ni zla ba'i zhabs kyi phyogs snga sma ba kho na yin te/ sems tsam pas gzhan 
dbang kun rdzob tu bden grub yin par rang lugs su bshad pa dang khyad par ml snang pa'i 
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phir dang/ rang lugs la bden pa gcig kho nar nges gsung pa dang 'gal ba'i phir/ /; f. 7: shes 
bya thams cad bden pa gnyis su grangs nges pa zhes bya ba 'de dbum ma'i rang lugs ma yin 
tel dbu ma'i rang lugs la gnas skabs su bden pa ni gcig khno na yin par..!!; f. 8: mdor na/ 
dbu mei rang lugs la gnas skabs kyi bden ba don dam pa'i bden pa gcig pu yin la// 
155 Grub mtha'i rnam bshad, f. 305: legs par dpyad na myang'das dang de las lhag pa'i chos 
kyang grub pa med mod rig shes kyis curtg zad dpyad ngor bslu med ni/ mya ngan 'das pa 
bden gcig pur/ / gang tshe sangs rgyas mams gsung ba// zhes pa ltar/ myang 'das kno na 
yin par bzhed pa'i phir/ / 
156 Dam chos dogs sel, p. 602: de lta bu'i de bzhin nyid dam de ni bden par grub pa yin tel kun 
rdzob mams mi bden pa rdzun pa blu ba'i chos su grub la/ de dang dral ba don dam ni 
bden pa rdzun med pa mi slu ba'i chos su grub ste/ de ma grub na 'phags pa'i bden pa 
mthong ba'ang mi srid de rdzun pa bslu ba'i don mthong bas tha mal pa ltar su yang grol bar 
mi 'gyur ro/ mgon po klus/ bcom ldan 'das kyis chos gang zhig/ rdzun pa de ni bgrub par 
gsungs shes dang/ /mya ngan 'das pa bden gcig pur/ /rgyal ba rnams kyis gang gsungs 
pa/ /de tshe lhag ma log pa zhes/ /mkhas pa su zhig rtog mi byed/ / ces gsung pa bzhin 
no!! In this passage, Mi pham not only attempts to show that ultimate truth is the only truth 
but also takes one step further to show that ultimate truth is 'absolute', or 'truly existent' 
(bden par grub par . 
157 D'ag brgyud grub pa'i shing rta, f. 302:des na grub mtha gong 'od thams cad kyi lugs gang la 
rigs pas gnod pa med cing dpyad bzod ni don dam clang des las ldog pa kun rdzob.../ / 
158 kLu grub dgongs rgyan, pp. 214-215, 222, 277 
159 In the Master of Wisdom (p. 321), he writes, "ontologically, nirvana is a world beyond 
sarnsara". 
16° In his introductory analysis to The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana, (p. 52) he argues, 
"phenomena are appearances, and appearances point to their reality. The veil gives a hint of 
that which is veiled". Also (p. 53) says "the absolute comprehended through the categories 
of thought is phenomena and phenomena stripped of these categories are the Absolute"; and 
(p. 57) "tathata or reality is also called nirvana or dharmata or dharmadhatu. The word dhatu in 
this context means the inmost nature, the ultimate essence. The tathata or dharmadhatu is both 
transcendent and immanent. It is transcendent as ultimate reality, but it is present in very one 
as his inmost ground and essence". Also he writes (p. 70): "In Mahayana we have, on the 
other hand, a denial of real elements (dharma-nairatmya), and an assertion of the absolute 
Whole (dharma-kaya). In Hinayana, we have a radical pluralism; in Mahayana, we have a 
radical monism"; and he (p. 72) says: "just as Mahayana moved towards radical Monism, 
even so Brahmanism moved towards radical Monism. It is most probable that Mahayana is 
indebted to some Upanisadic influence". See also pp. 51-59. 
161 He argues "the system of pluralism which is taught to Hinayana and to the monist view 
which is the central conception of Mahayana". See The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana, p. 19. 
162 In his introductory notes to the Madhyamika dialectic and The Philosophy of Nagarjuna, (p. 
xxvi), he argues, "in fact, there is only one truth—the Absolute. The other—sanivrtisatya, is 
truth so-called in common parlance, it is totally false from the Absolute standpoint". He goes 
on to say (p. 20) "In early Buddhism they correspond to a pluralistic universe, in Mahayana 
to a monistic". Also (p. 47) states: "The Madhyamika system started with an entirely different 
conception of reality. Real was that possessed as reality of its own (sva-bhava), what was not 
produced by causes (alcrtaka=asathskrta, what was not dependent upon anything else (paratra 
nirpelcsa)". 
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163 bDen gnyis rnam gzhag, ff. 15-16: 'phags pa'i mnyam gzhag la ltos nas ni bden pa gcig 
kyang ma gzhag ste/ des ni bden pa phar zhog gang du yang ma gzhigs pa'i phir ro/ 
/mthar spros pa thams cad clang dral ba'i rjes kyi shes pa la ltos nas ni bden ba gcig kyang 
ma gzhag ste/ de'i tshe ni shes bya'i mtshan ma ji snyed pa thams cad brdzun par bzhag 
dgos pa'i phir ro//...de ltar na mthar thug la ltos nas bden pa mi srid la/ gnas skabs su bden 
pa mtshan nyid pa don dam pa'i bden pa dang btags pa kun rdzob kyi bden pa'o/ /de'i shes 
byed kyang bden 'dzin gyi ngor bden na bden par 'gal pa la thug pa yin no!! Here, Sakya 
mChog ldan reinforces that the ultimate truth is the only real truth in the Madhyamika 
standpoint. However, it is not treated as an absolute truth. Ultimately, he says "it is to be 
proven false, because every object of knowledge is posited as false". Although, he talks about 
the conventional truth in a detail, it is not taken as truth from the Madhyamika standpoint. 
Hence, his monistic position still stands. Another crucial point to be noted here is, his 
categorical rejection of the dual objective basis of the two truths. He writes, f. 17: chos can 
gcig gi steng du kun rdzob kyi rang bzhin dang don dam pa'i kyi rang bzhin gnyis ka bden 
pa mi srid pa'i phir II  For further clarification see ff. 17-18,21-22. 
164 Grub intha'i rnam bshad, f. 305 (as cited above). 
165 Ibid. 
1' Dam chos dogs gsel, p. 602: de lta bu'i de bzhin nyid dam de ni bden par grub pa yin tel kun 
rdzob rnams mu bden pa rdzun pa bslu ba'i cho su grub la/ de dang dral ba don dam ni bden 
pa rdzun med pa mi bslu ba'i chos su grub ste/ de ma grub na phags pa'i bden pa mthong 
ba'am mi srid de rdzun pa bslu ba'i don mthong bas tha mal ba ltar su yang grol bar mi 'gyur 
ro/; f. 603: yang dag kun rdzob lta bu tha snyad du bden pa yin kyang gnyis snang dang 
bcas pa'i blo yi yul kun rdzob ba de dag rigs pas dpyad mi bzod pa yin pa'i phir bden grub 
min la/ chos nyid don dam par gang yin pa ni bden grub yin tel gnyis snang med pal blo 
yeshes kyis yul du grub pa gang zhig/ / de la rigs pa gang gis kyang gzhig cing gzhom pa'i 
rgyu ba mi 'jug pa'i dpyad bzod pa yin pa'i phir/ / de na rigs pa'i dpyad mi bzod pa ji srid 
du ni don dam ma yin de/ kun rdzob tu thal ba'i phir/ / 
Notes and Tibetan citations on Chapter II 
I 'Meaning' and 'sense' are here being used to translate the Tibetan term sdra bshad which 
normally refers not merely to meaning, but also has connotations of etymology. Since most of 
the discussion focuses on the various senses or meanings associated with the two truths, 
rather than with any strict etymological analysis, I have chosen to talk of just 'meaning' or 
'sense' rather than 'etymology'. 
Prasannapada, p. 415: kun nas sgrib pas na kun rdzob ste/ mi shes pa ni dngos po'i de lcho 
na nyid la kun nas 'gebs par byed pa'i phir kun rdzob ces bya'o/ yang na phan tshun brten 
pas na kun rdzob ste/ phan tshun brten pa nyid kyis na zhes bya ba'i don to/ yang no kun 
rdzob ni brda ste/ 'jig rten gyi tha snyad ces bya ba'i tha tshig go/ de yang brjod pa dang 
brjod bya dang/ shes pa dang shes bya la sogs pa'i mtshan nyid can no/ / The translation of 
this passage is borrowed from Newland, The Two Truths, p. 76. 
3 See Garfield, The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way, (p. 297) for his brief reflection on 
the three distinct meanings; Newland, The Two Truths (pp. 77-89) also offers his reading of 
dGe lugs pa's presentation of the three meanings of sathvrti. 
4 rTa shes tik chen, pp. 402-403: [1] kun rdzob ni mu shes pa'm ma rig pa ste dgnos po'i de kho 
na nyid 'gebs shing sgrib par byed pa'i phir ro/ 'di ni kun rdzob kyi skad dod sgrib pa la'ang 
'jug pas de'i cha nas bshad pa yin gyi kun rdzob thams cad sgrib byed du bshad pa min no/ 
12) yang na kun rdzob ni phan tshun brten pa yin pa'i don no/ 'di ni phan tshun brten dgos 
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pas na rang la tshugs thub kyi rang bzhin yod pa mi bden pa'i don no/ tshul de'i sgra bshad 
pa'i rgyu mtshan don dam bden pa la yang yod mod kyang kun rdzob pa'i sgra 'jug pa ni 
min tel dper na mtsho skyes kyi sgra bshad pa'i rgyu mtshan sbal pa la yod kyang mi 'jug 
pa bzhin no/ [3] yang na kun rdzob ni brda ste 'jig rten gyi tha snyad do/ 'de yang brjod bya 
dang rjod byed dang shes pa dang shes phya la sogs pa'i mtshan nyid can du bshad pas yul 
can gyi tha snyad shes brjod tsam la bzung ngo/ / My translations of the three meanings of 
sarizvrti are largely taken from Newland, The Two Truths, pp. 77-86. 
5 Nges don rab gsal, p. 377b: [1]kun nas grib pas na kun rdzob ste/ mi shes pa ni dngos po'i de 
kho na nyid la kun nas 'gebs par byed phir kun rdzob ces bya'o/ [2] yang na phan tshun. 
brten pas na kun rdzob ste/ phan tshun brten ba nyid kyis na zhes bya ba'i don te/ [3] yang 
na kun rdzob ni brda ste/ 'jig rten gyi tha snyad ces bya ba'i tha tshig go/ de yang brjod pa 
clang brjod bya dang/ shes pa dang shes bya la sogs pa'i mtshan nyid can no!! 
6 Newland, The Two Truths, (p. 77) consistently translates sarinytisatya (kun brdzob bden pa) as 
'concealer-truth', and seems to treats sarhyttisatya and 'concealer truth' as equal and assumes 
it as dGe lugs pa's standard reading. I borrowed his term 'concealer-truth' and use it in the 
context where sarrivrti is specifically referred to primal ignorance, however I do not consider 
them equivalent. Especially in Tsong Ichapa's sense sarrivrti carries a much wider application. 
All phenomenal objects can be described as sarrivrtisatya but certainly not as concealer truth, 
because phenomenal objects themselves do not conceal truth. Rather they are the truths. 
However, Newland's rendition is consistent with Go rampa's reading, for in the case of Go 
rampa, every saiiivrtisatya amounts to concealing the underlying truth. And phenomena 
themselves are not seen as truths. They are rather considered as total illusions. 
7 dGongs pa rab gsal, p.185. Also see rTsa shes tik chen, p. 403-404. mIthas grub rie (see 
Cabezon, A Dose Emptiness, pp. 361) also offers similar explanations. 
Nges don rab gsal, p. 37Th: dang po nil sathvrtisatya zhes pa'i sath ni samyag ste yang dag 
pa/ vrti ni sgrib par byed pa ste yang dag pa'i don la sgrib par byed pas na kun brtags and 
than skyes so sor ma phye ba'i bden 'dzin gyi gti mug ni kun rdzob kyi mtshan gzhi ste yang 
dag pa'i don la sgrib par byed pa'i phir ro/ satya ni bden pa ste blo de'i ngor bden par sriang 
bas na bden pa'o/ / 
9 1Ta ba ngan sel, ff. 595-596: lam gyi dgag bya ni lthrul ba'i snang ba mtha' dag yin la/ 'der 
lung rigs kyi dgag bya gnyis las/ dang po yang kun btags kyi ma rig pas btags pa dang/ 
than skyes kyi ma rig pas btags pa gnyis...gnyis pa yul can ni/ yul de dang der rtog pa'i blo 
dang lta ba ngan pa thams cad yin tel / / 
Lam rim chen mo, p. 651-652:phyin ci log gi 'dzin pa la dgag byar gsungs pa dang des bzung 
pa'i rang bzhin yod pa la dgag byar mdzad pa gnyis yod do!! 
' 1 Ibid., p. 652:'on kyang dgag bya'i gtso bo ni phyi ma yin tel yul can phyin ci log ldog pa 
des bzung pa'i yul thog mar dgag dgos pa's so!! 
12 Ibid., p. 652:dgag bya 'di ni shes bya la med pa zhig dgos ste/ yod na dgag par mi nus pa'i 
phyir roll 
13 Ibid., p. 652: de lta yin na yang yod par 'dzin pas sgro 'dogs skye bas dgag dgos la!! For 
more elaborations on dGe lugs pa's position on the epistemological and the soteriological 
objects of negation see dGeshes Yeshes Thabs mkhas, Drang nges, pp. 161-162; 'Jam dbyangs 
bZhad pa, Grub mtha' rnam bshad, pp. 811-816; LCang skya, Grub mtha' mdzes rgyan, pp. 284- 
288; Thub stan Chos grags, sPyod 'jug 'grel bshad, pp. 720-724; and mKhas grub rje (see 
Cabezon, A Dose of Emptiness), pp. 92-96, 161-1624. 
14 Madhyamakti vatarsyatika, p.73d: sgrib pa ni nram pa gnyis tel nyon mongs pa'i sgrib pa can 
gyi dang/ nyon mongs pa can ma yin par ma rig pa'o/ de la nyon: mongs pa can gyi ma rig 
pa ni 'khor ba'i rgyun ba'i rgyu yin la/ nyon mongs pa can ma yin pa'i ma rig pa ni 
gzugs la sogs pa snang pa'i rgu yin no// 
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15 dGongs pa rab gsal, p. 185: kun rdzob pa gang gi ngor 'jog pa'i kun rdzob ngos 'dzin pa yin 
gyi/ kun rdzob pa spyi ngo 'dzin pa min no/I 
16 See Tsong khapa's first sense of kun rdzob in the rTs shes tik chen, p. 402. 
17 rTa shes tik-chen, p. 404: nyon mongs pa can gyi ma rig pa'i dbang gis kun rdzob kyi bden 
pa mam par bzhag go/ / 
18 dGongs pa rab gsal, p. 186: kun rdzob bden 'dzin de'i mthus sngon po la sogs pa gang zhig/ 
rang bzhin gyis grub ma med bzhin du der snang bar bcos pa'i bcos ma sems can mams la 
bden par snang ba de ni/ sngar bshad pa'i 'jig rten gyi phyin ci log gi kun rdzob pa de'i ngor 
bden pas 'jig rten gyi kun rdzob gyi bden pa zhes thub pa des gsungs te/ / 
19 Ibid., p. 186: rang zhin de... ni kun rdzob kye bden pa ma yin no/ / 
20 Ibid., p. 188: bden 'dzin des bzhag pa ni rang gi tha snyad du yang mi srid par bzhad pa'i 
phir roil 
21 rTa shes tik chen, pp. 404-405: nyon mongs pa can gyi ma rig pa ni bden 'dzin yin pas dis 
bzung pa'i don tha snyad du yang mi srid pa'i phir dang/ kun rdzob kyi bden pa yin na tha 
snyad du yod pas khab pa'i phir roll 
22 Ibid., p. 404: dnos po la bden par grub pa me srid pas bden par 'jog pa ni blo'i ngor yin la/ 
bden 'dzin min pa'i blo ngor bden par gzhag tu med pa'i phir ro// 
23 Mulamadhyamakakarika of Nagarjuna, p. 85. 
24 Ibid., p. 404: bden pa ni ma yin te bden par mngon par rlom pa med pa'i phir roll 
25 Ibid., p. 404: byis pa mams ni slu bar byid pa yin la des las gzhan pa mams la ni sgyu ma la 
sogs pa ltar rten cing 'brel par 'byung ba nyid kyis kun rdzob tsam du 'gyur ro/ / 
26 Ibid., p. 405: nyon mongs can gyi ma rig pa'i kun rdzob spangs pa mams la/ gang gi ngor 
bden par 'jog pa'i bden zhen gyi kun rdzob med pa'i rgyu mtshan gis/ 'du 'byed mams de 
dag gi ngor mi bbden par bsgrubs kyi kun rdzob bden pa ma yin par ma bsgrubs pa'i phir 
ro/ / 
v Ibid. 
28 ITa ba ngan sel, f. 611. 
29 Ibid., f. 611: 'phags pa gsum gyi rjes thob la snang ba'i 'du 'byed kyi cha de yang yang dag 
sbrib gyed de gnyis snang gyi bag chags kyi dbang gyis byung bas snang med kyi mnyam 
gzhag la sgrib par byed pa'i phir ro// Jaideva Singh, The Conception of Buddhis Nirvana, (p. 
53) endorses Go rampa's view and argues "that which covers all round is sathvrti. Sathvrti is 
ajilana (primal ignorance) which covers the real nature of all things. Phenomena are 
characterised as sathvrti, because they throw a veil over reality". 
3° Refer to the above immediate quotation. 
3' Madhyamakavatarasyatika, p. 73b-c: gal te nyon mongs pa can gyi ma rig pa log pa yin na 
de'i tshe sgyu ma la sogs pa ltar rten cing 'brel par 'byung pa rnams ci ltar snang zhe na/ 
shes byal sgrib pa'i mtshan nyid can ma rig pa tsam kun du spyod pa'i phir/ / 
32 Legs bshad snying po, p.138:de ltar rgu dang rkyen la brten nas 'byung bal gtan tshigs nyid 
kyis chos mams las rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub pa'i rang bzhin med do// 
33 Ibid., p. 141: chos can rten 'brel dang chos nyid don dam pa'i bden pa gnyis rten dang rten 
par yod pa ni tha snyad shes ngor yin la.../ chos can med na chos nyid yan gar ba gnas 
pai mthu med... / 
34 Nges don rab gsal, p. 377c: saxii zhes pa ni rten pa'am ltos pa la 'jug la vrti ni 'jug pa ste brten 
nas 'jug pa'am ltos nas 'jug pa 'oil 
35 Ibid., p. 382b: thog ma med pa'i bden 'dzhin gyi bag chags sam tshe 'der grub mtha' ngan 
pa thos pa'i rkyen gyis yod med sogs kyi mtha' gang rung gcig bzung nas dngos po de'i ngor 
sgro btags pas na myed ces pa'i tha snyad 'jog ste/ / 
36 The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, pp. 244-245. 
' See his preface on The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana, p. 53. 
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Prasannapada, p. 415: yang na kun rdzob ni brda ste/ 'jig rten gyi tha snyad ces bya ba'i tha 
tshig go/ de yang brjod pa dang brjod bya dang/ shes pa dang shes bya la sogs pa'i mtshan 
nyid can no/I 
" rTa shes tik chen, p. 403: Yul can gyi tha snyad shes brjod tsam la mi bzung ngo// 
4° Nges don rab gsal, p. 377c: sath ni sanket zhes pa brda yin la vrti ni snga ma ltar te brda 'jug 
pas na kun rdzob ste/ / 
41 Ibid., p. 377c: de gnyis la'ang satya zhes pa sbyar ba'i tshe ltos nas 'jug pa'ang yin blo 'khrul 
ba'i ngor bden pa'ang yin pas na kun rdzob bden pa dang/ brda 'jug pa yin// 
42 Madhyamakavatara p. 156. Also cited in the Madhyamakavatarabhasya, p. 102: gti mug rang 
bzhin sgrib phir kun rdzob ste/ / des gang bcos ma bden par snang de ni/ / kun rdzob bden 
zhes thub pa des gsungs te/ / bcos mar gyur pa'i dngos ni kun rdzob tu'o/XI:28/ I disagree 
Huntington's translation of this stanza. He clearly equates the first kun rdzob and the latter 
kun rdzob, treats both as having the same meaning, and thus unambiguously renders both 
with what he describes as the "screen", a Tibetan equivalent of sgrib byed. See The Emptiness of 
Emptiness, p. 160. 
43 dGongs pa rab gsal, p. 186: rkang pa dang pos stan pa'i kun rdzob dang/ rkang pa phyi ma 
gnyis kyis bstan pa'i kun rdzob gnyis gcig tu me bya ste// 
" Ibid., p. 185: rang bzhin gyis yod par sgro 'dogs par byed pa yin lugs kyi rang bzhin 
mthong ba la sgrib pa'i bdag nyid can ni kur rdzob boll 
45 Ibid., p.185: kun rdzob pa gang gi ngor 'jog pa'i kun rdzob ngos 'dzin pa yin gyi/ kun 
rdzob pa spyir ngos 'dzin pa min no/I 
46 Ibid., p. 185: kun de ni kun rdzob kyi skad dod sgrib byed la yang 'jug pas sgrib byed do// 
rTsa shes tik chen, pp. 404-405: kun rdzob kyi bden pa yin na tha snyad du yod pas khyab 
pa'i phir ro// 
48 Ibid., p. 404: nyon mongs can gyi ma rig pa ni bden 'dzhin yin pas dis bzung ba'i don tha 
snyad du yang mi srid pa'i phir/ / 
Madhyamakavatarabhasya, p. 103: de'i phir de dang gang zhig kun rdzob hi yang rdzun pa ni 
kun rdzob kyi bden pa ma yin no/I 
5° Grub mtha' mdzod, f. 193: sarhvrti zhes bya ba sgrib par byed pas na kun rdzob ste/ yang 
dag pa'i don la sgrib par byed pa 'Ichrul pa'i shes pa'o/ de'i yul du bden pas na bden pa ste 
gzugs la sogs pa sna tsogs pa'i chos snang pa'i ngo bo rmi lam dang 'dra ba 'de nyid do// 
gZung lugs legs bshad, 72b: kun rdzob bden pa'i ngo bo ni/ snang ba yul dang yul can tel 
gzung 'dzin gyis bsdus pa'i chos thams cad do/ de dag la ci'i phyir kun rdzob kyi bden pa 
zhes bya zhe na/ kun ni shes bya'i gnas yin la/ rdzob ni sgrib ba ste/ / His dialectical 
structure seems to differ a little bit in the sense that for him, kun refers to the mode of being 
of all objects and rdzob refers to all objects of knowledge because they are the ones that 
conceal their own mode of being. Also see Thub pa dgongs gsal, p. 32b. 
bDen gnyis rnam gzhag, ff. 30: dbang poi ni...ma rig pa la kun rdzob ces bya zhing/ de 
la'ang nyon mongs pa can yin min gnyis las/ dang po'i ngor bden pa na bden pa zhes 
bya'o/ / gnyis pa ni/ phan tshun brten pas na kun rdzob ces bya ste mi bden pa zhes bya 
ba'i don to// gsum pa ni/ 'jig rten gyi tha snyad kyis bzhag pas ni kun rdzob ces bya ste/ 
don dam par ma grub pa zhes bya ba'i don to// gsum po de yang/ go rim bzhin du sartivrti 
zhes dang/ saihketu zhes clang/ sarhbhar zhes bya ba'i sgra las drangs pa'o/ / Also see ff. 
30-31 for more details on this issue. 
dBu tsa'i rnam bshad zab mo, p. 288. 
54 In his introduction to Madhyamika Dialectic and The Philosophy of Nagarjuna, p. xxv, he 
argues "as etymology shows, sazinvrti is that which covers up entirely the real nature of 
things and makes them appear otherwise. In this sense it is identical with avidya the 
categorising function of the mind-reasoning... It may also mean the mutual dependence of 
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things—their relativity. In this sense it is equated with phenomena, and is in direct contrast 
with the absolute which is by itself, unrelated. The third definitions of sarilvrti is that which 
is of conventional nature (sathketa), depending as it does on what is usually accepted by the 
common folk (lokavyavahara)". 
55 dGongs pa rab gsal, p. 190: nyon mongs can gyi ma rig pa ni...'gal zla ml thun phyogs gangs 
zag dang chos rang bzhin gis grub par sgro 'dogs pa'o/ / Tsong khapa maintains that the 
Prasarigika's identification of a deluded concealer (nyon sgrib, klelavararias) is unique and has 
to be contrasted with the positions of the Abhidharmikas and even of the Svatantrikas. The 
Abhidharmikas and Svatantrikas contrast the conception of the essence of self, and the 
conception of essence of phenomena. They categorise only the latter under the umbrella of 
deluded ignorance and the former under the umbrella of the view of the substantial 'I' and 
'Mine' Principle ('jig tshogs la lta ba, satkaya-drsti). See pp. 190,191-195. 
dGongs pa rab gsal, p. 196: nyon mongs pa'i bag chags mams shes sgrib yin te/ de'i 'bras bu 
gnyis snang pa'i cha thams cad kyang der bsdu'o/ /nyon mongs kyi sa bon la bag 
chags su bzhag pa gcig clang/ nyon mongs gyi sa bon min pa'i bag chags grwis las shes sgrib 
tu 'jog pa ni phyi ma te/ nyon mongs kyi sa bon thams cad zad pas bden 'dzin mi skye 
yang/ bag chags kyis bslad pas snang yul la pa'i blo skyed pa'o/ / Also see pp. 
195-198 for further details. 
Madhyamakavatarasyatik, p.73c: ma rig pa mam pa gnyis te/ nyon mongs pa can clang/ 
nyon mongs pa can ma yin pa'o/ de la nyon mongs pa can ni mi shes pa gang bdag dang 
bdag ge'o snyam pa'i mngon par zhen pa skyed pa'i sgo nas 'Ichor ba'i rgyu gyur pa'o/ nyon 
mongs pa can ma yin pa ni gang gzugs la sogs pa mams snang ba tsam gyi rgu yin gyi bden 
par mnong par zhen pa'i rgu ni ma yin no!! 
Ibid., p. 73c: de la nyon mongs pa can ma yin pa'i ma rig pa tsam kun du spyod pa'i phyir 
nyan thos la sogs pa mams la sgyu ma la sogs pa bzhin du rten cing 'grel par 'gyung ba 
rnams kun rdzob tsam du snang ba yin no!! 
Ibid., p. 73c: bden par zhin par med pa nyid kyis 'dod chags la sogs pa'i nyon mongs pa 
mams skyed par ml byed pas nyon mongs pa can ma yin pa'o zhes bya'o/ / 
60 Ibid., p. 73c: sngon po la sogs pa'i mam pa dang bcas pa'i shes pa nyams su myong ba mi 
mnga' ba'i sangs rgyas bcom ldan 'das mams la ni kun rdzob tsam snang ba med pa'o/ / 
Iti 1.14 (trans. by Thanissaro Bhikkhu), p. 3. 
62 Nges don rab gsal, p. 389a-d explains his own position; also offers his objections to Tsong 
lchapa's view. See p. 38b-d and pp. 390a-393b. 
ITa ba ngan sel, ff. 540-558,727-729,738. 
Madhyamakavatarasyastika, p.73a-d. 
Grub mtha' mdzod, f. 269: sems rab tu ma zhi bar byed pa gang mi dge ba'am/ sgrib pa lung 
du ma stan pa'i ngo bo ser sna la sogs pa ni nyon sgrib yin la/ khor gsum la bden zhin dang 
ma dral ba gang bde ba zag bcas sam ma sgribs lung ma stan gyi ngo bo gzung 'dzin gyi 
rtogs pa yul yul can ni shes sgrib yi no// 
bDu 'jug rnam bshad, p. 127-129: de la ma rig pa ni gnyis te/ nyon mongs pa can dang/ 
nyon mongs pa can ma yin pa'o/ /dang po ni bdag dang bdag gi bar mngon par zhen pa'i 
sgo nas 'khor ba'i rgyur gyur pa'o/ /gnyis pa ni gzugs sogs chos su mngon par zhen pa'i 
sgo nas yul dang yul can du snang ba skyed pa'o/ /dang po ni gang zhag gi bdag med pa 
sgoms pas spongs ngo/ /phyi ma ni chos su bdag med pa goms pas spong ngo/ / 
67 Rigs tsogs dka' gnad, ff. 109-123. 
68 Grub mtha'i rnam bshad, ff. 236-237,274-278. 
69 See 'Jug pa'i dka' gnad, ff. 477-486 for a detailed analysis of the definitions of the two 
concealers (sgrib gnyis); dBu 'jug rnam bshad, ff. 328-33 for his account; Don dam rnam bshad, ff. 
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169-171 for his critique of dGe lugs pa's view; Kun rdzob bden pa'i rnam bshad, ff. 126-143 for 
more of his critique of dGe lugs pa view; and ff. 143-150, for more on his own position. 
brGal Ian nyin byed snang ba, p. 518: gang zag gi bdag med rtogs pas nyon sgrib dang chos 
kyi bdag med rtogs pas shes sgrib spong ba'lang sems tsam nas thal 'gyur ba'i bar de bzhed 
pa la khyad med cing brjod tshul phra mo re mi 'dra ba yang don khyad med pa yin pas 
thams cad lam gyi gnad la dgongs pa gcig ces brjod do// He argues that there is no 
difference between the positions of Cittmatrins, Svatantrika's, and Prasaftgikas as far as they 
all accept that the knowledge of the selflessness of person eradicates deluded concealers and 
the knowledge of the selflessness of phenomena eradicates concealers of true knowledge. 
Also see Mi pham's (p. 487-518 detailed objections on bLo bzartg Rab gsal's position. 
21 kLu grub dgongs rgyan,"p. 182. 
22 In The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana (p. 34), he argues: "The Mahayanist says that Reality is 
veiled not only by klegavarana but also by jfieyli varana or the veil that hides true knowledge. 
The removal, therefore, of jfieyavarana is also necessary. This is possible by the realisation of 
dharmanairatmya or dharmalanyata, the egolessness and emptiness of all elements of 
existence". 
73 In his is article `Madhyamaka,' he argues: "the Madhyamaka school claims to find the true 
'middle way' by declaring, not only the unreality of the individuals (pudgala nairatmya), but 
also the unreality of the dharmas themselves; it denies the existence of not only the beings 
who suffers, but also of pain. Everything is void". See the Madhyamika Dialectic and the 
Philosophy of Nagarjuna, p. 150; also see pp. 149,151. 
74 "In the Absolute,..all elements of existence have vanished, because all of them, whether 
they be called defilers, or the creative power of life, or individual existences, or groups of 
elements, have totally vanished. This all systems of philosophy admit, i.e., that the Absolute 
is a negation of the Phenomenal". See The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana, p. 198; also see pp. 
10,195-196. 
25 In his studies on the Yuktisastika, The Master of Wisdom (p. 259), he argues: "reality is beyond 
all ontological and epistemological dualities (dvaya), while the empirical world of origination, 
destruction, and so forth is illusory—due merely to ignorance (avidya)". 
'In the Mit dhyamika Dialectic and the Philosophy of Nagarjuna (p. xxvii), states, "of constructive 
imagination are born attachment, aversion and infatuation, depending (respectively) on our 
good, evil and stupid attitudes. Entities which depend on these are not anything by 
themselves". 
n kLu grub dgongs rgyan, p. 182: mdor na rang cag tha mal pa mams la snartg zhing/ shing rta 
mam bdun gyi rigs pas dum bo stong du bzhigs kyang ldog du med pa'i snang ba 'de kun 
shes sgrib kho rang gam Icho yis nus pa zhig yin par snang/ ...snang pa'i mam bzhag 'de kun 
rigs ngor yongs su rdzogs par zhig pa na nyon sgrib spangs pa dang/ snang ngor yongs su 
rdzog par zhig pa na shes sgrib spangs pa yin no zhes slo dpon Ida ba drags pa rti sgrib gnyis 
zad pa'i sangs rgyas la de ltar med par snang ngo/ / cog rtse snying thag pa nas mthong pa 
nyon sgrib dang/ mig gis yod par mthong pa tsam shes sgrib ste/ / 
78 Ibid. 
29 Nibbdedhika Sutta, AN VI.63 (trans. by Thanissaro Bhildchu), p. 1. 
813 Bodhicaryavatara, p. 84: ji ltar mthong thos shes pa dag/ 'der ni dgag par bya min te/ /'der 
ni sdug bsngal rgyur gyur ba/ bden par rtog pa ldog bya yin/26/ For two slightly different 
ways of translating this verse, see Crosby and Skilton, Santideva: Bodhicaryavata, p. 117 and 
Sharma, Santideva's Bodhicaryavatara, p. 388. 
81  Kotthita Sutta, SN XXXV.191 (trans. by Thanissaro Bhikkhu), p. 1. 
82 Ibid. 
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Prasannapada, p.416b: don yang de yin la dam pa yang de yin pas na don dam pa'o/ de 
nyid bden pa yin pas don dam pa'i bden pa'o/ / CabezOn, A Dose of Emptiness, (p. 360) offers 
another way of translating this passage. 
rTsa shes flk chen, p. 411:don dang dam pa gyis ka don dam bden pa nyid la bzhed do/ / 
mKhas grub de (see CabezOn, A Dose of Emptiness, p. 360) also for emphasis on the same 
point. 
rTsa shes tik chen, p. 411: don dam bden pa'i bden tshul ni/ mi slu ba yin la de yang gnas 
tshul bzhan du gnas shing snang tshul gzhan du snang nas 'jig rten la mi slu ba'i phir/ / 
87 Dhamma-niyama Sutta, AN 111.137 (trans. by Thanissaro Bhikkhu although, I chose to use 
the term "regularity" instead of his term "steadfast", and "duldcha" instead of "stress"), p. 1. 
Paccaya Sutta SN )GI.20 (trans. by Thanissaro Bhilckhu), p. 1. 
Nges don rab gsal, p. 377d: phags pa'i yeshes dam pa'i spyod yul du gyur pa'i chos nyid ni 
rtogs par bya'am brtag par bya ba yin pas na don/ 'de las mchog tu gyur pa gzhan med pas 
na dam pa mi slu pas na bden ba zhes gzhi mthun gyis bldu ba ste/ / 
Madhyamakavatarasyabhasya, p. 74a-b: dam pa 'jig rten las 'das pa'i yeshe yin la/ don ni de'i 
yul yin pa'i phyir don dam pa yin la/ de yang bden pa nyid yin tel mi slu ba'i phir ro/ yang 
na mchog tu gyur pa'i don ni don dam pa yin tel de yang stong pa nyid do/ stong pa nyid 
las lhag pa'i dngos po mchog tu gyur pa med pas so!! 
lTa ba ngan sel, f. 714: grtas skabs der rtogs bya dang rtogs byed dam yul yul can tha dad du 
med pa'i phir ro/l Also see ff. 727-729. 
'Grub mtha'i rnam bshad, f: gnyis snartg med pa'i yeshes yul med du bshad/ / 
1Ta ba ngan sel, f.611: de yang gzh gcig nyid snang tshul gyis sgo nas so sor phye ba yin gyi 
yul gyi ngos nas so sor yod pa ni ma yin no/I 
94 Ibid., ff. 612-3: don dam pa'i bden pa ni 'phags pa'i so so rang rig pa'i yeshe kyis gnyis 
snang nub ba'i tshul gyis myang bar bya ba yin gyi/ gnyis snang dang bcas na mam mkyen 
gyi bar gyi yul yang don dam bden pa ma yin!! 
Grub mtha' mdzod, ff. 193: paramartha zhes pas/ nges par legs pa'i don du gnyer ba mams 
kyi gnyer bya'i 'bras bu yin pas don dam pa/ de nyid blo ma 'Ichrul pa'i ngo bo rig pa'i shes 
pa'o/ de nyid gya nom pa mchog tu gyur pa yin pas kyang dam pa ste/ blo ma 'khrul ba 
de'i yul du bden pas na bden pa ste de zhin nyid do// 
Thub pa dgongs gsal, p. 32b: don dam pa la paramartha ste/ param ni mchog gam dam pa/ 
artha ni don te dam pa mains kyis brtags na skyon med pa'i don yin pas na don dam pa zhes 
bsgyur/ / Also see gZung lugs legs bshad, p. 72b for more details. 
Don dam rnam bshad, f. 185: sangs rgyas kyi sas bsdus pa'i chos yin na/ kun rdzob kyi bden 
pa ma yin dgos tel de yin na chos sku yin dgos la/ de yin na/ kun rdzob kyi bden pa ma yin 
pa dgos pa'i phir... II; f. 186: stong nyid mngon sum du rtogs pa'i slob pa'i mnyam bzhag 
yeshes rnams kyang don dam pa'i bden par thal ba ma yin nam snam na/de yang 'dir 'dod 
dgos pa yin tel don dam pa dngos yin pa'i phir dang.../ /; f. 187: yeshes de chos can/ don 
dam pa'i bden pa yin tel stong nyid dngos su rtogs pa'i mnyam bzhag yishes kyi dngos kyi 
gzhal bya mtshan nyid pa yin pa'i phir/ rtags grub ste/ yeshes de so sor rang gis rig pa'i 
yeshes yin pa'i phir/ / In these statements, he equates the status of the wisdom of meditative 
equipoise of aryas and ultimate truth. "Ultimate truth, after all is the wisdom of the 
meditative equipoise. There is no ultimate truth apart from this wisdom. This wisdom itself 
serves as the apprehended object of the wisdom of the meditative equipoise" For this see, f. 
187: stong pa nyid mngon sum du rtogs pa'i mnyam gzhag yeshes kyi gzhal bya dgos nil 
yeshes de nyid yin gyi/ stong pa nyid ces bya ba gzhan sel dang/ ldog pa med dgag gi gyur 
pa de nyid de'i dgnos kyi gzhal bya ma nyin no/ / Also see bde gnyis rnam gzhag, ff. 29-30 for 
more on this issue. 
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" dBu tsa'i rnam bshad zab mo, pp. 287: yul can yeshes kyang don dam pa ste/ don dam pa yul 
du yod pa'i phir/ yul skye ba med par bstan pa la sogs pa dang/ yul can stong pa nyid kyi 
don thos pa dang/ bsam pa clang/ sgom pa las byung pa'i shes rab dag kyang don dam pa 
zhes bya ste/ don dam rtogs pa'i thabs yin pa'i phir dang/ phyi ci ma log pa yin pa'i phir/ / 
Interestingly, he expressly equates the subjective consciousnesses of itryas and buddha with 
the status of ultimate truth. In other words, instead of treating the verifying cognition of 
ultimate truth as conventional, he treats it as ultimate truth itself. Also see, dBu tsa'i rnam 
bshad zab mo, p. 287: don dam pa nyid bden pa yin pas/ don dam pa'i bden pa ste/ mam pa 
thams cad du de bzhin du gnas pa'i phir/ yul can yeshes kyang don dam pa ste/ don dam 
pa yul du yod pa'i phir/ yul skye ba med par bstan pa la sogs pa dang/ yul can stong pa 
nyid kyi don thos pa dang/ bsam pa dang/ sgom pa las byung pa'i shes rab dag kyang don 
dam pa zhes bya ste/ don dam rtogs pa'i thabs yin pa'i phir clang/ phyi ci ma log pa yin pa'i 
phir/ 'de ni rjes su mthun pa bstan no/I 
D'ag brgyud grub pa'i shing rta, f. 279: 'phags pa'i mnyam gzhag la ma ltos pa'am/ de las tha 
dad pa'i don du grub pa ni ma yin cing/ don dam pa'i bden pa las tha dad pa'i phags pa'i 
mnyam gzhag kyang yod pa ma yin no// He expressly equates ultimate truth with the 
wisdom of the meditative equipoise and categorically denies any distinction between the 
two. 
Madhyamakavatara, p.155: dngos kun yang dag brdzun pa mthong ba yis/ dngos myed ngo 
bo gyis ni 'dzin par 'gyur/ yang dag mthong yul gang de de nyid de/ mthong ba brdzun pa 
kun rdzob bden par gsungs/VI:23/ Also see the Madhayamkavatarabhasya of Candrakirti, p. 
98. I have largely borrowed Newland's translation of this verse. See The Two Truths, p. 95. 
Huntington, The Emptiness of Emptiness, (p. 160) offers very different way of translating the 
same verse. He translates yang dag mthong pa as "correct perception" instead of "perceivers of 
falsities" and mthong ba rdzun pa as "incorrect perception" instead of "perceivers of reality". 
The Two Truths, p. 96. 
dGongs pa rab gsal, p. 175: kun rdzob bden pa 'jog byed brdzun pa mthong bas rnyed 
don...shes bya brdzun pa slu ba'i don 'jal ba'i tha snyad pa'i tsed mas rived pa'o/ / See 
Newland, (1997), p. 95. 
1m Ibid., p. 175: yang dag pa'i don mthong ba ste 'jal pa'i rigs shes kyis myed pa'i yul gang yin 
pa de ni/ de nyid de don dam pa'i bden pa ste/ / Also see Tsong khapa in the rTsa shes tik 
chen, p. 406; and Guy Newland (1992), p. 96. 
Exterior phenomena include six spheres of senses, namely, form, sound, aroma, taste, 
tactile objects and ideas or concepts. 
Interior phenomena include six sense organs, namely, eyes, ears, nose, tongue, body and 
mind and six consciousnesses, namely, eye-consciousness, ear-consciousness, tongue-
consciousness, body-consciousness and mental consciousness. 
106 rTsa shes tik chen, p. 406: phyi nang gi ngos po 'di mams re re la yang don dam pa dang 
kun rdzob pa'i ngo bo gnyis gnyis yod de/ de yang myu gu lta bu gcig la mtson na/ shes 
bya yang dag pa de kho na'i don gzigs pa'i rigs shes kyis myed pa'i myu gu ngo bo'o/ shes 
bya rdzun pa slu ba'i don 'jal ba'i tha snyad pa'i shes pas rived pa'i myu gu'i ngo bo 'o/ de'i 
snga ma ni myu gu'i don dam bden pa'i ngo bo yin la phyin ma ni myu gu'i kun rdzob bden 
pa'i ngo bo'o/ / 
Madhyamakavatarabhasya, p. 98: bden pa gnyis kyis rang gyi ngo bo phyin ci ma log pa 
mkhyen pa sangs rgyas bcom ldan das mams kyis/ 'du byed dang myu gu la sogs pa nang 
dang phyi ro gyi dgos po thams cad kyi rang gyi ngo bo mam pa gnyis nye bar bstan ste/ / 
Cited in the rTsa shes tik chen, p. 406. 
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188 dGongs pa rab gsal, p. 173: 'dis ni myu gu lta bu gcig gi ngo bo la'ang phye na kun rdzob 
yin pa dang/ don dam yin pa'i ngo bo gnyis yod par ston gyi myu gu gcig nyid so skye and 
'phags pa la ltos nas bden pa gnyis su bstan pa gtan min no/I 
1' The Emptiness of Emptiness, p. 160. 
110 ITa ba ngan sel, f. 603: de ltar blo'i sgo nas ngo bo gnyis 'dzin pa'i mthong ba yang dag pa'i 
yul ni don dam bden pa yin la/ mthong ba brdzun pa'i yul ni kun rdzob bden pa'o/ / 
111 Ibid., f. 603: sangs rgyas bcom blden 'das kyis gdul bya la tha snyad pa'i sgo nas grvas lugs 
bstan pa'i tshe/ dngos po thams cad la kun rdzob dang don dam pa'i ngo bo grvyis bstan ste/ 
dngos po thams cad la 'phags pa'i mnyam bzhag yeshes kyis rang gi ngo bo stong nyid 
myed pa dang/ brdzun pa mthong ba'i so so'i skyes po'i blos rdzun pa'i stobs las rang gi 
ngo bo yod par myed pa la bden pa gnyis su bzhag pa yin... / / 
112 Nges don rab gsal, p. 375b: brdzun pa mthong ba dang/ yang dag mthong ba gnyis sant/ 
'khrul ma khrul grtyis/ rmongs ma rmongs gnyis/ phyin ci log ma log gnyis sam/ tshad ma 
yin min gnyis kyis mthong tshul gyi sgo nas kun rdzob den pa dang/ don dam bden pa gyis 
su phye ba ste/ / Also see p. 375b—d for his detailed defence of each of those assertions. 
113 Ibid., p. 384c: bden pa gnyis yul can gyi blo rmongs ma rmongs sam brdzun pa mthong ba 
dang/ yang dag mthong ba'am/ 'khrul ma 'khrul gyi sgo nas 'jog dgos pas yul can gyi blo'i 
sgo nas 'jog pa pa ni rgya gar gyi thal rang thams cad mthun par snang la// 
114 ITa ba ngan sel, f. 604: gzhan yang myu gu ngo bo cig nyid la/ bden pa gnyis kyi ming gis 
btags pa'i btags don tha snyad du myed par thal/ myu gu'i ngo bo yin par gyur pa'i bden 
grtyis kyi ngo bo grtyis yod pa'i phir/ yul can 'phags pa'i mnyam bzhag dis mthongs ba 
brdzun pas myed pa'i rived don de mthong par thal/ de mthong ba yang dag pas rued pa'i 
myed don la sgrub 'jug gang zhig yul de gnyis ngo bo gcig yin pa'i phir/ / 
115 bid., f, 604: myu gu'e ngo bor gyur pa'i kun rdzob kyi ngo bo de de'i ngo bor gyur pa'i don 
dam gyi ngo bor yin par thal/ di gnyis ngo bo gcig yin pa'i phir/ 'dod na/ mthong a brdzun 
pas rived pa'i ngo bo de mthong ba yang dag pas myed pa'i ngo bo yin par thal/ 'dod pa'i 
phir/ 'clod na/ mthong ba rdzun pas rnyed pa de mthong ba yang dag pas rived par thal/ 
'dod pa de'i phir/ 'dod na/ de gnyis yul gyi ngo go rued tsul khyad par med par `gyur 
ro// 
116 Nges don rab gsal, p. 370a: tshig gis rjod par bya ba ma yin zhing/ blos yul du bya ba ma 
yin pa'i phir tell 
117 Ibid., p. 370a: don dam bden pa 'phags pa'i mrtyam bzhag gis je ltar spros pa dang dral pa'i 
tshul kyis myong ba ltar mtshan nyid dang mtshan gzhi sogs gang gyis kyang bstan par mi 
nus tel / 
118 Notes on the 'Yuktisastikac Master of Wisdom, p. 259. 
119 No wonder that there are some dialectical parallels in their definitions. Both, Tsong khapa 
and Go rampa after all are glossing the same verse [VI: 231 of the Madhyamakavatara in the 
Madhyamakavatarabhasya, p. 98: dngos kun yang dag brdzun pa mthong ba yis/ dngos rived 
ngo bo gyis ni 'jin par 'gyur/ yang dag mthong yul gang de de nyid de/ mthong ba brdzun 
pa kun rdzob bden par gsurtgs/ / 
1211 Madhyamakavatarasyatika, p. 70d: yang dag mthong ba ste/ dngos po'i rang bzhin phyin ci 
ma log pa thogs su chud pa'i sangs rgyas bcom ldan ldas mams so/ de mams kye yul gang 
yin pa de ni de kho na nyid do/ de dag gi yul dang yul can gyi dngos po ni yul dang yul can 
mi dmigs pa gang yin pa'o/... mthog ba brdzun pa ni phyin ci ma log pa'i de kho na nyid 
ma rtogs pa dang ngos po rdzun pa mams la mngon par zhen pas so de mams kyi yul gang 
yin pa de ni kun rdzob yin no zhes pa'o/ / 
121 See the Master of Wisdom for his introductory notes, p. 
Madhyamakavatarasyatika, p. 71a: grtyis mi dmigs pa'i sgo nas gang nyams su myong ba 
spros pa thams cad dang drab pa'i rang bzhin can yin.../ / 
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123 Ibid., p. 71a: don dam pal gnas skabs na ni yul dang yul can cung zad kyang yod pa ma 
yin no/I 
124 Grub mtha'mdzod, ff. 203-204: kun rdzob kyi mtshan nyid gzung 'dzin spros pa dang bcas 
pa'i rnam par snang ba/ de'ang sgrib ba'i rnam par skyes pa ste/ /... don dam bden pa'i 
tshan nyid ni gzung 'dzin spros pa dang bral pa'i ngo bo/ / 
123 gZhung lugs legs bshad, p. 72b: kun rdzob bden pa'i ngo bo ni snang ba yul dang yul can tel 
gzung 'dzin gyis bsdus pa'i chos thams cad do/ de dag la ci'i phir kun rdzob kyi bden pa 
zhes bya zhe na/ kun ni shes bya'i gnas yin la/ rdzob ni sgrib ba ste/ / don dam bden pa'i 
ngo bo ni/ rigs pa yul dang bcas pa ste/ rigs pa ni sangs rgyas kyi yeshes dang byang chu 
sems dpa'i mams kyis mrtyam par gzhag pa'i shes pa dang/ so so skye bo'i gcig dang du 
bral la sogs pa/ spros pa gcod byed kyi rigs pa yin la/ rigs pa'i yul ni rigs pa des gtan la 
phab pa'am/ des rtogs chos mams kyi chos nyid spros pa dang dral ba'o/ / 
126 bDu 'jug rnam bshad, p. 121: 'de la don dam pa ni 'phags pa mams kyis yang dag pa'i 
yeshes kyi yul du bdag gi dngos po myed pa gang yin pa'o // kun rdzob ni so so skye po 
ma rig pa'i ling thog gyis blo gros kyi mig bsgrib pa mams kyis rdzun pa thong pa ma rig 
stobs kyis bdag gi dngos po rnyed pa gang yin pa'o// 
127 Shes 'grel ke ta ka, p. 3: de la kun rdzob ni so skye sogs kyi rang bzhin med bzhin du der 
snang pa sgyu ma dang rrni lain skra shad lta bu'i snang tshul 'de yin la// aslo in the zla ba'i 
zhal lung, ff. 80-81: de la yang dag pa'i yeshes kyi mthong yul gang de de nyid de don dam 
yin la/ mthong ba brdzun pa ye yul ni kun rdzob bden par gsungs so// Not only does he 
dichotomise the two truths on the basis of two conflicting experiences, i.e., of ordinary beings 
(so skye, prthagjana) and of aryas, he expressly reduces kun rdzob bden into snang tshul, which 
means the "modes of apprehensions" of ordinary folks. Also see brGal Ian nyin byed snang ba, 
pp. 543-544: nyon mongs can gyi ma rig pa'i dbarig gis kun rdzob bden pa 'jog cing de 
mthong ba rdzun pa clang don dam pa ni mthong ba yang dang par gsungs/ / 
128 bDen gnyis gnas 'jug, f. 378: 'jig rten pa mam kyi don dam pa'i bden pa 'jog 'byed ni/ than 
skyes pa'i ma rig pa'i sgri pa'o/ /; dBu rtsa'i rnam bshad 'jug ngog, f. 220: kun rdzob bden pa'i 
mtshan nyid nil yul can rdzun pa'i shes byar grub pa'o/ don dam bden pa'i mtshan nyid 
ni/ tha snyad kyi spros pa ma lus pa 'das pa'i de kho na nyid do// 
129 Grub mtha' kun shes, f. 27: mtshan nyid lthrul ngor dang rig ngor myid/ /; f. 28: de 'phir 
kun rdzob nges byed 'khrul shes tsam/ /Also see its commentary, i.e., the Grub mtha'i rnam 
bshad, f. 220, for his critique of Tsong khapa's definition of conventional truth which runs, f. 
221: kun rdzob kyi bden pa ni gti mug gi ming can 'jig rten ngar 'dzin lhas skyes kyis 'jog la/ 
dag pa'i yeshes kyis ma gzigs par yang yang gsung pa'i phir ro//; ff. 250-251. In the bDu ma 
Chen po Section (ff. 263-264) in particular, while he focuses on the treatments of the truths, he 
offers perspective based definitions: bden gnyis kyi mtshan nyid ni/ rim pa bzhin ma phyad 
lthrul pa'i shes ngor rived pa'i myed don dang/ ma 'khrul 'phags pa'i rig ngor myed pa'i 
myed don zhes bya ste/ / 
138 dBu tsa'i rnam bshad zab mo, p. 287: kun rdzob ni chos can snang tshul las mam par 'jog la/ 
don dam ni/ de'i gnas tshul stong pa nyid do//; Rigs tsogs dka' gnad, f. 6: kun rdzob kyi 
mtshan nyid ni gnas tshul la ma gzhug pa'i blo myed don/ don dam bden pa'i mtshan nyid 
gnas tshul la zhug pa'i blos myed don te/ / Also see, f. 7: bden pa gnyis po 'ang yul la chos 
gnyis yod pa'i dbang gis gzhag pa min gyi/ shes ngo gnyis la ltos nas gzhag pa ste/ / 
D'ag brgyud grub pa'i shing rta, f. 275: don dam pa ni 'phags pa yang dag pa gzig pa'i 
yeshes de ngor yul yang dag par 'jog go shes brjod par zad kyi/ rang gi bdag nyid du grub 
pa zhig blos myed bya yod pa ma yin no/ / kun rdzob ni so skye ma rig pa'i ling tog gis blo 
mig ma lus pa kebs pa rnams kyi blo ngor yul brdzun pa mthong pa yis blo'r jog go/ /blo 
dis mthong ba'i 'dzin startgs dang mthun par yul de ltar grub pa ni ma yin no/ /de na ngos 
pa rived do cog thams cad don dam pa dang kun rdzob pa'i ngo bo gnyis ni 'dzin par 'gyur 
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ro/ /de gnyis las 'phags pa yang dag pa mthong ba'i yul gang yin pa de ni de kho na nyid de 
don dam bden pa'o/ /mthong pa rdzun pa'i yul gang yin pa de ni kun rdzob bden par ston 
pas gsungs so// Also see ff. 280-281, 304-306. 
132 kLu grub dgongs rgyan, p. 217: mdor na bden gnyis bya ba de phal ba'i ngor bden pa zhig 
dang/ phags pa'i ngor bden pa zhig tu ma go bar/ phal pa'i gang bden pa de'i nang du 
phags pa'i gzigs tshul thams cad bsres pa na/ bsam gyis mi khyab pa'i gnas la yid ches 
chung zad tsam yong ba'i skal ba med la/ bsm gyis khyab pa'i ngas la ji srid sdo pa de srid 
du 'jig rten las cung zad kyang ma 'das par shes par bya'o/ / Also see pp. 220-221, 226, 237- 
238, 
133 "Sathvrtisatya is truth so-called; truth as conventionally believed in common parlance... It 
is the object of the ignorant and immature. Paramarthasatya is unsignified by language and 
belongs to the realm of the unutterable, and is experienced by the wise in a very intimate 
way". In fact, he argues "there is only one truth—the paramarthasatya, as there is only one 
real—the Absolute. The other—sathvrtisatya, is truth so-called in common parlance, it is 
totally false from the absolute standpoint". See 'Introduction', the Madhyamika Dialectic and 
the Philosophy of Nagarjuna, p. xxv. 
134 "Phenomena viewed as relative, as governed by causes and conditions constitute the 
world, viewed as free of all conditions are the Absolute. The Absolute is always the uniform 
nature. Nirvana or the Absolute is not something produced or achieved. Nirvana only means 
the disappearance of the fabrications of discursive through... Phenomena are appearances, . 
and appearances points to their reality. The veil gives a hint of that which is veiled". Ultimate 
truth in his sense is the only truth, "the Absolute as the essence of all being is neither born, 
nor does it cease to be...it is the reality of the appearances". See 'Introduction', The Conception 
of Buddhist Nirvana, pp.51-52. Also, see pp. 50-52. 
1' In 'Madhyamaka', (pp.152-153), he avowedly equates conventional dharmas with the 
daughter of a barren woman; and with the hairs that a monk with diseased eyes thinks he 
sees in his almsbowl, and argues "the object described, the description, and the person 
describing are all similarly nonexistent". The Absolute truth, which, as he argues "is, 
'knowledge of Buddha, is a 'not-knowledge", it is like a man without diseased eyes who 
does not see hairs. 
See his translation of the verse [VI: 23] of the Madhyamakavatara and compare it to his (see 
The Emptiness of Emptiness, p. 231-232, 38n.) notes on the same verse. He defines ultimate 
truth as an object of wisdom, which is revealed through accurate perception. He argues that 
conventional truth is an object which is obtained "on the strength of false perceptions made 
by common people in whom the eye of intelligence has been completely covered by the 
cataract of spiritual ignorance. This intrinsic nature is as well not established in itself, but is 
simply the object revealed through the perception of naïve people". 
137 In Mahayana Buddhism (p. 71), he argues that "all entities", as he argues have two natures, 
because there is a correct perception and a delusory perception. The object of correct 
perception is reality (tattva). That of delusory perception is said to be conventional truth". 
138 The Emptiness of Emptiness, p. 92. 
139 Mahayana Buddhism, p. 70. 
Malamadhyamakakarik, p. 45: gzhan las shes min zhi ba dang/ /spros pa mams ma spros 
pa/ /rnam rtog med don tha dad med/ /de ni de nyid mtshan nyid do/ /Also cited in the 
Prasannapada, p. 306b-307t. 
141 rTsa shes tik chen, pp. 330-332: gang zag gzhan gis stan pa stam las rtogs par bya ba min gyi 
rang gis zag pa med pa'i yeshes kyis rtogs par bya ba'o//...gnyis pa zhi ba ni rab rib med 
pas skra shad ma mthong pa ltar ngo bo nyid kyis yod par rang bzhin clang dral ba'o/ / de'i 
phyir don mams spros par byed pa'i spros pa ngag gis ma spros pa ste ma brjod pa ni gsum 
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pa'o/ / mam rtog med pa ni sems kyi rgyu ba yin la/ de lcho na nyid de mngon du gyur pa'i 
dus su ni de dang dral ba ste/ / -Mon tha dad med pa ni chos gcig don dam par ji lta bu yin 
pa der chos gzhan thams cad kyang mtshungs pas don dam par do so so ba med pa ste/ / 
142 1Ta ba'i 'od zer, p. 335b:'phags pal mnyam gzhag so so rang gis rig pa'i yeshes kyis 'ga' 
yang mthong ba med pa'i tshul gis rig par bya ba yin gyi/ byis pa mams kyis gzhan sgra 
dang/ gtan tshigs la sogs pa las ngo bo ji lta ba bzhin shes bar bya a ma yin pa dang/ gzod 
ma nas cir yang ma grub pas zhi ba dang/ ngag gi spros pa mams kyis zhen nas brjod par 
bya ba a yin pas ma spros pa dang/ sems sems byung gyi spyod yul las 'das pas mam par 
rtog pas 'gar yang brtag tu med pa dang/ mi 'dra ba'i byi drag med pas don tha dad min pa 
ste/ chos lnga po de ni don dam pa'i de kho na nyid kyi mtshan nyid do// 
143 Ibid., p. 326a: 'on na dngos po mams kyi rang bzhin de kho na'i rang bzhin ci lta bu zhig 
yin zhe na/ rang gi ngo bo ci lta ba bzhin bstan par mi nus mod/ gdul bya mams kyis rtogs 
par bya ba'i phyir/ zag pa med pa'i yeshes kyi spyod yul chos mams kyi de kho na'i rang 
bzhin dag gi mtshan nyid ni/ ngo bo rgyu rkyen gyis bcos pa min pa dang/ tha snyad mam 
'jog chos gzhan la ltos pa med pa dang/ gzhan du mi 'gyur ba ste/ chos gsum ldan yin la/ 
de'i mtshan gzhi ni spros dral gyi chos nyid yin tell 
1" Iti. 43 (trans. by Thanissaro Bhildchu), p. 2. 
145 Bahuna Sutta AN X.81 (trans. by Thanissaro Bhikldm). It is cited in The Mind Like Fire 
Unbound, p. 2. 
• 146 Malamadhyamakakarika of Nagarjuna, p. 272. 
142 SN XXXV.116 (trans. by Thanissaro Bhikkhu). Cited in The Mind Like Fire Unbound, p. 8. , 
Mumadhyamakakarika, p. 45: gang la brten te gang 'byung ba/ /de ni re zhig de nyid min/ 
/de las gzhan pa'ang ma yin phyir/ /de phyir chad min rtag ma yin/XVIII:10/ Cited in the 
Prasannapada, p. 310m. 
149 rTsas she trk chen, p. 332. 
150 1Ta ba'i 'od zer, p. 335b. 
151 The Central philosophy of Buddhism, p. 244. 
l'Malamadhyamakakarika, p. 64: tha snyad la ni ma brten par/ /dam pa'i don ni bstan mi 
nus/ /dam pa'i don ni ma rtogs par/ /mya ngan 'das pa thob mi 'gyur/XXIV:10/ 
153 Yuktisastika, p. 86: srid pa dang ni mya ngan 'das/ /gnyis pa 'di ni yod ma yin/ /srid pa 
yongs su shes pa nyid/ /mya ngan 'das zhes bya bar brjod/6/ 
Notes and Tibetan citations on Chapter III 
Madhyamakavatara, p. 156: rab rib mthu yis skra shad la sogs pa'i/ /ngo bo log pa gang zhig 
mam brtags pa/ /de nyid bdag nyid gang du mig dag pas/ /mthong de de nyid de bzhin 
'dir shes kyis/29/ Cited in the Madhyamalcavatarabhasya, p. 104b. 
2 dGongs pa rab gsal, pp. 198-200. 
3 1Ta ba ngan sel, ff. 612-613. 
1Ta ba ngan sel, ff. 612-613: don dam pa'i bden pa ni 'phags pa'i so sor rang rig pa'i yeshes 
kyis gnyis snang nub pa'i tshul gyis myang bar bya ba yin gyi/ gnyis snang dang bcas na 
rnam mkhyen gyi bar gyi yul yang don dam bden pa ma yin pa dang/ don dam bden pa 
rang gi ngo bo ji lta ba zhin gdul bya la bstan mi nus kyi/ gdul bya la tha snyad kyis bstan pa 
na sgra rtog gi yul thams cad mams grangs pa'i don dam zhes bya pa kun rdzob bden pa yin 
par bstan no// 
5 Cited in the Nyanaponika Thera's 'Sariputta: The Marshal of the Dhamma' in Great Disciples 
of the Buddha, p. 62). 
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6 ITa ba'i 'od zer, p. 335b: byes pa rnams kyis gzhan sgra dang/ gtan tshigs la sogs pa las ngo 
bo ji tla ba bzhin shes par bya ba ma nyin pa dang/ / 
Ibid., p. 335b: ngag gi spros pa rnams kyis zhen nas brjod par bya ba ma nyin pas ma spros 
pa dang/ sems sems byung gi spyod yul las 'das pas rnam par rtog pas 'gar yang rtag tu 
med pa dang/ / 
ITa ba'i shen 'byed, p. 127: mdor na gnas lugs la dpyod par byed pa'i blo ni sgra don 'dres 
'dzin gyi rtog pa las ma 'das pas/ 
9 Ibid., p. 127: mtha' bzhi'i spros pa gang rung du bzhung pas bzhi po cig char du bkag pa mi 
srid...// 
1° Recognising reality, p. 455. 
11 Ibid., p. 459. 
12  'Jug pa'i dka' gnad, f. 46: don dam pa 'jug 'byed kyi tshad ma la mtshan nyid ni...rjes dpag 
dang dpe nyer 'jal dang lung tshad ma gsum ni yod pa ma yin tel tshad ma de gsum gyi 'jug 
mtshams ni yul de dang de la rtog par song pa'i cha nas 'jog la/ yul gang la rtog par song 
ba'i cha nas don dam bden pa 'jal byed kyi tshad mar song ba mi srid pa'i phyir/ de bas na 
mngon sum gcig po'o/ /) Among the four a means of knowledge, pramanas, his epistemology 
clearly discounts the inferential knowledge (rjes dpad, anumana), analogy (dpe nyer 'jal, 
upamana) and verbal testimony (lung, iabda) as means of knowing ultimate truth. For him, 
they are only means of knowing conventional truth, for they are all conceptual. He considers 
direct perception (mngon sum, pratyaksa) alone as the means of knowing ultimate truth. For 
details, see 'fug pa'i dka' gnad, ff.460-465, 466-470, 475. 
13 His analysis of the epistemic practices within the Prasaftgika excludes the use of logical 
inference as a means of knowing ultimate truth. See Grub mtha'i rnam bshad, ff. 273-274: kun 
rdzob tsam mam bden pa gang yin yang rung nges byed kyi blo ni shes tsam du nges 
tel 'jig rten pa'i tshad ma'am bdu ma pa'i tshad min yin kyang rung ste gte mug kho na 'jog 
cing nges par byed pas so// Also see ff. 269-272. He expressly argues that the notion of 
pramana is inappropriate in the Madhyamaka tradition. See ff. 222-223: tshad ma bzhi po de 
'jig rten gyi 'dod pa bkod pa yin gyi rang lugs bzhag pa ma yin pa'i phir te...dbu ma rang 
lugs la tshad ma dang tshad min kun rdzob gzhir byas la med par 'dod par bya'o/ / 
14 Shes 'grel lce ta ka, p. 9: chos nyid spros pa thams cad las 'das pa na de ni blos dmigs pa byar 
med pa yin tel gang yul dang yul can du ma gyur cing mtshan ma gang du 'ang ma grub pa 
de la yang dag par ji ltar shes bya zhes rjord del/In commenting on the sixth chapter of 
antideva's Bodhicaryavatara, Mi pham categorically rules out the possibility of knowing 
ultimate truth by conceptual mind. This claim is made more obvious in his response (Shes 
'grel ke ta ka, pp. 9-10) to his critics. Mi pham's claim however, should not be taken too far. 
For he not only accepts (Nges shes sgron me, ff. 82-87, 96) ultimate truth as an object of 
knowledge by the non-conceptual mind or by direct personal realisation, but also argues that 
the conceptual-linguistic device offers us 'mere understanding that all conventional realities 
are utterly false'. See dBu rtsa'i mchan 'grel, f. 217:'jig rten tha snyad kyi rjes su 'drang nas de'i 
mtshan nyid brjod cig ci na/ rtags dpe sogs bzhan gis bstan pas ji bzhin shes mi nus te rab rib 
can la de med par bstan pas rab rib med par lta ltar ngo bo ma mthong 	tshul kyis rtogs 
bya ji lta ba rtogs minus kyang/ 'de phyin ci log go bya ba tsam gzhig rtog go// 
13 His commentary to "antideva's Bodhicaryavatara (dPyod 'jug tshig 'grel, pp. 438-440) reveals 
his deep commitment to the concept of ineffability and inconceivability (smra bsam bjod med) 
of ultimate truth. See dPyod 'jug tshig 'grel, pp. 440: chos nyid spros pa thams cad las 'das pas 
na/ ni blos 'dmigs par byar med pas yin tel gang yul clang yul can du ma gyur cing mtshan 
ma gang du'ang ma grub pa yang dag par na ji ltar shes bya shes brjod/ / 
16 kLu grub dgongs rgyan, p. 211: ji srid 'jig rten gyi rigs pa la snying thag pa nas yid ches yod 
pa de srid du 'jig rten las 'das pa'i do la yid ches yod pa nam yang mi srid de... 'jig rten gyi 
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rigs pa la yid ches dgos na lam bsgom pa don med par 'gyur ba'i rgyu mtshan du bcom ldan 
'das kyis mig clang ma ba sogs nas 'phags pa'i lam bya ba'i dbang po bzhan zhig yod par 
gsungs.../ / In this polemic dGe 'dun Chos 'phel unleashes server criticisms against the 
philosophy of Tsong Ichapa. dGe 'dun Chos 'phel renders the reasoning consciousness as 
utterly useless in terms of understanding ultimate reality. At the heart of his rejection of 
pramarza (perception) lies his equation of perception with the conception of true existence. See 
kLu grub dgongs rgyan, pp. 211-213. 
17 "Ordinary beings", he says "by means of following the inferential reasoning consciousness 
ascertain [ultimate realityr. See Grub mtha' mdzod, f. 196: don dam bden pa nges par byed 
pa'i tshad ma ni dpyad bzod mthar thug dpyod pa'i rig pa'i bzhal bya nges par byed pa'i 
tshad ma pa thob nas so so rang gi rig pa'i mam par ml rtog pa'i yeshes kyis rtogs na'ang/ so 
so skye bo de dag gyis gtan tshigs kyi rjes su 'brang ba'i rigs shes rjes dpag gi nges par byed 
do// 
18 Logical reasoning, as far as he is concerned, is an indispensable device for the direct 
realisation of ultimate reality. In sharp contrast with most of his followers such as Go rampa 
and Sakya mChog ldan, Sa pan holds that even the ordinary beings possess the reasoning 
consciousness that could conceptually access ultimate reality. See gZung lugs legs bshad, p. 
72b: don dam bden pa'i ngo bo ni/ rigs pa yul dang bcas pa ste/ rigs pa ni sangs rgyas kyi 
yeshes dang/ byang chub sems dpa' imams kyis mnyam par bzhag pa'i shes pa dang/ so so 
skye bo'i gcig clang du dral la sogs pa'i spros pa gcod byed kyi rigs pa yin la/ rig pa'i yul ni 
rigs pa des gtan las phap pa'am/ des rtogs pa'i chos mams kyis chos nyid spros pa dang dral 
ba'o// 
19 By closely following the footsteps of his predecessor, Sa part (Rigs tsogs dka' gnad, f. 22), 
Rong ston also differentiates between the reasoning consciousness analysing conventional 
truth and the reasoning consciousness analysing ultimate truth. And argues that the 
"knowledge generated from contemplation and meditation have the same continuum, 
because the meaning (don) established by the means of analytical process, is itself further 
processed through the meditative equipoise". See Rigs tsogs dka' gnad, f. 105:bsam byung 
dang sgom byung yang rtogs pa'i rigs rgyun gcig ste/ bsam byung gis gtan la phabs pa'i don 
de nyid la sgom byung gis kyang mnyam par 'jog ba'i phyir ro/ de la bsam byung ni rta'i 
dkyus bstan pa ltar yin la/ sgom byung ni de las brten nas rta thogs med du rgyug pa bzhin 
yin no!! Rong ston however admits the limits of inference and maintains that it is a 
mistaken insofar as the inferential cognition mistakes the universal of selflessness as 
selflessness itself. However inference, he argues, paves the way for the eventual eradication 
of the conception of self. In the Rigs tsogs dlca' gnad, f. 105, he says: gal te rjes dpag ni log shes 
yin pas des rtogs pa'i rigs rgyun goms pas phyin ci ma log pa'i rtogs pa skye ba ji ltar 'gyur 
zhe na/ bdag med pa'i don spyi la spyi'i bdag med du zhen pa'i cha nas Ikhrul pa'i phyir 
de'i 'dzin startgs kyi cha nas goms par byed pa ma yin las/ 'on kyang yul bdag med du gnas 
pa ltar rjes dpag kyang bdag med pa'i rnam ba can du skye ba'i 'dzin stangs kyi cha nas 
phyin cin ma log pa clang rjes su mthun pa'i phyir de'i 'dzin stangs kyi cha nas goms par 
byas pas bdag 'dzin log nas bdag med mngon du rtogs pa'i rtogs pa skye ba'i phyir nges ba 
ga las yod/ / Moreover, Rong ston criticises (Rigs tsogs dka' gnad, f. 39: rjes dpag la rigs shes 
su mi 'dod na rigs pa la rten nas sgro 'dog gcod byed kyi blo min par 'gyur roll) the view 
that denies the role of inference as the epistemic means by which ultimate reality can be 
eventually accessed directly. He equates inference and the reasoning consciousness, and 
argues that the denial of the epistemic role of inference would be tantamount to denying the 
analytical cognitions altogether. For him, this would amount to denying the meditative 
equipoise, which is a direct result of the logical analysis. Therefore, he writes (Rigs tsogs dka' 
gnad, f 40): spros pa gcod pa'i rjes dpag la yul gyi snang ba mi mnga' bas mnyam bzhag 
NOTES AND TIBETAN CITATIONS 	 Page 371 
snang med yin pa'i gnad kyang de yin tel rigs shes kyi myed don de nyid las mrvyam par 
'jog pa'i phyir zhes 'dod do// 
20 Nges don rab gsal, p. 370a: don dam bden pa 'phags pa'i mnyam gzhag gis ji ltar spros pa 
clang dral pa'i tshul kyis myong ba ltar mtshan nyid clang mtshan gzhi sogs gang gis kyang 
bstan par ml nus tel tshig gis brjod par bya ba ma yin zhirvg/ blos yul du bya ba ma yin pa'i 
phyir te/ / 
21 dGongs pa rab gsal, p. 198: rab rib med pas mthong ba 'dra ba'i skra shad med pa mi rtogs 
pa gsurtgs pas/ nyan pa pos de ltar ma rtogs kyang skra shad med pa me rtogs pa min no/I 
22 Ibid., p. 199: don dam bden pa ni zab mo'i don can gyi nges don gyi lung dang/ de ltar ston 
pa'i ngag gis brjod me nus pa...min tell 
23 Ibid., p. 198-199: dper byas nas de kno na nyid stan pa na ma rig pa'i rab rib kyi bslad pa 
dang dral bas mthong ba 'dra ba zhig ml rtogs kyang/ spyir de kho na nyid mi rtogs pa min 
par bzhed pas na/ don dam bden pa ni zab mo'i don can gyi nges don gyi lung clang/ de ltar 
ston pa'i ngag gis brtod mi nus pa dang/ de'i rjes su 'brang ba'i blos kyang rtogs ml nus pa 
min tel de kho na nyid kyi don shes brjod kyi yul min par gsurtgs pa thams cad la yang de 
bzhin du shes par bya'o/ / 
24 Nges don rab gsal, p. 384d: don dam bden pa'i yul can ma 'khrul pa ni 'phags pa'i mnyam 
gzhag kho na la byas nas/ de'i ngor mi slu ba don dam bden pa yin no/I 
25 Ibid., p. 384d: so so skye bo'i rigs shes kyis mam par dpyad nas gtan la 'bebs pa yin pa na 
mtshan nyid 'jog pa'i tshe yul can ma 'khrul ba ni 'phags pa'i mnyam gzhag kho nar rlom 
yang/ rigs shes tshed ma ni de'i khongs su gtogs pa'o/ / 
26 Recogising reality, p. 456. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Malamadhyamakakarika, p. 45: brjod par bya ba ldog pa ste/ sems kyi spyod yul ldog pas 
so/ ma skyes pa dang ma 'gags pa/ chos nyid mnya ngan ldas dang mtshungs/ 7/ Also 
cited in the Prasannapada, p. 299b-300a. See Garfield, The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle 
Way, (p. 249) and Kalupahana, Malamadhyamakalcarika of Nagarjuna, (p. 268) for other ways of 
translating this verse. 
Prasannapada, p. 300t-b: 'dir 'brjod par bya ba 'ga' zhig yod na ni/ de ston par 'gyur ba zhig 
na/ gang gi tshe brjod par bya ba ldog cing/ tshig dag gi yul yod pa ma yin pa de'i tshe 
sangs rgyas mams kyis cung zad kyang ma bstan to/ yang ci'i phyir brjod par bya ba med cc 
na/ sems kyi spyod yul ldog pas so// zhes gsungs te/ sems kyi spyod yul ni sems kyi spyod 
yul lo/ spyod yul ni yul te/ dmigs pa zhes bya ba'i tha tshigs go/ /gal te sems kyi spyod yul 
'ga' zhig yod par gyur na ni der rgyu mtshan 'ga' zhig sgro btags nas tshig dag 'jug par 'gyur 
na/ gang gi tshe sems kyi spyod yul nyid mi 'thad pa de'i tshe/ rgyu mtshan sgro btags nas 
tshig gar 'jug par 'gyur/yang ci'i phyir sems kyi spyod yul med ce na/ bstan pa'i phyir/ ma 
skyes pa dang ma 'gag pa/ chos nyid nya ngan 'das dang mtshurtg/ / zhes gsurtgs te/ gang 
gi phyir ma skyes pa dang ma 'gags pa chos nyid te chos kyi ngo bo dang chos skyi rang 
bzhin nya ngan las 'das pa dang tshung par bzhag pa de'i phyir de las sems ml 'jug go/ / 
sems mi 'jug na rgyu mtshan sgro 'dogs par ga la 'gyur la/ de med pa'i phyir tshig dag 'jug 
pa ga la 'gyur te/ de'i phyir sangs rgyas mams kyis cung zad kyang ma bstan to zhes bya 
bar grtas so// 
Madhyamakavatarabhasya, p. 104m: de ni brjod du med pa'i phir dang/ shes pa'i yul ma yin 
pa nyid kyi phir drtgos su bstan par ml nus pas/ 
rTsa she tik chen, p. 327: don dam par brjod par bya yod na de ston par 'gyur na'ang don 
dam par brjod par bya ba ldog pa ste yod pa min pa...// 
33 Ibid., p. 327:del rgyu mtshan ni don dam par sems kyi spyod yul gyi dmigs pa ldog pas 
so// 
NOTES AND TIBETAN CITATIONS 	 Page 372 
34 Ibid., p. 327: de'i rgyu mtshan yang chos thams cad don dam par ma skyes shing ma 'gags 
pa'i chos nyid nya ngan las 'das pa dang mtshungs pa ste/ / 
35 Ibid., p. 327: de'i tshe sangs rgyas mams kyis cung zad kyang ma bstan no/ / 
36 Nges don rag gsal, p. 372d:stong nyid rtogs nas goms pa mthar phyin pa'i tshe glo bur gyi 
dri ma zad nas blo nyid zag med kyi dbyings su gyur pa ni/ spangs rtogs phun sum tsogs pa 
don dam pa'i sangs rgyas yin la.../ 
37 1Ta ba ngan sel, f. 728: yeshes de'i ngor ji lta ba dang/ ji snyed pa dang/ yul can yeshes 
gsum po ngo bo tha dag me snang la.../ 
Nges don rab gsal, p. 371a-b: 'der spros pa zhes bya ba bden pa'i dngos po'am ma yin dgag 
kho na ma yin gyi gang la blo 'jug cing 'phro ba dgag sgrub ky chos kyi mtshan ma thams 
cad yin te...spros pa ni dngos po'i rgyu mtshan can yin la de bzhin gzhigs pa dngos po med 
pa la/ spros pa rnams 'jug pa ga la yod de/ de'i phyir de bzhin gshigs pa spros pa las 'das pa 
yin no// 
39 Ibid., p. 371a-b: spros pa ni dngos po'i rgyu mtshan can yin la de bzhin gzhigs pa dngos po 
med pa la/ spros pa rnams 'jug pa ga la yod de/ de'i phyir de bzhin gshigs pa spros pa las 
'das pa yin no/ / 
4° Ibid., p. 71a: kun rdzob kyi bden pa ni...ci ltar so so'i skye bo mams kyis dngos po yod pa 
dang med pa la sogs par brtags pa yin gyi/ de lta bu'i rang bzhin ni med pa yin te/ yod pa 
dang med pa la sogs pa rigs pas ml thad ba'i phir roll 
41 Ibid., p. 370b: gal te sems kyi spyod yul 'ga' zhig yod par gyur na ni der rgyu msthan 'ga' 
zhig sgro btags nas tshig dag 'jug par 'gyur na/ gang gyi tshe sems kyi spyod yul nyid mi 
'thad pa de'i tshe rgyu msthan sgro btags nas tshig gar 'jug par 'gyur/ / Also see 1Ta ba'i 'od 
zer, p. 335a. 
4`2 1Ta ba'i 'od zer, p. 335a: ci'i phir sems kyi spyod yul ldog ce na chos mams kyi chos nyid de 
bzhin nyid gdod ma nas ma skyes pa dang/ ma 'gags pas blo bur gyi dri ma dang dral ba'i 
mnya ngan las 'das pa dang mtshungs pas/ gnyis snang dang bcas pa'i blo la mam pa 'char 
rgyu med pa'i phyir roll 
.43 Nges don rab gsal, p. 370b: ci'i phyir sems kyi spyod yul med ce na/... gang gi phyir ma 
skyes pa dang ma 'gag pa'i chos nyid de chos kyi ngo bo clang/ chos kyi rang bzhin mnya 
ngan las 'das pa dang mthsung par bzhag pa de'i phir de sems mi 'jug go// 
" Ibid., p. 370b: sems mi 'jug na rgyu mtshan sgro 'dogs par ga la 'gyur la de med pa'i phyir 
tshig dag 'jug par ga la 'gyur te/ de'i phyir sangs rgyas mams kyis cung zad kyang ma bstan 
to zhes bya bar gnas so// 
1Ta ba'i 'od zer, p. 334d-335a: brjod par bya ba'i chos 'ga' zhig yod na ston par 'gyur ba zhig 
na de kho na nyid la ni sgras zhen nas brjod par bya ba ldog pas 'ga' yang ma bstan to// 
46 Ibid., p. 335b: don dam pa'i de kho na nyid rang gi ngo bo'i sgo nas bstan par ml nus kyang 
kun rdzob du sgro brtags nas bstan pa ltar mtshan nyid kyang sgro brtag nas bstan dgos// 
47 See dBu rtsa'i mchan 'grel, 217: 'on na rtogs bya'i de kho na nyid ci lta bu zhe na/ de bsam 
brjod las 'das par bstan zin to/ /'on kyang 'jig rten tha snyad kyi rjes su 'brang nas de'i 
mtshan nyid brjod.../ / 
dBu rtsa'i rnam bshad 'jug ngog, f. 175: de kho na nyid sgras brjod pa'am rtog pas shes par 
nus sam zhes na/ sangs rgyas kyis de lcho na nyid ston pa'is dbang du mdzad nas yongs 
bcod du ci yang bstan pa med de/ de kho na nyid ni sgras brjod par bya ba ldog pa ste/ 
brjod du med pa'i phyir te/ sems kyi man par rtog pa'i spyod yul du dmigs pa ste der 'dzin 
pa ldog pas so/ /de'i rgyu mtshan ni/ don dam par/ ma skyes pa dang ma 'gags pa'i chos 
nyid ni mya ngan las 'das pa dang tshung par sgra rtog gi di lta ba bzhin bzhung du med 
pa'i phir ro// 
Jaideva Singh, in The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana, (pp. 15-18) also endorses the the same 
view (esp. see (p.39). "From the standpoint of the Absolute, lanyata means prapancair 
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apraparicitam that which is devoid of, completely free of thought-construction, ananartlzam, 
that which is devoid of plurality. In other words, (a) in-expressible in human language, (b) 
that 'is', 'not is', 'both is' and 'not is', 'neither is' nor 'not is'—no thought category or 
predicate can be applied to it. It is transcendence of thought". 
513 We should not however take the similarity between Go rampa and his modern 
counterparts too far. The (non-traditional) reading of Nagarjuna, in my view, is a 
consequence of equating Nagarjuna's ultimate reality with either Kantian absolute or the 
Upanisadic way of defining Brahman as neti, neti. For example, Murit (1998) argues (p. 38) 
"the similarity of the avyakrta to the celebrated antinomies of Kant and the catuskoti of the 
Madhyamikas cannot fail to strike us". Moreover, he says (p. 48) "a close parallel.. .is the 
Upanisadic way of defining as 'neti,'"neti,' as what cannot be grasped by speech, thought or 
senses". Similarly, Narain (1985, p. 239) sees Madhyamikas as Kantians insofar as their share 
the notion of "innate incapacity of human reason to reach the Absolute". Singh (1989, pp. 48, 
72), however focuses on the connections between Brahma and livara of Vedanta with 
Dharmadhatu and Dharma-kaya of the Madhyamika. Stcherbatsky (1989, p.26) also draws the 
parallels emphasising the transcendental character of advaita-brahma, particularly the 
connection between Buddha's silence on the metaphysical question and afikara's silence on 
the issue about the essence of Brahma. I partly agree with the above philosophers that there 
are certain parallels in the explanatory mode of the Madhyamika's ultimate reality, the 
Kantian absolute and Upanisadic Brahma, specifically, the incapacity of logical mind to grasp 
them. However, I also partly disagree. Except for the dialectical parallels, there is a minimal 
point of intersection between the Madhyamika's ultimate reality (especially of Tsong 
khapa's) with either Kantian absolute or Upanisadic Brahma. 
Madhyamika Dialectic and the Philosophy of Nagarjuna, p. xi. 
52 "The Nature of Madhyamika,' p. 239. 
Ibid., p. 236. 
54 Maha-satipatthana, DN 22 (trans. by Thanissaro Bhikkhu), p. 4. 
55 Sabbasava Sutta, MN 2 (trans. by Thanissaro Bhildthu), pp. 1-2. 
The Noble Eightfold Path, p. 5. 
'Translated from Pali by Thanissaro Bhikkhu. See The Wings to Awakening, pp. 274-275. 
58See The Discourse Right view, p.1. AN X.121 (trans. Bhikkhu Nanamoli, ed. And revised by 
Bhikkhu Bodhi). 
59 Ibid. 
Maha-Cattarisaka, MN 117 (trans. by Thanissaro Bhikkhu). 
61 What four? They are physical food as nutriment, gross or subtle; contact as the second; 
mental volition as the third; and consciousness as the fourth. [Sammaditthi Sutta, MN 9]. (1) 
Physical food as nutriment (lcabalinkaro aharo), literally, food made into a ball) is nutriment 
that can be swallowed after making it into a ball; this is a term for the nutritive essence which 
has as its basis boiled rice, junket, etc. (2) Contact as the second nutriment (phasso dutiyo): the 
sixfold contact beginning with eye-contact; (3) mental volition (manosanetana); and (4) 
consciousness (viiinanam): any kind of consciousness whatsoever. 
62 Aging and death, birth, being, clinging, craving, feeling, contact, the sixfold base, 
mentality-materiality, consciousness, formations, and ignorance—taints. 
63 See his 'Introductory Notes' on The Discourse of Right View, p. 2. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Lam rim chen mo, p. 789: de ni rtog pa yin yang yeshes dang shin tu rjes su mthun pa'i rgyu 
yin te.../ 
66 Ibid., p. 791: so sor rtog pa'i shes rab kyi dpyad pa sngon du song ba'i mi rtog pa dgos kyi, 
mi rtog pa tsam gis chog pa ma yin no/I 
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67 Ibid., p. 789: de lta yin na lam zag bcas las zad med kyi lam 'byung ba yang mi srid pas so 
so skye bos 'phags pa thob pa med par 'gyur te.../ / 
68 Ibid., p. 789: de bzhin du sa bon skya bo las myu gu sngon po skye ba dang/ me las du ba 
skye ba dang/ bud med las skyes pa sogs rnams pa mi 'dra ba'i rgyu 'bras mtha' yas pa zhig 
snang ngo/ / 
69 Ibid., p. 789:'phags pa'i mam par mi rtog pa'i yeshes ni bdag gnyis su 'dzin pa'i yul gis 
stong pa'i bdag med pa'i don mrigon sum du rtogs pa yin la/ de skye ha la da lta nas bdag 
du 'dzin pa'i yul la so sor dpyad nas de med par rtogs pa'i sgo nas sgom dgos.../ / 
7° See The Discourse on Right View, p. 3. 
71 The Noble Eightfold Path, p. 5. 
n Except some of my minor modifications, the sutta is trans. by Thanissaro Bhildchu. 
73  Brahmajala Sutta (Ten Suttas from Digha Nikaya: Long Discourses of the Buddha, CIHTS), pp. 
16-69. 
74 For a detailed treatment of these views, see K. N. Jayatilleka, Early Buddhist Theory of 
Knowledge. (London: Allen & Unwin, 1963), p. pp. 23-168. 
78 Trans. by Thartissaro Bhikkhu. 
7 6 Mulamadhyamakakarika, p. 81: gang gis thugs brtse nyer bzung nas/ /lta ba thams cad 
spang pa'i phyir/ /dam pa'i chos ni ston mdzad pa/ go tam de la phyag 'tshal lo/XXVII:30/ 
n For his detailed treatment of this issue, see Legs bshad snying pa, pp. 248-250, 252-254; and 
rTsa she tik chen, pp. 258-259, 462-484. 
78 Empty Words, p. 46. 
79 Ibid. 
8° Ibid. 
81 Yang dag lta ba'i 'od zer, p. 307a:lta ba smad pa ni ma rig pa'i rab rib kyis blo'is mig my'ams 
pa'i blo chung gang dag phyi nang gi dngos po kun rdzob pa mains las yang dag par yod pa 
nyid dang/ de bkag pa'i med pa nyid du lta ba'i gang zag de yis ni lta bar bya ha don dam 
par rang bzhin gis mya ngan las 'das pa spros pa thams cad nyi bar zhi ba dang/ zhi ba 
mthar mthog pa mi mthong ste/ dgag bya spros pa'i mtha la bltas pas spros dral lta ba'i mig 
clang ml ldan phyir/ dmus long bzhin no/I 
For a detailed analysis, see 1Ta ba'i shen 'byed, pp. 41-64, 66-76 for his criticisms on Tsong 
lchapa's view; and pp. 116-154 for his account. 
Nges don rab gsal, p. 394d: dbu ma rang nyid la zhe 'dod kyi khas len curig zad kyang med 
pa'r phyir/ / 
p. 395a: rang la zhe 'dod kyi dam bca' khas len med pa de sgrub pa'i rang rgyud gyi 
rtags shes bya la ml Thad pa yin no/ /des na thal 'gyur gyi byed pas kyang pha rol po'i log 
par rtog pa'i dam bca"gog pa tsam yin gyi/ rang gi 'dod pa sgrub pa ni ma yin tell. ..des na 
dbu ma pa la rang 'dod pa'i bsgrub bya med pas dang/ chos can la mthun snang med pas 
rang rgyud kyi rtags mi 'thad cing gzhan gyi 'dod pa 'gog pa ni pha rol po nyid kyis khas 
blangs pa'i rtags las de dang brgyud nas 'gal ba'i pha rol po'i 'dod pa 'gog pa thal 'gyur ba'i 
lugs 'de nyid rigs pa yin no// Also see, pp. 396a-400a. 
'See his 'Introductory Notes' on the Ma lamadhyamakakarika of Nagarjuna, p. 12. 
'Lam rim chen mo, pl 792: bden par bzung nas gnas su mi rung ba yang sngar bshad pa ltar/ 
de dag bden par med par rtogs pa la rag las pas/ de 'dra ba'i mi gnas pa dang ml rtog par 
gsungs pa thams cad yul mams rang bzhin gis grub pa'am bden par 'gog pa' yang dag pa'i 
so sor rtog po sngon du 'gro ba kho na la gsungs pa yin par shes par gis shig/ / 
87 'The Nature of Mahyamika,' p. 238. 
88 Ibid., pp. 238-239. 
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Notes and Tibetan citations on Chapter IV 
'For example, kLong chen, Grub mtha' mdzod, ff. 196,294; Sa pan, gZung lugs legs bshad, p. 72b; 
Red mda' ba, bDu 'jug rnam bshad, p. 325; Mi pham, Shes 'grel ke ta ka, p. 10; Rong ston, Rigs 
tsogs dka' gnad, ff. 58-59; sTag tsang, Grub mtha'i rnam bshad, f.255; a•Icya mChog ldan, dBu 
rtsa'i rnam bshad 'jug ngog, f. 117; Mi skyod rDo rje, D'ag brgyud grub pa'i shing rta, f. 279; and 
mKhan po Kun bzang dPal dan, dPyod 'jug tshig 'grel, p. 440. 
2Madhyamakavatarabhasya 104: nyan par 'dod pa mams la rang gis myong ba nyid du de'i 
rang bzhin gsal par bya ba'i phir dpe bshad pa// 
3 Prasannapada, p. 307: 'de la bzhan las shes pa yod pa ma yin pas na gzhan las shes min tel 
gzhan gyis bstan pa rtogs par bya ba ma yin gyi/ rang nyid kyis rtog par bya ba yin no zhes 
bya ba'i don to/ / 
4 Ibid., p. 307: de'i tshe de kho na nyid ma rtogs pa'i tshul gyis rang nyid kyis rtogs par 'gyur 
tel de ltar na dngos po mams kyi rang gi ngo bo gzhan las shes ba ma yin pa.. .de ni de kho 
na nyid do// 
Madhyamakavatarabhasya, p. 105: gal te mam pa de lta bu'i rang bzhin ni mthong ba med pa 
nyid ma yin nam de'i phyir ji ltar de dag gis gzigs she na/ bden mod kyi 'on kyang ma gzigs 
pa'i tshul gyis gzigs so zhes brjod do// 
6 The Progress of Insight, p. 6. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid., see 'The Translator's Note', p. 11,34n. 
dGongs pa ra gsal, p. 202: de kho na nyid kyi gzig ngor gnyis snang nub pas gnyis kyi tshul 
gyis mi gzigs pa ni bden mod kyi/ 'on kyang ma gzigs pa'i tshul gyis de dag gis gzigs so 
zhes brjod do/ / 
10 Ibid., p. 200: don dam pa'i shes bya thams cad mIdiyen tshul... phung po la sogs pa kun 
rdzob pa'i snang ba mams ma gzigs pa'i tshul gyis/ de rnams kyi de kho na nyid mkhyen 
pa'o// 
11 Ibid., p. 202: sangs rgyas kyi don dam mkhyen pa'i yeshes kyis chos can la ma rig par chos 
nyid 'ba' zhig thugs su thud par gsungs tell 
12 Nges don rab gsal, p. 446: gnyis snang dang bcas ba'i snang ba ni med de/ 'khrul ba'i bags 
chags ma lus pa spangs pa'i phyir roll 
13 Cited in the dGongs pa rab gsal, p. 202: mthong ba med pa ni mthong ba dam pa'o/ / Also 
cited in the rTsa she tik-chen, p. 275. 
14 dGongs pa rab gsal, p. 202: ci yang ml mthong ba mthong bar mi bzhed kyi/ / Also see rTsa 
she pk chen, p. 275-276. 
15 dGongs pa rab gsal, p. 202:spros pa ma mthong ba ni spros dral mthong bar 'jog pas/ 
mthong ma mthong gzhi gcig la byed pa min no/ / Also see rTsa she pk-chen, pp. 275-276: 
mthong ba med pa ni mthong ba dam pa'i zhes gsungs pa'i don yang ci yang mi mthong ba 
mthong bar ml bzhed kyi/ sngar bshad pa ltar spros pa ma mthong ba ni spros dral mthong 
par 'jog pas mthong ma mthong gzhi gcig la byed pa min no/,/ 
16 lTa ba'i shan 'byed, p. 128b: ma mthong ba'i tshul gyis mthong/ ma gzigs pa'i tshul gyis 
gzigs/ / 
17 Praparica in Buddhist philosophical discourse, always carries a negative connotation. It 
usually means a tendency of the mind to proliferate issues from the sense of falsified or 
distorted self. It is therefore frequently used in the analyses of the psychology of conflict as 
the Buddha himself does in his discourses such as of the Sakka-panha Sutta DN 21, the 
Madhupinclika Sutta MN 18, and the Kalaha-vivada Sutta SN IV.11. Although this term is 
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translated in different ways such as self-reflexive thinking, reification, falsification, distortion, 
elaboration, or exaggeration, I opted to translate it as 'conceptual elaboration' to emphasis 
the role of conception in the process of paparica. In his introductory notes on the Madhupindika 
Sutta MN 18 (p. 2), Thanissaro Bhikkhu argues that "the word itself is derived from a root 
that means diffusiveness, spreading, proliferation. The Pali Commentaries define paparica as 
covering three types of thought: craving, conceit and views. They also note that it functions 
to slow down in its escape from sarilsara". 
18 See Thanissaro Bhildthu, 'Introductory Notes' on the Madhupindika Sutta, MN 18, p. 1. 
19 Ibid. 
20 I borrowed these mapping models from Thanissaro Bhikkhu, see 'Introductory Notes' on 
the Madhupindika Sutta, MN 18, p. 2. Although the mappings of the causal chain leading to 
praparica or vice versa seem somewhat linear in their mapping styles, Buddhist analysis of 
causality is generally positioned between linearity and non-linearity, between circularity and 
non-circularity, and between determinism and non-determinism. "It provides plenty of room 
for feedback loops", as Thanissaro Bhikkhus puts it. But at the same time, it prevents the 
justification of causal events generated through random, coincidental, accidental, or divine 
intervention. 




28 See 'Introductory Notes' on the Madhupindika Sutta, MN 18 
26 Ibid. 
27 rTsa she tik chen, pp. 322-323: 'o na gang zad pas las nyon zad par 'gyur snyam na/ 'khor 
bar skye ba'i las nyon ni nyon mongs las skye la nyon mongs kyang sdug mi sdug dang 
phyin ci log gi tshul min yid byed kyi mam rtog las 'byung gi ngo bo nyid kyis yod pa mm 
no/ / tshul min yid byed kyi mam rtog de dag ni shes pa dang shes bya dang rjod bya dang 
rjod byed dang bum snam clang skyes pa dang bud med dang/ myed ma rued la sogs pa la 
bden par zhen pa'i spros pa sna tshogs pa thog med nos goms pa las skyes'o/ bden 'dzin gyi 
spros pa ni yul de mams stong pa nyid du lta ba goms pas 'gags par 'gyur ro/ / Also see, pp. 
327,453. 
28 Ibid., pp. 420-421: de la spros pa ni 'jir rtags kyi dgag bya'i spros pa tsam ma yin gyi snang 
ba'i spros pa yang yin no/I 
Nges don rab gsal, p. 371a: 'dir spros pa zhes pa bden pa'i dngos po'am ma yin dgag kho na 
ma yin gyi gang gang la blo 'jug cing sphro dgag sgrub kyi chos kyi mtshan ma thams cad 
yin tell 
Recognising reality, p. 459. 
31 rTsa she tik chen, p. 421: snang ba'i spros pa med pa med pa la mi bya ste.../ / 
32 Ibid., p. 421: de las 'das pa'i tshul ni de kho na nyid mngon sum du gzigs pa'i ngor gnyis 
snang gi spros pa thams cad nub pa la bya'i... II 
Nges don rab gsal, p. 371a-b: spros pa ni dngos po'i rgyu mtshan can yin la de bzhin gzhigs 
pa dngos po med pa la/ spros pa mams 'jug pa ga la yod de/ de'i phyir de bzhin gshigs pa 
spros pa las 'das pa yin no/I 
34 bDu 'jug rnam bshad, p. 127. 
dBu rtsa'i mchan 'grel, ff. 209-212. 
dBu tsa'i rnam bshad zab mo, pp. 216-221. 
37 dBu rtsa'i rnam bshad, ff. 223-224. 
38 D'ag brgyud grub pa'i shing rta, f. 279. 
kLu grub dgongs rgyan, pp. 149-152. 
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4° Nges don rab gsal, p. 371b:spros pa'i ngos 'dzin bzhi tsam byung ba mams ni mtha' bzhi 
char spros pa las ma 'das kyang skabs thob kyi spros pa ngos 'dzin pa'i dbang du byas pa'o/ 
de clang dral ba'i don yang 'khrul ngo'i yod med sogs kyi spros pa 'de dag gdod ma nas rang 
gyi ngo bos stong pa yin la...// 
'U Ibid., p. 371a-b: 'der spros pa zhes bya ba bden pa'i dngos po'am ma yin dgag kho na ma 
yin gyi gang la blo 'jug cing 'phro ba dgag sgrub ky chos kyi mtshan ma thams cad yin 
te...spros pa ni dngos po'i rgyu mtshan can yin la de bzhin gzhigs pa dngos po med pa la/ 
spros pa mams 'jug pa ga la yod de/ de'i phyir de bzhin gshigs pa spros pa las 'das pa yin 
no/ / 
rTsa she tik chen, p. 421: gzhan du na chos nyid dang chos can snang ba'i spros pa gnyis ya 
mi dral bas don dam bden pa mi srid pa'r 'gyur ba'i phyir roll 
43 Transcendental Dependent Arising, p. 10, he adds that "with the attainment of dispassion, 
consciousness passes clear beyond the mundane level, and for a fleeting moment realises as 
its object the unconditioned state, nibbana". 
44 Ibid. 
45 Yuktisastika, p. 87:srid pa dang ni mya ngan ldas/ /gnyis po 'di ni yod ma nyin/ /srid pa 
yongs su shes pa nyid/ /mya ngan 'das zhes bya bar brjod/6/ 
rTsa shes tik chen, pp. 25-26: rten 'byung gi de kho na nyid gnas tshul bzhin 'phags pas 
gzhigs pa'i don bjord bya rjord byed dang mtshan mtshon la sogs spros pa thams cad 
ldog pa'i phyir rten 'byung gi de nyid la spros pa nger zhi zhes bya ba'i// 
47 Transcendental Dependent Arising, p. 10. 
48 Ibid. 
Saritsara in this context refers to one's five psychophysical aggregates. It does not refer to 
the external world. 
5° Transcendental Dependent Arising, p. 10. 
5' Nges don rab gsal, p. 371c-d: ngos po mams kyi rang bzhin mthar thug pa...ni de bzhin 
gshegs pa rmams byung yang rung ma byung yang rung/ chos mams kyi chos nyid ni gnas 
pa pa'o/ / zhes ba'i tshul gyis gsungs las sogs pa'i chos thams cad la dus thams cad du me'i 
tsha ba dang/ bu ram gyi mngar ba ltar cir yang ma grub pa'i stong nyid des khyab pa 
dang/ rigs pa yang dag gis mtha' gang du grub tsal ba na gang du yang ma grub par nges pa 
clang/ de la ji skad shad pa'i rang bzhin gyi chos gstun 'thad pa nyid phyir na dgos po mams 
kyi rang bzhin mthar mthug pa'o/ / 
52  rTsa she tik chen, p. 421: de las 'das pa'i tshul ni de kho na nyid mngon sum du gzhigs pa'i 
ngor gnyis snartg gyi spros pa thams cad nub pa la bya'i.../ / 
53 Transcendental Dependent Arising, p. 10. 
54 Transcendental Dependent Arising, p. 10. 
Non-dual wisdom is fully concentrated, fully purified from all epistemic and cognitive 
errors, and is capable of disintegrating, penetrating and seeing the reality by way of 
dissolving all psychophysical aggregates into the bodily and mental processes. The 
experiential 'right view' (or right understanding) is firmly grounded on the bedrock of the 
eightfold path. The eightfold path empower and reinforce non-dual wisdom's purgative 
potency and penetrating insight. The conceptual right view directs the mind upon the object 
of meditation; right speech, right action, right livelihood, eradicate obstructions and create 
suitable environment. Right effort invigorates the mind; right mindfulness fixes attention on 
the ultimate reality and right concentration unifies the strength of mind in order to absorb 
and penetrate the ultimate reality pertaining to one's five psychophysical aggregates. 
56rTa she tik chen, p. 417: des ji snyed pa'i don mam mngon sum du 'jal ba ma yin tel 'jal na ni 
shugs la rtogs pa mi rung bas dgnos su rtogs dgos shing de yang mam pa med par 'jal ba 'de 
pa'i lugs min pas gsugs sgra la sogs pa'i mam pa dngos su shar ba'i blo la yul yul can gnyis 
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su snang ba med par byar ml rung ba'i phyir roll 
57 Metaphorically speaking, "it is like seeing the continuous successive vanishing of a 
summer mirage moment by moment; or it is like the quick and continuous bursting of 
bubbles produced in a heavy shower by thick rain drops falling on a water surface; or it is 
like the quick, successive extinction of oil-lamps or candles, blown out by the wind, as these 
lights are being offered at a shrine by devotees". See The Venerable Maha Sayadaw and 
Nyanaponika Thera, The Progress of Insight, p. 6. 
58 Nges don rab gsal, p. 372d:stong nyid rtogs nas goms pa mthar phyin pa'i tshe glo bur gyi 
dri ma zad nas blo nyid zag med kyi dbyings su gyur pa ni/ spangs rtogs phun sum tshogs 
pa don dam pal sangs rgyas yin la.../ 
59 1Ta. ba ngan sel, f. 728: yeshes de'i ngor ji lta ba clang/ ji snyed pa dang/ yul can yeshes 
gsum po ngo bo tha dag me snang la.../ 
6° 1Ta ba'i shan 'byed, p. 128: mtha' bzhi'i spros pa cig char du 'gags nas rtogs bya'i chos nyid 
clang rtogs byed kyi blo gnyis so sor ml snang/ / 
61 Ibid., p. 128: blo de nyid spros dral dang dbyer med par mngon du gyur pa'i yul de nyid 
la/ don dam bden pa zhes pa'i tha snyad btags pa'i yin gyi/ de'i tshe yang don dam bden pa 
'di'o zhes cung zad kyang bzung bar bya ba med doll 
62 Don dam rnam bshad, ff. 187: stong nyid mngon sum du rtogs pa'i mnyam bzhag yeshes kyi 
gzhal bya dngos ni/ yeshes de nyid yin gyi/... 
63 Ibid., ff. 187-188:yeshes de chos can/ don dam pa'i bden pa yin te/ stong nyid dngos sum 
du rtogs pa'i rnnyam bzhag yeshes kyi dngos kyi gzhal bya mtshan nyid pa yin pa'i phyir/ 
rtags grub ste/ yeshes de so sor rang gis rig pa'i yeshes yin pa'i phyir... / / The following 
statement appears in between the above Tibetan citation: stong pa nyid ces bya ba gzhan sel 
clang ldog pa med dgag gi char gyur ba de nyid de'i dngos kyi gzhal bya ma yin tel dngos 
med dgnos su 'jal 	mngon sum ni phyogs glang yob sras kyis ml bzhed pa ltar/ zla ba'i 
zhabs kyis kyang me bzhed pa'i phyir ro/ / .Aakya mChog ldan denies emptiness from 
being the object of the transcendental wisdom. "So-called emptiness—which, eliminates 
other [entities] (gzhan sel, anyfipoha) and bears the non-affirming negative aspect, is not its 
actual cognitive sphere. Just as Dignaga and his son [Dharmakirti] deny the direct perception 
which, supposedly directly perceives entitilessness (dngos med), so does Candrakirti". 
" D'ag brgyud grub pa'i shing rta, f. 279: 'phags chen mams kyi mnyam gzhag mam par mi 
rtog pa'i yeshes kyis spros pa dang mtshan ma thams cad 'ga' yang mthong ba med pa'i 
tshul du so so rang gis rig pa'i yeshes kyis gzhigs pa la ni gzugs nas mam znIchyen gyi bar 
gyi don dam 	bden pa dang/ de bzhin nyid ces tha snyad btags par zad kyi/ 'phags pa'i 
mnyam gzhag la ma ltos pa'am/ de las tha dad pa'i don du grub ba ni ma yin cing/ don dam 
pa'i bden pa las tha dad pa'i phags pa'i mnyam gzhag kyang yod pa ma yin no// Only the 
last two sentences are translated and quoted in the main text. 
Zla ba'i zhal lung, f.159-160: mthar ni phyi don med de bags chags kyi snang ba tsam yin par 
dgnos stobs kyis 'grub ste.../ / phyi don yod yod lta bur bsgrub pa'i gzhung thams cad re 
zhig snang ngo'i dbang du byas te yod par bzhag/ / 
66 Ibid., f.159-160: pa rmi lam rang ngo'i rta glang bzhin no/ /dpyad cing dpyad na nang gi 
bag chags kyi rten 'byung la thar thug pa ni nang pa songs rgyas pa'i grub mtha'i phug ste/ / 
67 1Ta ba ngan sel., f. 728: de nas bzung ste yeshes de'i ngor dus snga phyi dbye ba yang med 
pa'i phyir te skye 'gag ml snang ba'i phyir roll 
68 For Go rarnpa's detailed treatment of Alayavijrifina, 'the foundational consciousness and of 
how he imposes this doctrine on the Prasafigika Madhyamaka, see Nges don rab gsal, pp. 
402d-403b. Also see his criticisms direct to Tsong khapa's view for the latter's refusal to 
impose the conception of the 'foundational consciousness' on the Prasafigika System, see 1Ta 
ba'l shan 'byed, pp. 91-94. Also see 1Ta ba ngan sel, ff. 634-640. 
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69 The Tibetan Book of Living and Dying. p. 47. 
7° Ibid. 
71 Ibid. 
n See Thanissaro Bhilckhu, 'Introduction' on the Mislapariyaya sutta, MN 1, p. 1. 
73 Ibid. 
Malapariyaya Sutta MN 1 (trans. by 'Thanissaro Bhikkhu), p. 2. I chose to retain the original 
Pali word nibbana in place of the term "Unbinding". 
75 Ibid., p. 3. 
78 Ibid., pp. 3-4. 
77 Ibid., pp. 4-5. 
78 Madhyamakavatara, p. 170:gsugs med na ni sems yod ma 'dzin cig/ /sems yod nyid na'ang 
gzugs med ma 'dzin cig/vi:91/ 
Nagara Sutta SN XII.65 (trans. by Thanissaro Bhikkhu), p. 1. 
8° Ibid. 
Nalakalapiyo Sutta SN XII.67 (trans. by Thanissaro Bhikkhu), p. 1 
82 Ibid. 
83 See his notes and 'Studies on the Yuktisastikac Master of Wisdom, p. 259. 
84 See his article 'Dhamma and Non-duality,' p. 2. 
85 Ibid. 
88 Ibid. 
87 Nges don rab gsal, p. 373c-d: spros dral don dam pa'i mtshan gzhir bsnyad pa'i tshul ni de 
ltar cir yang ma grub pa nyid yin yang ma grub pa nyid gdul byas rtogs pal don do mtshan 
gzhir sgro btags nas bsnyad pa yin gyi.../ 
88 Ibid., p. 373d: mtshan nyid bstan pa'i gzhir gyur ba'i mtshan gzhi ni mi srid do!! 
89 Ibid., p. 373d:des mtshon pa'i don yang mtshan nyid dang/ mtshon bya clang/ mtshan gzhi 
gsum du sgro btags pa'i tha snyad gsum gyi sgo nas don dam pa'i bden pa zhes kun rdzob 
kyi bden pa'i Ida bor bsnyad pa yin te.../ / 
9° Ibid., p. 373b-c: 'on na sngar spros dral ngos gzung ba'i skabs su bjord bya rjord byed 
dang/ yul yul can dang/ dgag sgrub kyi mtshan ma thams cad dang dral bar brjod nas 'dir 
de lta bu'i che ba nam mIcha' ml tok gi yon tan brjod pa ltar shes par ml nus so zhes na de lta 
mod kyi 'dir yang de rtog pa'i shes pa dang myong bas yul du byas pa'am 'ga' zhig gi byed 
rgyur bstan pa ma yin te/ ...'phags pa'i ml rtog pa'i shes rab kyis spros pa mtha' dag khegs 
pa nyid las stong nyid rtogs zhes clang/ bden pa mthong zhes bsnyad pa tsam yin gi rtog pa 
dang myong bas yul du byas na don spyi dang dngos po las ma 'das so!! 
91 Grub mtha'i rnam bshad, f. 260: phags pa'i mnyam bzhag yeshes la ni mtshan ma'i gnyis 
snang lta zhog snang ba'i Mang tsam yang med par dbyings so so zhi ba cig dgos te/ rtogs 
bya dang rtogs byed yul and yul can du snang ba yod na byang chub ni med par phags pa 
klu sgrub zhabs kyis...gsungs pa'i phyir ro/ / 
92 kLu grub dgongs rgyan, p. 186: mnyam gzhag gi skabs su ci yang med pa de/ rjes thob kyi 
snang ba clang 'drel tshe mnyam gzhag gi skabs cir yang med pa clang/ rjes thob tu ci yang 
snang pa gnyis zurtg du 'drel ba'i don yin la/ 
93 Ibid., 186: de ni don dam par cir yang ma grub pa dang/ tha snyad du cir yang grub pa'i 
don do shes par bya'o/ / 
94 Lam rim chen mo, pp. 773-783. 
95 See 'A critique of Quietism,' Cabezon, A Dose of Emptiness, pp. 112-117. 
96 Grub mtha'i rnam bshad, pp.878-889. 
97 His criticisms (see Thub pa dgongs gsal, pp. 24d-25c) are directed towards Hva Shang's view, 
and are not specifically targeted to Go rampa, but as Go rampa is committed to a similar 
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view as Hva Shang's, particularly in equating 'seeing nothingness' as 'seeing emptiness' Sa 
pan criticism definitely is not misplaced and inappropriate. 
98 dBu tsa'i rnam bshad zab mo, f. 12I:gang dag ci yang yid la me byed pa tsam mnyam gzhag 
du 'dod par ltar na mnyam gzhag gis sgrib pa'i bag la nyal ba 'joms par me nus tel stong 
nyid rtogs pa'i lhag mthong dang dral ba'i phyir/ 'dus shes med pa'i snyoms 'jug zhin/ / 
" Ibid., ff. 121-122: gal te ci yang yed la med byed pa tsam gyis spong ngo zhes na/ gnyid 
dang brgyal ba la sogs pas kyang spong bar 'gyur te/ yid la mi byed pa tsam 'de la yang yod 
pa'i phyir roll 
w° See Cabezon, A Dose of Emptiness, p. 400, 31n for his brief analysis of the Chinese monk 
Hva Shang as a historical and philosophical figure. According to Sa pan's (see Thub pa dgongs 
gsal, pp. 24d-25c) brief historical account of the origin of Hva Shang's view in Tibet, he 
argues that this view prevailed during the reign of Tibetan king, Trisong Deutsan. It was a 
Chinese monk, called Hashang Mahayana, who was held responsible for propagating this 
view in Tibet. Although eventually he was defeated by a great Indian pundita, Kamalagila in 
the great Samye-debate and was forced to return to China. His infamous doctrine, these days, 
branded as 'quietism' is an emphasis on stilling thoughts, or speculative analysis in order to 
attain tranquillity. It is also said that this doctrine dismisses the significance of the 
observances of ethical principles and the moral sides of the spiritual practices. 
Nges shes sgron me, f. 83: kha cig cir yang mi dzin zher/ cir yang mi dzhin zer ba'i 
don/ ...dran med ha shang lugs/ ma dpyad tse ner bzhag ba yes/ lhag mthong gsal ba'i cha 
med par/ mtsho gting rdo bzhin tha mal gnas.../ / 
102 Ibid., f. 84: ma mthong stong par rtogs shes na/ chos tshul shin ha zab pa ste/ sems ni 
gzugs can ma yin pas/ /sus kyang mdog sogs mthong mi srid/ /ma mthong tsam las stong 
pa nyid/ /ngo 'phrod snyam na shin tu gol/ /len brgyar rtag kyang mi yi mgor/ /phyugs 
kyi rwa mthong mi srid/ /de ma mthong bas de stong par/ rtogs su zhes na sus kyang sla/ / 
Ki3 Ibid., f. 87: cir yang mi dzin lta ngan la/ /dngos po cir yang ma grub pa'i/ /nges shes skye 
ba ga la yod/ des na sgrib pa spong mi nus/ de phyir 'di gnyis khyad par yang/ du ba'i 
rtags la mi bzhin du/ spang rtogs bog skyed tshul las shes/ / Also see, ff. 121-128, 74. 
10' Ibid., p. 446c: skyes 'gag la sogs pa gdul bya las bstan ba'i ya gyal gyi kun rdzob bden pa'i 
snang ba med kyang dbyings rig dbyer med kyi don dam pa snang ba'i snang ba yod dgos te 
gzhan du chos dbyings goms pa mthar mthog pa'i tshe chos dbyings mi snang na/ chos 
dbying snang ba'i yeshes mthar mthog med par thal ba'i phyir roll 
1°5 An Introduction to Buddhism, p. 112. 
106 Catuhlatakatika, f. 389: rten cing 'brel bar 'byung ba ni ji lta ba bzhin mthong ba na sgyu ma 
byas pa lta bur 'gyur gyi/ mo gsham gyi bu lta bu ni ma yin no/ /gal te mam par dpyad pa 
'dis skye ba mam pa thams cad du bkag pa las/ 'dus byas skye ba med pa bstan par 'dod na 
ni de'i tshe de sgyu ma lta bu nyid du mi 'gyur gyi/ mo gsham gyi bu la sogs pa dag gis nye 
bar gzhal bar 'gyur ba zhig na/ rten cing 'drel bar lbyung ba med pa thal bar 'gyur ba'i 'jigs 
pas de dag dang bstun par mi byed kyi/ de clang mi 'gal ba sgyu ma la sogs pa dag clang ni 
byed do/ / Also cited in the Lam rim chen mo, p. 743. 
107 Catulthatakatika, f. 389: rten cing 'brel bar `byung ba ni ji lta ba bzhin mthong ba na sgyu ma 
byas pa lta bur 'gyur gyi/ mo gsham gyi bu lta bu ni ma yin no/ 
108 Ibid., f. 389: / rten cing 'drel bar 'byung ba med pa thal bar 'gyur ba'i 'jigs pas de dag dang 
bstun par mi byed kyi/ de clang mi 'gal ba sgyu ma la sogs pa dag clang ni byed doll 
109 Ibid., f. 397: di'i phyir de ltar yongs su dpyad pa na/ dngos po mams kyi rang bzhin 'grub 
pa mi 'gyur bas so so nas dngos po mams la sgyu ma lta bu de nyid lhag mar lus par 'gyur 
ro// Cited in the Lam rim chen mo, p. 744. 
110 Lam rim chen mo, p. 743-744:rigs pa des mam pa dpyad nas rang bzhin khegs pa'i shul du 
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ngos po mams la sgyu ma tsam gyi don nyid yod par 'dzin pa ni nges par skye dgos pas 
skyon min tell 
m Ibid ., p. 743: rang bzhin yod med 'tshol ba'i rigs shes kyis sgyu ma tsam gyi don yod par 
gzung na'ang skyon yin gyi.../ 
112rTs she tik chen, p. 417: des ji snyed pa ma gzhal na chos can clang chos nyid ya dral du thal 
bar mi gyur tel de kho na nyid rtogs pa'i rigs shes kyi ngo na chos can clang chos nyid kyi 
'drel pa mi 'jog pa'i phyir dang.../ 
113 Ibid., p. 417: sngon po rtogs pa'i tha snyad pa'i tshad ma'i ngo na don darn bden pa med 
pas de gnyis 'brel mi dgos pa dang 'dra ba'i phyir ro/l 
114 dGongs pa rab gsal, p. 203: don dam pa gzigs pa'i ngor don dam bden pa de/ phung sogs 
lus kyi dang ngag gi spyod yul dang/ yid kyi yul du 'gyur ba ltar du 'gyur na ni/ de kho na 
nyid mngon sum du gzigs pa'i ngor spros pa dang ma dral bas don darn bden par mi 'gyur 
gyi kun rdzob kyi spros par 'gyur ro zhes pa ste/ de ltar byas na ma gzigs pa'i tshul gyis 
gzigs pa'i shes byed du 'gro'o/ / 
115 rTsa shes tik chen., p. 204: de kho na nyid mngon sum du gzigs 	yeshes de don dam 
shes pa dang/ don dam bden pa de'i shes byar 'jog kyang.../ 
116 	•., p. a 	204:yeshes de'i ngor bya byed de gnyis dang bral ba mi 'gal ba ni/ bya byed gnyis 
ni tha snyad pa'i blo kho na'i ngor 'jog pa'i phyir tell 
11' Ibid., p. 204m: bya byed gnyis ni tha snyad pa'i blo kho na'i ngor 'jog pa'i phir... / / 
118 Ud 1.10 (trans. by Thanissaro Bhikkhu). Cited in his book, The Mind Like Fire Unbound: An 
Image in the Early Buddhist Discourses. (Barr, MA: Dhamma Dana Publication, 1999), p. 10. 
119 rTsa shes tik-chen, p. 204: dper na rigs shes rjes dpag yul can dang/ don darn bden pa yul 
du 'jog nus kyang/ yul yul can gyi bya byed gnyis rigs ngor mi 'jog pa bzhin no/ / 
1" Samanupassana Sutta SN XXII.47 (trans. by Thanissaro Bhildchu). 
121 Paccaya Sutta SN XII.20 (trans. by Thanissaro Bhikkhu). 
122 Cited in the dGongs pa rab gsal, p. 202-203; also cited in the rTsa she tik-chen, p. 276. 
123 rTsa shes tik chen, p. 417: de Icho na nyid mngon sum du rtogs pa'i yeshes kyi ngor ni rang 
gi yul dang yul can gyi bar na gnyis su snang ba phra mo yang med par chu la chu bzhag pa 
bzhin du mnyam par zhugs pa yin la... / 
Notes and Tibetan citations on Chapter V 
1 Madhyamakavatara, p. 205:ji ltar snod kyi dbye bas mIcha' la dbye ba med de liar/ /dngos 
byas dbye ba 'ga' yang de nyid la med de yi phyir/ /ro mnyam nyid du yang dag thugs su 
chud par mdzad gyur na/ /mIchyen bzang khyed kyis skad cid gis ni shes bya thugs su 
chud/XI:11/ Cited in the Madhyamakavatarabhasya, p. 333. See Huntington, The Emptiness of 
Emptiness, p. 190, for a slightly different way of translating this verse. 
2 For Tsong khapa, see dGongs pa rab gsal, p. 455:ji ltar dper na bum pa dang Ichar gzhong la 
sogs pa'i snod kyi mi 'dra ba'i dbye ba du ma yod kyang/ mi 'dra dbye ba de yis snod 
de dag hi gtogs pa ste der khyab pa'i nam mIcha' la nil sgrib pa thams cad bkab tsam du 
mtshungs pa'i phyir/ de las gzhan pa'i dbye ba med... / / For Go rampa, see ITa ba's ngan sel, 
f. 728: gnyis snang nub pa'i lung ni ji liar snod kyi dbye ba zhes sogs rtsa 'grel yin la/ gzhan 
yang shes bya'i yul skye ba med pa la yul can gyi blo yang skye ba med par ldan par gsungs 
pa mams kyis stan toll 
3 AN VIII.19 (trans. by Thanissaro Bhikkhu). Cited in the 'Abstract' of The Mind Like Fire 
Unbound, p. 1. 
Sama dhirajasatra (VII, 5); Toh. no.127, mDo sde da, f. 20b:gcig gis thams cad shes gyur zhing/ 
/gcig gis thams cad mthong bar 'gyur/ /ji snyad mang po brjod byas kyang/ /de la dregs 
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pa skye mi 'gyur/ /bdag gi 'du shes shes pa ltar/ de bzhin kun la blo sbyor bya/ chos kun 
de yi rang bzhin tel /rnam par dag pa nam mkha' ngo bo yin// Cited in Candrakirti, 
Catuljiatakatika, f. 218; rGyal tshab rje (Ruth Sonam and Geshe Sonam Rinchen, The Yogic 
eds of Bodhisattva, pp. 194, 356-16n); and also miChas grub de (Cabezon, A Dose of Emptiness, p. 
166). Cabezon also offers slightly different way of translating this passage. 
5 Ibid.,(contd): bdag gi 'du shes shes pa ltar/ de bzhin kun la blo sbyor bya/ chos kun de yi 
rang bzhin tel /rnam par dag pa nam mkha' ngo bo yin// 
6 See TP, 815, Vol.33,16.3.2. This citation is taken from Candrakirti, Catuhiatakatika- , f. 218; 
gang gis chos gcig sgom nas chos mam kun/ /sgyu ma smig rgyu 'dra zhing gzung med la/ 
/gsob brdzun ther zug min par shes pa de/ /ring por mi thogs byang chub snying por 
'gro/ / Ruth Sonam, The Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattva (p. 356) points out that Gaganagamjasamadhi 
is listed in the Tibetan Canon as the Gaganagarijapariprcchasidra ('phag pa nam mkha'i mdzob 
kyis zhus pa'i mdo). See mIChas grub rje (Cabezem, A Dose of Emptiness, p. 166); rGyal tshab rje 
(Ruth Sonarrt and Geshe Sonam Rinchen, The Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattva, pp. 194, 356-17n). 
7 Catutztataka, p. 268: dngos pa gcig gi lta po gang/ /de ni kun gyi 
ta por bshad/ /gcig gi stong nyid gang yin pa/ /de ni kun gyi stong pa nyid/VIII:191/ Also 
cited in the Catutgatakatiko, f. 217. 
8 Catutigatakatika, ff. 217-218:gsugs kyi rang bzhin stong nyid gang yin pa de nyid tshor ba la 
sogs pa phong pa mams kyi rang bzhin stong pa nyid do/ /de bzhin du mig gi skye mched 
gyi rang bzhin stong pa nyid gang yin pa de nyid skye mched bcu gnyis char gyi yang yin 
no/ /de bzhin du mig gi khams kyi rang bzhin stong pa nyid gang yin pa de nyid khams bco 
brgyad char gyi yang yin no/ /de bzhin du dngos pa dang yul dang dus dang rten gyi dbye 
bas tha dad cing rab tu dbye ba mtha' yas pa mams las dngos pa gcig gi rang bzhin stong pa 
nyid gang yin pa de nyid dngos pa thams cad kyi rang bzhin stong pa nyid do/ /bum pa 
dang 'khar bzhong la sogs pa tha dad kyang nam mkha' tha dad med pa bzhin no/ /gzugs la 
sogs pa'i dngos pa tha dad kyang gzugs la sogs pa rnams kyi rang bzhin ma skyes pa la tha 
dad pa med pa'i phyir chos gcig lcho na'i rang zhin gyis ma skyes pa yongs su shes na chos 
thams cad kyi rang bzhin gyis ma shes pa yongs su shes par 'gyur tell 
9 dGongs pa rab gsal, p. 455: gzungs dang tshor ba la sogs pa la dngos po ste rang gi rgyu 
rkyen gyis byas pa'i dbye ba mi 'dra ba du ma yod kyang/ de dag tu gtogs pa de rang bzhin 
gyis grub pal skye ba med pa'i de kho na nyid dngos pa byas pa'i dbye ba 'ga' yang med pa 
de'i phyir de kho na nyid ni ro mnyam pa ste ro gcig kilo nar shes par bya'o/ / 
10 Midamadhyamakalairika of Nagarjuna, p. 272. 
11 In the Cii la-viyaha Sutta, Sn IV.12, the Buddha states: "The truth is one, there no second 
about which a person who knows it would argue with one knows. Contemplatives promote 
their various personal truths, that is why they do not say one thing and the same. But why do 
they say various truths, those how say they are skilled? Have they learned various truths or 
do they follow conjecture? Apart from their perception there are not many various constant 
truths in the world. Preconceiving conjecture with regard to views, they speak of a pair: true 
and false". 
12  rTen 'brel stod pa, p. 38:kyod kyis ji snyad bka' stsal pa/ /rten 'brel nyid las btsams te 'jug/ 
/de yang mya ngan 'da' phyir te/ /zhi gyur min mdzad kyod la med/38/ 
13 Ibid., 37:ston pa'i nang na rten 'grel ston pa clang/ /shes rab nang na rten 'brel shes pa 
gnyis/ /'jig rten dag na rgyal ba'i dbang po bzhin/ /phul byung legs par khyod mkhyen 
gzhan gyis min/37/ 
14  Nges don rab gsal, p. 381c:rang gi ngo bo nam mkha' ltar ro gcig pas rigs mi 'dra bas dbye ba 
med// 
15 dGongs pa rab gsal, p. 455: ro mnyam de yang mkhyen yang inkhyen pa'i skad cig gcig kho 
nas yang clas par thugs su chud par mdzad par gyur pas na/ mkhyen pa bzang po can 
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khyod kyis skad gcig gis ni shes bya thams cad thugs su chud pa'i yeshes brnyes so/ / Also 
see Candrakirti, Madhyamakavatarabhasya, p. 333: de yang mIchyen pa'i skad cig gcig kho nas 
thugs su chud pas bcom ldan ldas kyis mIchyen pa'i skad cid gcig kho nas thams cad mIchyen 
pa'i yeshes brnyes so/ / 
16 lTa ba ngan sel, f. 728: skad gcig ma gcig la yeshes skad cig ma gcig gis chos thams cad chos 
kyi dbyings su ro gcig par rtogs pa'i tshe yeshes de'i ngor ji lta ba dang/ ji snyed pa dang/ 
yul can yes hes gsum po ngo bo that dad du me snang la// 
17 Ibid., f. 728: de'i rjes su mnyam bzhag de las langs pa yang ml srid de/ thugs mnyam par 
ma gzhag pa mi mnga' ba sangs rgyas kyi mthun mong ma yin pa'i yon tan du gsungs pa'i 
phyir dang/ / 
18 /, • f. 728: de nas bzung ste yeshes de'i ngor dus snga phyi'i dbye ba yang med pa'i phyir 
ste skye 'gag me snang ba'i phyir roll 
19 Ibid., f. 727: 'phags pa 'od ma gsum gyi mnyam rjes kyis yul rtogs tshul ma shes na sangs 
rgyas kyis yeshes kyis shes bya rtogs tshul gyi mam gzhag Ichyad par du phyags pa mi shes 
pas thog mar de bshad na.../ 
20 Ibid., f. 727: 'on kyang bden par 'dzin par ni mi 'gyur te/ bden pa'i skyi med mngon sum 
du rtogs pa'i phyir ro// 
21 See Go rampa, 1Ta ba ngan sel, f. 727 and Tsong khapa, dGongs pa rab gsal, p. 459. 
22 Dvayatanupassana Sutta, Sn 111.12 (trans. by Thanissaro Bhiklchu). I, however, opted to retain 
the word dukkha instead of "stress," p. 1. 
23 1Ta ba ngan sel, f. 727: de'i rjes la thob pa'i yeshes la ni chos can ji snyed pa skye 'gag dang 
bcas par snang ste/ gnyis snang gi bag chags ma spangs pas so!! 
24 Ibid., f. 727: mnyam bzhag tu skye 'gag tsam yang ml snang bas ji ta ba rtogs.../ 
25 Ibid., f. 727: rtogs pa gnyis res 'jog tu 'byung ba ni chos thams cad kyi dbyings su ro gcig tu 
rtogs pa'i rtogs pa mthar mthog pa'i gnad kyis so!! 
dGongs pa rab gsal, p. 458: sangs rgyas ma thob bar du blo gcig gis skad cig ma gcig la chos 
can so sor snang ba clang/ chos nyid gnyis ka cingos su mIchyen pa ml 'ong bas.../ 
27 Ibid., p. 458: (contd) de gnyis mkhyen pa res 'jog tu 'ong ngo/ / 
1Ta ba ngan sel, f. 728. 
29 Nagarjuna, Miimadhyamkakarika [XUV:8] and Candrakirti, Madhyamakavatara [V1:24]. 
3° Nges don rab gsal, p. 446b: zhes pa'i skabs nas bstan pa'i kun rdzob bden pa ni med de/ yul 
can mthong ba brdzun pa med pa/ de'i yul med pa'i phyir roll 
31 Ibid., p. 446c: skye 'gag la sogs pa gdul bya la bstan pa'i ya gyal gyi kun rdzob bden pa'i 
snang ba med kyang dbyings rig dbyer med kyi don dam pa snang ba's snang ba yod dgos 
ste.../ 
32 Ibid., p. 447c:mdor na rtsa ba shes rab kyi mchod brjod kyi skabs kyi skye 'gag las sogs pa 
brgyad dang/ rab byed nyi shu rtsa bdun gyis dpyad par bya ba'i rkyen nas ita ba'i bar nyi 
shu rtsa bdun dang/ des mtshon nas kun rdzob tha snyad kyi mam bzhag thams cad spros 
pa yin pas de dag sangs rgyas kyi sar chos kyi dbyings su ro gcig par yeshes skad cig ma gcig 
gis mngon du gyur ba'i tshe spros pa de dag mi snang yang de dag rtogs zhes pa'i tha snyad 
ni mi 'gal te... / / 
33 Madhyamakavatasyatika, p. 74c: ci ltar rab rib can la snang ba'i skra shad la sogs pa'i de kho 
na nyid mig dag pas mthong pa yin las de bzhin du 'jig rten pa la snang ba'i kun rdzob kyi 
bden pa de spyan dag pas sangs rgyas bcom ldan 'das mams kyis bdag nyid gang gis gzigs 
pa de Icho na nyid yin no zhes pa'i don to/ / Also see pp. 75a-c, 161b-167a. 
bDu 'jug rnam bshad, p. 127: snang ba med pa'i spyod yul can gyi sangs rgyas bcom ldan 
das mams la ni thams cad du snang ba ma yin te/ chos thams cad mam par thams cad du 
spros pa'i mtshan ma nyi bar zhi ba'i chos kyi dbying kyi ngo bor mngon par rdzogs par 
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byang chub pa'i phyir/ sems dang sems byurvg las byung ba'i rgyu ba gtan log par 'dod par 
yin no// 
35 dBu 'jug rnam bshad, f. 335: ji srid rab rib ma bsal ba de srid skra shad kyi snang ba mi ldog 
pa de bzhin du/ ji srid ma rig pa'i bag chags ma spangs pa de srid du kun rdzob kyi snang 
ba char la/ rab rib bsal na skra shad kyi snang ba ldog pa de bzhin du/ ma rig pa'i bag chags 
spangs pa'i sang rgyas kyi gzigs ngor kun rdzob sna tshogs kyi snang ba 'de mi char bar 
bzhed pa yin no/ / Also see ff. 328-336; 'Jug pa'i dlca' gnad, ff. 475-476; and Don dam rnam 
bshad, ff. 1185-188. 
Grub mtha'i rnam bshad, f. 306: sangs rgyas kyi gzugs sku dang 'phrin las bsam yas brjod 
kyis mi lartg ba mams/ ...rtog pa med par ma zad/ sems bskyed pa tsam mi dgos par sngon 
gyi smon lam dang 'dul bya'i las bzartg po'i dbang gis gdul bya de dang de'i gzhan snang gi 
rnam rol Icho na yin par bzhed dell 
37 D'ag brgyud grub pa'i shing rta, f. 318: sangs rgyas mams la ni kun rdzob pa'i chos thams cad 
rnam pa thams cad du snang ba ma yin tel chos thams cad mam pa thams cad du mngon 
par rdzogs par byang chub pa'i phyir sems sems las byung ba'i rgyu ba gtan log pa yin no/I 
Also see, ff. 320, 324, 
38 Dam chos dogs sel, pp. 606: slcal ba du mar goms pa'i stobs kyis nyam bzhag ji brten ji rten 
clang kun rdzob 'Ichrul ba'i snang ba ji chung ji chung du song nas/ mthar rgyun mtha'i rdor 
ji gis gnyis snang ba'i bag chags phra mo'ang ldog par gyur pa na/ chos kyi dbyings 
las slar ldang pa med par gnyis snang nub pa'i mrtyam bzhag kho na de gnas pa'i tshe sangs 
rgyas su 'grub pa yin tell 
kLu grub dgongs rgyan, p. 144: 'on kyang da ltar rang res gang mthong ba'i s rdo ri drag 'de 
dag sangs rgyas tshe da dung yang phra lam mer mthong rgyu yod snyam na shin tu nor/ / 
Also see, pp. 147, 182, 191. 
4° Gzhung gsum gsal byed, p. 121: ji srid sgrib pa'i lhag ma yod pa de srid du/ nest thob pas 
snartg ba'i sna tshogs 'de dag sgyu ma lta bu la sogs par snang la/ nam bag chags thams cad 
yongs su dag pa na mam pa thams cad du kun rdzob kyi chos snang ma myong ba rang 
bzhin nyid la dus thams cad du mnyarn par 'jog pa yin no/I 
41 For Go rampa's detailed treatment of Alayavijriana, the 'foundational consciousness' and 
how he imposes this conception on the Prasangika Madhyamaka, see Nges don rab gsal, pp. 
402d-403b. For his criticisms direct to Tsong khapa for the latter's refusal to impose the 
conception of the 'foundational consciousness' on the Prasangika System, see 1Ta ba'i shan 
'byed, pp. 91-94. Also see 1Ta ba ngan sel, ff. 634-640. 
Go rampa treats the Ala yavijnana just like any other empirical truths. 'All empirical truths 
are provisionally explained as vehicles to understand ultimate truth, so is Alayavijriana', says 
Go rarhpa, 1Ta ba ngan sel, f. 632-639. 
4° 1Ta ba nga self, f. 637: dbu ma thal 'gyur bas tha snyad du kun bzhi lchas len dgos te/ sangs 
rgyas bcom ldan 'das kyis mdo las gsungs shing/ de yang don dam bden pa rtogs pa'i thabs 
su gyur pa'i tha snyad bden pa yin par slo dpon 'di nyid kyis gsungs pa'i phyir tell 
" Ibid., f. 635: tshogs drug las ngo bo tha dad yod pa ma yin gyi mam par shes pa gsal tsam 
gyi ngo bo sems can nas sangs rgyas kyi sa'i bar du rgyun ma chad par yod pa 'de ni...kun 
gzhir 'jog// 
1Ta ba'i 'od zer, p. 322c: skye 'gag mi snang bas/ 'dus byas dang mi rtag pa sogs med cirtg/ / 
Nges don rab gsal, p. 447a: 'dus byas thams cad skad cig ma yin pas skye 'gag dang bcas par 
'dod pa grtyis ka'ang mi 'thad de... / / 
Ibid., p. 447a-b: 'dus byas yin na 'rdzun pa bslu ba'i chos can yin dgos pa'i phyir dang/ 
skye 'gag snang na rten cing 'brel bar 'byung ba skye med kyi don du ma rgyur 
ba'i...phyir/ / 
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kLu grub dgongs rgyan, p. 191:ji srid kun rdzob kyi snang ba ma 'gag pa de srid dang/ ji srid 
mams kyi rten ma brje bar de srid du stong pa nyid mngon sum du rtogs kyang/ sngar gang 
khas blang ba de dbang med du khas len dgos// 
1Ta ba ngan sel, f. 730: mi rtag pa dang/ 'dus byas dang/ brdzun pa dang/ bslu ba rnams 
don gcig par gsungs shing/ 'di 'phags pa 'og ma'i lam bden la yod cing/ sangs rgyas kyi 
yeshes la med pa cig dgos pa las/ / 
5° Ibid., f. 730: don dam par de dag med pa 'phags pa 'og ma'i lam bden la yang yod 
phyir ro// 
Nges don rab gsal, p. 372d: stong nyid stogs nas goms pa mthar phyin pa'i tshe glo bur gyi 
dri ma zad nas blo nyid zag med kyi dbyings su gyur pa ni spang stogs phun sum tshogs pa 
don dam pa'i sangs rgyas yin la// 
52 Ibid., p. 446d:rdo rje lta bu'i ting ne 'dzin gis shes bya skye 'gag/ rtag chad la sogs pa'i bud 
shing bsrigs nas spros pa mtha' dag zhi ba'i chos dbyings dang/ sngar gyi rig pa'i rgyun 
de'ang skye 'gag la sogs pa'i spros a mtha' dag zhi nas de gnyis dbyer med du gyur pa la 
yeshes su 'jog pa'i phyir roll 
Nges don rab gsal, p. 446d: sems sems 'byung ni khams gsum pa'i mam pa can gyi gnyis 
snang dang bcas pa dang/ don gyi ngo bo clang khyad par mthong pa'i Ichyad par yod pa 
dang/ don gyi khyad par la'ang mi 'dra ba du ma mthong ba'i sgo nas gzhag par gsungs 
la// 
54 Ibid., pp. 446d-447a:'dir shes bya skye 'gag la sogs pa'i spros pa mtha' dag dang dral 
shes pa clang dbyer med pa mngon du gyur pa'i tshe gnyis snang dang 'dzin stangs mi 'dra 
ba'i khyad par cung zad kyang med pa'i phyir roll 
1Ta ba ngan sel, ff. 612-613: gnyis snang dang bcas na rnam mkhyen gyi bar gyi yul yang 
don dam bden pa ma yin.../ 
56 Ibid., f. 729: gal te de dag don dam par skye 'gag med pa'i don yin gyi tha snyad du ma yin 
no snyam na de ni ma nyin te/ tha snyad ni gdul bya'i ngor Ichas blangs pa tsam yin gyi 
sangs rgyas lungs snang la don dam pa dang tha snyad gnyis su dbyer med pa'i phyir// 
kLu grub dgongs rgyan, p. 192: sgyu ma michan gyis sgyu ma'i glang po sprul ba na/ Had mo 
mkhan mams kyis kyang glang po cingos su mthong/ sgyu ma mkhan gyis kyang glang po 
min pa zhig glang po dngos su mthong ba'i ched du sgyu ma stong pa yin pas/ ltad mo ba 
mams kyis sgyu ma mIchan las 'de glang po dngos yin nam zhes dris tshe yin zhes brjod 
dgos pa de sgyu ma mkhan gyis glang chin gzhan ngor khas len pa yin// 
1Ta ha ngan sel, f. 734: gzhan ngor ni don dam par skye ba dang tha snyad du skye ba gnyis 
ka yod do/ ma skye bar bshad pa mams ni rang ngor te rang ngo mams ni tha snyad dang 
don dam gang du yang skye ba med do// 
1Ta ba'i 'od zer, p. 322c: sangs rgyas rang snang la...skye 'gag mi snang bas/ 'dus byas clang 
mi rtag pa sogs med cing/ gdul bya'i gzhan ngor ni dgi ba sky dang 'jig pas na...sky 'gag 
yod kyang/ / 
60 Ibid., p. 322c: (contd) des sangs rgyas kyi yeshes la skye 'gag yod par mi grub ste/ gdul 
bya'i sems la snang tshul yin pa'i phir ro// 
61  Nges don rab gsal, p. 447b: gdul bya'i ngor skye 'gag tu snang ba ni gzhan snang yin gi rang 
snang ma yin tell 
Dam chos dogs sel, p. 607:mam par mi rtog pa'i yeshes chos sku de'i byin rlab las/ gzhan 
ngor rtsol ba med par sku gnyis su 'char zhing/ phrin las kyi 'jug pa nam mIcha'i ji srid du 
'jug pa yin no/I 
'3 Grub mtha'i rnam bshad, f. 306: sangs rgyas kyi gzugs sku dang 'phrin las bsam yas brjod 
kyis mi lang ba mams/ ...rtog pa med par ma zad/ sems bskyed pa tsam mi dgos par sngon 
gyi smon lam dang 'dul bya'i las bzang po'i dbang gis gdul bya de dang de'i gzhan snang gi 
mam rol kho na yin par bzhed de/ / Also see ff. 206, 273, 305. 
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D'ag brgyud grub pa'i shing rta, ff. 141-142: tha snyad pa'i skye ba zhes bya ba de bzhin 
gshegs pas ma gzigs shing 'phags pa 'og ma mams kyi mnyam bzhag gi gzigs don tha snyad 
du'ang yod pa ma yin la/ rigs pas dpyad na yang tha snyad du yod pa ma yin cing/ ...gzhan 
ngor tha snyad pa'i skye ba mam par bzhag tshe...gzhan ngor khas len par byed.../ / 
63 Rigs tsogs dka' gnad, f. 127: gal te gdul ba'i rgyud kyis bsdus pa yin no zhes na/ de dag 
tshogs gnyis yongs su rdzogs par mthar mthog pa 'thob par 'gyur tel sangs rgyas kyi sku 
dang yeshes thams cad rang rgyud la rdzog par thob pa'i phyir// 
66 Lam rim chen mo, p. 742: de la snang ba yod par rigs shes kyi mi grub la/ rang bzhin gyis 
stongs par tha snyad pa'i tshad mas ml 'grub pas rang bzhin yod med 'tshol ba'i rigs pa'i 
shes pa dang gzhugs sogs yod par 'dzin pa'i tha snyad pa'i blo gnyis dgos pa'i rgyu mtshan 
ni de yin no// 
67 dGongs pa rag gsal, p. 201: Ikhrul pal bag chags ma lus pa spangs pa na yeshe skad cig ma ri 
ri'i steng du yang yeshes gnyis ngo bo gcig tu skye ba rgyun mi 'chad pa...// 
68 Unlike most of non-dGe lugs pa scholars, meaning attributed to rjes thob by Tsong khapa is 
radically different. For others rjes thob means 'aftermath' of mnyam gzhag, which is in fact 
translated as 'post meditative equipoise'. For Tsong khapa, rjes thob, means 'subsequent 
attainment'. It does not mean aftermath of the meditative equipoise—in the sense of a later, 
in the sequence of time; rather it Means an attainment due to the power of meditative 
equipoise, or what is being generated from it". See dGongs pa rab gsal, p. 459: rjes la thob pa 
zhes ries kyi don ni/ mnyam gzhag las langs pa'i rjes zhes dus snga phyi'i rjes min gyi 
mnyam gzhag de'i stobs kyis thob pa'am byung ba'i don no/ / This is an important 
distinction for Tsong lchapa. For it allows him to argue that knowledge of both rjes thob and 
mnyam gzhag of an enlightened being have an equal status. Whereas Go rampa and his 
counterparts argue that mnyam bzhag of enlightened being is superior to their rjes thob. ries 
thob for them, therefore means aftermath of mnyam gzhag in this sense. This allows them to 
defend their view that mnyam gzhag is superior to rjes thob. 
69 dGongs pa rab gsal, p. 458: bden 'dzin gyi bag chags ma lus pa zad de sangs rgyas pa nas dus 
rtag tu don dam bden pa mngon sum du rtogs pa'i mnyam gzhag las bzhugs pas/ de las 
bzhengs pa'i mnyam rjes res 'jog med phyir/ / 
7° Ibid., p. 458-459: mnyam gzhag yeshes de las ngo bo tha dad pa'i ji snyad pa mkhyen pa'i 
rjes thob kyi yeshes med pa'i phyir na/ yeshes gcig gis bden pa gnyis kyis shes bya thams 
cad mkhyen par 'dod dgos so!! 
71 Ibid., p. 201: (contd) dus gcig tu shes bya mngon gsum du 'jal mi 'jal gyi res 'jog mi dgos 
so// 
72 Ibid., p. 461t: de bzhin du je lta ba rrayen pa'i yeshes kyis myed cing yul de la je Ita ba 
mkhyen pa'i yeshes su song ba clang/ je snyed pa mkhyen pa'i yeshes kyi rived cing yul de 
la je rnyed pa mkhyen par song ba'i sgo nas/ yul so so la ltos nas kun rdzob dang don dam 
mkhyen tshul yang shes par bya'o/ / 
73 Cited from Buddhaghosa, Visuddhimagga, p. 809 (Trans. from the Pali by Bhikkhu 
Ranamoli). 
74 Ibid. 
73 Ibid., p. 808. 
76 dGongs pa rab gsal, p. 201: yeshes gnyis ngo bo gcig yin kyang yul gnyis la ltos ba'i mkhyen 
tshul ml 'dra ba gnyis 'ong ba la 'gal ba cung zad kyang med pa ni/ sangs rgyas bcom ldan 
'das nyag gcig kyi khyad chos su 'dug pa la... / / 
n Ibid., pp. 458-459: mnyam gzhag gi yeshes de las ngo bo tha dad pa'i je snyed pa mkhyen 
pa'i rjes thob kyi yeshes med pa'i phir na/ yeshes gcig gis bden pa gnyis kyi shes bya thams 
cad mkhyen par 'dod dgos so/ gang gi tshe chos nyid la ltos te ji lta ba mkhyen pa'i yeshe su 
song ba de'i tshe blo de'i ngor gnyis su snang ba thams cad nye bar zhe bas yi shes de chu la 
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chu bzhag pa bzhin du ro gcig tu zhugs pa yin la/ gang gi tshe cho can la ltos te ji snyad pa 
mIchen par song ba de'i tshe/ yul yul can can so sor snang ba'i gnyis snang yod kyang/ 
gnyis snang 'ldu-ul pa'i bag chags drung phung pas snang yul la ma 'Ichrul pa'i gnyis snang 
yin gi pa'i gnyis snang min tell 
78 Lam rim chen mo, p. 742: rigs pa'i shes pas chos can snang ba la skye 'gag sogs kyi rang 
bzhin mam pa bcad pa tsam gyi stong pa la nam mIcha la bu'i stong nyid/ / 
79 Trans. by Thanissaro Bhikkhu. Cited in The Mind Like Fire Unbound, Part Two: Chapter 1, p. 
8. 
8° See Rohitassa Sutta, AN IV.45 (trans. by Thanissaro Bhikkhu), 13. 1. 
81 Cited in The Mind like Fire Unbound, Part Two: Chapter 1 (trans. by Thanissaro 
82 Ibid. 
Upasiva-manava-pucchti, Sn V6 (trans. by Thanissaro Bhildchu), p.1. 
Lam rim chen mo, p. 742: de nas rang bzhin gyis stong yang rang bzhin du snang ba'i gzugs 
sogs kyi snang ba 'char ba la sgyu ma lta bu'i stong nyid ces sngon gyi mkhas pa mams 
gsungs so// 
85 For a detail analysis on this subject see mithan zur Pad ma rGyal tshan, Zab don mig 'byed, 
pp. 353-360. In particular note the following statement (p. 357):gang gi tshe chos nyid la ltos 
te ji lta ba mldiyen pa'i yeshes su song ba de'i tshe blo de'i ngor gnyis su snang ba thams cad 
nye bar zhi bas yeshes de chu la chu bzhag ba bzhin du ro gcig tu zhugs pa yin la/ /gang gi 
tshe chos can la ltos te ji snyad pa mlchyen par song pa de'i tshe/ /yul can so sor snang ba'i 
gnyis snang yod kyang/ gnyis snang lchrul ba'i bag chags drungs phyung bas snang yul las 
ma 'Ichrul ba'i snyis snang yin gyi/ fIchrul pa'i gnyis snang med te 'de... / / 
86 Paccaya Sutta, SN XII.20 (trans. by Thanissaro Bhildchu), p. 2. 
87 Lam rim chen mo (contd from the note 84), p. 743: de'i gnad shes na mnyam gzhag tu nam 
mIcha' lta bu'i stong nyid sgoms pas de'i stobs kyis rjes thob tu sgyu ma lta bu'i stong nyid 
'char ba'i tshul mams legs pa shes par 'gyur ro/ / 
88 For a detailed analysis on this issue see rGyal tshab de, bDen gnyis rnam gzhag, pp. 138-140; 
mIthan zur Pad ma rGyal tshan, Zab don mig 'byed, pp. 357-368; 'byams dbyang bZhad pa, 
Grub mtha' rnam bshad, pp. 896-899 and mKhas grub de (see Cabezon, A Dose of Emptiness), 
pp. 380-386. 
89 rTsa she pk chen, p. 420: ji lta ba dang ji snyed pa mIchyen pa'i yeshes kyang ngo bo tha mi 
dad pas sangs rgyas kyi yeshes gcig gis kyang shes bya kun la kyab par bshad pa dang yang 
mi 'gsal tell 
Parivatta Sutta, SN XXII.56 (trans. by Thanissaro Bhildchu), p. 1. 
Parivatta Sutta, SN XXII.56 (trans. by Thanissaro Bhildchu), p. 1. 
'Cited from Buddhaghosa, Visuddhimagga, p. 809. 
93 Ibid. 
In the Parivatta Sutta, SN XXII.56 (trans. by Thanissaro Bhilckhu, p. 1), the Buddha says: 
"What is form? The four great existents [the earth property, the liquid property, the fire 
property, and the wind properly] and the form derived from them: this is called form. From 
the origination of nutriment comes the origination of form. From the cessation of nutriment 
comes the cessation of form". 
95 Parivatta Sutta, SN XMI.56 (trans. by Thanissaro Bhildchu), p. 1. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Upanisa Sutta, SN MI.23 (trans. by Thanissaro Bhildcu), p. 1. 
" Ibid. 
99 Rohitassa Sutta, AN IV.45 (trans. by Thanissaro Bhildchu), p. 1. 
NOTES AND TIBETAN CITATIONS 	 Page 388 
For detail enumerations of the seven-sets of the thirty-seven factors of enlightenment see 
the Sanskrit and Tibetan versions in the Dharmasaiiigrahall of Acarya Nagajuna, pp. 23-27. For 
a detailed exposition of the Pali version, see Mahathera Ledi Sayadaw, The Manuals of 
Dhamma, pp. 152-198; and Thanissaro Bhildchu, The Wings to Awakening, pp. 58-187. 
'°' In the Ariyapariyesana Sutta MN XVI, the Buddha tells us that he learned the eight 
absorptions (Pali jhanas) from Mara Kalama and Uddaka Ramaputta, so it is clear that the 
meditative absorptions are pre-Buddhist practices known to the Hindu faith. 
102 See below a comprehensive version of the Buddha's declaration recorded by U Na in 
'Three Fundamental Concepts': "Monks! There are four Satipatthanas. The path which is 
constituted by these four Satipatthanas, is the only path that will lead beings to purity of 
mind. This is the only path that will lead beings to liberation from tribulation and grief. This 
is the only path that will lead beings to extinction of bodily and mental suffering. This is the 
only path that will lead beings to achievement of maggas. This is the only path that will lead 
beings to the realisation of nibbana". See U Na, The Ten Sutta from Digha Nikaya, pp. 468-469. 
Mahaparinibbana Sutta, DN 16. Some modification are made in the translation of Sister 
Vajira & Francis Story. 
'°' 	sDe dGe Nyingma Edition, book no. 12, vol. Ka, 144b: Sari bu rigs kyi bu'am rigs kyi 
bu mo gang la la shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa zob mo'i spyad pa spyod par 'dod pa des 
'de ltar rnam par lta bar bya ste/ phung po nga po de dag kyang/ rang bzhin gyis stong par 
rnam par yang dag par rjes su lta'o/ gzugs stong pa'o/ /stong pa nyid gzugs so/ /stong pa 
nyid las kyang bzugs gzhan ma nyin no/ de bzhin du tshor ba dang/ 'du shes dang/ 'du 
byed dang/ rnam par shes pa rnams stong pa'o/ äri bu de ltar chos thams cad stong pa 
nyid de/ mtshan nyid med pa/ ma skyes pa/ ma 'gags pa/ dri ma med pa/ dri ma dang 
dral ba bri ba med gang ba med pa'o/ ...Sari bu/ byang chub sems dpa' sems dpa' chen pos 
de ltar shes kyi pha rol tu phyin pa zab mo la bslab par bya'o/ / I have borrowed the 
translation of this passage from Lopez, Elaborations of Empptiness, p. vii. 
Ibid., 144b: (contd) legs so legs so/ rigs kyi bu/ de de bzhin no/ rigs kyi bu de de bzhin te/ 
ji ltar kyod kyis bstan pa bzhin du shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa zab mo la spyad pa bya 
ste/ de bzhin gshegs pa rnams kyang rjes su yid rang ngo// 
186 For a detail list and their description, see Jones, The Maluivastu vol. I, pp. 134-140. 
1°7 For a detail list, see Tsepak Rigzin, Tibetan-English Dictionary, pp. 221-222. 
188 For a detail list see Ibid., pp. 165-166. 
108 See Jones, Mahavastu vol. I, the section on 'Attributes of the Buddhas', pp. 126-127; 
Nagajuna, Dharmasathgrahak pp.41-42; and Candrakirti, Madhyamaktivatara, pp. 209-210. 
no See Jones, The Malovastu vol. I, the section on 'Attributes of the Buddhas', pp. 127-128. 
Also see Nagajuna, Dharmasathgrahali, pp. 43-44. 
111 For a detail exposition on the ten Bodhisattva Bhamis see Huntington, The Emptiness of 
Emptiness, pp. 149-196. 
112 Brahmapla sutta, DN 1 (trans. by Thanissaro Bhildchu). Cited in his article: 'No-self or Not-
self?' p. 6. 
113 Mtilapariyaya Sutta, MN. 1 (trans. by Thanissaro Bhilckhu), p. 4. 
114 Yamalca Sutta, SN XXII.85 (trans. by Thanissaro Bhildchu), p. 2. 
115 Anuradha Sutta, SN )0(11.86 (trans. by Thanissaro Bhildchu), p. 2. 
116 Aggi-Vacchaotta Sutta, MN 72 (trans. by Thanissaro Bhildchu), p. 2. 
117 Great Disciples of the Buddha, p. 267. 
118 Ibid. 
119 Ibid.. 
no ibid . 
121 mid. 
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Maha-Nidana Sutta, DN 15 (trans. by Thanissaro Bhildchu), p. 1. 
123 The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way, p. 276. 
124 Ibid. 
Malamadhyamakakarika, p. 55:phung min phung po las gzhan min/ /de la phung med de 
der med/ /de bzhin gshegs pa phung ldan min/ de bzhin gshegs pa gang zhig yin /xxii:1 / 
126 The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way, p. 279. 
127 Mulamadhyamakakarika, p. 57:rang bzhirt gis ni stong de la/ /sangs rgyas mnya ngan 
'das nas ni/ /yod do zhes 'am med do zhes/ /bsam pa 'thad pa nyid med 'gyur /xxii:14/ 
Notes on Conclusion 
1 Malamadhyamakakarilca of Nagarjuna, p. 366. 
2 Madhyamakakarika, p.167: tha snyad bden pa thabs su 'gyur ba dang/ /don dam bden pa 
thabs byung 'gyur pa ste/ ... 18/ 
Buddhism and Society, p. 68. 
4 The Nature of Buddhist Ethics, p. 107. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid., p. 112. 
7 Ibid., p. 107. 
Translated by Homer. Cited in Keown, The Nature of Buddhist Ethics, p. 92. 
Dhamma and Non-duality, p. 3. 
10 The Tibetan Book of Living and Dying. p. 165. Curiously, Sogyal Rinpoche seems to be 
suggesting that even buddhas—the greatest yogis suffer from mental agonies. It is a 
commonly accepted fact that even a fully enlightened being is subjected to physical 
discomforts. Throughout Pali suttas we encounter occasions when the Buddha sustained a 
back ache [AN IV. 358-359], fell ill with intestinal wind [AN 1.174], and had his foot pierced 
by a stone splinter [SN I. 27], etc., and in each instance there was accompanying physical 
pain. But never was there an emotional reaction or psychological discomfort resulting from 
the pain. It is indeed very odd to claim that they suffer from mental agonies. Mental agonies, 
according to Buddhist psychology, arise due to mental defilements. Not only are buddhas, 
but also aryas, and arahats totally free from defilements. Buddhas especially have eradicated 
even the predisposition or remnants of defilement. This is one of the fundamentals of 
Buddhist psychology. So by claiming that buddhas experience sorrow and joy, Sogyal 
Rinpoche inadvertently suggests that buddhas are deluded beings. Surely such a view has no 
justification whatsoever. It fundamentally undermines the basic principles pertaining to 
Buddhist psychology, ethics, and soteriology. Compare Sogyal Rinpoche's claim with the 
following discourses of the Buddha: "Disenchantment, monks, also has supporting 
condition, I say, it does not lack a supporting condition. And what is the supporting 
condition for disenchantment? 'The knowledge and vision of things as they really are should 
be the reply' [Upanisa Sutta, SN X11.23]. The Buddha further clarifies this: "The destruction 
of the cankers, monks, is for one who knows and sees, I say, not for one who does not know 
and does not see. Knowing, seeing what does the destruction of the cankers occur? 'Such is 
material, such is the arising of material form, such is the passing away of material form. Such 
is feeling...perception...mental formations. ..consciousness; such is the arising of 
consciousness, such is the passing away of consciousness'—for one who knows and sees this, 
monks, the destruction of the cankers occurs" [Upanisa Sutta, SN XII.23]. 
Dhamma and Non-duality, p. 3. 
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12 In Hope of Nibbana, p. 67. 
13 Ibid. 
14 The Nature of Buddhist Ethics, p. 113. 
15 Cited in Keown's The Nature of Buddhist Ethics, p. 113. 
16 Ibid., p. 114. 
17 Ibid. 




22 Ibid., p.113. 
23 Mahaparinibbana Sutta in the Ten Suttas from Digha Nikaya, p. 253. 

































view of substantial 'I' and 
'Mine' principle 






reality, true nature, things 
as they are 
ultimate truth 
provisional meaning 
as it is, as they are 




'jig rten grags pa 
'jig rten gyi tha snyad 
'jig rten las 'das pa 
'jig rten las 'das 
yeshes 
'jig rten ma yin pa 
'jig rten pa 
'jig tshog la lta ba 





don dam bden pa 
drang don 
ji lta ba 
ji snyed pa 
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'jig rten kun rdzob/ yang 
dag kun rdzob 
'jig rten ma yin pa'i kun 
rdzob/ log pa'i kun 
rdzob 
'jig rten pa'i shes pa 
kun nas nyon mongs pa'i 
chos 
kun rdzob bden pa 
log pa'i kun rdzob 
ma rig pa 
mnyam gzhag yeshes 
nges don 
nmyam gzhag 
nyon mongs can gyi ma 
rig pa 
nyon mongs can ma yin 
pa'i ma rig pa 
rang bzhin/ rang gi ngo 
bo 
rang gzhin/ gtso bo 
rjes thob 















































sgro brtags pa 
shes bya 
ngo bo gcig 
tha snyad bden pa 
ldog pa tha dad 
yang dag kun rdzob 
yul 
yul can 
rang gi mtshan nyid 
rang gi mtshan nyid kyis 
grub pa 
rang gi mtshan yid kyi 
yod pa 
kun rdzob tsam 
byis pa, so skye 



















knowable, object of 
knowledge 
'single ontological identity' 










existence by way of self-
defining characteristic 
mere conventionality 
childish, ordinary being 
perceivers of falsity 
conceived object: a referent 
object of the conception of 
self etc. 
appearing 	object: 
appearing object of 
thought 
project, fabricate, impute, 
snang yul/rtog pa'i pratibhasa visya 
snang yul 
brtags pa 	 vijriapti 
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rten cing 'brel bar 'byung pratityasamutpada 
ba 
so so skye bo 	 prthagjana 





eighteen cognitive spheres 
six sense powers 
twelve sources of 
perception 
wisdom realising reality as 
it is is 
wisdom realising empirical 
phenomenal as they are 
wisdom realising ultimate 








free 	from 	verbal 




subtle predisposition of 
misconception of dualistic 
phung po lnga 	patica skandhah 
lchams bco brgyad, 	astadaya dhatu 
dbang po drug sad indriyan 
skye mched bcu gnyis, 	dvadaja ayatanani 
ji lta ba mkhyen pa'i 
yeshes 
ji snyed pa mIchyen pa'i 
yeshes 
don dam mkhyen pa'i 
yeshes 
kun rdzob mkhyen pa'i 
yeshes 
spros pa 	 praparica 
(pall) paparica 





de bzhin nyid 








thos byung shes rab 
bsam byung shes rab 
sgom byung gyi shes rab 
gnyis snang 
lhag mthong 
'dus shes med pa'i 
snyoms 'jug 
rten cing 'brel bar byung 
ba'i chos 


























direct knowledge, direct 
awareness 
valid verbal testimony 
analogy, paradigm 
sphere of ultimate reality 
non-conceptual 
conceptual 
wisdom arisen from 
hearing 
wisdom arisen from 
conceptual analysis 
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I have strictly avoided translating any Tibetan names into English. I seriously 
belief that the translation of Tibetan names into English is a bizarre practice 
which often creates more confusion. The same name is translated differently 
by different interpreters, and consequently one Tibetan name ends up having 
several English versions. Throughout my thesis, I have retained the original 
Tibetan names although I employed their abbreviated forms. The following 
list contains most of the names of the Tibetan texts appearing in the 
dissertation and they appear in 'Wylie' transliterated forms. 
Abbreviated forms 	 Full forms 
'Jug pa'i dka' gnad 
bDag med sgrub rigs 
bDen gnyis gnas 'jug 
bDen gnyis rnam gzhag 
bDen gnyis rnam gzhag 
akya mChog idan, dBu ma 'jug pa'i dka' ba'i 
gnad rnam par bshad pa ku mud phren 
mrdzes 
akya mChog ldan, Theg pa chen po dbu ma 
rnam par nges pa'i bang mdzod lung rigs 
rgya mtsho las bdag med sgrub rigs le'u 
brgyad pa 
akya mChog ldan, bDen pa gyis kyi gnas la 
'jug pa nges don bdud rtsi'i thigs pa 
akya mChog ldan, Theg pa chen po dbu ma 
rnam par nges pa'i bang mdzod lung rigs 
rgya mtsho las bden pa gnyis kyi rnam bzhag 
le'u bzhi pa 
rGyal tshab rJe, bden gnyis kyi rnam gzhag 
clang lta ba'i 'Ichrid yig rin po che'i phrin pa 
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bDu 'jug rnam bshad 
bKa' gdams bces btus 
Red mda ba, bDu ma 'jug pa'i rnam bshad de 
kno na nyid gsal ba'i sgron ma 
Potowa, Legs par bshad pa bka' gdams rin po 
che'i gsungs gi gces btus nor bu'i bang 
mdzod. 
brGal lan nyin byed snang ba Mi pham, brGal lan nyin byed snang ba 
bShes spring 'grel ba 	Red mda ba, bShes pa'i spring yig gi 'grel pa 
don gsal 
bad rgya'i 'grel ba 	Red mda ba, bDu ma bzhi brya ba'i 'grel pa 
D'ag brgyud grub pa'i shing rta 	Mi skyod rDo rje, dbu ma la 'jug pa'i 
mam bshad dpal ldan lus gsum mkhyen pa'i 
zhal lung d'ag rgyud grub pa'i shing rta 
Dam chos dogs sel 
dBu 'jug mam bshad 
dBu ma'i 'byung tshul 
dBu ma'i phan yon 
Mi pham, rDo grub pa dam chos zhes pas 
gzhan gyi zer sgros bsdus nas mkhas su re 
ba'i 'Ichyar ngag de dag ml mkhas mtshang 
phud du kho rang nas skul ba bzhin nyams 
mtshar du bkod pa 
akya mChog ldan, dBu ma lug pa'i mam 
bshad nges don gn.ad kyi tika 
akya mChog ldan, dBu ma'i byung tshul 
mam par bshad pa'i gtam yid bzhin lhun po 
akya mChog ldan, Theg pa chen po dbu ma 
mam par nges pa'i bang mdzod lung rigs 
rgya mtsho las 'bras bu sku gnyis zung 'jug 
le'u bcu gcig pa dang dbu ma'i phan yon 
bstan pa'i le'u bcu gnyis pa 
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dBu rtsa'i 'grel ba 
dBu rtsa'i mchan 'grel 
dBu rtsa'i mam bshad 
dBu tsa'i mam bshad 
dDu ma'i lta khrid 
dGongs pa rab gsal 
dKa' gnas brgyad bshad 
Don dam mam bshad 
dPyod 'jug tshig 'grel 
Drang nges 
Maja byang chub rTson 'grus, dBu ma rtsa ba 
shes rab kyi 'grel ba 'thad pa'i rgyan 
Mipham, dBu ma rtsa ba'i mchan 'grel gnas 
lugs rab gsal 
akya mChog ldan, dBu ma rtsa ba'i rnam 
bshad skal bzang 'jug ngogs 
Rong ston, dBu ma tsa ba'i rnam bshad zab 
mo'i di kho na nyid snang ba 
Rong ston, dDu ma'i lta khrid kyi bsdus don 
snying po'e gsal byed. 
Tsong khapa, bDu ma dgongs pa rab gsal 
Tsong khapa, rTsa ba shes rab kyi dka' gnas 
chen po brgyad kyi bshad pa 
•alcya mChog ldan, Theg pa chen po dbu ma 
mam par nges pa'i bang mdzod lung rigs 
rgya mtsho las don dam mam bshad le'u 
drug pa 
Kun bzang dPal dan, Byang chub sems pa'i 
dpyod pa la 'jug pa'i tshig 'grel 'jam dbyangs 
bla ma'i zhal lung bdud tsi'i thig pa 
dGe shes Yeshes Thabs mkhas, Shar 
Tsongkhapa's drang ba dand nges pa'i don 
mam par `byed pa'i bstan bcos legs bshad 
snying po 
Gang zag bdag med 	.akya mChog ldan, Theg pa chen po dbu ma 
mam par nges pa'i bang mdzod lung rigs 
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rgya mtsho las gang zag bdag med le'u bdun 
pa 
Grub mtha' kun shes 	sTag tsang, Grub mtha' kun shes nas mtha' 
bral sgrub pa zhes bya ba'i bstan cos 
Grub mtha' mdzes rgyan 1Cang skya, Grub mtha' thub stan lhun po'i 
mdzes rgyan 
Grub mtha' mdzod 	kLong chen, Grub mtha' rin chen mrdzod 
Grub mtha'i mam bshad 	sTag tsang Lotsa ba, Grub mtha' kun shes nas 
mtha' bral sgrub pa zhes bya ba'i stan cos 
mam par bshad pa legs bshad rgya mtsho 
Grub mtha'i mam bshad Jamyang bZhad pa, Grub mtha'i mam bshad 
kun bzang zhing gi nyima 
gZung gsum gsal byed 	Kun mkhyen Padkar, dBu ma'i gzung gsum 
gsal bar byed pa nges don grub pa'i shing rta 
gZung lugs legs bshad 	Sa pan, gZhung lugs legs par bshad pa'i 
bstan bcos 
kLu grub dgongs rgyan 	dGe 'dun Chos 'phel , dBu ma'i zab gnad 
snying por dril ba'i legs bshad klu sgrub 
dgongs rgyan 
Kurt rdzob bden pa'i mam bshad 	fticya mChog ldan, Theg pa chen po 
dbu ma mam par nges pa'i bang mdzod lung 
rigs rgya mtsho las kun rdzob bden pa'i mam 
bshad le'u lnga pa 
Lam rim chen mo 	Tsong khapa, Byang chub lam gyi rim pa 
chen mo. 
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Las thabs shes bzung 'jub 	akya mChog ldan, Theg pa chen po dbu ma 
mam par nges pa'i bang mdzod lung rigs 
rgya mtsho las thabs shes bzung 'jub le'u bcu 
pa 
Legs bshad snying po 	Tsong khapa, Drang ba dang nges pa'i don 
mam par 'byed pa'i bstan bcos legs bshad 
snying po 
1Ta ba'i 'od zer 
1Ta ba'i gnas 
Rigs lam rab gsal 
Go rampa, dBu ma rtsa ba'i shes rab kyi mam 
pa bshad pa yang dag lta ba'i 'od zer 
akya mChog ldan, Theg pa chen po dbu ma 
mam par nges pa'i bang mdzod lung rigs 
rgya mtsho las lta ba'i gnas le'u dgu pa 
Go rampa, 1Ta ba'i shen 'byed theg mchog 
gnad gyi zla zer 
Go rampa, dBu ma spyi don nges don rab 
gsal 
Mi pham, Nges shes rin po che' sgron me 
Candrakirti, 
Malamadhyamakavrttiprasannapada 
Mi pham, gZhan gyis brtsad pa'i Ian mdor 
bsdus pa rigs lam rab gsal de nyid snang 
byed 
1Ta ba'i shan 'byed 
Nges don rab gsal 
Nges shes sgron me 
Prasannapada 
Rigs tsogs dka' gnad 	Rong ston, dBu ma rigs pa'i tsogs kyi dka' 
ba'i gnad stan pa rigs lam kun gsal 
rTen 'brel stod pa 	Tsong khapa, rTen 'brel stod pa legs bshad 
snying po 
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rTs shes tilc chen 
sDom gsum rab dbye 
sGom rim 'Ichrul spong 
Shes 'grel ke ta ka 
Shes rab ral gri 
Tsong khapa, rTsa shes tilc chen rigs pa'i 
mgrya mtso. 
Sa part, sGom gsum rab tu dbye ba'i stan 
bcos 
akya mChog ldan, dBu ma chen po'i sgom 
rim lchrul spong dbyangs kyi mga sgra 
Mi pham, Shes rab le'ui 'grel pa ke ta ka 
Mi pham, Don mam par nges pa shes rab ral 
gri 
Shes rab snying po'i mam bshad 	Rong ston, Shes rab sying po'i mam 
bshad yum don rab gsal 
Zia ba'i zhal lung 
fticya mChog ldan, Zab mo spros bral gyi 
bshad pa stong nyid bdud rtsi'i lam po che 
Thub bstan Chos grags, sPyod 'jug gi 'grel 
bshad rgyal sras yon tan bum bzang 
mKhas grub de, dBu ma'i stong thun skal 
bzang mig 'byed 
akya mChog ldan , sTong thun chung ba 
dbang po'i rdu rje blo gsal mgu byed 
Sa part, 'Thub pa'i dgongs pa rab tu gsal ba 
mKhensur Padma rGyal tshan, Zab don 
gdams pa'i mig 'byed gser gyi thu ma 
Mi pham, dBu ma 'jug pa'i 'grel pa zla ba'i 
zhal lung dri med she! phreng. 
sPros bral bshad pa 
sPyod 'jug 'grel bzhad, 
Stong thun chen mo 
sTong thun chung ba 
'Thub pa dgongs gsal 
Zab don mig 'byed 
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Tibetan Tripitaka 
sDe dGe Nyingma Edition The Nyingma Edition of the sDe dGe bKa"gyur 
and bsTan 'gyur. 1981 (ed.). USA: Dharma 
Publishing. 
sDe dGe Pajor Edition 	sDe dGe Edition of bKa"gyur and bsTan 'gyur. 
n.d. (ed.). The Tasmanian University 
Collection, Dharamsala: Paljor Press. 
Toh: 	 A Complete Catalogue of Tohuku University 
Collection of Tibetan Works on Buddhism. 1934 
and 1953 (ed.). Sendai, japan: Prof. Yensho 
Kanakura. 
Tokyo-Kyoto Edition 	Tibetan Tripitaka. 1959 (ed.). Tokyo-Kyoto: 
Tibetan Tripitaka Research Foundation. 
Päli Tipitak 
AN 	 Anguttara Nikaya (trans. by Thanissaro 
Bhildthu). 
Dhp 	 Dhammapada: A practical Guide to Right 
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